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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have attracted great attention not
only in industry but also in academia due to their enormous applica-
tion potential and unique security challenges. A typical sensor network
can be seen as a combination of a number of low-cost sensor nodes
which have very limited computation and communication capability,
memory space, and energy supply. The nodes are self-organized into a
network to sense or monitor surrounding information in an unattended
environment, while the self-organization property makes the networks
vulnerable to various attacks.
Many cryptographic mechanisms that solve network security problems
rely directly on secure and efficient key management making key man-
agement a fundamental research topic in the field of WSNs security.
Although key management for WSNs has been studied over the last
years, the majority of the literature has focused on some assumed vul-
nerabilities along with corresponding countermeasures. Specific appli-
cation, which is an important factor in determining the feasibility of the
scheme, has been overlooked to a large extent in the existing literature.
This thesis is an effort to develop a key management framework and
specific schemes for WSNs by which different types of keys can be
established and also can be distributed in a self-healing manner; ex-
plicit/implicit authentication can be integrated according to the security
requirements of expected applications. The proposed solutions would
provide reliable and robust security infrastructure for facilitating secure
communications in WSNs.
There are five main parts in the thesis. In Part I, we begin with an intro-
duction to the research background, problems definition and overview
of existing solutions. From Part II to Part IV, we propose specific solu-
tions, including purely Symmetric Key Cryptography based solutions,
purely Public Key Cryptography based solutions, and a hybrid solution.
While there is always a trade-off between security and performance,
analysis and experimental results prove that each proposed solution can
achieve the expected security aims with acceptable overheads for some
specific applications. Finally, we recapitulate the main contribution of
our work and identify future research directions in Part V.
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Recent advances in tiny microprocessors, low-power circuit designs, and radio tech-
nologies have made a new technological vision referred to as “Wireless Sensor
Networks (WSNs)” possible. WSNs generally consist one or several sinks (base
stations) and perhaps tens of thousands of sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are
equipped with low-cost sensing devices, a mini processor, and a battery-powered
module. Although the price and size of sensors vary according to applications, the
price of a general sensor is less than one US$ and the size would be a few cubic
millimeters. When large quantities of sensors are scattered in a physical space, they
are self-organized into a new form of network with sinks as interfaces to remote end
users.
The typical tasks for WSNs could be sensing or monitoring physical phenom-
ena, such as temperature, light, pressure, radiation, etc. from the surrounding envi-
ronments. Sensor nodes report the crude data or aggregated data to the sink. The
sink makes decisions according to the aggregated data and in turn can inject com-
mands into the network to assign tasks to sensors. However, except for some com-
mon threats, WSNs are additionally vulnerable to other security breaches because
they are usually deployed in unattended environments and use unreliable radio com-
munication. Due to various attacks, end users may receive incorrect sensing data
and correspondingly make wrong decisions, which may be dangerous in scenar-
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ios such as battlefield surveillance and environment monitoring. Therefore, proper
security mechanisms have to be used in order to keep networks secure.
In Section 1.2, we introduce the background to this research, including the clas-
sification, application, constraints, vulnerabilities, security requirements of WSNs,
and current hot research topics in WSN security. In Section 1.3, we identify our
motivation for carrying out this research. In Section 1.4, we clearly define the re-
search scope and highlight the areas that will be addressed in this thesis. In Section
1.5, we list the general objectives of the thesis. In Section 1.6, we summarize the
significance of this research. In Section 1.7, we outline the main structure of thesis.
Finally, we conclude this chapter in Section 1.8.
1.2 Background of the Research
1.2.1 Classification of WSNs
WSNs can be classified by their architectures into two categories: hierarchical
networks and distributed networks [8]. A hierarchical wireless sensor network
(HWSN) which is shown in Figure 1.1 typically consists of a large number of low-
cost sensor nodes (L-nodes), a few powerful nodes (we alternatively call them H-
nodes or cluster heads in this thesis), and a base station. In contrast, a distributed
wireless sensor network (DWSN) which is shown in Figure 1.1 contains only L-
nodes. In an HWSN, only the base station and H-nodes manage the network. The
base station is usually assumed to be trusted. H-nodes are responsible for cluster
management. The effect of nodes addition and revocation operations can be local-
ized into one or several clusters. In addition, because only H-nodes bear the respon-
sibility of aggregating and transmitting data to the base station, the L-nodes can be
equipped with simple hardware. In a DWSN, since each node has to be capable
of aggregating and forwarding data, it is necessary for each node to have complex
hardware. In addition, DWSNs are not practical in many applications where strict
ranks exist, such as in the military. In contrast, HWSNs take advantage of node di-
versity and have better scalability. Therefore, HWSNs are more applicable in some
practical scenarios.
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Figure 1.1: The distributed and hierarchical wireless sensor network topologies
1.2.2 Application of WSNs
WSNs are event-driven networks widely used for military and civilian operations.
One of the key advantages of WSNs is that they are potentially low-cost solutions to
a variety of real-world challenges. Sensors can be deployed to continuously report
environmental data for a long period of time. This is a very important improve-
ment with respect to previous operating conditions where human operators had to
move to the fields and take manual measurements periodically, resulting in less
data, higher errors, higher costs and non-negligible interference with life conditions
of the observed species. WSNs can reduce or eliminate the need for human involve-
ment in information gathering in certain applications, including agriculture, health,
environment, military, etc. [9].
In agricultural application, sensors are scatted over a large tract of farmland to
test any changes in water or chemicals. If the fertility points are below the require-
ment, the farmer can obtain the information from sensors. Correspondingly, the soil
would be fertilized appropriately. Sensors can also be used to monitor the nutrition
and health indexes of cattle on farms. Wireless sensor networks can accurately re-
port animal species and collect data concerning their habits, population, or position
to farmers.
The development of cross-disciplinary networking within various medical fields
makes in-home pervasive networks possible. For example, one of the projects un-
dertaken by the Laboratory for Assisted Cognition Environments at University of
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Washington is concerned with the continuous medical monitoring of degenerative
diseases like Alzheimer, Parkinson, or similar cognitive disorders [10]. The medical
networks may assist residents by continuously monitoring physiological parameters
such as heartbeat or blood pressure of patients, and reporting to the hospital when
any parameters are altered or an emergency occurs [11].
There are numerous examples of environment monitor applications of WSNs.
Sensors can be installed on bridges or buildings to collect data about earthquake vi-
bration patterns. They are used to detect marine ground floor erosion because wired
facilities cannot research the deeply embedded points. Pollution detection systems
can also benefit from WSNs. Sensors are deployed to monitor the current levels
of polluting substances in a town or a river and identify the source of anomalous
situations, if any. Similar detection systems can be employed to monitor rain and
water levels and forecast flooding [12].
The military can also take advantage of sensor network technology. They can
deploy such networks behind enemy lines and observe movements/presence of troops
and/or collect geographical information on the deployment area [13]. In addition,
sensor networks can be used to detect any signs of life in rescue activities.
1.2.3 Constraints of WSNs
Sensor nodes are low-cost and have very limited resources. These nodes are usually
scattered randomly in a designated field and self-organized into a network after the
deployment. Sensor nodes are usually densely deployed in unattended and even
harsh environments and the scale of WSNs varies from hundreds to thousands of
sensor nodes. The topology of WSNs may frequently change due to the mobility
of nodes in some applications. Wireless channels are open and unreliable and may
suffer from many kinds of attacks. The transmission of data packets may be delayed
or they may not reach their destination at all. Indeed, security challenges in WSNs
stem from these constraints. Here we examine a number of constraints which make
the design of security mechanisms for wireless sensor networks more complicated
and challenging. In order to facilitate understanding, we categorize the constraints
into device constraints, communication constraints, and deployment constraints.
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Figure 1.2: The components of a typical sensor node
Device Constraints
A typical sensor node/device comprises four basic components (as shown in Figure
1.2): a sensing unit, a processing unit, a transceiver unit, and a power unit [14].
• Sensing unit. Sensing unit is usually composed of two subunits: sensor and an
analog-to-digital converter (ADC) [14]. The sensor produces analog signals
of the observed physical phenomenon and the ADC converts the measure-
ments into digital signals which are further processed by the processing unit.
• Processing unit. As a part of its processing unit, it has processor, memory,
and I/O components. The main function of this unit is to analyze and process
sensor data.
• Transceiver unit. A transceiver unit transmits and receives data. It connects a
sensor node to a network.
• Power unit. Power unit of sensor node is typically a battery or may be sup-
ported by power scavenging units such as solar cells [14].
Current sensor nodes are tiny devices with very limited resources and unrecharge-
able battery. Therefore, the complicated and resource-consuming security algo-
rithms used in other networks cannot be used to protect WSNs. The security solu-
tions designed for sensor networks should take into consideration of the following
device constraints.
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• Limited memory. MICA2 is a widely used sensor node with 128KB program
memory and 4KB RAM. Such limited memory requires short software code
and communication packets. The total code space of TinyOS, which is a
specialized operating system for programming with a small embedded device,
is approximately 4KB [15].
• Limited energy. MICA2 is powered by only two AA batteries. Energy usage
is another major constraint to consider when designing security mechanisms
for WSNs. Since sensor nodes are usually powered by batteries so that they
are physically small and economical, the unattended deployment environment
makes replacing the batteries impracticable. Thus, it is very important to keep
energy consumption at a reasonable level as increased expenditure of energy
may decrease overall network performance.
• Limited processor. MICA2 has a 8-bit ATmega128L CPU. Except for the
constraints of the processor itself, the data processing capability is constrained
by limited energy.
Communication Constraints
Sensor nodes in WSNs communicate over wireless channels which can be accessed
by anyone within the cover range. This openness feature of wireless communication
makes security an important issue. In addition, wireless channels are unreliable and
heavily affected by environmental conditions. This property calls for fault-tolerant
countermeasures.
• Unreliable channels and limited bandwidth. Wireless communication chan-
nels are inherently unreliable. They are susceptible to various abnormalities,
such as channel error and congestion, which can cause the packets to be tam-
pered with or lost. More serious situations occur if the channels are intention-
ally interfered with adversaries’ radio signals. The limited bandwidth makes
the transmission of large blocks of data over a wireless channel impossible.
• Collision. WSNs are susceptible to packet collision in the wireless channel
as they utilize a dense arrangement of nodes. Collisions happen when two or
more sensor nodes within communication range of each other transmit pack-
ets at the same time. The wireless protocols have to handle traffic collision as
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the retransmission of packets is impracticable due to the energy limitation of
sensor nodes [14].
• Latency. Latency arises from the nature of WSN communication, such as
multi-hop routing, network congestion, and node processing capability. This
latency makes it difficult to achieve synchronization among sensor nodes and
further impacts on WSN security in terms of event reporting and crypto-
graphic key distribution and updating.
Deployment Constraints
One of the main benefits of WSNs is their ability to collect information from public,
even potentially hostile, environments without supervision. Just as a coin has two
sides, the unattended deployment environments render WSNs vulnerable to various
types of attacks and make some physical protection measures, such as infrastructure
support and tamper-proof components, infeasible.
• Unattended environments. WSNs are usually deployed in unattended areas
open to physical attacks or harsh environments. An attacker may compromise
one or a number of sensor nodes without being noticed. In addition, extreme
natural phenomena-such as storms and flash flooding may also impede their
functioning.
• No fixed infrastructure. After deployment, sensor nodes are self-organized
into a network without support of a fixed infrastructure. Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to implement continuous surveillance after network deployment. If the
WSN is not properly designed, the self-organized network may be inefficient,
even fragile.
• Remote management. Although sensor nodes can be deployed in inaccessible
environments and managed remotely. There are disadvantages. On the one
hand, it is difficult to remotely detect attacks against WSNs , replace the bat-
teries, and redeploy cryptographic keys; on the other hand, insecure WSNs
might be used by attackers to gain access to the remote control center.
• Application-specific property. WSNs are application-specific networks. No
single security mechanism is ideal for all the scenarios where WSNs are used.
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It is impossible to design a “one-size-fits-all” solution for every different type
of application.
1.2.4 Vulnerabilities of WSNs
In general, WSNs are susceptible to various security attacks due to the aforemen-
tioned constraints. The attacks can be categorized according to different criteria,
such as the origin of attacks, or the techniques used in attacks. The attacks can be
divided into passive attacks and active attacks according to the operation mode, or
external attacks and internal attacks according to their origin [16].
Passive and active attacks
Passive attacks include eavesdropping on, or monitoring of transmissions. The
openness of the wireless communication medium makes passive attacks easier than
those in traditional wired environments. In a passive attack, the attacker merely
attempts to learn or utilize information that is being transmitted without being de-
tected. The attacker analyzes the large volume of collected information in order
to extract any secret information. Such secret information might be used later to
launch an active attack. In a passive attack, the attacker may knows the commu-
nications and follow the protocols like normal nodes. It is very difficult to detect
passive attacks because the attacker does not leave much evidence.
However, in active attacks, the attacker actively launches various attacks typi-
cally through system faults or security holes. Some of the well-known active attacks
include packet modification, injection, or replaying. The impact of active is more
severe than passive attacks. However, additional anomalies can show evidence of
malicious attacks because the attacker is actively involved in network communica-
tions [16]. Most of these attacks result in a Denial of Service, which is a degradation
of or a complete halt to network service.
External and internal attacks
Generally, all the nodes in the network can be seen as honest and cooperative en-
tities, whereas unauthorized nodes have no right to access the network. External
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attacks are carried out by an external adversary from outside the scope of the net-
work. The impact of external attack is limited if external adversaries just eavesdrop
on the public traffic. Such external attack can be easily prevented with effective
authentication techniques. However, great harm may be caused if the external ad-
versary gains access to the network as an authorized user by means of physical
attack or capturing a few legitimate nodes, replicating them and then deploying
them throughout the network. These attacks are of highly possible because WSNs
are often left unattended after deployment.
Once an attacker obtains authorization from compromised nodes which are ac-
tually part of the network, it becomes an internal attacker. In this case, the attacker
can easily launch a large class of attacks because it knows some private informa-
tion and is seen as a valid member [16]. The replicas of the compromised nodes
can be severely destructive to the functioning of a network [17]. For example, an
replica can overhear the secret passing traffic, or inject bogus data into the network,
defame other nodes and even revoke legitimate nodes [18]. Unfortunately, con-
ventional cryptographic techniques, such as encryption and authentication, are not
impregnable to internal attacks, because the internal attackers hold the legitimate
cryptographic keys.
Message-based, node-based, and network-based attacks
Li et al. in [19] classified the security requirements into three security levels:
message-based level, node-based level, and network-based level. Here, we classify
the attack goals according to whether they are message-based attacks, node-based
attacks, or network-based attacks. Message-based attacks attempt to break data con-
fidentiality, integrity and freshness. Typical message-based attacks includes eaves-
dropping attack, replay attack, and traffic analysis attack. Node-based attacks target
on the valid nodes to obtain secret information stored by the nodes and make fur-
ther attacks using the obtained information. Node compromise, node replication,
resource exhaustion, and node misbehavior are the four most common node-based
attacks. Network-based attacks try to reduce network connectivity or availabil-
ity. Network-based attacks can be launched locally or globally. The most com-
mon network-based attacks include routing attack and time synchronization attack.
These three types of attacks are not isolated from each other. Some message-based
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and node-based attacks may result in Denial of Service (DoS), which degrades a
network’s performance.
1. Message-based attacks
• Eavesdropping attack. Eavesdropping is the most common attack on
privacy. By overhearing the communication, the attacker could easily
obtain critical data such as sensing data and routing information. When
the traffic conveys the control information about the sensor network con-
figuration, which contains potentially more detailed information than is
accessible through the location server, the eavesdropping can effectively
breach privacy protection [20].
• Replay attack. Replay attack is when an adversary replays the old mes-
sages at a later time. Replay attack disrupts data freshness which is very
important, especially when shared keys need to be changed over time.
A commonly used defence is to add a nonce or time-related counter to
every message and reject messages with old nonce or counter values.
• Traffic analysis attack. Traffic analysis typically combines with moni-
toring and eavesdropping [20]. Traffic analysis attacks provide a way to
identify the network topology and special roles of some sensor nodes.
Once the structure of the targeted WSN is known, the adversary can
intentionally attack some critical nodes.
2. Node-based attacks
• Node compromise attack. Node compromise is one of the most fruit-
ful attacks on a WSN. Because sensor nodes are usually deployed in
an open area without monitoring and protection of infrastructure and
low-cost sensor nodes are not installed with tamper-proof component,
an adversary can extract all secrets from a captured sensor node. The
extracted secrets make the adversary more capable of launching other
severe attacks [16].
• Node replication attack. In the node replication attack [18], an attacker
intentionally adds replicas of a compromised node to an existing sensor
network. These replicas can produce inconsistent or severe disrupted
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ongoing network communication: packets can be corrupted or even
misrouted. A cryptographic key related defence was proposed in [21]
whereby each node uses a location-based key to detect node replication
attack.
• Resource exhaustion attack. In this attack, an adversary intends to de-
plete resources of the victim nodes. The targeted resources include bat-
tery power, bandwidth, and computational power. The attacks could be
in the form of unnecessary requests for routes, very frequent generation
of beacon packets, or forwarding of stale packets to other nodes. As a
result of the attack, the base station denies access to sensory readings
[22].
• Misbehavior. Nodes in a network misbehave when they become mali-
cious or selfish. Malicious nodes may do harm to a network. Srinivasan
et al. [23] classify malicious behavior into two types of misbehavior:
forwarding and routing. Some common forwarding misbehavior in-
cludes packet dropping, modification, fabrication, timing attacks, and
silent route changes. A malicious node with routing misbehavior at-
tacks during the route discovery. Black hole, grey hole, and worm hole
are the common routing misbehavior attacks. Selfish behavior may re-
sult in unintentionally causing damage to other nodes. The aim of a
selfish behavior node is not to launch an attack, but it may have other
aims such as wanting to obtain an unfair advantage over other nodes.
Selfish behavior is classified as either self exclusion or non-forwarding
[23]. In self-exclusion misbehavior, a selfish node does not participate
in the network. This helps the selfish node conserve its power. A non-
forwarding node behaves selfishly by simply not forwarding the packets
it receives in order to save its resources.
3. Network-based attacks
• Routing attack. Many sensor network routing protocols are so simple
that they are vulnerable to attacks. Karlof and Wang in [24] documented
a list of attacks which may be applied to compromise routing protocols
that have been proposed in the literature for WSNs. Most attacks against
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sensor network routing protocols fall into one of the categories listed in
Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Routing attacks in wireless sensor networks
Attack type Attack method
Spoofed, altered, or Create routing loop, attract or repel network traffic, extend
replayed routing or shorten source routes,generate false error messages,
information partition the network, increase end-to-end latency etc.
Selective forwarding A malicious node refuses to forward certain messages
or behaves like a black hole and refuses to forward
every packet it receives.
Sinkhole attacks Make a compromised node look especially attractive to
surrounding node with respect to the routing algorithm. It
makes selective forwarding trivial.
Sybil attacks A single node presents multiple identities to other
nodes in the network to defeat the redundancy mechanisms.
Wormhole attacks An adversary tunnels messages received in one part of
network over a low latency link and replays them in a
different part. It can be used in combination with selective
forwarding or eavesdropping.
HELLO flood attacks An adversary sends or replays a routing protocol’s HELLO
packets with more transmission power and convinces nodes in
the network that the adversary is its neighbor.
Acknowledgement An adversary can spoof link layer acknowledgement for “overhead”
spoofing address to neighboring nodes. The goal is convincing the
sender that a weak link is strong or a disabled node is alive.
• Time synchronization attack. The main goal of a time synchronization
attack is to convince the victim node that its clock is at a different time
than it actually is. In such an attack, the adversary repeatedly forges
messages to one or both end nodes. These messages carry sequence
numbers or control flags that cause the end nodes to request retrans-
mission of missed frames. If the adversary can maintain proper timing,
it can prevent the end points from exchanging any useful information,
causing them to waste energy in an endless synchronization-recovery
protocol [25].
1.2.5 Security Requirements of WSNs
Many survey papers [16, 20] examined a great number of security requirements
of WSNs. We have shown in Figure 1.2 that security requirements can be classi-
fied into three security levels: message-based level, node-based level, and network-
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based level. Here we address the security requirements according to these three
levels.
1. Message-based level. WSNs are more vulnerable to various attacks than tra-
ditional networks as sensor nodes are resource-constrained and deployed in
unattended environments. Correspondingly, WSNs have the following fun-
damental security requirements which also appear in conventional networks,
namely:
• Confidentiality, which ensures that the data, either unicast, multicast,
or broadcast messages, should be understood by the expected recipients
alone [26].
• Integrity, which ensures that the transferred message is not modified by
intermediate nodes [26].
• Authentication, which ensures that the entities with whom one commu-
nicates are the expected ones and the received data is the original one
sent by the counterparts. That is, the authentication includes authentica-
tion of both the data source and data itself [26].
• Refreshness, which ensures that content-correlative information reaches
its destination within the specified time [26].
2. Node-based level. The security services at this level deal with node addition,
revocation, as well as node compromise or failure. Security requirements at
this level includes:
• Forward secrecy: A sensor node should not be able to break the confi-
dentiality of any future messages after it leaves the network [26].
• Backward secrecy: A sensor node should not be able to break the con-
fidentiality of any previously transmitted messages before it joins the
network [26].
• Fault-tolerance: The security mechanism should continue to provide
security services in the presence of faults such as nodes compromise or
failure [26].
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• Efficiency: The storage, computation, and communication overheads in-
troduced by security mechanisms should comply with the resource con-
straint of sensor nodes.
3. Network-based level. The security requirements at this level elaborate on
the network-related issues. Securing the whole network is completely differ-
ent from securing a single sensor node. All the network parameters such as
routing, nodes’ energy consumption, communication range, network density
should be discussed correlatively [19]. The network-related security require-
ments should include the following functions:
• Survivability: The security mechanism should provide a minimum level
of service in the presence of power exhaustion or attacks. In fact, sur-
vivability means tolerating faults from a network-wide perspective.
• Scalability: The security mechanism should be able to scale when the
network needs extension after deployment.
• Self-healing: The authorized sensors can obtain the services on their
own, without requesting additional transmission from the higher level,
in case packets loss occurs during transmission.
1.2.6 Research Interest in WSN Security
In the previous subsections, we mentioned that WSNs are vulnerable to numer-
ous security threats due to their deployment environments. And due to resource
constraints of sensor nodes, traditional security mechanisms with large overheads
of computation and communication are infeasible in WSNs. Moreover the use of
WSNs must ensure that the network is protected from unauthorized access and ad-
versarial attacks. Security in WSNs is, therefore, a particularly challenging task and
attracts great interest from world-wide researchers . In this subsection, we review
the current popular research interest in WSN security. It is important to note that
we list the current hot research topics in the field of WSN security and highlight the
importance of key management in the whole security framework, rather than giving
a comprehensive coverage of existing security techniques being researched.
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Key management
Key management is one of the important security aspects of WSNs as it is crucial
for providing data authentication, confidentiality and integrity and almost all WSN
security mechanisms rely on solid encryption. Even though key management has
been intensively studied in broadcast communication and is not a unique issue to
wireless sensor networks, traditional key management techniques cannot be used
for WSNs directly or even with minor revision due to the constraints of sensor
nodes and application environments.
Symmetric Key Cryptography based techniques are attractive for WSN appli-
cation because they are energy-efficient. Symmetric keys are predistributed to sen-
sors before network deployment. After deployment, sensors perform operations of
neighbors discovery and shared key establishment to establish secure communica-
tions between them. However, due to the limited memory of sensor nodes, these
Symmetric Key Cryptography based techniques are not able to achieve both perfect
connectivity and perfect resilience for large-scale WSNs. Instead, the use of Public
Key Cryptography (PKC) would eliminate the above problem. Due to their asym-
metric property, sensors do not need to carry the predistributed keys. Any two sen-
sors can establish a secure communication channel between themselves. Because
of the key independence of each other’s public key, the capture of some sensors
will not affect the security of others. However, it is universally acknowledged that
the essential cryptographic primitives for WSN are Symmetric Key Cryptography
(e.g. RC5, RC6, AES), Message Authentication Code (MAC), and hash function
(e.g. MD5, SHA-1). Public Key Cryptography has long been considered infeasible
in WSNs due to resource constraints of sensor nodes. There is almost no quantita-
tive analysis that supports this widely accepted conclusion [19]. To the best of our
knowledge, the first challenge on common perception is the literature [27] which
proposed a hybrid authentication key establishment scheme based on Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC).
Authentication
Authentication guarantees that the entities with whom one communicates are the
expected ones and the received data is the original one sent by the counterparts.
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Generally speaking, an asymmetric key mechanism is required to authenticate mes-
sages. However, due to the resource constraints at sensor nodes, solutions based
on Public Key Cryptography (e.g. RSA) have intolerable storage and computa-
tion overheads on WSNs. Current research on authentication in WSNs focuses on
broadcast authentication.
Local broadcast is an essential service in HWSNs because the networks are de-
coupled into small clusters and each cluster has a high degree of autonomy. In an
HWSN, the base station or cluster heads broadcast commands and data within the
cluster. The authenticity of such commands and data is critical for the normal oper-
ation of WSNs [28]. In a hostile environment, if sensor nodes are convinced by the
forged or modified commands, they may operate in an inverse way, and cannot fulfill
the intended target of the network. However, providing broadcast authentication in
hierarchical WSNs is by no means a trivial task. On the one hand, PKC-based digi-
tal signatures consume too much energy to be practical in WSNs. On the other hand,
secret key cryptography based mechanisms cannot be directly applied to broadcast
authentication, since otherwise a compromised receiver can easily forge any mes-
sages from the sender [28]. Perrig et al. [2] proposed a broadcast authentication
mechanism named µTESLA. Many techniques are used to extend the capabilities
of µTESLA in [28, 29, 30]. The scheme in [29] talked about how to tailor µTESLA
to local broadcast authentication. The scheme in [28] overcomes the length limit
of the hash chain. The scheme in [30] extends µTESLA to support a multicast
scenario.
Secure routing
Routing protocols, to some extent, have received maximum attention from the re-
searchers both in wired networks and wireless networks. Therefore, most current
research primarily focuses on providing the most energy efficient routing scheme.
In WSNs, the in-network processing characteristic is one of the challenges of de-
signing a routing protocol. Intermediate nodes have access to the data. Once one
of these intermediate nodes is compromised, it can eavesdrop and even modify the
data, thus threatening the entire network. Another challenge is that it is very easy
for a single node to disrupt the entire routing protocol by simply disrupting the route
discovery process [20]. So, the routing protocols in WSNs should provide not only
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reliable delivery, but also security services.
The routing security in WSNs summarizes attacks against the current proposed
routing protocols and discusses countermeasures and design considerations for se-
cure routing protocols. The attacks can be classified into two categories: (1) Those
that try to manipulate user data directly or (2) Those that try to affect the underlying
routing topology. Both kinds of attacks can consume valuable resources to cause a
DoS attack. The author claimed that it is unlikely to find effective countermeasures
against those attacks after the design of a protocol has been completed. So, it is
crucial to consider security issues at the beginning of routing protocol design [24].
Intrusion detection
Traditional intrusion detection methods fall into two main categories: Anomaly-
based Intrusion Detection (AID) and Misuse Intrusion Detection (MID). The AID
technique assumes that intruders will demonstrate unusual system behavior com-
pared to the legitimate nodes and any unusual network behavior is an indication of
an attack. With that in mind, a profile of the system in normal use is developed
and used to evaluate the system when intruders emerge. The advantage of the AID
system is that it is able to detect previously unknown attacks. However, the AID
system has two obvious disadvantages. Firstly, it is susceptible to false positives
since it is difficult to define normal system behavior. Secondly, the AID system
has high computational cost when comparing the current system activity to the base
profile. Such high computation cost can severely impact upon the longevity of the
network.
The MID technique maintains a database of intrusion signatures. Using these
signatures, the system can easily detect intrusions on the network. This approach is
less prone to false positives but is unable to detect unknown attacks. The advantage
of this technique is that it requires less computation in order to identify intruders
as the comparison of network events with the available signatures is relatively low
cost [31].
Even though effective intrusion detection systems are essential for WSN secu-
rity, a perfect solution has not yet been devised.
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Secure data aggregation
As WSNs continue to grow in size, so does the amount of data that the WSNs
are capable of sensing. This data is collected by individual sensor nodes that have
limited storage and sensing capabilities. In order to obtain meaningful information
from this data, the raw stream of data must be securely processed first. This is
typically done using a series of aggregators which are responsible for collecting
the raw data from a subset of nodes and processing/aggregating the raw data from
the nodes into more usable data. However, these aggregators are a single point
of failure. In the event that an aggregation node is compromised, then all of the
data delivered from the WSN to the control server may be forged. The end user
may make an incorrect decision based on the forged data. Therefore, secure data
aggregation techniques should be developed for WSNs.
Wagner analyzes the resilience of existing aggregation techniques in [32], and
argues that current aggregation schemes were designed without consideration of se-
curity and that there are easy attacks against them. To date, a great number of secure
data aggregation protocols have been proposed for WSNs. Wang et al. in [26] pre-
sented a taxonomy of secure data aggregation protocols, plaintext-based protocols
and ciphertext-based data aggregation protocols. A conflict in data confidentiality
and data aggregation exists in almost all of literature. Confidentiality requires the
data to be transmitted after encryption, whereas data aggregation is usually done af-
ter decryption. Frequent encryption and decryption operations involve unacceptable
computation overhead. An alternative method is to aggregate concealed data.
Secure localization
The location information of nodes in WSNs plays a important role in understand-
ing the application environment. There are three visible advantages of knowing the
location of sensor nodes [33]. First, location information is needed to identify the
location of an event of interest, such as the location of an intruder. Second, location
awareness facilitates numerous application services. Third, location information
can assist in various system functionalities, such as geographical routing. Due to
these advantages and specific characteristics of WSNs, it is natural that secure lo-
calization in WSNs has become a major focus of research in recent years.
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Time synchronization
Time synchronization is an important component in all distributed systems, and
WSNs are no exception. With the proliferation of WSNs, time synchronization in
WSNs has attracted increasing attention in the last few years. In order to conserve
power, an individual sensor’s radio may be turned off for periods of time. Further-
more, sensors may wish to compute the end-to-end delay of a packet as it travels
between two pairwise sensors. A more collaborative sensor network may require
group synchronization for tracking applications, etc.
The authors in [34] presented an overview of the time synchronization problem
in WSNs, defining the requirements, and various issues for designing synchroniza-
tion algorithms for wireless sensor networks. The authors argue that time synchro-
nization should be multi-modal, tiered, and tunable, so that it can satisfy the diverse
needs of various sensor network applications.
Trust management
Trust management can solve some problems in WSNs that traditional cryptographic
security mechanisms cannot deal with. For example, Trust mechanisms are effec-
tive in judging the quality and reliability of sensor nodes and wireless links, data
aggregation reliability and correctness of aggregator nodes. However, it is not easy
to build a good trust model within a sensor network given the resource constraints
[20]. Many existing security mechanisms assume that a trust relationship between
nodes exists in advance. This assumption ignores the independence of sensor nodes.
Trust establishment techniques in wireless networks even in ad hoc networks are
not fresh. However these techniques cannot be applied directly to WSNs due to the
capacity of sensor nodes. The specific techniques for trust management in sensor
networks were proposed only recently. Ganeriwal et al. proposed a reputation-
based framework for a high integrity sensor network in [35]. A beta reputation
system is employed in this framework for reputation representation, updates, and
integration. The trust model in [36] presents a method of location-centric isolation
of nodes exhibiting misbehavior and trust-based routing in WSNs. The trust value
is a function of the capacity of the cryptographic suite being used. If the trust value
falls below a specific trust threshold, then the location of the node is considered
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insecure and the node is avoided when forwarding packets.
Trust management usually involves high computation overhead, so that building
an efficient scheme for resource-constrained sensor network is a very challenging
task.
1.3 Motivation of the Research
It is not easy to implement security defences in WSNs. One of the major obstacles in
deploying security on WSNs is that the current WSNs have limited computation and
communication capabilities and it is impossible to manually replace the battery due
to the unattended nature and hazardous sensing of environments. The constraints
make the provision of adequate security countermeasures even more difficult.
Key management is the provision made in a cryptography system design that is
related to key generation, key distribution, key updating, and key revocation [37].
Key management is the essential building block for most cryptographic solutions.
The proper management of cryptographic keys determines the effective use of cryp-
tography for security. Key management is built on several cryptosystems and cryp-
tographic primitives, such as PKC and MAC, and provides support to other security
mechanisms, such as authentication and secure routing. The position of key man-
agement in a security architecture is displayed in Figure 1.3, part of which has been
shown in [19].
However, the unique characteristics render the key management schemes of
wired and general wireless networks ineffective for WSNs. With that in mind,
some researchers have begun to safeguard WSNs with lightweight key manage-
ment mechanisms. Compared with general key management schemes, lightweight
key management schemes provide security support with reduced overhead and thus
are more suitable for WSNs. Although considerable developments have been made
in general key management, the research on lightweight key management is still in
its infancy. Most of the available literature follow a routine whereby they firstly
discover the potential attacks and then counteract the security problems with cor-
responding countermeasures. None of these solutions take into consideration the
specificities of WSNs in practical application terms.
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Figure 1.3: The position of key management in a security architecture
WSNs are application-specific networks. Except for some common features,
a sensor network for a specific application has some unique features and corre-
spondingly has some unique security requirements. The solution proposed for one
particular application is unlikely to be readily applicable for another environment.
Suppose a sensor network is deployed in the military surveillance environment and
another in an agricultural base; the requirements of security should be different
based on the resource that nodes possess and the risks they face. It is impossible
to reach a one-fits-all key management solution. A key management mechanism
would lose its practical value in applications when it is separated from the consid-
erations of network-related issues [19]. Our designs are driven by specific appli-
cations and their security requirements; this principle makes the designed scheme
more practical. In this work, we integrate prior research results and investigate the
open problems from the following subcategories: establishment of different types
of keys, implicit or lightweight authentication mechanism, self-healing key distri-
bution mechanism, and PKC-based or hybrid key management for WSNs.
1.3.1 Support for Different Types of Communication
Most of the key management schemes for group communication in WSNs address
only session key establishment and renewal. Almost all the key predistribution
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schemes consider only the establishment of pairwise keys between sensor nodes.
There are still several unsolved problems in the key predistribution field. For ex-
ample, path keys do not exclusively belong to two end nodes. All the intermediate
nodes on the path know the pairwise keys forwarded by them; the compromise of
a limited number of nodes may lead to the exposure of the whole key pool. Most
importantly, there is no way to establish different types of keys for different kinds of
communication requirements. A single key cannot meet different communication
requirements of WSNs, especially of HWSNs.
1.3.2 Embedding Lightweight/Implicit Authentication to Key Man-
agement
Existing authentication schemes have at least one or several of the following short-
comings: high computation or communication overhead, no resilience to nodes
compromised, delayed authentication, loose or even strict time synchronization,
and absence of scalability. Lightweight authentication and PKC-based authenti-
cation are ideal alternative options for WSNs, while the unique characteristics of
WSNs should be given full consideration. Current literature mainly talks about au-
thentication of communication content which happens after key establishment. In
fact, authentication is also vital during the process of key establishment.
1.3.3 Development of Secure and Efficient Self-healing Mecha-
nisms
Due to the nature of WSNs, they are inherently susceptible to packets loss and
nodes failure. Much current research on group management has been dedicated to
minimizing the storage, computational and communication overhead to meet scal-
ability. However, little attention has been paid to the robustness of these protocols.
Most of the current key management protocols are not designed with the capabil-
ity of tolerating failures. However, such failures may block the normal run of key
management protocols which are the building blocks of the whole security architec-
ture. Self-healing key distribution is an ideal mechanism for dealing with packets
loss in session key distribution. However some problems, such as robustness incon-
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sistence, still remain unsolved. The existing countermeasures against node failure
either make stringent assumption, or are too costly to be feasible. The node failure
tolerance property of pairwise key establishment protocols has not been addressed
to date. How to maintain a trade-off between fault-tolerance and redundancy is also
an open problem.
1.3.4 Development of PKC-based/Hybrid Key Management Mech-
anisms
Although much literature has demonstrated the feasibility of ECC-based public key
generation from the hardware or software point of view, rarely do current works pro-
posed complete key management infrastructure using PKC. Traditional key man-
agement schemes for wired network cannot be directly transplanted to HWSNs
given the unique attributes of the latter. Public Key Cryptography has incompa-
rable advantages over Symmetric Key Cryptography in key management and au-
thentication. Nevertheless, great effort has to be applied to make PKC-based key
management a reality in HWSNs.
1.4 Scope of the Research
In the previous sections, we highlighted the advantages of HWSNs over DWSNs.
Most importantly, the standards which imply the current trends of WSNs, IEEE
802.15.4b [38] and the ZigBee “enhanced” standard [13], support cluster-based op-
erations. The two standards give group support a high priority. In addition, the new
target broadcast feature that can reach a specific subset of nodes is important to key
management mechanism selection because it adds a new functional requirement.
Therefore, those purely random or pairwise keying scheme like [3] and [39] would
not be commercially viable. With that in mind, this thesis focuses on proposing key
management schemes for HWSNs. The proposed keying schemes offer broadcast
or multicast abilities and thus are much more compatible with industry trends.
It should be noted that the methodology proposed in this thesis relates purely to
the domain of key management. It encompasses cryptographic algorithms and pro-
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tocols which focus on issues involving the management of cryptographic keys: their
generation, distribution, transmission and destruction. Related topic, including al-
gorithm selection and appropriate key size, cryptographic policy, and cryptographic
module selection, are also included in this thesis. This thesis does not address the
implementation details for key generation. We assume that the key materials are
generated utilizing existing approaches presented in the literature.
Key management is not a separate component of security architecture for WSNs.
Key management provides a security infrastructure for other security services. At
the same time, it relies on other security services. Key management and other secu-
rity services together make up the security architecture of wireless sensor networks
(shown in Figure 1.3). A comprehensive consideration is compulsory when design-
ing a key management scheme for a sensor network. However, in our solutions,
we do not assume the existence of too many other security components, such as
Intrusion Diction Systems (IDS) and secure routing.
1.5 Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis focuses on key management from four perspectives, including: the es-
tablishment of different types of keys, integrating lightweight authentication, in-
volving self-healing property, and exploring the feasibility of PKC-based or hybrid
key management protocols. The aim of this thesis is to design, specify, and analyze
key management frameworks in HWSNs.
The main research objectives of this thesis are as follows:
1. We present the security requirements and challenges of WSNs. We highlight
the properties that directly affect key management protocols. The informa-
tion includes the densities and the size of network, the available hardware and
software resources, and some special knowledge that can be used in a partic-
ular real-time scenario, such as location information. We also illustrate the
performance indicators that can be used to assess specific key management
schemes. These performance parameters allow key management schemes for
the same architecture and parameter settings to be directly compared. These
parameters include the desired key connectivity, scalability, resilience, and
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computation/communication overheads. Based on the acquired information
and with a clear understanding of the challenges involved in implementing se-
curity mechanisms, one can define a threat model and then clarify the security
requirements. The security model is defined according to security require-
ments and will work as a performance metrics to evaluate the proposed key
management schemes. The development of security metrics, measurements,
and evaluation of approaches are of great importance in order to establish
a scientific methodology for the field of entire wireless network security re-
search.
2. We propose a methodology whereby different types of keys, including net-
work key, cluster key, pairwise keys, can be established to support different
communication modes. We also fix the security problems in the famous Lo-
calized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) [29] which supports
the establishment of four types of keys. Our mechanism disperses the damage
resulting from the disclosure of the initial key.
3. We propose a methodology which combines implicit authentication with the
proposed schemes. Such authentication methodology produces lightweight
authentication without needing time synchronization.
4. We propose a methodology whereby nodes can establish keys over an unreli-
able channel. By subtly introducing random numbers, the proposed scheme
can resist collusion attack while existing schemes can only maintain forward
and backward secrecy. We also define a security model and explore the tech-
nical details of mutual-healing key distribution.
5. We propose a methodology which takes full advantage of the heterogeneity of
two-tiered nodes in HWSNs. It uses PKC-based cryptosystem (ECC) in clus-
ter head level communication. Our scheme is very flexible and can be used
in a group communication dominated environment and peer communication
dominated environment by selecting the different keying algorithm at a lower
level.
1.6 Significance of the Research
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1.6.1 Social and Economic Significance
The significance of the proposed research, from a social and economic point of
view, includes:
1. Saving resources. Current key management schemes consume valuable re-
sources like memory, network bandwidth, and power. The proposed ap-
proaches are efficient and can reduce the consumption of resources and thus
can be used in large-scale HWSNs.
2. Low-cost network maintenance. The introduced fault-tolerant property of
key management schemes makes the establishment of keys over an unreliable
network possible. Hence, it can address the network maintenance problem
without increasing hardware costs.
3. Provision of lightweight key management. The applications of HWSNs calls
for corresponding security mechanisms. The lack of matching lightweight
security mechanism hinders the wide applications of HWSNs. However, the
challenges of HWSNs render most of security mechanism infeasible. The
key management schemes in this research pave the way of access control and
establishment of secure communication channels in HWSNs.
1.6.2 Scientific Significance
The significance of the proposed research, from a scientific point of view, includes:
1. proposing robust key management schemes for HWSNs. Each of them has
some advantages over existing key management schemes of the same kind.
More specifically, this thesis proposes a robust key management scheme which
fixes security problems of LEAP and can be seamlessly used to enhance key
management services of ZigBee networks; this thesis proposes a hash chain
based key predistribution scheme which reduces storage overhead while in-
creases key connectivity, and is resilient to node capture attack; this thesis
proposes a unified approach for collusion attack against hash chain based
self-healing key distribution schemes and develops a fully anti-collusive self-
healing key distribution scheme.
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2. proposing a formal definition of mutual-healing key distribution and develop-
ing a practical mutual-healing key distribution for WSNs. It is the first time
to develop mutual-healing key distribution and explore its technical details.
3. integrating implicit authentication mechanism and PKC-based authentication
mechanism with self-healing key distribution schemes to filter the false broad-
casts out. It is the first time to realize authenticated self-healing key distribu-
tion.
4. proposing a practical hybrid key management solution for HWSNs, whereby
the entities can take full advantage of their heterogeneity and merits of Sym-
metric Key Cryptography and Public Key Cryptography.
1.7 The Structure of the Thesis
As mentioned earlier, in this thesis we propose to develop a methodology for key
management whereby keys can be distributed and updated with lightweight over-
head. In the case of there being packets loss during transmission, the key manage-
ment mechanism can proceed in a fault-tolerant manner. In order to achieve the
above objectives, this thesis is organized as follows:
Part I: Research background, problem definition, and major contributions
• In Chapter 1 we introduce the background on sensor network security.
We outline the motivation, the significance, the scope, and main objec-
tives of this research. Finally, we present the structure of the thesis.
• In Chapter 2, we present an in-depth survey of the state-of-the-art tech-
niques for key management in WSNs with a focus on five aspects. We
review, compare, and contrast the proposed techniques in terms of each
aspect and summarize the weaknesses and existing problems in each as-
pect. The literature review in this chapter provides the foundation for
the problem definition in the following chapter.
• In Chapter 3, we formally present the problem definition. We then break
down the problem definition into different research issues. We also de-
fine the terms and terminologies that will be used while solving each
issue. Finally in this chapter, we overview the solutions.
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Part II: Symmetric Key Cryptography based solutions
• In Chapter 4, we analyze the security problem of LEAP [29]. The secu-
rity is threatened by attacks launched after the initialization phase. We
then propose a key management scheme which disperses the damage
resulting from the disclosure of the initial key.
• In Chapter 5, we propose a methodology whereby nodes in a hierarchi-
cal network can establish five types of keys. The methodology adopts a
keyed hash chain based approach. A new cluster mechanism is used to
improve the probability of key sharing between sensors and their cluster
heads. Unlike existing schemes where a node capture attack might lead
to the disclosure of several key chains, our method can avoid this draw-
back without storing network-wide generating keys in low-cost sensors.
• In Chapter 6, we propose a unified approach for collusion attack against
hash chain based self-healing key distributions schemes. Then we pro-
pose a fully anti-collusive mechanism to defend against collusion attack
in hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes.
• In Chapter 7, we propose an implicitly authenticated self-healing key
distribution scheme. The scheme is based on a hash binary tree. Impli-
cation authentication is subtly introduced to detect tamper attack against
broadcast messages during transmission. The scheme achieves the same
security level of existing schemes with reduced storage and computation
overhead.
Part III: PKC-based solutions
In Chapter 8, we propose a methodology for mutual-healing key distribution
which enables a node in a WSN to recover its new session key although its
last broadcast message was lost. A formal definition for mutual-healing key
distribution is proposed. The methodology is based on bilinear pairings and
is collusion-free for any coalition of non-authorized nodes. We also propose
an authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme.
Part IV: A hybrid solution
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In Chapter 9, we propose a methodology which takes full advantage of the
heterogeneity of nodes in hierarchical networks. It uses Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tosystem in cluster head level communication and an improved one-way func-
tion tree based key management in general nodes lever. The proposed scheme
has good flexibility and can be used in a group communication dominated en-
vironment and peer communication dominated environment by selecting the
different keying algorithm at a lower level.
Part V: Conclusion and future work
In Chapter 10, we conclude the thesis by summarizing the work developed in
this thesis and then identify the potential for further work.
1.8 Conclusion
The proliferation of WSNs has driven the research into sensor network security,
with key management being the cornerstone of the whole research. In this chapter,
we provided a comprehensive overview of WSN security, including, the applica-
tion, classification, constraints, vulnerabilities, security requirements, and current
hot research topics in the field of sensor network security. The overview helps in
understanding of the characteristics of WSNs and the importance of key manage-
ment research. Then we introduced the motivation that drives us to carry out this
research, followed by a description of the significance of our work. The scope and





We highlighted that security is a crucial issue in wireless sensor networks due to
inherent network characteristics in Chapter 1. In this chapter, we examine and
present an overview of existing literature on key management techniques. Sub-
stantial progress has been made on providing a sound, practical basis for a number
of problems that are associated with key management for sensor network security.
A number of key management techniques have been documented in the literature.
In the following sections, we will discuss the work that has been previously un-
dertaken to solve some of the issues related to key management for WSNs. The
research areas investigated by this dissertation can be grouped into four categories:
1. Key management scheme for WSNs
• Symmetric Key Cryptography based key management
• PKC-based key management
• Hybrid key management
2. Establishment of different types of keys
3. Authentication mechanism in key management
4. Self-healing key distribution mechanism
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Our research focuses on key management in hierarchical wireless sensor net-
works. Different types of keys have to be established in order to meet different
types of communication. Therefore, the problem of establishment of different types
of keys is especially discussed in this research. We do not consider separate authen-
tication and self-healing mechanisms. Our research lays emphasis on integration
of these two properties with key management. Both Symmetric Key Cryptography
and Public Key Cryptography are used to realize these two mechanisms.
2.2 Key Management Schemes for WSNs
The majority of the literature is based on the generic characteristics of WSNs. The
researchers were devoted to discovering numerous vulnerabilities and addressing
the corresponding countermeasures. The countermeasures mainly rely on Sym-
metric Key Cryptography, Public Key Cryptography, or a hybrid of these. This
motivates us to review the state-of-the-art key management techniques and cate-
gorize the schemes according to: Symmetric Key Cryptography based schemes,
PKC-based schemes, and hybrid schemes. Figure 2.1 presents a collection of rep-
resentative key management solutions proposed in the literature for wireless sensor
networks.
2.2.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography Based Key Management Schemes
Existing literature [40, 41] thoroughly examine the state-of-the-art techniques for
key management for WSNs. A key predistribution mechanism provides a nice
tradeoff between storage overhead and processing power, and thus is considered
as the most suitable mechanism for WSNs. Solutions to key predistribution can be
classified into the following five types according to the mathematical construction
on which they are based:
1. Random graph theory based key predistribution schemes
2. Polynomial-based key predistribution schemes
3. Matrix-based key predistribution schemes
4. Combinatorial design based key predistribution schemes
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Figure 2.1: A collection of representative key management solutions for WSNs
5. Exclusion Basis System (EBS) based key predistribution schemes.
In this subsection, we introduce the representative schemes in each category. In
addition, we survey tree-based key management schemes as tree models are widely
used in key management.
Random key predistribution schemes
Eschenauer and Gligor proposed the original random key predistribution scheme
for WSNs that relies on probabilistic key sharing among nodes of a random graph
in [3]. The scheme includes three phases: key predistribution, shared key discovery,
and path key establishment. In the key predistribution phase, a large key pool of P
keys and their identities are generated. Each sensor randomly draws k (k ¿ P ) keys
from the key pool without replacement. These k keys and their identities form the
key-chain for a sensor node. In the shared key discovery phase, two neighbor nodes
exchange and compare the list of identities of keys in their key chains. If two sensors
have some keys in common, they can set up a secure link directly. Otherwise, the
path key establishment procedure needs to be triggered to set up a link between two
neighbors. If a node is compromised, the base station broadcasts a message to all
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other nodes to revoke the compromised node’s key chain. Re-keying follows the
same procedure as revocation. The probability that any two nodes share at least one
common key is p = 1− ((P − k)!)2/((P − 2k)!P !). Eschenauer et al. showed that
if p reaches a critical value, the connectivity of the entire network can be obtained
with a high probability. The advantage of the random key predistribution scheme is
that there is no computational overhead to generate pairwise keys between sensor
nodes. The main shortcoming of the scheme in [3] is that a large number of keys
could be disclosed by compromising a few selected nodes. For one compromised
node, the attacker has a probability of k/P to successfully attack a link. Because
k ¿ P , a compromised node does not affect the security of the scheme too much.
The basic scheme [3] that two nodes share a unique key for establishing a secure
communication link was further improved by Chan et al. in [42] from two different
aspects. Two variations are proposed: q (q ≥ 2)-composite scheme and the multi-
path key reinforcement scheme. In the q-composite scheme, two neighboring nodes
can build a secure link only if they have at least q common keys. They may form a
new communication link using the hash of all the q keys, i.e., K = hash(k1 ‖ k2 ‖
. . . ‖ kq).
The multi-path key reinforcement scheme is used for rekeying. Suppose nodes
A and B share a key k. Since k may be residing in the key ring memory of some
other nodes in the network, the security of k is jeopardized if node A or node B
is captured. Thus, it is necessary to update the shared key k between nodes A
and B instead of using a key in the key pool. In the multi-path key reinforcement
scheme, if node A updates the shared key with node B, all possible disjointed paths
to node B must be used. Assume that there are h such disjointed paths from node
A to node B. Then node A generates h random values (g1, g2, . . . , gh) with the
same size of the shared key and sends one down each available disjointed path to
node B. When node B has received all h random values, it computes the new key
k′ = k ⊕ g1 ⊕ g2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ gh where k is the original key. Node A does the same
computation. The new key k′ is used to secure communication link. An adversary
in this case has to eavesdrop on all the disjoint paths between node A and node B
if he wants to reconstruct the new shared key k′.
The q-composite scheme makes it more difficult to compromise a node. It is
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secure under small scale attacks while being vulnerable under large scale attacks.
The scheme does not satisfy scalability requirements. Also, it is hard to choose
an optimal value for q. The multi-path key reinforcement scheme increases the
resilience of the network against node capture at the cost of more CPU use and
power consumption. It can be used for applications where security is more of a
concern than is bandwidth or power drain.
Du et al. combined a random key predistribution scheme with node deploy-
ment knowledge to improve resilience [43]. In this scheme, deployment knowledge
is modeled using non-uniform probability density functions. Nodes are grouped
based on their deployment knowledge and each group has a small key pool. As
nodes from the same group are more likely to be neighbors, their keys can choose
from the corresponding key pool. As the size of key pool becomes smaller, both
local connectivity and global connectivity increase. As each node has fewer keys,
resistance to node capture attack and network overhead for pairwise key establish-
ment are improved.
Polynomial-based key predistribution schemes
Blundo et al. proposed a polynomial-based key predistribution scheme in [44]. In
this polynomial-based scheme, the setup server randomly generates a bivariate t-
degree polynomial f(x, y) =
∑t
i,j=0 ai,jx
iyj over a finite field Fq, where q is a
prime number that is large enough to accommodate a cryptographic key, such that
the equation has the property f(x, y) = f(y, x). The setup server then computes a
polynomial share of the equation for each node in the network; e.g., a node with ID i
receives f(i, y) and a node with ID j receives f(j, y). When node i and node j want
to establish a key, node i can compute the same key f(i, j) by evaluating f(i, y)
at point j, and node j can compute the same key f(j, i) = f(i, j) by evaluating
f(j, y) at point i. Each node in this approach has to store a t-degree polynomial
f(i, x), which occupies (t+1)logq storage space. This scheme is secure and reveals
nothing for less than t compromised nodes. t value depends upon the memory
available of sensors. There is no communication overhead during the pairwise key
establishment process. The computation overhead is incurred from the calculation
of the polynomial at the ID of the other sensor node.
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Liu et al. extended the scheme in [44] to a polynomial pool based key predistri-
bution scheme in [45]. Instead using a single t-degree polynomial in [44], the setup
server generates a pool of polynomials over Fp. Each polynomial has an ID. The
setup server picks up a subset of these polynomial shares and places it in each node.
In the key discovery stage, each node finds a node with which it shares the same
bivariate polynomial and calculates the shared key as that in [44]. After the key
discovery stage, if two nodes do not find a common polynomial, similarly they can
establish a path key. The polynomial pool-based key predistribution scheme allows
for network growth after deployment. The collision resistance is constrained by t.
More than t compromised polynomials would lead to whole network compromise.
The experiment shows that the scheme has a better resilience property than [3] and
q-composite scheme in [42] if some nodes are compromised. However, when the
number of compromised nodes is higher than a threshold (for example 60% nodes
are compromised), the number of compromised paths in [45] is higher than that of
[3] and q-composite scheme in [42].
Liu et al. [45] further developed a random subset assignment scheme which is
an extension of the polynomial pool based scheme. In this scheme, each node is
assigned with a small set of random polynomials rather than keys as that in [3]. The
following stages are similar to the polynomial pool-based scheme. The probability
of two sensors sharing the same bivariate polynomial is the same as the probability
of the two sharing a common key in [3]. While in this scheme, the established
pairwise keys generated by any two nodes are unique. If no more than t shares
of the same polynomial have been disclosed, the pairwise keys computed from the
polynomial are secure.
Liu et al. then proposed a grid-based key predistribution scheme [45]. Suppose
a sensor network has at most N nodes, the server constructs a m × m grid with
a set of 2m polynomials {f ci (x, y), f ri (x, y)}i=0,...,m−1, where m = d
√
Ne. Each
column i in the grid is associated with a polynomial f ci (x, y), and each row i is
associated with a polynomial f ri (x, y). The server assigns each sensor in the net-
work to a unique intersection in this grid. For the sensor at the coordinate (i, j), the
server assigns polynomial shares of f ci (x, y) and f
r
j (x, y) to the sensor, as shown
in the Figure 2.2. After deployment, the nodes in the same row or column can es-
tablish pairwise keys directly. Therefore, each node can establish a pairwise key
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Figure 2.2: Grid-based key predistribution scheme
with 2(m − 1) other nodes directly. According to the path discovery method, any
two nodes in different rows and columns can establish a pairwise key with the help
of intermediate nodes. The grid-based scheme offers all the attractive properties
of the polynomial pool based scheme and guarantees that the nodes can establish
a pairwise key with each other and they can judge which polynomial should be
used for key establishment. This scheme has the same resilience as does the basic
scheme [3] and the q-composite scheme [42] with less communication and com-
putation overhead; this scheme offers the same degree of security as the random
pairwise scheme when the same number of sensors and storage overhead are con-
sidered. The grid-based approach offers a greater probability of key establishment
than any other scheme does when there are no compromised nodes, as well as a
greater probability of key establishment when some nodes are compromised.
The grid-based scheme was further extended to a hypercube-based scheme in
[46]. Suppose a network has N nodes and key predistribution is performed in a n-
dimensional hypercube. Each node is assigned with an exclusive coordinate in the
hypercube. The setup server computes mn−1(m = d√Ne) bivariate polynomials
for each dimension and assigns each node a set of polynomials according to its
coordinate. i.e. a node at coordinate (j1, . . . , jn) is assigned with polynomials
{f 1j1,...,jn(x, y), . . . , fnj1,...,jn(x, y)}. If nodes i and j share a common polynomial,
they can make a direct connection and compute a pairwise key to communicate.
If the two nodes do not share a common polynomial, they have to use the path
discovery method to compute an indirect key [46]. The storage cost at most is
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n(t + 1)logq + ntl(l = dlog2me) bits including n polynomials and t number of
compromised node IDs. The computation cost is 2(L + 1) polynomial evaluations
where L equals the key path [46]. There is no communication overhead if the two
nodes have a common polynomial.
Similarly to the scheme in [43], many key predistribution schemes can be com-
bined with deployment knowledge. Liu et al. proposed two location-aware key
predistribution schemes in [47]. They firstly integrated the expected location with
the random pairwise keys scheme [42]. Then they integrated the expected location
information with the random subset assignment scheme [45]. By exploiting the
location information, these two schemes have a higher probability of establishing
pairwise keys between neighbor nodes with smaller storage overhead than that of
the original schemes. They also provide better resistance against node compromise
attacks and greatly improve the performance of key predistribution.
Matrix-based key predistribution schemes
In the original matrix based key predistribution scheme [48], the base station first
constructs a (λ+ 1)×N public matrix G over a finite field GF (q), where N is the
size of the network. An example of matrix G is as follows:
1 1 1 . . . 1
s s2 s3 . . . sN






sλ (s2)λ (s3)λ . . . (sN)λ
 .
The base station also creates a random symmetric matrix D(λ+1)×(λ+1) over
GF (q) and calculates AN×(λ+1) = (DG)T . Both D(λ+1)×λ+1) and AN×(λ+1) should
be kept secret. A matrix KN×N = (DG)TG stores all pairwise keys of a group of
N nodes, where each element kij is the key of node i for securing the link with node
j. We can verify that KN×N is a symmetric matrix as follows:
KN×N = (DG)TG = GTDTG = GTDG = KTN×N .
If each node i stores the ith row of secret matrix and the ith column of public
matrix G, each pair of nodes i and j can individually compute a pairwise key kij =
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Figure 2.3: The relationship of several representative key predistribution schemes
kji by exchanging only their columns in plain text because the key is a product of
their own row and the column of another’s. This scheme guarantees a complete
key graph, that is, any pair of nodes in the network is able to establish a pairwise
key. This scheme has λ-security. In other words, if no more than λ nodes are
compromised, the entire secret matrix is perfectly secure.
Du et al. combined Blom’s scheme [48] with the random key distribution
scheme [3] to a multiple-space key predistribution (MSKP)scheme [39]. A key
pool with ω symmetric matrices D1, . . . , Dω of size (λ+ 1)× (λ+ 1) is generated
by the base station. Each node is assigned with G and τ distinct matrices D. After
deployment, if any pair of nodes discovers that they have a common space, then they
follow Blom’s scheme to establish a pairwise key. The MSKP scheme is scalable
and flexible. It also achieves better resilience against node capture while it reduces
full connectivity to a connected graph. However, in this scheme, each node has to
store a lot of key materials in order to ensure a connected network. This produces a
heavy storage overhead to memory-constrained nodes. The combination of Blom’s
scheme with deployment knowledge was proposed in [49].
We summarize the relationship of the reviewed key predistribution schemes in
Figure 2.3.
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Combinatorial design based key predistribution schemes
Camtepe applied combinatorial design theory to deterministic key distribution for
WSNs in [50]. Assume that a network has N sensor nodes. A finite projective plane
with order q (q is a prime and satisfies q2+ q+1 ≥ N ) is a symmetric Balanced In-
complete Block Design (BIBD). It supports a network with q2+q+1 nodes. b ≥ N
blocks needs to be constructed by using a set S with | S |= v = b = q2+ q+1 dis-
tinct random key and each block can be looked as a key chain with k = q + 1 keys.
The symmetric design guarantees that any pair of key chains has at least λ = 1 key
in common. That is, the probability of key connectivity of any pair of sensors is
1. However, the prime q cannot be used for any network size. For example, when
N > q2 + q + 1, a smaller q′ must be chosen for the network. Otherwise, too big
a q causes the size of key chains to dramatically increase. Once the size of the key
chain is larger than the memory of the sensors, the scheme is infeasible. Gener-
alized Quadrangles (GQ) support different network size. For example, GQ(q, q),
GQ(q, q2) and GQ(q2, q3) support networks with O(q3), O(q5) and O(q8) respec-
tively. However, the prime q is not easy to find. Camtepe combined symmetric
BIBD and GQ to design a hybrid key predistribution scheme. The hybrid construc-
tion combines a deterministic core design with probabilistic extensions to achieve
key distribution for any network size. They generate q2+q+1 < N key chains with
BIBD or GQ. Then they select uniformly at random remaining N− (q2+q+1) key
chains among (k = q + 1)-subsets of the Complementary Design of BIBD or GQ.
These N−(q2+q+1) key chains and q2+q+1 key chains generated in the first step
together construct N key chains. The hybrid key predistribution scheme improves
the scalability and resilience of networks, while it does not guarantee that the key
share probability is 1. The analysis indicates that such a deterministic approach has
advantages over a randomized one [3] in two aspects. Firstly, it increases the prob-
ability that two nodes share a key, and secondly, it decreases the average key-path
length while providing scalability with hybrid approaches.
EBS-based key predistribution schemes
Eltoweissy et al. in [51] proposed a low energy hierarchical key management for
WSNs based on an Exclusion Basis System, which is an abstraction of the problem
of constructing a logical structure for key management. The definition of an EBS is
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as follows:
Definition 2.1. [52] Let n, k and m be positive integers, such that 1 < k,m < n.
An Exclusion Basis System of dimension (n, k,m), denoted by EBS(n, k,m), is a
collection Γ of subsets of [1, n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} such that for every integer t ∈ [1, n]
the following two properties hold:
1. t is in at most k subsets of Γ, and
2. there are exactly m subsets, say A1, A2, . . . , Am, in Γ such that ∪mi=1Ai is
[1, n] − {t}. (That is, each element t is excluded by a union of exactly m
subsets in Γ.)
In the EBS(n, k,m) key distribution system, n is the size of the network (num-
ber of members), k is the number of keys stored by each group member, and m
is the number of rekey messages. A canonical enumeration of all possible ways to
form subsets of k objects from a set of k+m objects is employed in the construction
of EBS(n, k,m) for feasible values of n, k, and m. In the selected enumeration
method, each element of the sequence is a bit string of length k +m where a 1 in
the ith position of a string means that object i is included in that subset, for any i
(1 ≤ i ≤ k +m).
For any k and m, let Canonical(k,m) be the canonical enumeration of all
C(k + m, k) ways to form a subset of k elements from a set of k + m objects.
The sequence of bit strings in Canonical(k,m) can form a canonical matrix A
whose C(k + m, k) columns are the successive bit strings of k + m length, each
with k bits 1. Table 2.1 displays a canonical matrix A for EBS(10, 3, 2). There are
C(5, 3) ways to form a subset of 3 keys from 5 keys.
Table 2.1: The canonical matrix for EBS(10, 3, 2).
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
K1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
K2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
K3 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
K4 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
K4 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
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The canonical matrix A serves rekeying. Suppose M4 in EBS(10, 3, 2) in Table
2.1 is compromised. Since M4 possesses keys K1, K3, and K5 and session key S,
these keys need updating. At this point, onlyK2∪K4 is unknown byM4. Therefore,
K2 ∪ K4 can be used for rekeying. The following messages will be generated for
rekeying:
Message 1 : E(K2(S





Message 2 : E(K4(S





where E() is an encryption function and S ′ is the new session key. In this way, the
compromised keys are renewed and the compromised node M4 is evicted.
The EBS-based key management scheme uses symmetric encryption and rekey-
ing to support current, forward and backward secrecy. An important contribution
is that it yields optimal results with respect to the parameters n, k, and m. The
solution allows for the trade-offs between the number of keys per group member, k,
and the number of rekeying messages. It also separates administrative keys used for
key management from communication keys used for secure data transmission re-
sulting in efficient key management and multi-granularity secure communications.
In a large-scale group, the cost for key establishment and key renewing is usually
relevant to the group size and subsequently becomes a performance bottleneck in
achieving scalability. Another drawback of this scheme is that it does not resist
collusion attack.
A new approach called SHELL [53] has been developed to resist collusion attack
in the EBS-based key management system. SHELL is a hierarchical scheme and
can be used for clustered sensor networks. SHELL uses post-deployment location
information to assign keys and an EBS framework to perform rekeying in each
cluster. The keys are stored by gateways and are assigned to each node by the
corresponding gateway. Due to the location-based key distribution mechanism, the
number of keys revealed by compromised nodes can be minimized.
Eltoweissy et al. presented a hierarchical key management scheme for WSNs
called ‘localized combinatorial keying’ (LOCK) [54]. As shown in Figure 2.4, the
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Figure 2.4: Physical network architecture of LOCK
Figure 2.5: The relationship of several EBS-based key predistribution schemes
physical network model of LOCK consists of three tiers, including a base station,
cluster heads, and normal sensor nodes. LOCK employs two-layer EBS to perform
localized rekeying to minimize communication overhead. However, LOCK uses
neither location information to generate keys nor location-based key assignment as
in SHELL. LOCK uses key polynomials to improve network resilience to collusion
so that a compromised node does not affect the operations of other nodes in other
clusters.
The relationship of EBS-based key predistribution schemes [51, 53, 54] is shown
in Figure 2.5
Tree-based key management schemes
Two tree models are commonly used in key management. One is the Logical Key
Hierarchy (LKH) model [55] which was proposed in 1999 and the other is the One-
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Figure 2.6: An example of the LKH model with 10 nodes
way Function Tree (OFT) model [56] which was proposed in 2003.
LKH model based key management schemes
The LKH model was introduced to efficiently update the group key when the
membership changes for group communication. In the LKH model, a key tree is
maintained at the Key Distribution Center (KDC) which is used for group key dis-
tribution and updating. The group key which is the root of the key tree is used to
encrypt all messages broadcast in the group. Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) which
are intermediate nodes of the key tree are used to update the root GK and other
KEKs. Each leaf of the key tree is an Individual Key (IK) which associates with
a group member. Each group member knows all the keys from its leaf node up to
the root. As a result, each member in a group possesses three kinds of keys: its
own IK, KEKs (on the path to the root), and a root GK. The set of these keys is
referred to as the key path. Figure 2.6 is an example of LKH model consisted of
10 nodes. Without loss of generality, we take node 1 as an example. Node 1 stores
key set {GK,KEK1−1, KEK2−1, IK1}. In the LKH model, the number of keys
required to update is O(logN) (N is the number of members) which is the same as
the number of keys on the key path.
The LKH model has been extended to a directed diffusion secure multicast
scheme for WSNs (LKHW) in [57]. The directed diffusion is a data-centric, energy-
efficient data dissemination technique for WSNs [58]. In directed diffusion, a query
would be transformed into an interest and then diffused throughout the network
nodes (called source nodes). The source node will activate its sensors to collect
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information with propagated interest. The dissemination technique also sets up cer-
tain gradients designed to draw data matching the interest. The collected data is then
sent back to the sink along the reverse path of the interest propagation. The LKHW
scheme take advantages of both LKH model and the directed diffusion technique.
The LKHW protocol is described as follows:
1. The base station, which works as a key distribution center, sends out “interest
about interest to join”;
2. The interested nodes reply with “interest to join”;
3. The base station supplies key set and then secures interest and data encrypted
with the group key.
LKHW allows nodes to leave and join. When a node joins the network, a key set
is generated for the new node based on the keys within the existing key hierarchy.
When a node leaves the network, the key hierarchy is used to effectively re-establish
keys for the nodes below the node that has left the group. In a multi-hop WSN where
each node routes messages of other nodes, rekeying messages generated from the
logical key tree should be forwarded to many irrelevant nodes before reaching their
destinations. In other words, logical key tree-based schemes can incur heavy com-
munication overhead in multi-hop WSN environments since the key tree structure
does not reflect the underlying network topology [59]. LKHW is vulnerable to sin-
gle point of failure attack as all keys logically root at the base station.
Lazos and Poovendran improved LKHW [57] in [60] and [61], respectively. In
[60], a routing-aware tree is constructed in which the leaf nodes are assigned keys
based on all relay nodes above them. As the scheme takes advantage of routing
information to construct the key hierarchy, it is more energy-efficient than routing
schemes that arbitrarily arrange nodes into a routing tree. In [61], the nodes are
grouped into different clusters according to geographical location. The nodes within
the same cluster are able to reach each other with one-hop communication. Using
the cluster information, a key hierarchy is constructed in a manner similar to that
proposed in [60].
OFT model-based key management schemes
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Figure 2.7: An OFT key tree and the functional relationships among its node secrets
and node keys
In the OFT model, a group manager maintains a balanced binary tree for a group.
The node secret of the root node is the group key. A one-way function key tree is
computed in a bottom-up manner using the pseudo-random function f and a bitwise
exclusive-or operation denoted by ⊕. Each internal node v in the key tree has a left
child L and right child R. Each internal node v in the key tree is associated with a
node secret xv and a node key kv. The node secret associated with v is computed
from its children’s secrets. Specifically, as shown in Figure 2.7 , the node secret for
an internal node v is computed by xv = f(xL)⊕ f(xR). For each node v, the node
key kv is computed by kv = g(xv) where g is also a pseudo-random function.
In comparison with the top-down LKH model [55], the bottom-up OFT model
approximately halves the broadcast overhead in rekeying after membership change.
It is the first time to achieve an approximate halving in broadcast length. It is
claimed that the OFT algorithm provides complete forward and backward security:
newly admitted group members cannot read previous messages, and evicted mem-
bers cannot read future messages, even with collusion by arbitrarily many evicted
members [56]. However, collusion attacks against original OFT key establishment
algorithm were proposed in [62, 63] shortly after its publication.
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2.2.2 PKC-based Key Management Schemes
In Chapter 1, we have mentioned that the first challenge to a common perception
that PKC is infeasible in WSNs was made in [27] which proposed a hybrid authen-
tication key establishment scheme based on ECC. In fact, sensors are also assumed
unable to perform PKC operations in [27]. The computation intensive elliptic curve
scalar multiplication of a random point at senor nodes is removed. Alternatively,
the scheme shifts high-cost operations to a new entity called a ‘security manager’.
In order to prevent the node impersonation attack, the scheme authenticates the two
identities based on Elliptic Curve implicit certificates, solves the key distribution
and storage problems, which are typical bottlenecks in pure symmetric key based
protocols. Lately, the first known implementation of ECC [64] over F2p for sensor
networks based on MICA2 show that ECC-based public key scheme is practical for
popular sensors.
TinyPK [65] is a mechanism for authentication and key exchange between sen-
sor nodes and a third-party. It is based on the RSA cryptosystem. The protocols
were implemented on MICA2 motes with a TinyOS platform. TinyPK does not
support dynamic networks where multiple session keys are inevitable due to mem-
bership change.
The authors of [66] claimed that PKC is feasible in WSNs provided with the
right selection of algorithms and associated parameters. It was envisioned that
NtruEncrypt and ECC are the most promising candidates for low-power WSNs im-
plementation. In order to validate their claim, they made an in-depth comparison
of three different PKC implementations (Rabin’s scheme, NtruEncrypt and Ellip-
tic Curve) particularly target on WSNs. The authors of [67] investigated several
additive homomorphic public key encryption schemes as well as their applicability
to WSNs. The authors recommended that selecting the most suitable PKC should
comply with the topologies and the scenarios of WSNs. They concluded that public
key cryptographic schemes are required for specific WSN settings where symmetric
encryption schemes prove to be insufficient due to their sensitivity to node compro-
mise.
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ECC-based key management schemes
It is important to note that all of the schemes [27, 64, 65, 66, 67] of PKC implemen-
tation are key generation, authentication, or encryption/decryption algorithms but
none is a complete PKC-based key management framework. As far as we know, the
first trial of PKC key management for WSNs is the work in [68]. This paper presents
three key management schemes for HWSNs: one is based purely on Symmetric Key
Cryptography (SACK), another is based purely on PKC (SACK-P), and the other is
the hybrid of both the symmetric and public approaches (SACK-H). These schemes
are based on a typical hierarchical network model which compose of a base station
(BS), a number of cluster heads, and numerous nodes. The network is arranged in a
cluster-based topology. Each entity has a unique Identity (ID). All sensor nodes are
loosely time synchronized with the BS. Key management starts after all the nodes
have joined the network and before other communication has started.
SACK supports the establishment of three types of keys which helps to minimize
the impact of any key’s compromise to only a certain number of nodes. The key
KNB is an unique pairwise key shared by each node and the BS. A routing key
(KCL) is used by a cluster head to communicate with the BS. Cluster Key KCi
is used by sensor nodes of the i-th cluster to communicate with their cluster head
and other nodes within the cluster. Before network deployment, each sensor node
is preloaded with one unique key (KNB) and one master key KM . The BS stores
(SNIDj , KNB) pair for each node and uses it to authenticate and establish a pair-
wise symmetric key for each sensor node when the node joining in the network. The
BS also stores routing keys (KCL) and cluster keys (KCi) in a database. After the
formation of clusters, the BS sends a key generation seed SCL to the cluster heads.
Each cluster head then computes KCL using SCL and KM . Once KCL is generated,
every cluster head generates a seed SCi different from SCL and broadcasts it to its
respective nodes. Each node of cluster i then computes KCi by using SCi on KM .
SACK-P is based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Before deployment, a
public key pair (Kpub[CNj], Kpri[CNj]) is generated for each node using ECC. The
BS maintains [SNIDj , Kpub[CNj]] pair for each node and each node is preloaded
with its respective private key Kpri[CNj]. During the phase of network setup, each
sensor node sends a JOIN request message encrypted with Kpri[CNj] and its ID
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to the nearest cluster head. The cluster head forwards the message to the BS. The
BS verifies the node authenticity by decrypting the message with the public key
registered against the node ID stored in its database. If the node is authenticated
as a legitimate node, an OK message is sent to the cluster head; otherwise a RE-
VOKE message is directed to the cluster head. If the cluster head receives an OK
message, it stores the node’s public key Kpub[CNj] for future references; otherwise
the message is discarded. After completion of this process, the BS broadcasts its
public key to all the cluster heads. On receiving the BS’s public key, each cluster
head broadcasts its public key to its subordinate sensor nodes.
To the best of our knowledge, the first completed PKC-based key management
scheme for HWSNs was proposed in [69]. The scheme is a routing-driven scheme,
which establishes a shared key only for neighbor nodes that communicate with each
other. Suppose a network consists of M H-nodes and N L-nodes. On the condition
that each node is aware of the tree structure of the network and location, each H-
node has to store (N + 3) keys and each L-node has to store 2 keys. Otherwise,
much more storage and communication overhead and some security problems may
arise from an incorrect assumption. The scheme also requires that all nodes must be
deployed by strictly following the known tree structure; otherwise, some L-nodes
cannot find the keys matched with their cluster head. The scheme proposed in [70] is
more secure than the scheme in [69]. Each L-node is preloaded only with its secret
point and its random number. The secret point is used to dynamically establish
pairwise keys with other communicating nodes. The random number is periodically
renewed by the BS and forwarded to L-nodes through the corresponding cluster
head. The random number is used for authentication between an L-node and its
cluster head. Most of the security services of the scheme are based on the security
of random numbers. Therefore, in each session, the renewed random number for
a specific L-node is encrypted with the shared key between the L-node and the
cluster head. If an L-node is not directly connected to the cluster head, the cluster
head performs multiplex encryption with the key shared with L-nodes in the path
from the cluster head to destination L-node. Obviously, the renewal of random
numbers incurs large communication overhead and computation overhead at each
cluster head.
Another pairing-based key management scheme for wireless sensor networks
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was proposed in [71]. The scheme not only exploits the means of pairwise key
establishment, but also the method of cluster key and network key establishment.
The scheme is built on a static network model. It is assumed that each node knows
its location. It is claimed that the scheme is robust against several typical attacks.
However, the robustness relies on a strong assumption that each cluster head is
equipped with a intrusion detection system to detect misbehavior. It is well known
that any intrusion detection system is too complex to be installed in a cluster head.
ID-based key management schemes
The basic idea of an ID-based encryption system is that a user’s public key can be
derived from its identity information. E.g. a user can use email as ID to calculate
a public key, rather than extracting it from the certificate issued by a Certificate
Authority (CA). ID-based encryption can eliminate the communication overhead
for transmission of public key certificates.
Zhang proposed an ID-based key predistribution scheme for wireless sensor net-
works in [72]. The scheme comprises two phases: system initialization and pairwise
key establishment. The procedure is as follows:
• System Initialization. A trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) constructs
two groups G1, G2 and an admissible bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 where
G1 is a cyclic additive group with order q and G2 is a cyclic multiplicative
group with order q. KGC also chooses two cryptographic hash functions
h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q , h1 : G2 → Z∗q .
KGC computes g = e(P, P ) and Ppub = kP where P is a random generator
of G1 and k ∈ Z∗q is a random integer which works as the network master
secret.
KGC assigns a unique IDu ∈ {0, 1}l to each node u. Then KGC calcu-
lates Su = (h(IDu) + k)−1P and Pu = h(IDu)P + Ppub. Each node u is
preloaded with its IDu, its key pair (PU , Su) and the public system parame-
ters (p, q, G1, G2, h, h1, P, Ppub, g).
• pairwise key establishment. Each node u can establish a pairwise key with its
neighbor node v within three steps.
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1. u : ru ∈R Z∗q , ruPv = ru(h(IDv)P + Ppub), h1(gru)Su;
u→ v : {ruPv, h1(gru)Su};
2. v : Pu = h(IDu)P + Ppub, e(ruPv, Sv) = gru ; e(h1(gru)Su, Pu) =
gh1(e(ruPv ,Sv));
If the equality holds, rv ∈R Z∗q ; Kv,u = e(ruPv, Sv)rv = grurv ;
u→ v : {rvPu, h1(grv)Sv};
3. u : e(h1(grv)Sv, Pv) = gh1(e(rvPu,Su));
If the equation holds, Ku,v = e(rvPu, Su)ru = grvru .
In this scheme, the established pairwise key can be known only by the two
end nodes. The storage overhead is acceptable in this scheme. In this scheme,
each node has to store its ID, its key pair, system parameters, and the established
pairwise keys. In each pairwise key establishment, each node has to perform two
elliptic curve discrete logarithm operations, two bilinear maps operations, and three
discrete logarithm operations based on a finite field. If the network is large, the cost
for computation may exhaust sensor nodes.
2.2.3 Hybrid Key Management Schemes
SACK-H system in [68] takes advantage of the difference in the computational ca-
pabilities of different nodes. The scheme shifts the burden of more complex, com-
putationally expensive algorithms on the BS and cluster heads which have greater
resources. It uses the public cryptography in inter-cluster level communication, and
symmetric cryptography in intra-cluster communication. Before deployment, each
node is installed with two types of cryptosystems: one is PKC-based cryptosystem
like ECC and the other is Symmetric Key Cryptography based cryptosystem like
RC5 or AES. The same as for SACK, each node is given a unique key KNB and
preloaded with a master key KM . Instead of KCL, each cluster head has separate
publick/private key pair which can be denoted as Kpri[CLi] and Kpub[CLi]. The
key generation process is initiated by the BS. It calculates its public/private key pair
and broadcasts its public key to cluster heads. Subsequently, each cluster head gen-
erates its public/private key pair and sends its public key along with its ID to the BS.
The BS saves this public key and also broadcasts it along with the cluster head’s ID
so that all the cluster heads receive the public keys of all the other cluster heads.
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After the completion of the key generation at cluster head level, each cluster head
generates a seed and broadcasts it to all of its subordinate sensor nodes. Each sensor
node uses this seed to generate the cluster-wide common symmetric key.
The performance analysis is undertaken from the perspective of scalability, key
connectivity, revocation, resilience, and mobility. Network scalability is determined
by security overhead in terms of data packet length. The experiment shows that
SACK is best at scalability, followed by SACK-H, and SACK-P is worst. In fact, the
operations of scalability in these three schemes are trivial. Node addition involves
interaction between cluster heads and the BS. If new nodes join the network fre-
quently, the authentication operations will collapse the BS. Key connectivity refers
to the number of keys required to be stored on each node for a specified level of
required connectivity. Both SACK and SACK-H guarantee 100% network connec-
tivity. As far as SACK-P is concerned, it also provides complete network connec-
tivity with the help of intermediate nodes. Secure node revocation is realized by
TASER, a node revocation mechanism which was addressed in detail in [68]. For
SACK-P, although the compromised nodes do not reveal any important keying in-
formation, removal of other sensor nodes’ public key from compromised node will
prevent the compromised node from generating any kind of attack on sensor nodes
whose public key it possesses. The BS takes the role of trusted CA and maintains
the Certificate Revocation List (CRL). SACK-P employs a hierarchical mode of
communication, which makes the certificates verification proceed in a hierarchical
manner. That is, for the communication between cluster heads, CRL is performed
at the BS to check whether the intended cluster head has been revoked. In a similar
way, for communications between sensor nodes, the validity of the node’s certificate
is checked by each cluster head. The resilience capability indicates the network’s
resistance against node capture. The higher degree of resilience, the more secure of
the network. For SACK, one node compromise reveals its cluster or routing key and
master key KM which, in turn, makes the whole network vulnerable. For SACK-H,
one node compromise reveals the common symmetric key for cluster-wide commu-
nication. Any node compromise in SACK-P does not reveal any keying informa-
tion except its own private key and a few public keys. Therefore, SACK-P has the
best resilience capability while SACK-H has intermediate resilience capability, and
SACK has the worst resilience capability.
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A more detailed hybrid key management scheme was proposed in [73]. In the
upper tier, the pairing-based Public Key Cryptography is used to distribute pairwise
keys. In the lower tier, a unbalanced Blom key predistribution scheme [48] is used
to establish pairwise keys. The unbalanced key predistribution scheme provides
perfect key connectivity. However, it inherits the weakness of the Blom key predis-
tribution scheme. That is, the resilience is constrained by a threshold λ. More than
λ compromised nodes within a cluster can work out all the pairwise keys for the
specific cluster. The larger the size of λ, the larger is the broadcast message and the
complexity of computation involved. In addition, this scheme considers only how
to establish pairwise keys.
2.2.4 Security Issues in Existing Key Management for WSNs
Even though a lot of work has been done in this field, there are some drawbacks
to overcome. The main disadvantage of random key predistribution schemes is that
a large number of keys could be disclosed by compromising a few nodes. The
polynomial-based key predistribution scheme has better attack resilience capability
than do random key predistribution schemes when a small number of nodes are
compromised. However, when the number of compromised nodes is higher than
a certain threshold, the number of compromised paths increases dramatically. The
scalability of EBS-based schemes is constrained by the cost of key establishment
and key renewing which increase with group size. The combinatorial design key
predistribution schemes do not guarantee that the key share probability is 1. LKH-
based schemes incur too much communication overhead in multi-hop WSNs and
OFT-based schemes are vulnerable to collusion attack.
In contrast to Symmetric Key Cryptography, Public Key Cryptography has ad-
vantages in addressing issues like key management, authentication, non-repudiation
and digital signatures. The public key cryptosystem is being deployed in WSNs as
is evidenced by the recent interest in [27, 64, 66, 67] from different aspects. The first
trial of the PKC-based key management scheme was SACK-P [68]. However, it is a
direct transformation of the basic SACK scheme which is based on Symmetric Key
Cryptography and correspondingly cannot be seen as an original PKC-based key
management scheme. Even though several PKC-based key management schemes
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have been proposed, the algorithms rely too much on some strict assumptions or
incur heavy overhead. PKC-based key management in WSNs is still in the infant
stage and lightweight PKC-based for WSNs is an open problem.
The hybrid scheme is a better approach for WSNs because it exploits the hetero-
geneous property of networks. It shifts the cryptographic burden to the base station
or the cluster heads where the resources are less constrained. The hybrid scheme has
the advantages of both the asymmetric and symmetric key cryptosystems. There-
fore, it is suitable for the large HWSNs.
2.3 Establishment of Different Types of Keys
Most of existing key management schemes for group communication in WSNs ad-
dress only session key establishment and renewal. Key predistribution is considered
as the most suitable key assignment mechanism for WSNs. However, key predistri-
bution schemes are concerned only with the establishment pairwise keys which can
only be used for peer-to-peer communication between neighboring nodes.
Generally speaking, a HWSN includes three types of entities: the base station,
cluster heads, and normal sensor nodes. These entities comprise a hierarchical net-
work. In such a network, various types of communication may occur. The base
station broadcasts control commands throughout the whole network. Each clus-
ter head multicasts messages within the cluster. A node communicates with its
neighboring nodes by unicasting. In one word, a single key cannot meet different
communication requirements in WSNs, especially in hierarchical WSNs. Differ-
ent types of keys should be established in WSNs to secure unicast, multicast, and
broadcast communications.
Most of existing symmetric schemes for WSNs mainly consider a distributed
network topology. They introduce different mechanisms for pairwise key establish-
ment. Some centralized schemes [52, 55, 56] only discuss how to distribute and
update globally shared group key. Research shows that such a network topology is
poor at performance and scalability. HWSNs have better scalability while they in-
volve various communication patterns, including unicast of single nodes, multicast
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within a group and broadcast in the whole network. Therefore, different keys must
be established to encrypt different types of packets.
2.3.1 LEAP
Zhu et al. [29] devised a scheme called LEAP for hierarchical WSNs. LEAP sup-
ports the establishment of individual keys, pairwise keys, cluster keys, and a global
key. Different keys are used to handle the different types of packets.
• Individual key [41]: This is a unique key that is shared between the base sta-
tion and each sensor node [29]. The key is preloaded into each node’s mem-
ory before being deployed. The individual key is calculated as Kmu = fKm(u)
where f is a pseudo-random function and Km is the master key known only
to the base station. Each sensor node uses the individual key to calculate
MAC on the messages to the base stations. In the same way, a base station
can use the shared individual key to encrypt messages to each node. The base
station does not store all the individual keys. The base station can generate
the individual key whenever it attempts to communicate with a node.
• Pairwise shared key [41]: Each node shares a pairwise key with each of its im-
mediate neighbors. The pairwise key is used to secure communications that
requires privacy or source authentication. Similar to the scheme in [3], there
are four stages of pairwise key establishment: key predistribution, neighbor
discovery, pairwise key establishment, and key erasure. During the initial
stage of key predistribution, node U is loaded with a key Ki by the controller
and drives the master key Ku using it. For neighbor discovery, node U first
initializes a timer to activate at time tmin, then it broadcasts a HELLO mes-
sage containing its ID. The neighboring node V responds to node U with an
acknowledgement (ACK) containing its ID if it receives node U ’s HELLO
message. The ACK of V is authenticated using its master key Kv which is
derived from Ki. Node U verifies the authentication of V by generating the
master key Kv with Ki. The neighbor discovery stage can be denoted as:
U → ∗ : U ;
V → U : V,MAC(Kv, U | V ).
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In the stage of pairwise key establishment, node U computes the pairwise key
Kuv shared with node V , as Kuv = fKv(u). Node V can also compute Kuv
in the same way. Kuv serves as their pairwise key. In the final stage, when
its timer expires after tmin, node U erases Ki and all the masters keys of its
neighbors, which is computed in the neighbor discovery stage. Even though
an adversary captures a node, the communications between it and another
node cannot be decrypted without the key Ki.
• Cluster key [41]: This is a key shared between a node and its neighboring
nodes. Cluster key establishment follows the pairwise key establishment
phase. Suppose a node U wants to establish a cluster key with all its im-
mediate neighbors V1, V2, . . . , Vm. Node U first generates a random key Kcu,
then encrypts this key with the pairwise key shared with its neighbors, and
then transmits the encrypted key to each neighbor Vi(1 ≤ i ≤ m).
U → Vi : (Kcu)Ku,vi .
Each node Vi decrypts the key Kcu with the key Ku,vi and stores it in a table,
and then sends its own cluster key to node U in the same way. When node U
is revoked, every neighbor node generates a new cluster key and transmits it
to all the other neighbors in the same way.
• Global key [41]: This key is shared between the base station and all the sensor
nodes in the network. It is mainly used by the base station to distribute confi-
dential messages to the whole network. A simple method of bootstrapping a
group key is to preload each node with the global key before the deployment.
An important issue that arises immediately is the need to securely update the
global key once the membership changes or a compromised node is detected.
Such key renewal involves much communication overhead. However, Zhu
et al. [29] proposed an efficient scheme based on cluster keys for which the
transmission cost will be only one key. In WSNs, all messages sent by the
base station must be authenticated; otherwise, an adversary may impersonate
them. µTESLA, based on a one-way key chain and delayed the disclosure of
keys, is an efficient method to broadcast messages into a WSN. To bootstrap
µTESLA, each node should be preloaded with the commitment of the key
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chain. If Kg is the new group key and U is the node to be revoked, the base
station broadcasts the following message M :
Controller → ∗ : u ‖ fK′g(0) ‖MAC(kTi ;u | fK′g(0)),
where fK′g(0) is the authentication key which enables a node to verify the au-
thenticity of the global key fK′g that it will receive later. The server then dis-
tributes the MAC keyKiT after one µTESLA interval. After a node V receives
the message M , it verifies the authenticity of the message using µTESLA. If
node V is a neighbor of U , V will remove its pairwise key shared with U
and update its cluster key. Each node encrypts the renewed global key with
its cluster key and transmits it to neighbors. This algorithm continues recur-
sively until all the nodes have received the renewed key.
2.3.2 The Time-based Key Management Scheme
In order to minimize the portion of compromised network when the initial key IK
is disclosed, Jang et al. [1] split the lifetime of a sensor network into P time slots
and each time slot is assigned with an initial key. As depicted in Figure 2.8, Tj
and Nj represent a time slot and a group of node deployed during that time slot Tj ,
respectively. If a node is deployed at time slot Tj , the sensor node is preloaded with
the initial key IKj and m master keys of randomly chosen time slots. Then the
newly deployed node can establish pairwise keys with nodes which are deployed
at the same or different time slots. Three situations exist for the establishment of
pairwise keys.
1. All nodes in the same group Nj (1 ≤ j ≤ P ) are able to establish pairwise
keys with each other using the initial key IKj during the time slot Tj .
2. Then, they are able to establish pairwise keys with other nodes which are
deployed at different time slots, but have the master key derived from the
current initial key. Suppose u is a node deployed at time slot Tj and v is
a node deployed before Tj . If the node v has the master key Kvj which is
derived from the initial key IKj for the time slot Tj , the node v can compute
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Figure 2.8: Key materials preloaded to nodes at different time slots in the scheme [1]
a pairwise key Kuv = fKvj(u). The node u is also able to generate a master
key of the node v, Kvj = fIKj(v).
3. Finally, a pair of sensor nodes that do not share any keying material but are
within each other’s communication range, can establish pairwise keys via
proxy nodes.
2.3.3 Security Issues
LEAP efficiently establishes multi-level keys. LEAP is energy-efficient since it
supports an in-network processing technique which greatly reduces network com-
munication. LEAP can minimizing the effects of selective forwarding attack by
restricting this problem to a local area. LEAP can also prevent a HELLO attack
since the nodes accept packets only from authenticated neighbors. However, LEAP
suffers from sinkhole attack. In a sinkhole attack, a compromised node attracts
packets by advertising information like high battery power, etc., then later drops
all the packets [41]. Like many other key management protocols, LEAP assumes
that sensor nodes are secure during the initialization phase and can be compromised
after the phase. However, such an assumption could be incorrect. The security of
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LEAP depends mainly upon the initial key which is erased from sensor nodes after
the initialization phase. However, the same initial key IK should be used again for
node addition after that phase, while the new node can be captured before removing
the initial key. Therefore, the initial key IK should never be used for node addition
in LEAP after the initial time Tmin. Different initial keys are used for different time
slots in the time-based key management scheme [1]. The threat caused by the dis-
closure of the initial key is eliminated. However, the key connectivity is constrained
by the number of preloaded master keys m and the order of the current time slot. If
m is far less than the lifetime P of the network, the key connectivity m
P−j is far less
than 1 at the time slots j (j ≤ P/2). On the contrary, if m is close to P , higher key
connectivity can be achieved with a heavy burden on storage.
We consider the security problem of the established pairwise key between two
nodes. The pairwise key does not exclusively belong to the two end nodes and threat
against confidentiality and authentication may arise from it. As shown in Figure 2 in
[1], Nodes of groupN1, N2, andN6 are preloaded with master keyKu7, the pairwise
keys between any two groups of them are known by the other group. In addition,
m master keys of randomly-chosen time slots are preloaded to the nodes when they
are deployed to the network without taking the lifetime of nodes into consideration.
Suppose a node which can survive at most Gw time slots is deployed at the j-th time
slot with m master keys of randomly-chosen time slots. Those master keys of the
time slots from the (j + Gw)-th to the P -th would never be used. They waste the
scant memory of sensor nodes.
2.4 Authentication Mechanisms in Key Management
Authentication guarantees that the entities with which one communicates are the
expected ones and the received data is the original one sent by the counterparts.
Generally speaking, an asymmetric key mechanism is required to authenticate mes-
sages. However, due to the resource constraints at sensor nodes, solutions based on
RSA-based authentication have unacceptable storage and computation overhead in
WSNs. Current research on authentication in WSNs focuses on unicast authenti-
cation, broadcast authentication, and filtering false data with Symmetric Key Cryp-
tography. Only in very recent years, has research been carried out on ECC-based
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authentication and lightweight authentication.
2.4.1 Unicast Authentication
Unicast authentication ascertains the origin and integrity of the transferred messages
when two nodes establish communication. If the two nodes share a secret sym-
metric key, a MAC can be generated with the shared key to ensure secure unicast
authentication. Perrig et al. proposed a suite of security protocols called Security
Protocols for WSNs (SPINS) optimized for WSNs [2]. SPINS includes two pro-
tocols: secure network encryption protocol (SNEP) and µTESLA. SNEP provides
unicast authentication, confidentiality, and replay protection through authentication
with MAC and encryption. µTESLA offers a solution for broadcast authentication.
With the SNEP protocol, two communicating nodes maintain a shared counter
to prevent replay attacks. The counter is initialized when two nodes begin commu-
nicating and increases it after each communication block. The counter aids both
the encryption process and the calculation of the MAC. SNEP generates the MAC
by running the plaintext message and the counter through the RC5 block cipher
in CBC-MAC mode. Since the MAC provides message integrity, the CRC field is
dropped. Thus, total packet length increases only by 6 bytes. SNEP provides origin
authentication and message integrity by appending an 8-byte MAC to the ciphertext.
It is unnecessary to send the counter along with each message, thereby minimizing
communication overhead. For those cases where strong freshness of message is
required, a nonce is employed.
SNEP has a number of unique advantages. It packages multi-functions into
one cryptographic protocol. SNEP achieves semantic security which prevents ad-
versaries from reading the plaintext even from multiple ciphertexts of the same
message. The use of the counter in encryption means that repeatedly encrypting
a message M would produce different ciphertexts. In addition, use of the counter
in calculation of the MAC provides weak message freshness and protection against
replay attack. However, Karlof et al. in [74] state that SNEP was neither fully
specified nor fully implemented, motivating the creation of TinySec.
The TinySec was designed as a replacement for the incomplete SNEP. TinySec
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aims to provide similar security: origin integrity, message integrity, replay protec-
tion, and message confidentiality. In SNEP, each node has to maintain a counter for
each node communicating with it. Since such a mechanism consumes a great deal
of memory,, TinySec removes the application of counters. TinySec secures wireless
sensor networks in a way that facilitates integration into sensor network applica-
tions. It uses CBS mode with ciphertext stealing for encryption and CBC-MAC
mode for authentication. TinySec provides two packet formats: TinySec-Auth for
origin and message authentication only, and TinySec-AE for authentication and en-
cryption. Since TinySec drops the TinyOS Group ID field, TinySec-Auth produces
only 1-byte of additional communication overhead.
TinySec makes use of MAC to provide authentication and message integrity.
The security of CBC-MAC is directly related to the length of the MAC. The secure
length of MACs usually ranges from 8-bytes to 16-bytes, while TinySec specifies
a 4-byte MAC for the trade-off between security and cost. Karlof et al. argue that
a 4-byte MAC meets the adequate level of security for WSNs [74]. This implies
that 231 packets must be generated in order to forge just one malicious packet. As a
compensating control, it is required that nodes signal the base station when the rate
of MAC failures exceeds a predefined threshold.
The TinySec MAC evolved from CBC-MAC block cipher mode. This con-
struction fails to secure variably sized messages. Three alternatives for generating
MACs of variably sized messages were provided later. TinySec is implemented
with Skipjack rather than RC5 because the latter requires additional RAM to store
a pre-computed key schedule. The implementation shows that the operational costs
of TinySec are relatively low.
2.4.2 Broadcast Authentication
Broadcast authentication guarantees that multiple recipients of a message can ver-
ify its origin and integrity. Perrig et al. [2] proposed a broadcast authentication
mechanism named µTESLA. Many techniques are used to extend the capabilities
of µTESLA in [28, 29, 30]. The scheme in [29] tailors µTESLA to local broadcast
authentication. The scheme in [28] overcomes the length limit of the hash chain.
The scheme in [30] extends µTESLA to support multicast scenarios.
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µTESLA divides the time period for broadcasting into multiple time intervals
and assigns different authentication keys to different time intervals. µTESLA em-
ploys a key chain of authentication keys. Each key in the key chain is the image
of the next key under a pseudo random function. µTESLA achieved broadcast au-
thentication through delayed disclosure of authentication keys in the key chain. The
sender selects a random value Kn as the last key in the key chain and repeatedly per-
forms the pseudo random function F to compute all the other keys: Ki = F (Ki+1)
(0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), where Ki is assigned to the i-th time interval. With the pseudo
random function F , given Ki in the key chain, anybody can compute all the pre-
vious keys Ki (1 ≤ i ≤ j), but nobody can compute any of the later keys Ki
(j + 1 ≤ i ≤ n). Thus, with the knowledge of the initial key K0, which is called
the ‘commitment of the key chain’, a receiver can authenticate any key in the key
chain by merely performing pseudo random function operations. When a broadcast
message is available in i-th time interval, the sender generates MAC for this mes-
sage with the key derived from Ki and then broadcast this message along with its
MAC and discloses the key Ki−d assigned to the time interval Ii−d, where d is the
disclosure lag of the authentication keys. The sender prefers a long delay in order
to make sure that all or most of the receiver s can receive its broadcast messages.
But, for the receivers, a long delay could result in a high storage overhead to buffer
the messages. As far as authentication is concerned, µTESLA is efficient because
only a one-way random function and Symmetric Key Cryptography based crypto-
graphic operations are needed to authenticate a broadcast message. However, the
base station has to unicast the parameters to the sensor nodes individually in the
initialization phase. Such a method for bootstrapping new receivers in µTESLA
does not scale to large WSNs. Therefore, the major barrier to using µTESLA is the
mismatch between the unicast-based distribution of key chain commitments and the
authentication of broadcast messages.
µTESLA is not suitable for local broadcast because µTESLA does not provide
authentication immediately. In µTESLA, nodes need to keep the packets in their
buffers until the authenticating key arrives. Local broadcast usually requires imme-
diate authentication. Pairwise keys cannot be used for local broadcast authentication
because, if a node has n neighbors, the approach requires the sender node to calcu-
late n MACs for each message. Local broadcast needs a method where a node can
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broadcast a message to all its neighbors using a single MAC and cluster keys, with
a problem as follows. If an adversary can compromise a node, the cluster key from
that node is available and can be used to attack the network by impersonating that
node or a neighboring node. If nodes X , U , and V are three vertices of a triangle,
X is compromised, and U wants to send messages to X and V , X can use node U ′s
cluster key to impersonate it and send false messages to V [41].
Zhu et al. [29] designed a one-way key chain based authentication scheme
which is based on µTESLA for defeating this attack. In the proposed authentication
scheme, each node generates a one-way key chain and sends the commitment of it
to their neighbors. If a node wants to send a message to its neighbors, it attaches the
next authorization key from its key chain to the message. The receiving node can
verify the validation of the key based on the commitment it has already received.
The one-way key chain based authentication is designed based on two observations
[41]: a node only needs to authenticate to its neighbors and that a node V will
receive a packet before a neighboring X receives it and re-sends it to V . This
observation is true because of the triangular inequality among the distances of nodes
involved. An adversary may still try to attack the nodes by shielding node V whileU
is transmitting a message, and then later send a modified packet to V with the same
authorization key; but this attack can be prevented by combining the authorization
keys with the cluster keys. When this is done, the adversary does not have the cluster
key and so cannot impersonate node U . However, this scheme does not provide a
solution for attacks from inside where the adversary knows U ’s cluster key.
The original idea of [28] is to predetermine and broadcast the initial parameters
required by µTESLA instead of unicast-based message transmission. The authors
presented a multi-level key chain scheme to efficiently distribute the key chain com-
mitments for µTESLA. Several techniques are also proposed to improve the surviv-
ability of the scheme and defeat some DoS attacks. By using pre-determination
and broadcast, the final multi-level approach removes µTESLA’s requirement of
a unicast-based distribution of initial key chain commitments and satisfies several
nice properties, including low overhead, tolerance of message loss, scabridity to
large networks, and resistance to replay attacks as well as DoS attacks. Despite
these advantages, several issues are not yet properly addressed. None of µTESLA
and multi-level µTESLA are scalable in terms of the number of senders. Though
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multi-level µTESLA schemes are scalable in terms of receivers, they either use
substantial bandwidth and storage at sensor nodes, or require significant resources
at senders to deal with DoS attacks. Subsequently, Liu et al. presented efficient
techniques in [30] to support a potentially large number of broadcast senders using
µTESLA instances as building blocks. The scheme has three advantages over the
multi-level µTESLA schemes. Firstly, the scheme allows broadcast authentication
with a large number of senders. Secondly, the scheme is not subject to the DoS at-
tacks against the distribution of µTESLA parameters. Thirdly, the proposed scheme
revokes the broadcast authentication capabilities from compromised senders with
two complementary approaches: a Merkle hash tree based scheme and a proactive
distribution based scheme. The former approach removes the authentication de-
lay as well as the vulnerability to DoS attacks during the distribution of µTESLA
parameters, while the latter proactively controls the distribution of the broadcast
authentication capability of each sender to allow the revocation of compromised
senders.
2.4.3 Filtering False Data
WSNs are susceptible to false data injection attacks because they are often deployed
in unattended environments. In false data injection attacks, an adversary may com-
promise several sensor nodes, and then use the compromised node and inject false
data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the re-
source of the relaying nodes. Once a node is compromised , all the security param-
eters stored in that node become accessible to the attacker. The compromised node
can successfully authenticate a bogus report to a neighbor, which has no way of
differentiating such false reports from legitimates ones. This attack falls in the cat-
egory of insider attacks. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent such
insider attack. A symmetric group key-based Statistical Enroute Filtering (SEF) of
injected data scheme, which allows both the base station and en-route nodes to de-
tect and drop false fata with certain probability, is proposed in [75]. SEF requires
that each sensing report be validated by multiple keyed MACs, each generated by
a node that detects the same event. As the report is forwarded, each node along
the way verifies the correctness of the MACs probabilistically and drops those with
invalid MACs at earliest points. The probability of detecting incorrect MACs in-
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creases with the number of hops the report travels. Depending on the path length,
there is a non-zero probability that some reports with incorrect MACs may escape
en-route filtering and be delivered to the sink. In any case, the sink will further
verify the correctness of each MAC carried in each report and reject false ones.
SEF exploits the network scale to determine the truthfulness of each report through
collective decision-making by multiple forwarding nodes. The basic components
of the scheme include a key assignment method designed for en-route detection of
false reports in the presence of compromised nodes and a mechanism for collective
data report generation, enroute report filtering, and sink verification. The analysis
and simulation results show that SEF can effectively detect false reports even when
the attacker has obtained the security keys from a number of compromised nodes,
as long as those keys belong to a small number of the key pool partitions. With an
overhead of 14 bytes per report, SEF is able to filter out 80% ∼ 90% false data by a
compromised node within 10 forwarding hops. SEF is the first step towards filter-
ing false data. SEF achieves this goal by carefully limiting the amount of security
information assigned to each individual node.
Three interleaved hop-by-hop authentication schemes was proposed in [76].
These schemes guarantee that the base station can detect injected false data im-
mediately when no more than a certain threshold nodes are compromised. More-
over, these schemes enable attempts to filter out false data packets injected into the
network by compromised nodes before they reach the base station, thus saving the
energy for relaying them. These schemes based on strong security assumptions. In
the security model, the base station has a mechanism to authenticate its broadcast
message and every node can verify the broadcast message. Such a broadcast mech-
anism can be achieved by µTESLA [2]. The schemes also assume that every node
shares a master security key with the base station and every node knows the authen-
ticated set of its one-hop neighbors and has established a pairwise key with each of
them. Such security assumptions can be achieved by the pairwise key establishment
scheme in LEAP [29]. In a sense, these schemes can be seen as the complement of
LEAP [29]. Though the local broadcast authentication mechanism is robust against
outsider attacks, it is vulnerable to insider attacks in which an adversary only needs
to compromise a single node to inject false data. In contrast, the interleaved hop-
by-hop authentication scheme is robust against insider attacks involving a certain
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number of compromised nodes. Indeed, the local broadcast authentication mech-
anism can be considered as a special case of the interleaved hop-by-hop scheme
where t = 0.
2.4.4 PKC-based Authentication
Even some public key cryptosystems are viable to WSNs. However, compared to
the secret key cryptography and one-way hash function, PKC is still much more
expensive. To maximize the life time of batteries, the use of PKC in WSNs must
be limited and optimized. Authenticating the public key is essential for PKC, and it
may happen many times. In general networks, public key authentication is achieved
by certificates. This operation involves an expensive signature verification on a cer-
tificate. Therefore, it is necessary to substitute the PKC authentication with algo-
rithms that consume much less energy. Du et al. [77] proposed to use one-way hash
function to conduct public key authentication in wireless sensor networks. Seeing
that sensors usually belong to one administrative entity before the deployment, they
can exchange the one-way hash values of their public keys securely prior to the
deployment. The Merkle tree technique is used such that each sensor only needs
to save one hash value while being able to authenticate all the public keys. Since
the communication is proportional to the height of the Merkle tree, they trim down
the single Merkle tree to a number of shorter trees to reduce the communication
overhead. The trimming scheme is based on sensor deployment knowledge and can
be described as follows: if B is more likely to be A′s neighbor, B should be in a
shorter tree of A, so the communication overhead to authenticate B′s public key is
lower; if B is less likely to be A′s neighbor, B can be put in a taller tree of A, be-
cause the authentication is less likely to occur. The performance evaluation shows
that the scheme can save up to 86% of the energy for the public key authentication
operation.
2.4.5 Lightweight Authentication
µTESLA [2] and its variants [28, 29, 30] achieved delayed authentication with the
requirement of loose time synchronization among nodes as well as the sharing of
initial secrets between authenticators and verifiers. However, in some scenarios,
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especially when the network size is large, it is hard to determine the bound of nor-
mal delay, and this can be exploited by the adversary to launch DoS attacks. SEF
[75] and interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme [76] use hash functions to
produce multiple MACs to authenticate messages. These two schemes are more ef-
ficient than the PKC-based approaches. However, because each secret key is shared
by multiple nodes, these schemes become ineffective or even useless if a large num-
ber of nodes are compromised. In addition, these schemes [2, 28, 29, 30, 75, 76]
cannot achieve non-repudiation, either.
Lightweight authentication is a new authentication mechanism designed for
RFID [78]. Zhang et al. lent this idea to WSNs [72]. They provided a lightweight
and compromise-resilient message authentication scheme which adopts a perturbed
polynomial-based technique to simultaneously accomplish the goals of lightweight,
resilience to a large number of node compromises, immediate authentication, scal-
ability and non-repudiation. The scheme achieves a good level of security by lo-
cal collaboration method. The perturbed polynomial-based message authentication
provides higher adaptability over existing authentication techniques based on mul-
tiple MACs [75, 76]. The proposed method also keeps the advantage of immediate
authentication held by those techniques. In addition, independent and random fac-
tors are employed to perturb polynomial shares that preloaded to individual nodes,
which significantly increases the complexity for the intruder to break the secret
polynomial, and therefore renders the proposed approach to be resilient to node
compromises. The authors claimed that the scheme is lightweight. However, the
higher level security is achieved at the cost of very high computation and commu-
nication overheads.
2.4.6 Security Issues of Authentication Mechanisms
The main problem of SNEP is that it was not fully specified and implemented.
TinySec is not perfectly resilient to attacks. The security of TinySec relies on a
single key, and therefore is unable to securely perform a rekey if necessary [64]. As
far as broadcast authentication is concerned, all µTESLA-like schemes [2, 28, 29,
30] require loosely time synchronization and the nodes suffer from severe energy-
depletion DoS attacks due to the nature of delayed message authentication. As far
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as filtering false data is concerned, collaborative filtering of false reports in [75]
requires that nodes share a certain amount of security information. The more secu-
rity information each forwarding node has, the more effective the en-route filtering
can be, but also the more secret the attacker can obtain from a compromised node.
However, the problem of how to evaluate the trade-off between these two conflict-
ing goals is not explored. The three hop-by-hop authentication schemes in [76] can
only be applied to data collection. They do not work for hop-by-hop data aggre-
gation applications and the applications in which more complex data reports other
than Boolean values are generated. Lightweight authentication and PKC-based au-
thentication are ideal alternative options for WSNs while the unique characteristics
and constraints of WSNs should be given full consideration. To date, no feasible
lightweight authentication and PKC-based authentication schemes have been pro-
posed for resource-constrained WSNs.
2.5 Self-healing Key Distribution Mechanisms
Faults in WSNs may stem from a variety of things, including hardware and software
design, radio interference, de-synchronization, unreliable communication channel,
battery exhaustion, or dislocation. It is a common assumption that both hardware
and software are well designed and implemented in sensor networks. Current re-
search considers node failure or compromise, and corrupted or undelivered packets.
The failure nodes may reduce the availability of the network and even lead to net-
work failure. Corrupted or undelivered packets compromise the effectiveness of the
aggregated results. Therefore, fault-tolerance is an essential attribute that should be
integrated into WSNs. To date, fault- tolerance techniques have been widely used in
WSNs from hardware to software, from the physical layer to the application layer.
We have mentioned that sensor nodes can be compromised or disabled and mes-
sages may be delayed or lost. These faults considerably affect the performance of
key management protocols. Most of existing solutions have been dedicated to mini-
mizing the computational and the communication overhead of key management pro-
tocols to meet scalability. However, most of the current research does not take these
faults into consideration and the majority of current key management protocols are
not designed to tolerate failures. In particular, node failure during key establishment
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is not addressed. However, such failure may block the key establishment process
resulting in significant communication overhead needed to re-synchronize the par-
ticipants to the shared key. Fault-tolerant property of key management guarantees
the establishment of a key between correct members even if service is halted due
to high traffic or system failure. Here we consider a self-healing key distribution
countermeasure to combat packet loss or corruption during key transmission.
Self-healing key distribution is a type of key distribution. Key distribution
schemes should meet availability, integrity, confidentiality, authentication and non-
reputation traditional security requirements. The same is true of self-healing key
distribution schemes. In addition, according to the feature and application envi-
ronment of self-healing key distribution, some particular evaluation measurements
should be highlighted. The first one is security. The security here includes not
only forward and backward secrecy, but also collusion resistance between the newly
joined nodes and the revoked nodes. Considering the wireless application environ-
ment, storage and bandwidth are regarded as constrained resources moreover, com-
putational power, storage, communication and computation overheads should be as
low as possible. Furthermore, the group may become too large to be managed by
a single party, thus raising the issue of scalability. A self-healing key distribution
scheme used in a resource-limited environment seeks to minimize the workloads of
both the group manager and end users in order to augment the scalability.
2.5.1 Classification of Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes
The success of a self-healing key distribution scheme is determined in part by its
capability of securely and efficiently recovering the session key in low-cost wireless
networks. Self-healing key distribution schemes can be broadly classified into un-
conditionally secure and computationally secure schemes. Unconditionally secure
schemes are based on information theory, which is generally considered to have
been founded in 1948 by Claude Shannon in his seminal work [79] and are defined
by entropy function H(·). On the other hand, computationally secure schemes are
based on one or several open hard problems. The first and several subsequent self-
healing key distribution schemes are unconditionally secure. In recent years, more
and more research works have dealt with computational secure schemes. Existing
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Table 2.2: Classification of self-healing key distribution schemes
Unconditionally secure Computationally secure
Theory basis Information theory Open problems
in cryptography
Polynomial [80, 81, 82, 83, 84] [6, 85, 86]
secret sharing [87, 88, 89]
Vector space [90, 91] [7, 92, 93]
secret sharing
Hash chain None [6, 7, 86, 92, 93, 94, 95]
SDR None [96, 97]
Bilinear None [98]
pairing
self-healing key distribution schemes can be classified into more classes with regard
to different cryptographic primitives on which they are based. They are polynomial
secret sharing, vector space secret sharing, hash chain, Subset Difference Rekeying
(SDR), and bilinear pairings based self-healing key distribution schemes.
Table 2.2 shows a classification based on the two criteria: unconditionally secure
VS. computationally secure and different cryptographic primitives on which they
are based.
2.5.2 The Model of Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes
The life span of a network is partitioned into time intervals called sessions. m
denotes the number of sessions, which should be determined in advance in some
schemes. Let U = {U1, . . . , Un} be the finite universe of users. Each user Ui has
a unique identifier IDi. A broadcast unreliable channel is available, and time is
defined by a global clock. The group manager sets up and manages, by means
of joining and revoking operations, a communication group which is a dynamic
subset of U . All the operations take place within a fixed range (here we suppose
the range is Fp, where p is a sufficiently large prime number). Let Gj ⊆ U be the
communication group established by the group manager in session j(j = 1, . . . ,m).
Each user Ui ∈ Gj holds a personal key Si, received from the group manager before
or when joining Gj . The personal key is used to recover the session keys as long
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Figure 2.9: The general communication model of self-healing key distribution
schemes
as Ui is not removed from the group by the group manager. Figure 2.9 depicts a
general communication model.
Let Rj ⊆ Gj−1 denotes the set of revoked group users in session j and Jj ⊂
U \Gj−1 denotes the set of users who join the group in session j with Rj ∩ Jj = φ.
Hence, Gj = (Gj−1 ∪ Jj) \ Rj for j ≥ 2 and by definition G1 = U . Moreover, for
session j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the session key Kj is chosen independently and according
to the uniform distribution on Fp. For any non-revoked user Ui ∈ Gj , the j-th
session key Kj is determined by broadcast information Bj and personal key Si. All
the aforementioned notions are used throughout the thesis.
Self-healing key distribution schemes are defined under security models. The
pioneering self-healing key distribution scheme [80] is unconditionally secure and
defined by entropy function H(·) (See [99] for more details). The subsequent mod-
els are slightly modified versions of the basic one.
To clarify the performance of the schemes and facilitate the later analysis, we
mention the following formal security model of the self-healing key distribution
scheme with revocation capability. Here we consider the original communication
model. Suppose there are n users and a group manager. The life-time of the network
is divided into m sessions. t is the maximum number of users that can be revoked
in the life-time of the network. We define the general unconditionally secure self-
healing key distribution scheme from two aspects. Definition 1 defines self-healing
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key distribution scheme with revocation capability. Definition 2 defines the proper-
ties of security including forward secrecy, backward secrecy and the capability of
collusion resistance.
Definition 1. Let U be the universe of users of a network, m be the maximum
number of sessions, and t be the maximum number of users that can be revoked by
the group manager.
1. The scheme is a session key distribution scheme if the following conditions
are true:
(a) For any user Ui ∈ Gj , the key Kj is determined by Bj and Si. Formally,
it holds that:
H(Kj|Bj,Si) = 0. (2.1)
(b) What users learn from the broadcast Bj and their own personal key cannot
be determined from the broadcasts or personal keys alone. That is:
H(K1, . . . ,Km|B1, . . .Bm) = H(K1, . . . ,Km|SG1∪...∪Gm) = 0. (2.2)
2. The scheme has t-revocation capability if, for each session j, let R = Rj ∪
. . . ∪ R1, such that |R| ≤ t, the group manager can generate a broadcast Bj
such that the collusion of all revoked users in R cannot recover Kj . Formally,
it holds that:
H(Kj|B1, . . .Bj,SR) = H(Kj) (2.3)
where SR denotes the set of personal keys of all users in R.
3. The scheme is self-healing if the following property is satisfied:
Every Ui ∈ Gr, who has not been revoked after session r and before session
s, from broadcast messages Br and Bs, where 1 ≤ r < s ≤ m, can recover
all keys Kl, for l = r, . . . , s. Formally, it holds that:
H(Kr, . . . ,Ks|Br,Bs,Si) = 0. (2.4)
72
Definition 2. Let U = {U1, . . . , Un} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The scheme guaran-
tees both forward and backward secrecy if the following properties are satisfied:
1. For any set R ⊆ U , and all the users in R are revoked before session j, it
is computationally infeasible for the Ui ∈ R together to get any informa-
tion about Kj , even with the knowledge of group keys K1, . . . , Kj−1 before
session j. Formally, it holds that:
H(Kj|B1, . . . ,Bm, {Si}Ui∈R, K1, . . . , Kj−1) = H(Kj) (2.5)
2. For any set J ⊆ U , and all Ul ∈ U join after session j, it is computationally
infeasible for the users in J together to get any information about Kj , even
with the knowledge of group keys Kj+1, . . . , Km after session j. Formally, it
holds that:
H(Kj|B1, . . . ,Bm, {Si}Ui∈R, Kj+1, . . . , Km) = H(Kj) (2.6)
3. Let C ⊆ Rr ∪ . . . ∪ R1 be a coalition of users removed before session r and
let D ⊆ Js ∪ . . .∪ Jm be a coalition of users who join the group from session
s. Let |C ∪D| ≤ t. Then, such a coalition does not get any information about
keys Kj , for any r ≤ j < s. Formally, it holds that:
H(Kr, . . . ,Ks−1|B1, . . . ,Bm,SC ,SD) = H(Kr, . . . ,Ks−1) (2.7)
In Definition 1, Condition (1) states that every user Ui, from the broadcast Bj
and its own personal key Si, recovers the current session key Kj; however, per-
sonal keys and broadcasts alone do not give any information about any session key.
Condition (2) means the group manager is able to revoke at most t users from the
group. Conditions (3) characterizes the self-healing property: any two broadcasts
are enough to recover all lost session keys for the “sandwich” sessions. In Definition
2, Condition (1) and Condition (2) describes the forward secrecy and backward se-
crecy respectively. Condition (3) defines the feature of resisting collusion. It states
that a coalition of or less t revoked users and the newly joined users cannot obtain
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Figure 2.10: The basic procedures in a general self-healing key distribution
any information about the current session key.
2.5.3 The Procedures of Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes
Self-healing key distribution entails five basic procedures, namely Setup, Broadcast,
Key Recovery, Adding/Revoking Users, and Self-healing. The basic procedures in a
general self-healing key distribution are described in Figure 2.10. The entities in a
self-healing key distribution scheme include a group manager and a great number of
end users. The group manager is responsible for the procedures of Setup, Broadcast
and Adding/Revoking Users. The end users perform Key Recovery and Self-healing.
In Figure 2.10, The large pane 1 includes the operations performed by the group
manager, while the large pane 2 includes all the operations performed by the end
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users. The small panes are operations which must be executed in each round, while
the small dashed frames represent the operations which cannot be executed in some
rounds of the scheme.
1. Setup. The group manager chooses and releases system parameters. It also
generates and privately distributes personal keys to current group users. It
is supposed that the personal keys are distributed in an off-line manner or
there is a secure channel between the group manager and each user in this
procedure. At last, the group manager chooses m session keys K1, · · · , Km
from a fixed key space (for example Fp). These session keys are independent
to each other and according to uniform distribution.
2. Broadcast. Suppose |Gj| denotes the number of users in session j. For each
session 1 ≤ j ≤ m, according to the session group Gj , the group manager
computes and broadcasts message Bj so that only authorized users can re-
cover the session key from the broadcast message and their personal keys.
At the same time, the construction of the broadcast message should meet the
properties of forward and backward secrecy even the property of collusion
resistance.
3. Key Recovery. When an authorized user Ui ∈ Gj receives the broadcast mes-
sage Bj , it can recover the session key for the j-th session using its personal
key and the received broadcast message.
4. Adding/Revoking Users. When the group manager wants to add a new user
from session j, it will generate and privately distribute a personal key to the
new user so that the new user can recover session keys in subsequent sessions.
Similarly, if the group manager wants to revoke a user from session j, it will
add or delete some information related to the revoked user in the procedure
of Broadcast so that the revoked user cannot recover the session keys in sub-
sequent sessions. Both forward and backward secrecy, and the property of
collusion resistance, should be guaranteed in this procedure.
5. Self-healing. If a user misses some broadcast messages before session j,
when it receives the broadcast message in session j, it can recover all the
lost session keys using its personal key and the broadcast Bj . The only re-
quirement that must be satisfied, in order for the user to recover the lost keys,
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is the membership in the group both before and after the sessions in which
the broadcast messages containing the keys are sent.
Among these procedures, Setup occurs only during the period of initialization.
Broadcast and Key Recovery are performed in each session. While Adding/Revoking
Users does not necessarily occur in each session. Self-healing is triggered by the
loss of broadcast messages. It only happens in the sessions after the broadcast
messages have been lost.
2.5.4 Typical Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes
In this section, we present an overview of existing works in the area of self-healing
key distribution according to their classification. Here we omit the proof of secu-
rity of each scheme because the security of each scheme was proved in the corre-
spondingly proposed paper. Nevertheless, we thoroughly analyze and compare the
performance of schemes in the same classification.
Polynomial secret sharing based self-healing key distribution schemes
The idea of self-healing key distribution was introduced by Staddon et al. in the
pioneering work [80]. Formal definitions, lower bounds on the resources as well
as some constructions of self-healing key distribution scheme were proposed. The
group manager, at the beginning of each session, in order to provide a key to each
user of the group, sends packets over an unreliable broadcast channel. Combined
with the pre-distributed secret key, every authorized user can recover the session
key from the packets. In this way, the group manager can launch multiple sessions
during a certain time interval, by adding/removing users to/from the initial group.
The self-healing feature in the key distribution scheme enables a group manager
to distribute session keys to a dynamic group over an unreliable network. If at
the beginning of a certain session some broadcasted packets get lost, then users
are still capable of recovering the session key for that session simply by using the
packets they have received at the beginning of a previous session and the packets
they will receive at the beginning of a subsequent one, without requesting additional
transmission from the group manager. The only requirement that a user must satisfy
in order to recover the lost keys through self-healing is its membership in the group
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both before and after the sessions in which the broadcast messages containing the
keys are sent. This approach reduces network traffic and the work load on the group
manager as well as the risk of user exposure through traffic analysis. This has made
self-healing key distribution a hot research topic.
Liu et al. generalized the definitions in [80] and presented several construc-
tions in [81]. The scheme introduced a novel key distribution scheme firstly by
using both a revocation polynomial and a mask polynomial. Then they added the
self-healing feature to the basic key distribution scheme, thereby greatly reducing
communication and storage overhead. Furthermore, they developed two techniques
that allow a trade-off between the broadcast message size and the recoverability of
lost session keys. The first technique deals with possibly frequent but short-term
communication failures and the second technique targets situations where there are
relatively long-term but infrequent communication failures. The two methods fur-
ther reduced the size of broadcast messages in these two conditions respectively. An
unreasonable requirement of [81] is that the set of revoked group users must change
monotonically. That is, Rj1 ⊆ Rj2 for sessions j1 and j2 (1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m).
Otherwise, a group user who is revoked in session j1, rejoins the group in a later
session j2, can recover the key for session j1. Therefore, the scheme is prone to a
rejoin-collusion attack and does not allow temporary revocation.
More et al. in [89] addressed the three problems in [80] using a sliding window
mechanism. The three problems are inconsistent robustness, high overhead and
expensive maintenance cost. The scheme achieved good performance. Above all,
the use of a sliding window mechanism makes error recovery consistently robust. In
addition, the group manager is entitled to spread the cost of personal key distribution
over multiple sessions, rather than having to distribute new personal keys to all users
at the same time. Furthermore, by reusing the masking polynomial, personal key
storage and broadcast size are dramatically reduced.
Blundo et al. in [83] proposed a new mechanism for implementing self-healing
key distribution. Moreover, they described a secure and efficient construction which
has optimal memory storage and communication complexity. Shortly afterwards, in
[87] they presented an attack on the first construction in [80]. Then, they proposed
a new self-healing key distribution scheme, which requires low storage and com-
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munication overhead. Finally, they slightly modified the security model, in order to
extend the self-healing key distribution model, and proposed a scheme which en-
ables a user to recover from a single broadcast message all those keys associated
with sessions in which it is a user of the communication group. They pointed out
two problems of the long-lived Construction 5 in [80]. In [80], the values that are
used for computing the instances of the personal key are sent by means of a single
broadcast message at the beginning of each new set of m sessions. Since the net-
work is not reliable, if some user does not receive such a message, it will retreat
from the corresponding m sessions. This problem is solved by sending with each
broadcast the values that are used for evolving the personal key in each session.
For the solution of the first problem, the involved cost of modular exponentiation
operations is too high to be affordable for low-cost wireless networks. This solution
turned out to be infeasible. The second problem lies in the join operation in the
presence of new users. It cannot be solved by slightly modifying Construction 5
given in [80] and Scheme 4 given in [87] in order to enable a secure join. It is still
an open problem.
Hong et al. proposed a new self-healing key distribution scheme in [82]. It is
one of the efficient unconditionally secure self-healing key distribution schemes.
As the original self-healing key distribution scheme, it includes five procedures:
• Setup. The group manager randomly chooses m t-degree polynomials s1(x),
. . . , sm(x) ∈ Fp[x] and m session keys K1, . . . , Km ∈ Fp. Both polynomials
and session keys are independent on each other and according to uniform
distribution. Then, the group manager privately sends personal key Si =
{s1(i), . . . , sm(i)} to Ui (i = 1, . . . , n).
• Broadcast. LetWj = {rj1, . . . , rjwj} be the set of revoked user IDs for sessions
in and before j such that |Wj| = wj ≤ t, and let rj(x) = (x − rj1), . . . , (x −
rjwj). The broadcast message for the j-th (j = 1, . . . ,m) session is in this
form:
Bj = {P1(x), . . . , Pj(x)} ∪ {Wi}i=1,...,j,
where Pj(x) = rj(x)Kj + sj(x).
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• Key Recovery. When a user Ui ∈ Gj receives the j-th broadcast message, it






• Adding/Revoking Users. When the group manager wants to add a new user
starting from the r−th session, it gives an unused unique identity i′ ∈ Fp,
computes personal keys corresponding to the current and future sessions {sk(i′)}
(k = r, . . . ,m) and privately sends the keys to this new user. When the group
manager wants to revoke a user Ui′ starting from session s, it adds the identity
i′ ∈ Fp to Wj for j = s, . . . ,m.
• Self-healing. For any Ui that is a user in session r and s (1 ≤ r < s ≤ m), it
can recover {Pr(i), . . . , Ps(i)}. Using the method described in Key Recovery,
Ui can subsequently recover the whole sequence of session keys Kr, . . . , Ks.
Compared with previous schemes, this scheme has good combined performance.
It is optimal in terms of user memory storage and more efficient in terms of com-
munication complexity.
The schemes in [80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89] focus on unconditionally secure
self-healing key distribution. The definitions and constructions were stated in terms
of the entropy function. Blundo et al. in [100] analyzed current definitions of self-
healing key distribution. They showed that no protocol can achieve the security
requirements stated in [80, 81] and identified where the proposed schemes fail.
They also showed that a previously derived lower bound on the size of the broadcast
messages that the group manager has to send in order to establish session keys,
proved in [80] and also used in [81], does not hold. After analysis, they proposed a
new definition of self-healing key distribution and showed that it could be achieved
by concrete schemes. Some lower bounds on the resources, such as user memory
storage and communication complexity, required for implementing such schemes,
were given finally and showed that these lower bounds were tight through simple
constructions.
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Dutta claimed that they realized unconditionally secure self-healing key distri-
bution schemes in [101, 102]. The storage overhead in these two papers is (t +
1)logp, where t is the maximum number of compromised users and p is the key
space. However, this claim cannot hold. Indeed, in [80, 87, 90], it has been proved
that a lower bound on the size of the storage overhead is equal to (m− j + 1)logp,
where m is the life-time of the network, j is order of the current session, and logp is
the size of the distributed key. According to the above-mentioned bound, one can-
not design an unconditional secure self-healing scheme for m sessions by giving to
each user a (t + 1)logp-size secret key which is updated by a broadcast message.
The schemes in [80, 87, 90] are referenced by both [101, 102], but it seems that the
authors missed this lower bound.
Zou and Dai in [88] proposed a new self-healing scheme based on a novel con-
cept of access polynomial. It overcomes some shortcomings of existing schemes
yet still possesses all their advantages. We should point out that the communication
overhead in [88] comes from broadcast Bj which is comprised of 2(m+1) polyno-
mials. As far as the polynomial Pj(x) is concerned, Pj(x) = Aj(x) ·Sj(x)+H(x).
Both Sj(x) and H(x) are t degree polynomials, and the degree of Aj(x) amounts
to (|Gj| + 1) where |Gj| is the number of users in current communication group.
Generally speaking, |Gj| is larger than t. Therefore, the claim that communication
overhead is O(mt) is incorrect.
Tian et al. introduced and improved an secret sharing scheme in [85]. Then,
they applied the secret sharing scheme to the design of a self-healing key scheme.
The new scheme possesses several desirable properties. Firstly, the scheme reduces
storage overhead of personal key to a constant. Secondly, the scheme cancels the re-
quirement of secure channel in the Setup phase. In addition, the long-lived scheme
is much more efficient than those in [80, 87]. However, efficiency is improved at
the cost of relaxing the security slightly. The scheme is a computationally secure
scheme. By introducing a one-way key chain, Dutta et al. proposed two construc-
tions of scalable self-healing key distribution with t revocation capability in [86].
The schemes greatly reduce both communication and computation overheads with-
out increasing storage overhead. At the same time, forward and backward secrecy
are achieved. However, there is a fatal defect in their constructions. The collusion
between the newly joined users and the revoked users can recover all the session
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keys to which they were not authorized.
In terms of storage overhead, the schemes require that each user stores a per-
sonal key for each session. It comes from the procedure of Setup and after receiving
the session key distribution broadcast. Communication overhead comes from the
procedure of Broadcast. Generally speaking, the broadcast message for the j-th
session consists of identifiers of a set of revoked users. Since the user identities can
be selected from a small finite field, one can ignore the communication overhead
incurred by the identifies of all the revoked users set [82]. Computation overhead
is introduced by the procedures of Key Recovery and Self-healing. It is supposed
that the group manager has more computation resources while end users have lim-
ited computational ability. Therefore, we consider the computation cost only at user
end. For the different cryptographic primitives on which the schemes are based, the
computation overhead varies.
To clarify the performance of the proposed schemes, we present a thorough
comparison of them. Table 2.3 summarizes the comparison in terms of storage,
communication, computation overheads and several security parameters. We use C
to denote Construction and S to denote Scheme, for example, C3 in [80] denote
the Construction 3 in [80]. We suppose the life-span of schemes is m sessions. j
represents the order of a session, t represents the maximum number of users that
can be revoked and logp represents the length of private and session keys. The stor-
age overhead is measured by the length of the personal key. The communication
overhead comes from broadcast messages. For a user Ui at the j-th session, the
computation overhead is incurred by recovering all previous session keys up to the
j-session (worst case) by self-healing mechanism [86]. The key recovery opera-
tions include computing one or more points on polynomials (such as operations in
[81, 82]) or recovering a t degree polynomial by using Lagrange formulation (such
as operations in [83, 85, 86, 87]) or both (such as operations in [80]). Computing a
point on a t-degree polynomial requires at most t multiplication operations because
division can be regarded as multiplication when we calculate computation overhead.
Compared with the overhead produced by multiplication, the overhead produced by
addition and hash operations can be ignored. Therefore, the computation cost for
each user is 2t + 1 of Construction 1 in [86], whereas the computation complexity
of the scheme of Construction 1 in [82] is j(2t + 1). Recovery of a t degree poly-
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Table 2.3: Performance comparison of the different polynomial secret sharing-based
self-healing key distribution schemes
Method Storage Communication Computation Forward and Collusion Secure
overhead overhead overhead backward resistance channel in
secrecy initialization
C3 in [80] (m− j + 1)2logp (mt2 + 2mt 2mt2 + 3mt− t Both, t-wise At most t Yes
+m+ t)logp
S3 in [81] 2(m− j + 1)logp [(m− j + 1)t+ mt+ t+ 2tj + j Both, t-wise At most t Yes
(m+ 1)]logp
S2 in [87] (m− j + 1)logp (2tj + j)logp 2j(t2 + t) Both, t-wise At most t Yes
C1 in [82] (m− j + 1)logp (tj + j − t− 1)logp j(2t+ 1) Both, t-wise At most t Yes
[83] (m− j + 1)logp tj(t+ 1)logp j(2t2 + 3t) Both, t-wise At most t Yes
[85] logp j(t+ 1)logp j(logp+ 2t2 + 2t) Both, t-wise At most t No
C1 in [86] (m− j + 1)logp (t+ 1)logp 2t+ 1 Both, t-wise No Yes
C2 in [86] (m− j + 1)logp (t+ 1)logp 2(t2 + t) Both, t-wise No Yes
nomial by using Lagrange formulation requires 2{(t + 1)2 − (t + 1)} = 2(t2 + t)
multiplication operations. Thus the computation overhead of Scheme 2 in [87] is
2j((t2+ t)) and that of Construction 2 in [86] is 2((t2+ t)). t-wise for forward and
backward secrecy means these schemes can keep forward and backward secrecy for
the coalition of at most t unauthorized users. The capability of resisting collusion
means the scheme is secure even at most t newly joined users and revoked users
collude to recover the session keys that they do not authorized to access. To date,
the scheme in [85] has been the only self-healing key distribution scheme without
the requirement of a secure channel between members and the group manager in
the initialization stage.
Vector space secret sharing based self-healing key distribution schemes
Sa´ez in [90] considered applying vector space secret sharing instead of polyno-
mial secret sharing schemes to a realize self-healing key distribution scheme. The
scheme makes use of general monotone decreasing structures for the family of sub-
sets of users that can be revoked, instead of a threshold one. Thus, the scheme
achieves more flexible performance than do the polynomial secret sharing based
schemes. Another advantage of the scheme is that the distance between the broad-
casts used to recover the lost one is variable. The reason for this modification is
to allow adjustment of the length of broadcasts according to the condition of net-
works. In the same year, Sa´ez in [91] considered the possibility that a coalition of
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users sponsor a user outside the group for one session. Firstly, the formal definition
and some bounds on the required amount of information were given. Then a general
construction of a family of self-healing key distribution schemes with sponsoriza-
tion was presented. The sponsorization mechanism strengthens the robustness of
the scheme. An authorized subset of users in the group has the ability to invite a
new user to join the group without the help of the group manager. Both [90] and [91]
are unconditionally secure schemes. The model in [91] not only includes Definition
1 and Definition 2, but also includes Definition 3.
Definition 3. The scheme has the property of sponsorization. This means that
the three following properties are satisfied:
1. Every user Ul ∈ Gj can generate a proof of sponsorization P jli to sponsor a
user Ui 6∈ Gj for session j using its personal key. In other words:
H(P jli|Sl) = 0. (2.8)
2. A user Ui 6∈ Gj that receives enough sponsorization from a subset of users
A ⊂ Gj with A ∈ Γ can compute the key Kj in the same conditions that
users in Gj . That is: for A ∈ Γ, A ⊂ Gj , i 6∈ Gj and r ≤ j ≤ s, there exists
H(Kj|P jAi, Br, Bs) = 0 (2.9)
3. Suppose that a coalition of users Ui1 , . . . , Uiu 6∈ Gj , not revoked before ses-
sion j, have received sponsorization from subsets of users C1, . . . , Cu 6∈ Γ
respectively, with C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cu = {Ul1 , . . . , Ulv} ⊂ Gj . This action is
performed in such a way that users Ul1 , . . . , Ulv sponsor subsets of users
D1, . . . , Dv ∈ S respectively, with D1∪ . . .∪Dv = {Ui1 , . . . , Uiu} ⊂ U−Gj;
therefore P jC1i1 , . . . , P
j
Cuiu
= P jl1D1 , . . . , P
j
lvDv
. In these conditions, such a
coalition does not get any information about the value of key Kj . Formally,
it holds that:
H(Kj|P jC1i1 , . . . , P jCuiu , Br, Bs) = H(Kj) (2.10)
for C1, . . . , Cu 6∈ Γ, D1, . . . , Dv ∈ S, such that P jC1i1 , . . . , P jCuiu = P jl1D1 , . . .,
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P jlvDv , C1∪. . .∪Cu = {Ul1 , . . . , Ulv} ⊂ Gj , D1∪. . .∪Dv = {Ui1 , . . . , Uiu} ⊂
U −Gj and r ≤ j ≤ s.
In Definition 3, Condition (1) describes the property of sponsorization: the infor-
mation used to sponsor is computed from the personal key. Condition (2) describes
the fact that the information obtained from enough sponsorizations with the corre-
spondent broadcast allows to compute the personal key of the session. Condition
(3) describes the security requirement: a coalition of users outside Gj sponsored
by an insufficient number of users cannot obtain any information about the value of
the key Kj . The key remains secure even if every user receives sponsorization of a
coalition in S.
In fact, polynomial secret sharing based self-healing key distribution scheme is a
particular case of vector space secret sharing based scheme. with polynomial secret
sharing based schemes, the access structure is fixed to the degree of the underlying
polynomial. Therefore, vector space secret sharing based schemes achieve more
flexible properties.
The schemes [90, 91] use the same vector space secret sharing mechanism. The
storage, communication and computation overheads are very similar. In terms of
storage overhead, each user has to store a personal key of size (m − j + 1)logp in
[90, 91]. The storage overhead is optimal with respect to Theorem 1 in [90]. The
communication overhead comes from the broadcast which depends on the particular
function ψ used. According to [90], the broadcast can be divided two parts. The
first part of broadcast is defined as (xj, yj). The total number of broadcast bits is
(1 + (t + 1)(m − 1 − 0.5t))logp. According to [91], B11 and B1m have 0.5tmlogp
bits and B1j for j 6= 1,m has 0.5t(m − 1)logp bits. Then the total number of
broadcast bits is 0.5t(m2−m+2)logp. The second part of the broadcast in [90, 91]
is composed of the identities of revoked users and its purpose is to perform the
rejection action as well as the recovery of the session key. Its length depends on
the history of rejected subsets. Since the user identities can be chosen from a small
finite field, we can ignore the communication overhead for the broadcast of all those




l + tl) because the
user Ui has to compute ψ(D)Pj =
∑
k∈Wj∪{i} λkψ(k)Pj for each lost key. Here we
use Table 2.4 to highlight the features of the two schemes.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of features of vector space secret sharing based self-healing
key distribution schemes
Scheme Storage Communication Computation Resisting Sponsorization
overhead overhead overhead collusion
[90] (m− j + 1)logp (1 + (t+ 1) 2∑jl=1(t2l + tl) Yes No
(m− 1− t/2))logp
[91] t(m− j + 1)logp 0.5t(m2 +m+ 2)logp 2∑jl=1(t2l + tl) Yes Yes
SDR-based self-healing key distribution schemes
SDR [103] is a stateless rekeying method. In this protocol, a key server maintains
a logical key tree and every user is mapped to a leaf node of the key tree. In each
rekeying operation, the key server partitions the current group into a minimal num-
ber of subsets, and then encrypts the new group key with the common key of each
subset respectively. In this scheme, the communication overhead is independent of
the group size; thus, the scheme is scalable. One of the advantages of the scheme is
that there is no dependency between the keys used in different rekeying operations.
In order to decode the current group key, a user only needs to receive the keys that
are transmitted by the key server during the current rekey operation. This property
makes the SDR scheme very attractive for secure multicast applications where users
may go off-line frequently or experience burst packet losses.
The SDR method performs well in key recovery operations and is secure against
the collusion of any number of revoked users. By contrast, the polynomial-based
key distribution scheme proposed by Liu et al. in [81] has the similar message size
and has a feature whereby group users can recover the session key on their own
under certain conditions. However, this protocol has a constraint which may limit
its application. That is, the maximum number of users that can be revoked during
the life-long time of networks has to be pre-determined and must not be exceeded
for the sake of security. The maximum number of users that can be revoked depends
on the degree of the polynomial. The higher the degree of the polynomial, the larger
is the number of users that can be revoked, and the higher is the communication and
computation overhead and vice versa.
Zhu et al. first addressed the addition of a self-healing feature to SDR in [96].
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The key idea is to bind the ability of a user to recover a lost group key to its mem-
bership duration. They used a one-way hash key chain such that revoked users and
new users cannot collude to recover the keys that they should not know. The notions
are different from those used in the general self-healing key distribution schemes.
The scheme can be explained as follows:
1. In each group rekeying, the group manager generates a key chain of size
(m + 1). Let the keys in the key chain generated for the rekeying at T (i) be
Km(i), . . . , K1(i), K0(i), where K0(i) = H(K1(i)) = H2(K2(i))) = . . . =
Hm(Km(i))) and H is a one-way hash function such as SHA-1. Due to the
one-way property of the hash function, a user who knows Kji can compute all
the keys Kj−1(i), . . . , K0(i) independently, but it can not compute all of the
keys Kj+1(i), . . . , Km(i). K0(i) is the group key that all the users should use
for data encryption between T (i) and T (i+ 1).
2. The users in the group are considered to be partitioned into m+1 subgroups,
and depending upon their membership duration, each subgroup is associated
with a separate key from the one-way key chain generated in the first step.
Specifically, Kj(i) is the key intended for the users that joined the group at
T (i− j) for 0 ≤ j < m, and Km(i) is the key intended for users that joined
at or before T (i−m).
3. The group manager broadcasts m encrypted keys as shown below:
{K0(i−m)}K0(i−m−1)⊕Km(i), . . . , {K0(i− 1)}K0(i−2)⊕K1(i). (2.11)
The communication overhead of this protocol is very small. To allow an autho-
rized user to recover the previous s group keys, the number of additional encryption
keys to be transmitted is at most 3s.
Bohio et al. in [97] considered incorporating the self-healing feature into the
SDR rekeying method. Some optimization techniques that can be used to reduce
the overhead caused by the self-healing capability were proposed in the paper. In
addition, the idea of mutual-healing was discussed. One motivation behind mutual-
healing is that, if a node has missed a key updating message, it does not have to
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wait until the next update broadcast to recover the previous session key; instead,
it can acquire assistance from its neighboring nodes to recover that key instantly.
However, the SDR scheme itself has a limitation. The positions of the revoked
users in the tree can not be reused. Hence, deficiency discounts the feasibility of
SDR-based self-healing key distribution schemes.
Hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes
Jiang et al. proposed an efficient self-healing group key scheme with time-limited
node revocation based on dual directional hash chains (DDHC) in [94]. The perfor-
mance of the proposed scheme in a poor broadcast channel was evaluated by both
theoretical analysis and numerical results. The result shows that the scheme toler-
ates high channel loss rate, and hence achieves a good balance between performance
and security. Therefore, it is suitable for wireless networks.
As aforementioned, the schemes [86, 92] are based on a hash chain. The dif-
ference is that [86] utilizes a polynomial secret sharing masking mechanism thus
the maximum number of the revoked users is constrained by the degree of polyno-
mial while [92] adopts a general access structure that achieves flexibility. The pro-
posed self-healing technique enables better performance over previous approaches
in terms of storage, communication and computation complexity. They provided
proof of the security of their scheme under an appropriate security framework. The
proof shows that the scheme is computationally secure and achieves both forward
and backward secrecy. Kausar et al. proposed a simpler self-healing key distribu-
tion scheme in [95]. In their scheme, all broadcast messages are masked with XOR
operation. The scheme is efficient in terms of storage and computation overhead.
However, the operation of dealing with a compromised node is too impractical to af-
ford. If one compromised node is detected, all nodes are forced to be re-initialized.
Due to the efficiency of hash function, these schemes greatly reduce both com-
munication and computation overheads. At the same time, forward and backward
secrecy are achieved. However, there is a fatal defect in these constructions. The
collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked users will recover all
the session keys to which they are not entitled. Tian et al. in [93] dealt with the
problem gracefully. They assigned each user Ui a pre-arranged life cycle (si, ti).
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Random numbers which are related to the users’ membership are used in the pro-
cedure of Key Recovery. Compared with the scheme in [92], the scheme in [93] not
only maintains forward and backward secrecy, but also resists collusion between
the newly joined users and the revoked users. As far as we know, this is the first
time that a scheme has been proposed to withstand a collusion attack against hash-
chain-based self-healing key distribution. The schemes in [6, 7] slightly reduced
storage and computation overheads of the scheme in [93] with a polynomial secret
sharing masking mechanism and vector space secret sharing masking mechanism,
respectively. In our recent research, we found that the schemes [6, 7, 93] can only
resist collusion between the users whose life cycles have finished, and newly joined
users. They in fact could not resist collusion attacks of the newly joined users and
the revoked users whose life cycles have not yet expired. This problem remains
unsolved.
The hash chain itself cannot be the only cryptographic primitive of a self-healing
key distribution scheme. It forms a self-healing key distribution scheme together
with other cryptographic primitives. For example, the scheme [94] is based on hash
function and MAC, the scheme [95] is based on hash function and XOR operation,
the scheme in [6, 86] is based on hash function and polynomial secret sharing, while
the schemes in [7, 92, 93] are based on hash chain and vector space secret sharing.
These schemes have some common characteristics while each has its own special
features as well. We summarize the features of one-way hash function based self-
healing key distribution schemes in Table 2.5 without [94]. In fact, the scheme in
[94] is a totally different self-healing group key distribution mechanism. It supposes
that there is a buffer at each sensor in order to recover the lost session keys. Each
user has to send the Request Key message to explicitly request the current rekey-
ing message for the current session. That is, this self-healing mechanism involves
the interaction between the user and the group manager. The communication over-
head varies at a different user end and it depends on how many rekeying messages
the user fails to receives and how large the renewal interval t is. Because each
message is encrypted with a Traffic Encryption Key (TEK), the computation over-
head varies according to the encryption mechanism. The authors did not suggest
which encryption mechanism is suitable for the scheme. Therefore, we exclude the
scheme [94] from the Table 2.5. In Table 2.5, the storage overhead of a user Ui
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Table 2.5: Summary of the one-way hash function based self-healing key distribution
schemes
Scheme Cryptographic primitives Storage Communication Computation partial collusion
overhead overhead overhead resistance
C1 of [86] hash function and (m− j + 1)logp (t+ 1)logp 2t+ 1 No
polynomial secret sharing
[92] hash function and vector 2(ti − si + 1)logp (tj + 1)logp 2(tj2 + tj) No
space secret sharing
[95] hash function and XOR (m− j + 2)logp jlogp constant No
operation
[93] hash function, vector space (2ti − 2si + 3)logp (tj + 1)logp 2(tj2 + tj) Yes
secret sharing and XOR operation
C1 in [6] hash function, polynomial 2(ti − si + 1)logp (t+ 1)logp 2t(t+ 1) Yes
secret sharing
C2 in [6] hash function, polynomial 2(ti − si + 1)logp (t+ 1)logp 2(t+ 1) Yes
secret sharing
[7] hash function, vector space (ti − si + t+ 2)logp (tj + 1)logp 2(tj2 + tj) Yes
secret sharing
is the size of its personal key which is closely related to its life cycle (si, ti). The
communication overhead is produced by the broadcast messages for Key Recovery
and Self-healing. The communication overhead at the j−th session in [7, 92, 93]
is (tj + 1)logp bits, where tj = |Wj ∪ Rj|, Rj 6∈ Γ is the set of all revoked users
for sessions in and before j and Wj ⊂ U\Gj with minimum cardinality such that
Wj ∪ Rj ∈ Γ0. The computation overhead is measured by the number of multi-
plications in the underlying field. In terms of computation overhead of the scheme
in [95], it only includes hash and XOR operations, so the computation overhead
at user end in [95] is a constant compared with that of other schemes such as those
in [92] and [93]. The computation overhead of Key Recovery in [7, 92, 93] is
2(t2j + tj). This is the number of multiplication operations needed to recover ψ(D)
by using equation ψ(D) =
∑
k∈Wj∪{i} λkψ(k) [7]. This is because self-healing
mechanism only involves hash and addition operations. Compared with the compu-
tation overhead produced by multiplication operations, the computation overhead
resulting from hash and addition operations can be ignored.
Bilinear pairing based self-healing key distribution schemes
Although a formal definition of ID-based cryptosystems has been known for a while
[104], the first fully functional one fitting all the requirements of an ID-based cryp-
tosystem appeared only quite recently in [105]. Inspired by the idea of [105], Du
et al. proposed a broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution in [106]. We
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extended the broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution to a self-healing key
distribution scheme in [98]. This scheme has some desirable properties. In terms
of storage overhead, each user only stores the group manager’s public key and its
public/private key pair. The storage overhead for each user is a constant.
This scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of unauthorized users, including
the revoked users and the newly joined users. In our scheme, if a user wants to
obtain the session key Ki, it should compute e(X1, x1Si) in the procedure of Key
Recovery with personal key Si. Therefore, only the authorized users can recover
the session key. In addition, any coalition of non-authorized users cannot derive the
private keys of authorized users from their public keys. The personal private key
has nothing to do with the number of revoked users and can be reused as long as
it is not disclosed. As far as we know, it is the first self-healing key distribution
scheme using bilinear pairings.
2.5.5 Compositive Analysis of Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes
According to the state-of-the-art research, self-healing key distribution is the most
suitable way to establish session keys for large and dynamic group communication
over unreliable wireless networks. It is one branch of the key management schemes
and has received much attention. In this section, we conduct a comprehensive anal-
ysis of existing schemes.
Although unconditionally secure self-healing key distribution schemes can ful-
fill strict security requirements, they should meet some lower bounds in terms of
storage and communication overheads. Computationally secure self-healing key
distribution schemes relax the security slightly and have some desirable features,
such as constant storage overhead. As far as the cryptographic primitives are con-
cerned, self-healing key distribution schemes are limited to polynomial secret shar-
ing, vector space secret sharing, hash chain, and the SDR mechanism. We intended
to design a bilinear pairing based self-healing key distribution scheme and have
made a little progress.
Figure 2.11 provides a taxonomy of papers on self-healing key distribution
schemes. The figure is a directed acyclic graph where nodes represent papers. Di-
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Figure 2.11: Taxonomy of the papers on self-healing key distribution schemes
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Table 2.6: Summary of different classes of self-healing key distribution schemes
Class Features
Polynomial secret Advantage: It performs easily;
sharing Disadvantage: High computation overhead; the maximum number of revoked
users is constrained to the degree of the polynomial.
Vector space Advantage: A monotone decreasing family of rejected subset of users;
secret sharing Disadvantage: Some public mapping may incur large communication
overhead.
Hash chain Advantage: Efficient in computation;
Disadvantage: can not resist collusion attack.
SDR Advantage: Do not require re-distribution of any personal keys; can revoke
any number of users;
Disadvantage: The communication depends on the number of subsets, which
increases with the number of joined and revoked users.
Bilinear pairings Advantage: Efficient in computation;
Disadvantage: Communication overhead is high in large-scale networks
rected edges show predecessor/successor relations among solutions provided by the
papers. There is an edge from one paper to another one if the latter improves on
the solution proposed by the former. Style of an edge represents the problem for
which destination paper provides improvements. Existing papers are ordered over
a horizontal time axis according to their publication dates. The vertical axis groups
papers under five categories: (1) polynomial secret sharing, (2) vector space secret
sharing, (3) SDR, (4) hash chain, and (5) bilinear pairing based self-healing key
distribution schemes. The style of edge between two nodes represents the prob-
lem for which an improvement is provided. A paper may based on more than one
cryptographic primitive; therefore, corresponding work may be reached from more
than one origin paper, and there may be more than one edge with different styles in
between two papers.
Table 2.6 summarizes the strengths and shortcomings of each class of self-
healing key distribution schemes.
2.5.6 Security Issues of Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes
Every category has its own features, requirements and goals. In summary, polyno-
mial secret sharing is the most common technique used to realize self-healing key
distribution. It performs easily. However, the maximum number of revoked users
is constrained to the degree of the polynomial. In addition, in the procedure of Key
Recovery, Lagrange’s interpolation formula should be used in order to recover the
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secret polynomial thus leading to much computation overhead.
Vector space secret sharing based self-healing key distribution schemes consider
a monotone decreasing family of rejected subset of users instead of a monotone
decreasing threshold structure. This general case makes the self-healing scheme
more flexible and suitable for practical application. In addition, the constructions
are general in the sense that they depend on the particular public mappings and for
different choices of public mappings, different self-healing key distribution schemes
can be attained. The length of broadcast messages also depends on the particular
function.
A hash chain has many elegant features and can be used to design self-healing
key distribution schemes. The constructions do not need to send the recorders of
revoked subsets of users in order to perform self-healing, thereby reducing the com-
munication cost. Both forward and backward secrecy and partial collusion resis-
tance property can be assured. However, the collusion of the revoked nodes whose
life cycles have not expired and the newly joined nodes, can recover the session
keys to which they are not entitled.
One of the remarkable properties of SDR-based self-healing key distributions is
that the personal keys of users are independent of the number of sessions. Because
of this property, the SDR-based schemes do not require a redistribution of any per-
sonal keys after the number of sessions exceeds the estimation. Another remarkable
property of SDR schemes is that they can revoke any number of users and remain
secure against their collusion. As in the original SDR algorithm, the number of sub-
sets increases when users join and leave. The communication complexity depends
upon the number of additional subsets. The number of additional subsets depends
on the group size, the number of the newly joined users and the revoked users in
each rekeying period, and the value of session number.
Tian et al. presented a self-healing key distribution scheme by using bilinear
pairings. The scheme achieved several nice features as aforementioned. However,
the communication overhead increases with the number of authorized users in the
communication group. How to reduce the communication overhead is an interesting
problem yet to be solved.
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2.6 Summary of Common Problems
The previous research investigations on key management for WSNs focus mainly on
reducing overhead based on a hypothetical network model, rather than on a specific
application. Some gaps in the area of key management for WSNs, are yet to be
thoroughly investigated.
1. Lack of support for different types of communication. Most key management
schemes for group communication in WSNs address only session key estab-
lishment and renewal. Almost all the key predistribution schemes consider
only the establishment of pairwise keys between sensor nodes. There are still
several unsolved problems in the key predistribution field. For example, path
keys do not exclusively belong to two end nodes. All the intermediate nodes
on the path know the pairwise keys forwarded by them; the compromise of
a limited number of nodes may lead to the exposure of the whole key pool.
Most importantly, there is no way to establish different types of keys for dif-
ferent kinds of communication requirements. A single key cannot meet the
different communication requirements in WSNs, especially in hierarchical
WSNs.
2. There is no feasible PKC-based/hybrid key management scheme for HWSNs.
Although many researchers have demonstrated the feasibility of ECC-based
public key generation from the hardware or software perspectives, rarely do
current works propose a complete key management infrastructure using Pub-
lic Key Cryptography. Traditional key management scheme for wired net-
work cannot be directly transplanted to HWSNs given the unique attributes
of the latter. As far as we know, SACK-P is the first trial of a PKC-based
key management scheme for HWSNs. In fact, it cannot be seen as an original
PKC-based key management scheme; it is a direct transformation of the basic
SACK scheme which is based on Symmetric Key Cryptography. Public Key
Cryptography has incomparable advantages over Symmetric Key Cryptogra-
phy in key management and authentication. Nevertheless, great effort has to
be put into making PKC-based/hybrid key management a reality in HWSNs.
3. Deficiencies of authentication. Existing authentication schemes have at least
one or several of the following shortcomings: high computation or commu-
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nication overhead, no resilience to nodes compromises, delayed authentica-
tion, loose or even strict time synchronization, and absence of scalability.
Lightweight authentication and Public Key Cryptography based authentica-
tion are ideal alternative options for WSNs while the unique characteristics
of WSNs should be given full consideration. Current literature is mainly con-
cerned with authentication of communication content which happens after
key establishment. In fact, authentication is also indispensable during the
process of key establishment.
4. High-cost and limited capability of fault-tolerance. Due to the nature of
WSNs, they are inherently susceptible to packet loss and node failure. Much
current research on group management has been dedicated to minimizing
storage, computational and the communication overhead to meet scalability.
However, little attention has been paid to the robustness of these protocols.
Most of the current key management protocols are not designed to cope with
failures. However, such failures may block the normal run of key manage-
ment protocols which are the building block of the whole security architec-
ture. Self-healing key distribution is an ideal mechanism to deal with packet
loss in session key distribution. However, problems such as robustness in-
consistence remain unsolved. Existing countermeasures against node failure
are either under stringent assumptions or are too costly to be feasible. To
date, node failure tolerance property of pairwise key establishment protocols
has not been addressed. How to maintain an acceptable trade-off between
fault-tolerance and redundancy is still an open problem.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we carried out a survey of existing literature. We evaluated existing
literature critically with a view to analyzing and assessing each category. We first
surveyed existing key management schemes for WSNs security. We classified these
approaches into different categories based on the key mechanism. We then talked
about the necessity of and techniques for establishment of different types of keys
in HWSNs. After that, we surveyed the authentication mechanism and self-healing




3Problem Definition and Solution
Overview
3.1 Introduction
As a result of significant advances in pervasive computing and wireless commu-
nication technology, WSNs have gained wide application. However, some unique
features of sensor networks make them more vulnerable to security attacks than
their wired counterparts. Security countermeasures should be taken to resist cor-
responding attacks. Key management works as the cornerstone of other security
mechanisms as almost all of security mechanisms rely on, or are related to, en-
cryption. Chapter 2 surveyed the literature and identified a series of weaknesses
in current approaches aiming to address key management for sensor network secu-
rity. We have found that, despite significant contributions have been made over the
decades, very few practical approaches, especially in terms of key management so-
lutions for HWSNs, have been proposed in the literature. In addition, as discussed
in Chapter 2, some important auxiliary properties of key management in WSNs,
such as authentication and self-healing, have not been addressed sufficiently.
To address the shortcomings discerned in the literature, in this chapter we will
outline the problems that we intend to address in this thesis. Then the research
methodology and solutions are proposed. In Section 3.2, we outline a set of defi-
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nitions that will be used throughout the thesis. In Section 3.3, we define the main
problems to be addressed in this thesis. In Section 3.4, we break down the main
problems into research issues in order to better propose a solution. In Section 3.5,
we introduce the research method that we will adopt in this thesis. In Section 3.6,
we discuss the solutions to each of the research issues identified in Section 3.4.
Finally, in Section 3.7, we conclude the chapter.
3.2 Key Concepts and Preliminaries
In this section, we explain the key concepts and preliminaries which we will be used
in this chapter to formulate our problem, and subsequently throughout the thesis for
proposing the solution to the defined problem.
3.2.1 Key Predistribution
Key Predistribution is a key distribution method. In large-scale WSNs whose phys-
ical topology is unknown prior to deployment, some keys or key materials would
be installed in sensor nodes. Key predistribution alleviates the communication cost
between group members and also provides secure connectivity between nodes.
3.2.2 Symmetric Key Cryptography
Symmetric Key Cryptography [107] concerns symmetric algorithms, also called se-
cret key algorithms or single key algorithms, and are algorithms where the encryp-
tion key can be calculated from the decryption key and vice versa. In most symmet-
ric algorithms, the encryption key and the decryption key are identical. Symmetric
algorithms require that the sender and the receiver agree on a key before they can
communicate securely. The security of a symmetric algorithm rests in the key.
Symmetric key algorithms can be divided into stream ciphers and block ciphers.
Some examples of popular and well-respected symmetric algorithms include AES
(Rijndael), DES, 3DES, IDEA, RC4 and etc.
Encryption and decryption with a symmetric algorithm can be denoted as fol-
lows:
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EK(M) = C; DK(C) =M.
3.2.3 Public Key Cryptography
Public Key Cryptography [107] concerns public key algorithms where the key used
for encryption is different from the key used for decryption. Furthermore, the de-
cryption key cannot be calculated from the encryption key. The encryption key is
public and correspondingly is called the public key. Anyone can use the encryption
key to encrypt a message, while only the person with the corresponding decryption
key can decrypt the message. The decryption key is called a private key. RSA and
ECC are two very popular public key algorithms.
Encryption and decryption with a public key algorithm is denoted as the same
as the symmetric key algorithm even though the public key and the private key are
different.
3.2.4 Hierarchical Wireless Sensor Network (HWSN)
Unlike flat WSNs where sensors act as routers and transfer data via multi-hop rout-
ing, in an HWSN, some more powerful fixed or mobile nodes are used to collect and
transfer sensing data. These more powerful nodes also work as a cluster head by
performing a management function. Commonly used HWSNs include three levels:
the base station at the root level, cluster heads at the second level, and normal sensor
nodes at the third level.
3.2.5 Mutual Authentication
Mutual authentication, also called two-way authentication, is a process in which
both entities in a communication link authenticate each other. In general network
environments, especially E-commence transactions, the client authenticates the server
and vice versa. In sensor network environments, mutual authentication not only
refers to authentication between the normal nodes and the base station, it can also
refer to two counterparts that are assured of each other’s identity.
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3.2.6 Implicit Authentication
Implicit authentication is not performed as an independent process. Instead, it is
the byproduct of other processes, such as key establishment. This authentication
paradigm in wireless sensor networks can reduce operating complexity and mini-
mizes power consumption.
3.2.7 Self-healing Key Distribution
Self-healing key distribution can be thought of as a branch of key distribution. The
objective of self-healing key distribution is to enable group users to recover session
keys by themselves, without requesting additional transmissions from the group
manager, even if they miss some broadcast messages. The pioneering work on self-
healing key distribution was proposed by Staddon et al. in [80]
3.2.8 Mutual-healing Key Distribution
Mutual-healing Key Distribution can be seen as complementary to the self-healing
key distribution mechanism. In self-healing key distribution schemes, if a node
has missed more than a fixed number of broadcast messages or the last broadcast
message, it can get assistance from its neighboring nodes. The neighboring nodes in
the same session group cooperate with each other, forwarding broadcast messages
which the neighboring nodes missed. In this way, the nodes can receive the missed
broadcast messages in a timely and efficient manner. Thus, the robustness of self-
healing key distribution schemes is strengthened. The idea of mutual-healing was
proposed by Bohio et al. in [97].
3.2.9 Session
In order to make key management convenient, the lifetime of a network can be
divided into many time slots. Each time slot is called a session.
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3.2.10 Access Structure
The terminology Access Structure is originally used in secret sharing. A secret is
shared between users in U = {1, . . . , n}, only qualified subsets of U can recon-
struct the secret from their shares. The family of qualified subsets is called access
structure, denoted by Γ. The subset Γ ⊆ 2U \ φ must be monotone increasing, that
is, A1 ∈ Γ and A1 ⊆ A2 ⊂ U embodies A2 ⊂ Γ. The family of authorized subsets
Γ is the closure of minimal authorized subsets Γ0 called the basis of the structure.
The family of non-authorized subsets Γ¯ = 2U \ Γ is monotone decreasing. That is,
if A1 ∈ Γ¯ and A2 ⊆ A1 imply A2 ∈ Γ¯. The family of non-authorized subsets Γ¯ is
determined by the set of maximal non-authorized subsets Γ¯0.
3.2.11 Shamir’s Secret Sharing
Shamir’s Secret Sharing [108] is based on a polynomial interpolation technique. It
allows a dealer D to distribute a secret s to n players P1, . . . , Pn, such that at least
k ≤ n players can reconstruct the secret, while any fewer than k players cannot
obtain any information about the secret.
A (k, n) secret sharing protocol is as follows:
1. Share computation algorithm:
• Dealer D creates a k− 1 degree random polynomial f(x) = a0+ axx+
a2x
2+ . . .+ak−1xk−1 which satisfies a0 = s. Without loss of generality,
we suppose f(x) is constructed over a finite field.
• Dealer D randomly chooses n distinct point xj 6= 0(j = 1, . . . , n), and
secretly distributes each share (xj, f(xj)) to each player Pj
2. Share reconstruction algorithm: Given k distinct pairs of (xti , f(xti))(1 ≤
i ≤ k), there is unique k− 1 degree polynomial f(x), passing through all the




f(xti) ∗ Li(x) (3.1)
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3.2.12 Vector Space Secret Sharing
Vector Space Secret Sharing was introduced by Brickell [109]. Suppose D wants to
share a secret with the members of set U . It picks up a function
ψ : U ∪ {D} → GF (q)l (3.2)
where q is a prime power and l ≥ 2 is an integer. This function satisfies the property:
A ∈ Γ if and only if the vector ψ(D) can be expressed as a linear combination of
the vectors in the set ψ(A) = {ψ(i)|i ∈ A}. An access structure Γ is said to be a
vector space access structure if it can be defined in the above way.
A vector space secret sharing scheme for Γ with set of secrets GF (q) is con-
structed as follows: (Please refer to [109] for a proof).
1. Share Distribution. To distribute a secret value k ∈ GF (q), D takes at ran-
dom an element v ∈ GF (q)l, such that k = v · ψ(D). For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D sent
the share si = v ·ψ(i) to i ∈ U over secure channel. Here the operation “·” is
the inner product modulo q.




λi · ψ(i) (3.3)










λiψ(i) = v · ψ(D)
= k. (3.4)
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3.2.13 Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG)
A Pseudo-random Number Generator (PRNG) takes a seed of a certain length as
input and outputs a string, which is of a greater length than that of the seed.
3.2.14 Cryptographically Secure Pseudo-random Number Gen-
erator (CSPRNG)
A CSPRNG [110] is a PRNG whose output string cannot be computationally dis-
tinguished from a truly random distribution. CSPRNG requirements fall into two
groups:
1. Every CSPRNG should satisfy the next-bit test. The next-bit test is as follows:
Given the first k bits of a random sequence, there is no polynomial-time al-
gorithm that can predict the (k + 1)-th bit with probability of success higher
than 50%.
2. Every CSPRNG should withstand “state compromise extensions”. In the
event that part or all of its state has been revealed (or guessed correctly),
it should be impossible to reconstruct the stream of random numbers prior
to the revelation. Additionally, if there is an entropy input while running, it
should be impossible to use knowledge of the input’s state to predict future
conditions of the CSPRNG state.
3.2.15 One-way Hash Function
A hash function is the foundation of a hash chain. A hash function H takes a binary
string M of arbitrary length as input, and outputs a binary string of fixed length,
which is called hash value h: h = H(M). A one-way hash function H satisfies the
following three properties [107]:
1. Computable property: Given an input M , it is easy to compute h such that
h = H(M);
2. One-way property: Given a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible to
find a second input M such that H(M) = h;
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3. Collision-free property: Given a hash value h, it is computationally infeasible
to find a second input M ′ such that H(M ′) = h, where M ′ 6=M .
3.2.16 One-way Hash Chain
The forward hash chain of length m can be derived based on a hash function as
follows:
1. generate a random key seed KF0 for forward hash chain;
2. iteratively apply the hash function H on the seed to produce forward hash key
chain of length m, the forward hash chain is generated as:
{H(KF0 ), . . . , H i(KF0 ), . . . , Hm(KF0 )} (3.5)
The backward hash chain can be derived based on a hash function as follows:
1. generate a random key seed KB0 for backward hash chain;
2. iteratively apply the hash function H to the seed to produce a backward hash
chain of length m. The backward hash chain is generated as:
{H(KB0 ), . . . , H i(KB0 ), . . . , Hm(KB0 )} (3.6)
3.2.17 Bilinear Pairings
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of order q for a large prime q. G1 is a cyclic
additive group and G2 is a cyclic multiplicative group. We assume that the discrete
logarithm problems in both G1 and G2 are difficult. Let e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a
pairing which satisfies the following conditions:
• Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab, for ∀ P,Q ∈ G1 and ∀ a, b ∈ Z∗q;
• Non-degeneracy: there exists P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G1, such that e(P,Q) 6= 1;
That is, for any point P,Q ∈ G1, e(P,Q) = 1 iff P = O.
• Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for any
P,Q ∈ G1.
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3.2.18 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption
BDH Parameter Generator: A BDH parameter generator IG is a probabilistic al-
gorithm that takes a security parameter 0 < k ∈ Z, runs in polynomial time, and
outputs the description of two groups G1 and G2 of the same order q and the de-
scription of an admissible bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2.
BDH Problem: Given 〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉 for some a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , computes e(P, P )abc
∈ G2.
BDH Assumption: There is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the BDH
problem.
3.2.19 Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
Given two group elements P and Q, to find an integer n ∈ Z∗q , such that Q = nP
when such an integer exists.
3.2.20 ID-based PKI
ID-based PKI involves a trusted KGC and nodes. Nodes’ private keys are calculated
by KGC and send to the node via a secure channel. The basic operations consist
of Setup and Private Key Extraction. When we use bilinear pairings to construct
ID-based private/public keys, the operations can be implemented as follows: KGC
runs BDH parameter generator to generate two groups G1, G2 and a bilinear pairing
e : G1 × G1 → G2. It chooses an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1 and defines two
cryptographic hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1, H2 : G2 → {0, 1}∗.
• Setup: KGC chooses a random number s ∈ Z∗q and set Ppub = sP . Then
KGC publishes system parameters params = {G1, G2, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2},
and keeps s as a master-key, which is known only to himself.
• Private Key Extraction: A node submits its identity to KGC. KGC computes
the node’s public key QID = H1(ID) and private key SID = sQID, then
privately returns SID = sQID to the node.
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3.3 Problem Definition
As discussed in the previous chapter, significant advancement, documented in the
literature, has been made in the area of key management for WSNs security. But
most of existing schemes have drawbacks and there are some unsolved problems
which really merit in-depth research. In this section, we give four fields of problem
definition related to sensor network security, namely:
• Problems with key management schemes for WSNs
• Problems with establishment of different types of keys
• Problems with authentication mechanism
• Problems with self-healing mechanism
For each of these problems, the discussion is carried out from two perspectives:
existing solutions, and the technical problems inherent in these solutions. These
technical problems determine the research issues and are the key requirements of
any new solution development.
3.3.1 Problems with Key Management Schemes for WSNs
Existing solutions of Symmetric Key Cryptography based key management
The key predistribution mechanism has been considered as the most suitable sym-
metric key management mechanism for wireless sensor networks. A standard key
predistribution scheme has four stages as shown in Figure 3.1. In the key pool
generation stage, a large pool of keys and key identities is generated. In the key
predistribution stage, each sensor is preloaded a small number of keys which are
selected from the key pool. In the shared key discovery stage, two neighbor nodes
compare the list of identities of keys that they have. If two sensors have one or
some keys in common, they can setup a secure link directly. Otherwise, the path
key establishment stage is triggered to set up a link with the help of intermediate
nodes.
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Figure 3.1: The general processes of a standard key predistribution paradigm
Technical problems of Symmetric Key Cryptography based key management
Almost all the Symmetric Key Cryptography based key management schemes for
WSNs follow a key predistribution paradigm, or a variant. In the previous chapter,
we have examined many different mathematical models that can be utilized to re-
alize key predistribution in previous chapter. However, approaches of each model
have one or several of the following drawbacks:
• All the intermediate nodes have knowledge of the established path key. In
the path key establishment stage, any pair of nodes within wireless commu-
nication range that do not share a key can be assigned with a path key. The
assigned path key is transferred by two or more links with multi-fold encryp-
tion. This method not only introduces heavy communication and computation
overhead, but also brings vulnerability. The compromise of any intermediate
node can lead to the disclosure of the path key.
• The shared key does not exclusively belong to two end nodes. Two or more
different pairs of nodes may use the same shared key. The compromised link
between one pair of nodes may introduce a security threat to links between
other nodes.
• Many schemes endow nodes with the ability to establish pairwise keys with
all nodes in the network. This ability requires a significant amount of over-
head and places a heavy burden on nodes. We argue that it is impractical and
unnecessary to establish links with all the nodes in the network. The main
problem is to make sure that each node has the highest key share probability
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with nodes within its communication range rather than throughout the net-
work.
• One of the main drawbacks of key predistribution schemes is weak resilience.
A large number of keys, even the whole key pool, could be disclosed by
intentionally compromising a few number of nodes.
• There are very few schemes that discuss key predistribution for HWSNs. We
have discussed the advantages of HWSNs over DWSNs. It calls for the devel-
opment of key predistribution schemes for HWSNs in order to keep up with
the proliferation of the latter.
To sum up, current Symmetric Key Cryptography based key management schemes
have the above technical issues and no solution to date has addressed all of the draw-
backs. This situation motives us to carry out research into the development of new
and practical key predistribution schemes for HWSNs.
Existing solutions and technical problems of PKC-based key management
Even though much of the literature has demonstrated the feasibility of Public Key
Cryptography in WSNs, there have been few PKC-based key management schemes
in this field. As far as we know, the first PKC-based key management scheme
SACK-P [68] is directly transformed from the Symmetric Key Cryptography based
key management scheme SACK. Several existing PKC-based key management schemes
rely too much on some strict assumptions or incur heavy overhead.
Existing solutions and technical problems of hybrid key management
To the best of our knowledge, except for the SACK-H scheme [68] which is also di-
rectly transformed from the symmetric key based key management scheme SACK,
there is no practical hybrid key management scheme for HWSNs. We considered
the advantages of hybrid key management in hierarchical wireless sensor networks
in the previous chapter. These motivate us to design a practical hybrid key manage-
ment scheme for HWSNs.
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3.3.2 Problems with the Establishment of Different Types of Keys
Existing solutions
As discussed in Chapter 2, LEAP [29] supports the establishment of individual keys,
pairwise keys, cluster keys, and a global key. Individual key which is a unique key
shared between the base station and each sensor node [29]. The key is pre-calculated
and preloaded into each node’s memory before being deployed. A pairwise key is
shared between each pair of neighboring nodes. Each node U is preloaded with
a key Ki. U drives the master key Ku using it. Correspondingly, a neighboring
node V can derive its master key Kv too. The node U computes the pairwise key
Kuv = fKv(u). Node V can also compute Kuv in the same way. Cluster keys
are built upon the pairwise keys. A node U encrypts the selected cluster key Kcu
with the pairwise keys of its neighboring nodes and sends the encrypted key to each
neighboring node. The global key originates from the base station and recursively
transits to all the nodes in a width priority manner. The time-based key management
scheme [1] uses different initial keys for pairwise key establishment at different time
slots. The establishment of other types of keys is the same as that in [29].
Technical problems
We cannot deny that LEAP presents an efficient way of establishing different types
of keys. However, this scheme cannot be used in WSNs which have strict secu-
rity requirements. This is because current schemes LEAP [29] and the time-based
scheme [1] have the following technical issues:
• LEAP suffers from sinkhole attack. In a sinkhole attack, a compromised node
attracts packets by advertising information such as high battery power, etc.,
then later drops all the packets [41].
• The initial key is reused again for node addition in LEAP. The initial key
which is removed after the initialization phase is reused. However the new
node could be captured before erasing the initial key. Various attacks can be
launched based on the disclosed initial key.
• In scheme [1], the key connectivity is reduced even though the threat caused
by the disclosure of the initial key is eliminated. The key connectivity is af-
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Figure 3.2: Plain SNEP protocol which offers weak freshness
fected by the number of preloaded master keys m and the order of the current
time slot. A higher key connectivity can be achieved at the cost of heavy
burden on storage.
• In scheme [1], the established pairwise key does not exclusively belong to the
two end nodes. As we discussed in Chapter 2, nodes in one time slot may
have knowledge of the pairwise keys established by nodes in other time slots.
This drawback makes the scheme vulnerable to attacks against confidentiality
and authentication.
• In scheme [1], some of preloaded master keys are useless. m randomly-
chosen master keys are preloaded to the memory of each node before it is
deployed to the network without consideration of lifetime of the node. Some
preloaded master keys are unused because a node’s lifetime is limited.
3.3.3 Problems with Authentication Mechanisms in Key Man-
agement
Existing solutions
Authentication is an important tool which is used to verify the transferred messages
and communication counterparts. We have examined current research on authenti-
cation in wireless sensor networks: unicast authentication, broadcast authentication,
filtering false data, PKC-based authentication, and lightweight authentication.
SNEP requires any two nodes keep a shared counter to keep data freshness. As
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Figure 3.3: Strong SNEP protocol which offers strong freshness
Figure 3.4: TinySec packet formats in TinySec-Auth mode and TinySec-AE mode
shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, plain SNEP offers weak freshness and strong
SNEP offers strong freshness. In Figure 3.2, KAB and KBA are encryption keys and
for directional communication between node A and node B, respectively; K ′AB and
K ′BA are authentication keys and for directional communication between node A
and node B, respectively; CA and CB are counters maintained by node A and node
B, respectively; M1 is the message transferred from node A to node B and M2 is
the message transferred from node B to node A. In Figure 3.3, node A generates
a nonce NA and sends it along with a request message RA to node B. Then B
returns the nonce with the encrypted response message RB, along with the MAC of
encrypted message RB, CB, and NA. If the MAC verifies correctly, node A knows
that node B generated the response after it sent the request [111].
TinySec provides two different packet formats: TinySec-Auth for authentica-
tion only and TinySec-AE for authentication and encryption. The two packet for-
mats are shown in Figure 3.4. In TinySec-Auth mode, the un-encrypted packet is
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Figure 3.5: µTESLA one-way key chain [2].
authenticated with a MAC. In TinySec-AE mode, packet is encrypted first and then
authenticated with a MAC.
µTESLA provides authentication for broadcast with a one-way key chain of
authentication keys. Figure 3.5 displays the evolution of authentication keys. K0 is
the initial key.
MAC is the basic way used of filtering false data. Both SEF [75] and hop-
by-hop authentication can be seen as variants of MAC. PKC-based authentication
has incomparable advantage than symmetric key based authentication. Existing
PKC-based authentication for WSN [77] cannot be seen as purely PKC-based au-
thentication. The notion of “lightweight authentication” comes from authentication
for RFID. Even though it was claimed as a “lightweight” mechanism, it has high
computation and communication overhead.
Technical problems
• The feasibility of SNEP has not been fully specified and implemented. Tiny-
Sec does not provide replay protection for the message, which is an important
security requirement. It does not renew the key over time. TinySec requires
extra energy, bandwidth, and incurs latency overhead with increased packet
length [111].
• All µTESLA-based broadcast authentication schemes [2, 28, 29, 30] require
loosely time synchronization. A delayed packet authentication mechanism
may suffer from severe energy-depletion DoS attacks.
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• It is not known how to keep the trade-off between the shared secrets between
nodes and the probability of SEF [75]. The three hop-by-hop authentication
schemes in [76] can only be applied to data collection rather than hop-by-hop
data aggregation applications.
• To date, no feasible lightweight authentication and PKC-based authentication
schemes have been proposed for WSNs.
• No unified standard can be used to evaluate whether a scheme is lightweight
or not.
3.3.4 Problems with Self-healing Key Distribution Mechanisms
Existing solutions
The classification and the basic procedures of self-healing key distribution schemes
have been discussed in Chapter 2. As shown in Figure 2.10, general self-healing
key distribution schemes, either unconditionally secure or computationally secure,
include five basic procedures: Setup, Broadcast, Key Recovery, Adding/Revoking
Users, and Self-healing. Many different cryptographic primitives have been used
to realize self-healing key distribution. Each category has different features and
different limitations.
Technical problems
• For polynomial secret sharing based self-healing key distribution schemes,
heavy computation overhead is introduced in the procedure of Key Recov-
ery. Shamir’s secret sharing inherent property determines that the maximum
number of revoked users is constrained to the degree of the polynomial.
• Sponsorization can be seen as complementary to vector space secret sharing
based self-healing key distribution. That is, a coalition of users sponsor a
user outside the group for one session. Sa´ez discussed the technique details
in [91]. However, a secure unicast channel between each sponsor and the
sponsored user is required in order to fulfill the sponsorization. It is too rigor-
ous to be feasible for WSNs. In addition, the operations introduce too much
communication and computation overheads.
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• Hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes are more efficient
than their counterparts based on other cryptographic primitives. However,
these schemes are vulnerable to collusion attack. The collusion of the revoked
nodes whose life cycles do not expire and the newly joined nodes can recover
the session keys to which they are not authorized.
• For the bilinear pairing based self-healing key distribution schemes, the com-
munication overhead increases with the number of authorized users in the
communication group.
• Bihio et al. [97] proposed the general idea of mutual-healing without explor-
ing the technical details. Tian et al. [98] made the security requirements more
clear and proposed a rough idea for realization of mutual-healing. However,
no formalized model definition has been proposed.
Hence, based on the above discussion, we can broadly define the problem that
we intend to address in this thesis as:
To develop a key management framework for wireless sensor networks by which
different types of keys can be established, among which network-wide key can be
distributed in self-healing and mutual-healing manner; explicit or implicit authen-
tication can be guaranteed according to the security requirements of expected ap-
plications.
3.4 Research Issues
In the previous section, we discussed four areas of problem definitions, including
current available solutions, and existing technical problems arising from each cat-
egory of solutions. These technical problems help in identifying research issues.
In this section, we now explain in detail each research issue which needs to be
addressed in order to provide the solution to the broadly defined problem.
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3.4.1 Research Issues 1: Developing a hash chain based key pre-
distribution algorithm which improves key sharing proba-
bility with reduced storage overhead
In Chapter 2, we reviewed existing key predistribution schemes which are regarded
as the most suitable Symmetric Key Cryptography based key management meth-
ods for WSNs. In the third section of Chapter 3, we identified the main technical
problems with existing key predistribution schemes. In summary, existing key pre-
distribution schemes have one or several of the following weaknesses:
• All the intermediate nodes have knowledge of the established path key.
• The shared key does not exclusively belong to two end nodes.
• Many schemes endow nodes with the capability of establishing pairwise keys
with all nodes in the network.
• Another drawback of key predistribution schemes is weak resilience.
• There are very few schemes that tackle key predistribution for HWSNs.
HWSNs have better scalability than do flat WSNs and the size of networks may
scale to thousands of nodes. If we directly apply key predistribution schemes to
HWSNs, each node should be preloaded with a great number of keys in order to
reach expected key connectivity probability. In a large scale hierarchical sensor
network, nodes are divided into different clusters. Node addition and revocation are
performed by the cluster head. Also, each node communicates only with its cluster
head and nodes in the same cluster head. Each cluster head can communicate with
peer cluster heads and the base station. If we take advantage of hierarchical struc-
ture of networks with hierarchical key predistribution, some beneficial properties
will be achieved. In HWSNs, each cluster works as a self-managed system. Hierar-
chical key predistribution allocates a small portion of the key pool to each cluster,
so the storage overhead at each sensor nodes would be greatly reduced while the
key connectivity probability within each cluster can be as high as 100%. The pro-
cess of path key establishment can be removed. Another advantage of such key
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predistribution is that, if a node is compromised, only very few preloaded keys will
be disclosed. In this way, better resilience is achieved.
The storage overhead can be further reduced and key connectivity can be further
increased if we substitute a randomly generated key pool with keyed hash chains.
Just as a coin has two sides, the one-way property of a hash chain has both an
advantage and a disadvantage. Once an adversary obtains the key seed and hash
function of a key chain, all the keys on the key chain can be derived. In order to resist
node capture attack, it is prohibited to store the key seed at sensor nodes. Hence,
we have to find an appropriate alternative predistribution method to eliminate the
disadvantages of the one-way property.
In section 3.6, we will make the above considerations come true. We present
a solution overview of the methodology of a hash chain based key predistribution
scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks. The scheme improves key con-
nectivity probability and can resist node capture attack. The concrete scheme will
be presented in Chapter 5.
3.4.2 Research Issues 2: Developing an algorithm supporting
the establishment of different types of keys whose security
does not rely on the security of the initial key
LEAP [29] supports the establishment of multi-level keys. It has been served as the
benchmark for localized encryption and authentication in sensor network since its
emergence. However, LEAP [29] has some weakness. In Chapter 2, we reviewed
LEAP [29]. In section 3.3, we identified its main technical problems.
• LEAP suffers from sinkhole attack.
• The initial key is reused again for node addition in LEAP.
Jang et al. proposed a time-based key management scheme which split the
lifetime of a sensor network into multiple time slots and each time slot has its initial
key. This scheme minimizes the effect of disclosure of the initial key. However, this
scheme still has several technical problems as summarized in section 3.3:
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• In [1], the key connectivity is reduced even though the threat caused by the
disclosure of the initial key is eliminated.
• In [1], the established pairwise key does not exclusively belong to the two end
nodes.
• In [1], some of preloaded master keys are useless.
As is well known, normal sensor nodes are powered by a non-chargeable battery
so their lifetime is limited. Generally speaking, the lifetime of sensor nodes are far
less than that of WSNs. New sensor nodes should be replenished over time to keep
network connectivity. The main reason for the low key connectivity probability of
Jang [1] is that the designer did not take the life-time of sensor nodes into consid-
eration. Suppose a sensor node which is deployed at time slot j can survive at most
t time slots, so the preloaded master keys for time slots after the (j + t)-th time
slot are unused. Therefore, the preloaded master keys should match the lifetime of
sensor nodes. That is, in order to make full use of a node’s memory and increase
key connectivity, only those master keys corresponding to the node’s lifetime can
be preloaded to the node’s memory.
Resilience is an important evaluation factor of key management schemes. In
order to achieve the resilience property, the established pairwise key should exclu-
sively belong to the two end nodes. Once a node is compromised, the adversary
can only get the pairwise key of the compromised node and its neighboring nodes,
while the communication between the uncompromised nodes remain secure. If we
can find a different way to derive master keys from the corresponding initial keys
and a different way to establish pairwise keys, a higher key connectivity probabil-
ity between nodes belonging to different time slots, and better resilience, can be
achieved.
In section 3.6 we will solve the technical problems of [1]. We present a solution
overview of the enhanced key management scheme whose security does not hold
on that of the initial key and can resist sinkhole attack. The concrete scheme will
be presented in Chapter 4.
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3.4.3 Research Issues 3: Developing a fully anti-collusive hash
chain based self-healing key distribution algorithm
Hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes are much more efficient than
those self-healing key distribution schemes based on other cryptographic primitives.
However, the introduction of a hash chain improves efficiency but at the cost of
possible collusion attack. As reviewed in the purely hash chain based self-healing
key distribution scheme [95], even though forward and backward secrecy can be
guaranteed, the collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked users will
recover all the session keys to which they are not entitled. Tian et al. presented a
scheme to resist collusion attack in [93]. Each user Ui is assigned a pre-arranged
life cycle (si, ti). Random numbers corresponding to its life cycle will be preloaded
to the node as part of personal keys. However, we identified that [93] and two
subsequent schemes [6, 7] could resist collusion only between the users whose life
cycles have finished and the newly joined users. They could not resist collusion
attacks of the newly joined users and revoked users whose life cycles have not yet
expired.
In order to resist collusion attack, our first aim is to find the breaking point of
the collusion attack. In Tian et al.’s scheme [93], the import of random numbers ef-
fectively against collusion attack between the users whose life cycles have finished,
and the newly joined users. However, those users who are revoked before their life
cycles finish, still have the random numbers. If they collude with the newly joined
nodes, they can derive the several keys to which they are not authorized. In order
to maintain security, a part of the key material should be related to the user’s status.
Once a user is revoked before its life cycle expires, at least part of the key material
or broadcast message should be changed so that the revoked user cannot continue to
access the subsequent session keys. At the same time, the operation of authorized
users should continue. So the research issue for this technical problem is to find a
suitable way to change key material or broadcast messages.
In section 3.6 we will solve the collusion problems of hash chain based self-
healing key distribution schemes. We present a solution overview of the proposed
self-healing key distribution scheme that is robust again collusion attack. The con-
crete scheme will be presented in Chapter 6.
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3.4.4 Research Issues 4: Developing a secure HBT-based self-
healing key distribution algorithm with implicit authenti-
cation
A Hash Binary Tree (HBT) is established by iteratively applying two different hash
functions to the same seed to generate the left node or right node of any interme-
diate nodes, respectively. Jiang et al. proposed a novel HBT-based self-healing
key distribution scheme in [112]. Like all the self-healing key distribution schemes,
the life-time of a network is expressed by the number of sessions. The number of
sessions is the same as the number of leaf nodes of the hash binary tree. Each leaf
node in the hash binary tree is mapped to a forward key. This HBT-based technique
is efficient because the generation of a hash binary tree involves only hash oper-
ation. This technique also helps to reduce storage overhead. However, HBT can
be considered as a variant of a hash chain and this HBT-based scheme inherits all
the vulnerabilities of a hash chain based self-healing schemes. Moreover, the mask
method is based on Shamir’s secret sharing; hence, the number of revoked users
cannot exceed the threshold.
We can present several possible ways to improve the HBT-based self-healing
key distribution scheme.
• If we can replace the threshold structure with a more flexible access structure,
a more flexible self-healing key distribution scheme will be possible;
• If we can introduce random numbers as in [93], then the scheme can not only
maintain forward and backward secrecy but resist collusion attack;
• Broadcasts over wireless channels are vulnerable to various attacks, such as
replay attack and tamper attack. Authentication is an effective method to repel
such attacks. However, explicit authentication has the further requirement of
shared keys. If we can find an implicit authentication method which makes
uses of a hash chain, the requirement of shared keys would be removed and
computation cost of authentication and verification would be minimized.
In section 3.6 we consider how to add the collusion resistance property and
implicit authentication to the HBT-based self-healing key distribution scheme. We
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present a solution overview of the proposed scheme. The concrete scheme will be
presented in Chapter 7.
3.4.5 Research Issues 5: Exploring technical details of mutual-
healing key distribution algorithm
Bohio et al. in [97] proposed the concept of mutual-healing to complement the
self-healing key distribution schemes without presenting technical detail. In order
to keep communication secure, Bohio et al. claimed in [97] that a mutual-healing
scheme should meet two conditions. Firstly, in order to avoid attacks on limited
resources, effective means of authentication of the requesting node should be devel-
oped to identify misbehaving nodes. Secondly, authentication of the requested keys
should be developed to make sure that the requesting nodes are authorized to access
the requested session keys. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the motivation of mutual-
healing is that nodes can obtain assistance from neighboring nodes under certain
special conditions. If the concept can be realized, it will complete the self-healing
key distribution schemes.
Tian et al. in [98] pointed out that authentication of requested keys is unnec-
essary. This is because broadcast messages are broadcasted in a masked manner
within the communication group. Any entities can receive the broadcast messages.
If the requesting node is authorized for the session, it would be able to recover the
session key. Otherwise, even if unauthorized nodes receive the broadcast message
from their neighbors, they can not recover the session key. Hence, the only research
issue related to mutual-healing is how to effectively authenticate requesting nodes.
In general self-healing key distribution schemes, each node receives a personal
key from the group manager. Keys are distributed and renewed via broadcast com-
munication. No pairwise keys between sensor nodes and no pairwise keys between
nodes and the group manager are established. Originally, the self-healing key dis-
tribution scheme was intended to reduce the burden of the group manager so that
the interaction between nodes and the group manager is removed. Hence, the estab-
lishment of pairwise keys between nodes and the group manager will countermand
the self-healing key distribution. Mutual-healing through transfer of the group man-
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ager is infeasible. If there are pairwise keys between nodes, the authentication of
the requesting nodes should be much easier.
As a complement to the self-healing mechanism, mutual-healing does not fre-
quently occur. Hence, it is not necessary to establish pairwise keys for each pair
of nodes in advance. Authentication of requesting nodes is executed on demand
and a pairwise key can be established prior to authentication. If each node has an
ID-based public/private key pair, it can perform node-to-node authentication when
it is necessary.
In section 3.6, we discuss how to entitle each node with a public/private key
pair to perform node-to-node authentication. We present a solution overview of
the proposed mutual-healing scheme. The concrete scheme will be presented in
Chapter 8.
3.4.6 Research Issues 6: Developing a practical hybrid key man-
agement algorithm for HWSNs
We have highlighted the advantages of HWSNs in Chapter 1. However, many exist-
ing key management schemes for HWSNs with a single key mechanism overlooked
the architecture and individual resources of different tiers. The practical design of
key management should take the heterogeneity into consideration. Otherwise, key
management scheme itself will exhaust low cost bottom nodes.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the several existing PKC-based solutions for HWSNs
have different technical problems. Du et al.’s routing-driven scheme [69] estab-
lishes a shared key for only neighbor nodes that communicate with each other. The
scheme works under the strict assumption that all nodes must be deployed follow-
ing the known tree structure and each node should be aware of the tree structure
of the network. The security services of the proposed scheme [70] rely on the
preloaded secret point and random number. While the renewal of random numbers
brings large communication overhead and computation overhead at each cluster
head. The scheme [71] also works under the strong assumption that each cluster
head is equipped with an intrusion detection system to detect misbehavior and each
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node is aware of its location.
Hybrid solutions can exploit the advantages of Symmetric/Public Key Cryptog-
raphy and heterogeneity of HWSNs. To date, no practical hybrid key management
solution has been proposed for HWSNs. In fact, it is not easy to realize hybrid key
management in wireless sensor networks. In a hierarchical sensor network, cluster
heads act as a bridge between the base station and normal sensor nodes. If we use
public key cryptosystem in the upper level and symmetric key cryptosystem in the
lower lever, one of the main research issues is whether it is possible to install two
cryptosystems on cluster heads. Even though the answer is definite, it would be
better to find some lightweight or simplified cryptosystems in order to conserve the
limited resources of cluster heads.
In section 3.6, we will discuss how to install two cryptosystems into cluster
heads and how to establish different types of keys to meet different types of commu-
nication. We present a solution overview of the proposed hybrid key management
scheme. The concrete scheme will be presented in Chapter 9.
3.5 Research Methodology
3.5.1 The Chosen of Science and Engineering Based Research
Method
In addressing the stated technical problem, this thesis focuses on the development
of an efficient and secure key management scheme for WSNs. In order to propose
a solution for the research issues listed in the previous section, we need to fol-
low a systematic scientific approach to ensure that the methodology development is
scientifically-based. A science and engineering based research approach is adopted
in this research project. Science and engineering research leads to the development
of new techniques, architecture, methodologies, devices or a set of concepts, which
can be combined together to form a new theoretical framework. This research ap-
proach commonly identifies problems and proposes solutions to these problems.
Particularly in the engineering field, the spirit of “making something work” is es-
sential [113, 114]. They decompose the science and engineering based research into
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three main levels:
• Conceptual level (level one): creating new ideas and new concepts through
analysis;
• Perceptual level (level two): formulating new methods and approaches through
designing and building the tools or environment or system through implemen-
tation.
• Practical level (level three): carrying out testing and validation through ex-
perimentation with real world examples. The process of testing and validating
a working system provides unique insights into the benefits of the proposed
concepts, frameworks and alternatives.
3.5.2 Research Stages
We present the research stages based on the three levels of the science and engineer-
ing research approach.
• Literature Review. We reviewed survey papers on WSNs security so as to
obtain a thorough understanding of the characteristics and security require-
ments of WSNs. Secondly, we reviewed existing key management schemes
for WSNs. This review allowed us to identify open problems that are re-
lated to key management in WSNs. In addition, we reviewed some other
lightweight cryptographic primitives, combinatorial mathematics and graph
theory, simulation technique that will aid in the design and evaluation of key
management schemes.
• Conceptual Framework for Key Management in a Wireless Sensor Network.
Figure 1.3 shows that key management is not a separate component of secu-
rity architecture. Key management provides security infrastructure to other
security services. At the same time, it relies on other security services. Key
management and other security services together make up the security ar-
chitecture for sensor networks. Therefore, a comprehensive consideration of
these factors is essential when designing a key management scheme for a
wireless sensor network. Here we will propose a conceptual framework for
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Figure 3.6: A conceptual framework of key management for wireless sensor
networks security
key management for WSNs (Figure 3.6). The conceptual framework would
provide a guideline to design key management schemes in the next stage.
1. We have mentioned that, WSNs are application-specific networks. Ex-
cept for some common features, a sensor network for a specific appli-
cation has some unique features and thus its own security requirements.
Suppose a sensor network is deployed in the military surveillance envi-
ronment and the other in an agricultural base. Both network’s security
requirements should be different based on the resources that nodes can
use and the risks they face. Therefore, the first step is to fully understand
the application background and extract a network model. The acquired
information in this step includes the densities and the size of network,
the available hardware and software resources, and some specialized
knowledge that can be used in a particular real-time scenario, such as
location information.
2. This step defines the security model. The security model is defined ac-
cording to security requirements and will work as a performance met-
rics for proposed key management schemes. Here we will quantify the
security with entropy. As far as we know, it is the first time that a se-
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curity model has been defined with this terminology. The development
of metrics, measurements, and evaluation of approaches are of great
importance in order to establish a scientific methodology for the entire
wireless network security research area.
3. This step initializes system parameters. The types of keys that need to
be established according to different communication requirements, au-
thentication mechanism, and encryption mode are fixed in this step. The
basis includes the type of information to be encrypted (i.e. aggregated
data, routing information, and key information), available memory and
energy or any predefined policies or recommendations specified for the
current network. A fully integrated view of the design factors is essential
for the development of protocols for WSNs.
4. The outcome of this research is displayed in this step. Several hierarchi-
cal key management schemes are proposed for different applications.
Information theory, combinatorial mathematics, graph theory, and var-
ious cryptographic primitives may be adopted in the development of
these components but these have not been selected at this point in time.
This stage corresponds to the perceptual level of the science and engi-
neering research method.
5. Both theoretical analysis and simulation are good tools to test the de-
signed schemes. Only by using these tools can we prove the validity of
the schemes and, at the same time, discover their deficiencies.
The steps 3, 4, and 5 proceed in turn. They form a loop and perform numerous
times before an efficient and secure key management scheme is obtained.
This stage corresponds to the practical level of the science and engineering
research method.
• Development of Schemes and Protocols. Based on the conceptual framework
proposed in the first research stage, the main task in this stage would be to
design several key management schemes for HWSNs. Each of these schemes
has some specialties according to the application background. It is not our
final goal and it is impossible to design a single protocol that will outperform
all others for all possible models. We concentrate designing a key manage-
ment scheme which matches the abstracted security model in Figure 3.6. A
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key management suite includes five modules: key predistribution, the estab-
lishment of other types of keys, nodes addition or revocation, network adjust-
ment, and abnormity disposal. Rekeying, authentication, and fault-tolerance
are not separated modules. Node addition or revocation, network adjustment,
and abnormity disposal incur rekeying operations. Each module needs an au-
thentication mechanism to ensure the origin of entities and the reality of data
and a fault-tolerance mechanism to deal with some abnormities. The selection
of a key predistribution mechanism is determined by the trade-off between
security requirements and resource constraints. Both random, deterministic,
and hybrid key predistribution mechanisms can be employed. Some theories,
such as plane of projection, from combinatorial mathematics and graph the-
ory can be used to improve the efficiency of key management. Lightweight
cryptographic primitives, such as the ECC and Ntru cryptosystem, are ideal
building blocks for public key management and lightweight authentication.
Some novel techniques from information theory and coding, such as error
correcting codes, can be adopted to realize the fault-tolerance capability.
• Evaluation and Validation of Schemes and Protocols. The evaluation here in-
cludes security evaluation and performance evaluation. Theoretical analysis
is based on the effectiveness of cryptographic primitives used in the proposed
schemes with the help of software Mathematica and Matlab. We will verify
whether the schemes satisfy the security requirements with reasonable over-
heads. It would be useful to have comprehensive guidelines for evaluating a
specific protocol and compare it with others. Based on the proposed security
model, appropriate performance metrics would then be used to evaluate the
strengths and weaknesses of each protocol. Due to the nature of WSNs, there
is an inevitable coupling of the layers. Therefore, an evaluation framework
would not be useful if it concentrates only on protocols of a specific layer. The
framework should evaluate the goodness of the network as a whole and pro-
vide metrics to measure the effects of the design on the operation of the net-
work (by evaluating, for example, energy efficiency, communication perfor-
mance, etc). In order to quantify the effects of a compromise on the security
architecture, Hwang et al. in [115] investigate the inherent tradeoffs involved
between energy, memory, and security robustness in WSNs. A framework
called the security-memory-energy (SME) is presented that is used to evalu-
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Figure 3.7: Overview of the solutions proposed in this thesis
ate and quantify the multi-metric trade-offs involved in security design. The
security of the lightweight key management schemes will be demonstrated by
mathematical security proof.
3.6 Overview of Solutions
We have identified six research issues that are aimed at solving technical problems
of existing key management schemes for HWSNs in the previous section. In this
section, we propose an overview of the solution for each of the research issues. As
shown in Figure 3.7, the solutions can be categorized into three categories: Symmet-
ric Key Cryptography based solutions, PKC-based solutions, and a hybrid solution.
3.6.1 Overview of the solution for robust key management in
multi-phase HWSNs
We have identified the main technical problems arising from LEAP [29] and the
time-based key management scheme in section 3.3. In order to solve the identified
technical problems, we should address several research issues outlined in section
3.4.
In the proposed solution, the lifetime of the network is denoted by the number of
time slots. Each time slot has its initial key. The initial keys for different time slots
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are independent of each other. As reviewed in [1], a sensor node which is deployed
in time slot j is preloaded with the initial key IKj and m randomly chosen master
keys. We have ascertained that a part of the master keys are useless due to the
limited lifetime of the sensor. Here we take the nodes’ lifetime into consideration.
The lifetime time of sensor nodes is measured by the number of time slots. Suppose
a node whose lifetime isGw time slots joins the network at time slot j, it is preloaded
with the initial key for time slot j and (Gw − 1) masked initial keys. In this way,
the initial key is used to establish pairwise keys with nodes deployed in the same
time slot and the masked initial keys is used to establish pairwise keys with node
deployed in different time slots.
The mask mechanism plays a vital role. On the one hand, it has to make sure that
attackers cannot derive the actual initial keys from the masked initial keys. On the
other hand, it has to ensure that nodes deployed at different time slots can establish
pairwise keys. In the proposed solution, for a node deployed at time slot j, it will be
preloaded with (Gw−1) masked initial keys for the subsequent generations j+1 ≤
l < j + Gw − 1. The masked initial keys are given as {Kj,l|Kj,l = H(IKl ‖ j)}
where IKl is the initial key for the l-th generation. With the masked initial keys,
nodes can establish pairwise keys with nodes deployed at different time slots. The
established pairwise keys belong exclusively to the two nodes. Hence, the proposed
solution has a resilience property.
The current ZigBee standard does not provide forward secrecy. It does not spec-
ify how to deal with pairwise keys when nodes leave the network. The proposed
solution can be used to fix these problems. In addition, we also provide authen-
tication for node admission control. The specific solution is presented in Chapter
4.
3.6.2 Overview of the solution for hash chain based key predis-
tribution
In this subsection, we present an overview of the solution for hash chain based key
predistribution which should satisfy at least the following properties:
• Each intermediate node cannot access the path key passed-by it.
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• The shared key should exclusively belong to two end nodes.
• The nodes only establish pairwise keys with nodes in its communication range
or the same cluster.
• The proposed scheme should resist node capture attack.
• The proposed scheme should support the establishment of different types of
keys.
As is usual with key predistribution schemes, the proposed scheme includes
three stages: key pool generation, key ring assignment and common key discovery.
While in the proposed scheme, the key pool generation is much different from that
of the random key predistribution scheme. It is unnecessary to generate a great
number of random keys. Instead, a small key pool with a very limited number of
generation keys and their IDs as well as their commitments is generated. Each key
chain is generated by a hash function with input of a seed and a specific generation
key. Each sensor is preloaded with IDs and commitments of a small number of
generation keys without actual generation keys. Each cluster head is preloaded
with a large number actual generation keys, their IDs and commitments. Then
both cluster heads and sensor nodes are uniformly and randomly deployed in the
network.
We adopt a different clustering method in the proposed scheme to improve
key connectivity probability. Each node establishes pairwise keys only with nodes
within the same cluster. If any two nodes do not share any key chain, the cluster
head will generate and unicast pairwise keys for them. We do not consider path key
establishment as it is insecure and complex. We also talked about the establishment
of other types of keys for the networks with preloaded master key or generation
keys.
The proposed scheme reduces storage overhead greatly. Each node stores only
the IDs and commitments of the corresponding generation keys. With the new
clustering mechanism, each sensor node chooses the powerful nodes with which
it has more generation keys in common as its cluster head. In this way, a higher
key connectivity probability is achieved. The proposed scheme subtly overcomes
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the weakness of the one-way property of hash chain. The scheme can resist node
compromise or node capture attack as sensor nodes do not store actual generation
keys in their memory. In Chapter 5, we will introduce the proposed scheme in detail.
3.6.3 Overview of the solution for hash chain based self-healing
key distribution
We have analyzed that Tian et al.’s scheme and its two improvements [6, 7] can
resist collusion only between the users whose life cycles have finished and newly
joined users. However, they are vulnerable to collusion attack of newly joined users
and revoked users whose life cycles have not yet expired. Du et al. [116] proposed
a self-healing method which aims to totally anti-collude in hash-based self-healing
key distribution schemes. Before presentation of our solution, we present two at-
tacks against Du et al.’s scheme [116]. Then we closely examine the breach of
the collusion attack in self-healing key distribution schemes and propose two possi-
ble solutions. After ruling one of the solutions out, we prove that the only feasible
solution is masking new random numbers in the corresponding broadcast messages.
We redefine the security model which provides more strict security require-
ments. As far as we know, this is the first time that the anti-collusive property
and implicit authentication of self-healing key distribution schemes have been de-
fined. In Setup phase of the proposed solution, each node not only be preloaded
with random numbers and secret vectors corresponding to its life cycle, but also a
commitment which is used to authenticate broadcast messages. Our technical in-
novation is embodied by the operations at the phase of Broadcast. If no user is
revoked, the broadcast message is of the same format as that in [93]. If any user
is revoked at session j, the group manager will select new random numbers and
change the format of the broadcast message to maintain forward secrecy. The proof
under an appropriate model and performance analysis demonstrated that the pro-
posed scheme achieves fully anti-collusive property with acceptable overhead. The
solution will be proposed in Chapter 6.
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3.6.4 Overview of the solution for HBT-based self-healing key
distribution with implicit authentication
We have reviewed the main technical problem of Jiang et al’s HBT based self-
healing key distribution scheme [112]. This scheme has all the weakness of hash
chain based self-healing schemes. Moreover, the mask method is based on Shamir’s
secret sharing, hence the number of revoked users cannot go over the threshold.
After that, we break the technical problem into several research issues. Here, we
present a solution for each of these research issues.
In the proposed solution, the generation of a hash binary tree follows that in
[112]. The number of leaf nodes of the hash binary tree is the same as the lifetime
of the network which is denoted by the number of sessions m. The forward hash
chain has a one-to-one correspondence relationship with leaf nodes of the hash bi-
nary tree. The backward hash chain is of length (m + 1). The last element of the
backward hash chain is used for implicit authentication. Even though the hash bi-
nary tree is generated based on a hash chain, its special construction has one good
property. The forward keys themselves for each node match the node’s prearranged
life cycle. Hence, it is unnecessary to introduce random numbers as that in [93]. In
the proposed solution, we replace Shamir’s secret sharing with vector space secret
sharing. The number of revoked nodes is not constrained by the threshold secret
sharing scheme. The concrete scheme will be presented in Chapter 7.
3.6.5 Overview of the solution for mutual-healing key distribu-
tion and authenticated self-healing key distribution
In the previous section, we pointed out that the only research issue related to mutual-
healing is to effectively authenticate requesting nodes. One possible solution which
considers the establishment of pairwise keys between nodes and the group manager
has been refuted after verification. The only feasible way is to endow each node
with a public/private key pair so that it can perform node-to-node authentication on
demand.
In the proposed solution, we bound each node with its identity and location
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rather merely one or the other of them. Before Setup, a localize method is used to
determine each node’s location. A public/private key pair can be calculated from
its identity and its location. At the end of this process, each node stores its location
and LBK pair.
The mutual-healing operation includes three stages: mutual-healing request,
mutual-healing response, and verification. If a node ui misses the broadcast mes-
sage Bt and cannot recover session key SKt in self-healing manner, ui broadcasts a
mutual-healing request including its identity IDi, location li and the sequence num-
ber of the expected broadcast message t. The neighboring node uj who receives the
request will check whether the requesting node ui is its neighboring node. If ui
cannot pass the check, uj discards the request to avoid the unexpected attacks. If ui
passes the check, ui will calculates a pairwise key with ui and send mutual-healing
response message to ui. The requested broadcast message is encrypted the newly
calculated pairwise key. ui can drive the pairwise key from the mutual-healing re-
sponse message and further obtain the broadcast message Bt.
We mentioned that the critical advantage of Public Key Cryptography is that it
provides effective way of authentication. Hence, we implement authentication in bi-
linear pairings based self-healing key distribution scheme with short signature. The
short signature is generated on the broadcast message by the group manager with its
private key. Each sensor node verifies the signature with the group manager’s public
key. This authentication mechanism can effectively ensure the broadcast messages
that authorized users receive are sent by the group manager.
The two solutions will be presented in further detail in Chapter 8.
3.6.6 Overview of the solution for practical hybrid key manage-
ment in HWSNs
We have identified technical problems of existing PKC-based and hybrid solutions
for HWSNs in the previous section. To date, no practical PKC-based or hybrid key
management solution has been proposed for HWSNs.
The proposed hybrid solution takes advantage of the different capabilities of
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nodes at different tiers. It uses resource-consuming ECC-based Public Key Cryp-
tography at the BS and cluster heads and efficient AES in low-cost nodes. The BS
serves as a CA which generates ECC-based public/private key pairs, one pair for
the BS itself and others for cluster heads. Each cluster head has a unique identity
and has both cryptographic algorithms ECC/AES installed on it. Each cluster head
is preloaded with the BS’s public key and a unique ECC public/private key pair.
Each low-cost node is preloaded with the node secret. After cluster formation, each
cluster head stores a public key list of all of its neighboring cluster heads. Each
L-node stores the public keys of its cluster head and the backup cluster head.
Each cluster equals a small communication group. The potential key manage-
ment framework depends on the communication mode. For the broadcast commu-
nication dominated group, efficient group key establishment and renewal schemes
are preferred. While for the peer communication dominated group, efficient and
secure pairwise key establishment, such as key predistribution, is a better option.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we firstly outlined a set of definitions that will be used throughout
the thesis. We then summarized the technical problems arising from the literature
in terms of four key aspects, and formulated the problem definition that we intend
to address in this thesis. We then decomposed the main defined problem into six
research issues, which form the key requirements for the development of an individ-
ual new solution. Further, we discussed a science and engineering based research
approach which will be utilized in this thesis for the proposed solution develop-
ment. Finally in this chapter, we took the first step in proposing the solution for
the problem that we intend to address in this thesis. We gave a brief overview of
the solutions for each of the outlined research issues and showed how each of these
solutions addresses these issues. This work leads us to solve the defined problem of
the thesis.
From the next chapter, we will discuss in more detail each of these solutions for
attaining the outlined research issues.
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Part II
Symmetric Key Cryptography Based
Solutions
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In the previous chapters, we mentioned that most of the key predistribution schemes
consider a flat topology of homogeneous nodes and support only the establishment
of pairwise keys. Even though flat networks are simple and efficient on a small
network scale, such networks lack scalability due to “one-affects-n” effect in node
addition and revocation. In a hierarchical WSN, the effect of node addition and
revocation can be localized into a cluster; thus, scalability is achieved.
In an HWSN, various types of communication may occur. The BS broadcasts
control commands to the whole network. The control node multicasts messages
within the cluster. A node communicates with its neighboring nodes by unicasting.
Therefore, network-wide key, cluster key, and pairwise key are required to satisfy
different types of secure communication. One of the better known key management
protocols, LEAP [29], supports the establishment of individual keys, pairwise keys,
cluster keys, and a global key. Different keys are used to handle the different types
of packets. The main problem of LEAP [29] is that the security of all types of keys
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relies upon that of the initial key. Jang et al. [1] improved LEAP by introducing a
time-based key management protocol. The scheme strengthens the security with a
new notion of probabilistic time intervals. However, the scheme solved the security
of [29] at the cost of reduced key connectivity probability.
ZigBee is a protocol specification and industry standard for a type of low-rate
wireless personal area networks (LR-WPAN) technology [117]. As depicted in Fig-
ure 4.1, the ZigBee standard is built upon the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [38] which
defines Physical layer and Media Access Control layer. It defines higher-layer net-
work and application services. Both ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 standards together
enable the development of complete LR-WPAN systems. The 802.15.4 standard
supports basic Media Access Control layer security services, such as access con-
trol and data encryption, leaving complex security services to the higher layers.
Therefore, in addition to a standardized set of protocols and interfaces for hardware
platform and software application, ZigBee provides a security model and a set of
security services in order to provide a comprehensive network security infrastruc-
ture although security is not mandatory in ZigBee. The security model provides
essential security services such as trust infrastructure, encryption, authentication,
and admission control for nodes joining the network. After an in-depth review of
the security model of ZigBee, we found it is inefficient in network key renewal.
Neither forward secrecy nor backward secrecy is adequately addressed, thereby al-
lowing the intrusion of a number of threats at the routing and the application layer
[118]. The security of ZigBee should be given full consideration in order to keep
up with increasingly wide application.
In this chapter, we propose a comprehensive key management solution. The so-
lution is based on the time-based key management [1] which disperses the damage
resulting from the disclosure of the initial key. We clearly handle key generation,
distribution, delivery, and erasure processes. This solution can be used to enhance
the security service of the ZigBee network. Compared with existing security mech-
anisms of ZigBee standard, the proposed solution provides sufficient security with
acceptable overhead.
This chapter is organized as follows: We review the security problems of LEAP
and the time-based key management scheme with focus on research issues to be
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Figure 4.1: The ZigBee layer model
addressed in this chapter in Section 4.2. We introduce the necessary requirements
of multi-phase deployment of WSNs and outline the problems arising from it in
Section 4.3. Then we propose a key management solution which is based on the
time-based key management for multi-phase HWSNs in Section 4.4. We firstly give
an overview of ZigBee key management and point out its vulnerabilities, then show
how the proposed solution can be used to enhance the key management services of
ZigBee protocol specification in Section 4.5. We analyze the performance of the
proposed solution in Section 4.6 and security in Section 4.7. Finally, we conclude
this chapter in Section 4.8.
4.2 The Security Problems of LEAP and the Time-
based Key Management Scheme
As one of many existing key management protocols, LEAP assumes that the ini-
tial key is secure during the initialization phase and is erased from the memory of
sensor nodes when the initialization phase finishes. The authors regard the scheme
as secure under such an assumption. However, the same key IK should be used
again for node addition and replacement after that phase while the new node can be
captured before removing the initial key. According to the assumption, some new
nodes may be captured at any time after the initialization phase. That is, the newly
deployed nodes might be captured before removing the initial key. The security
of the scheme is threatened by the attacks launched after the initialization phase.
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Therefore, the initial key IK should never be used for node addition in LEAP after
the initial time Tmin.
Different initial keys are used for different time slots in the time-based key man-
agement scheme [1]. The threat caused by the disclosure of the initial key is elim-
inated. However, the key connectivity is constrained by the number of preloaded
master keys m and the order of the current time slot. If m is far less than the life-
time P of the network, the key connectivity m
P−j is far less than 1 at the time slots
j(j ≤ P/2). On the contrary, if m is close to P , higher key connectivity can be
achieved with a heavy burden on storage.
We consider the security problem of the established pairwise key between two
nodes. The pairwise key does not exclusively belong to the two end nodes and threat
against confidentiality and authentication may arise from it. As shown in Figure 2 in
[1], Nodes of groupN1, N2, andN6 are preloaded with master keyKu7, the pairwise
keys between any two groups of them are known by the other group. In addition,
m master keys of randomly-chosen time slots are preloaded to the nodes when they
are deployed to the network without taking the lifetime of nodes into consideration.
Suppose a node which can survive at most Gw time slots is deployed at the j-th
time slot with m master keys of randomly-chosen time slots. Those master keys of
the time slots from (j +Gw)-th to P -th would never be used. They waste the scant
memory of sensor nodes.
4.3 The Importance of Multi-phase Deployment of
Wireless Sensor Networks
Most of the current key management systems neglect the relationship between the
lifetime of WSNs and the limited battery of sensor nodes. Usually, WSNs should
work for longer time than lifetime of ordinary sensor nodes. However, current lit-
erature about key management are designed for single-phase WSNs even though
some of them allow dynamic node addition or revocation. WSNs are composed of
low-cost sensor nodes which are powered by irreplaceable batteries. Therefore, new
nodes should be deployed to replace erroneous nodes or power-off nodes. In this
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way, WSNs can retain their expected network connectivity and work well.
In order to make deployment easy, new nodes are periodically deployed into
WSNs in batches. Then two new problems arise from multi-phase deployment.
In some highly sensitive environments, how can key connectivity be maintained
between nodes deployed at different periods? If an attacker can collect information
from compromised nodes or power-off nodes and launch a lengthy attack against
the networks, how can the networks be safeguarded from such a long-term attack or
minimize the risk?
General key predistribution schemes assume a static key pool which does not
renew over time. The replenished nodes also draw a subset of keys from the key
pool. As a result, some already compromised keys might be in use again. It is pos-
sible to eventually discover the whole key pool if the attacker continues to capture
nodes. A collapsed key pool may have a disastrous effect on the network. In view
of these potential attacks, we have to find the right solution to renew the key pool
and remove compromised or outdated keys. In addition, the nodes for a particu-
lar period should be preloaded with appropriate keys which enable them to sustain
communication with nodes deployed at different periods.
To the best of our knowledge, RoK [119] is the first key predistribution scheme
adapted to multi-phase WSNs. In this scheme, sensor nodes which run out of power
will be removed from the network and new sensor nodes need to be periodically de-
ployed to ensure network connectivity. Correspondingly, the predistributed keys
have limited lifetimes and the key pool should be refreshed periodically. This
scheme overcomes the drawback of the general key predistribution schemes [3, 42].
The security of the network does not degrade with time. Zo-RoK [120] takes advan-
tage of prior deployment knowledge in order to reduce the size of the key ring. In
this way, the resilience of the network against node capture attack increases with a
smaller key ring of each node, yet deployment knowledge is not always available in
WSNs. Recently, a random generation material (RGM) key predistribution scheme
was proposed in [121]. In this scheme, the life-time of the whole network is divided
into generations. Each generation has its own random keying material and pairwise
keys shared by two nodes which are known only to the nodes in the two generations
to which the two nodes belong. Nodes deployed in other generations have no access
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to the pairwise key. We extend this idea to fix security issues of the LEAP scheme
[29] and the time-based key management scheme [1] in this chapter.
4.4 The Construction
We propose a novel key management protocol for multi-phase HWSNs. In this
scheme, the time domain of the network is split into many time slots. Alternatively,
we call the time slot generation as well. It is assumed that there are in total P gen-
erations. We assume that a BS handles key management and network management.
The BS has numerous resources and is safe from the threat. The middle nodes are
cluster heads which have the function of cluster management. The general sensors
are usually powered by battery and have very limited resources. It is assumed that
a node may live at most Gw generations. In the proposed solution, each generation
has its initial key which is pre-installed to memory of nodes. There is no correlation
between the initial keys for different time slots. This property prevents the attackers
from concluding the previous and future initial keys. WSNs are set up for a longer
life-time as compared to that of sensor nodes. Therefore, new nodes need to be
replenished in some generations to provide continuity of the network in the case of
node capture attack or depletion of battery. It is supposed that an attacker could
obtain all the key materials stored in the captured node. In order to achieve a higher
key connectivity probability between nodes belonging to different generations and
resilience, the keys that are used to establish pairwise keys should evolve in a differ-
ent way, independent of evolution of the initial keys. Table 4.1 presents the symbols
used in our proposed key management protocol.
Table 4.1: Notations used in the proposed key management scheme
u, v The low-cost devices
P The initial key pool size and the whole life time of the network
KRj The key ring of nodes deployed at generation j
Kjuv Pairwise key between nodes u and v which deployed at generation j
Kghuv Pairwise key between nodes u which deployed at generation g and v
which deployed at generation v where 1 ≤ g < h ≤ g +Gw − 1
H(·) Secure hash function
fk Pseudo-random function
MAC(k, s) The MAC of message s using a symmetric key k
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4.4.1 Precomputation of Key Materials
The BS computes key materials prior to deployment. The key materials include
a Network key for network-wide broadcast communication, an individual key for
each node, and initial keys and masked initial keys for nodes deployed at different
generations.
• Network key. The Network key NK1 is shared by all the entities in the net-
work. It is used to encrypt broadcast messages. We call it NK1 because it is
an initial network key and will be renewed periodically or on each member-
ship change.
• Individual key. An individual key is a unique key shared between the BS
and each node. The individual key keys are computed from the Master key.
For security reasons, the Master key Km is only known to the BS and is not
preloaded to ordinary nodes. Instead, each pre-computed individual key is
loaded to the corresponding node prior to its deployment. The individual key
is calculated as Kmu = fKm(IDu).
• Initial keys and masked initial keys. As depicted in Figure 4.2, the group Gj
deployed at generation Tj are assigned with an initial key IKj and (Gw − 1)
masked initial keys in order to establish links with nodes deployed at the
same or different generations. The initial key is reserved for the establish-
ment of pairwise keys with nodes deployed in the same generation. The other
(Gw − 1) masked initial keys are used to establish pairwise keys with the
groups deployed at subsequent generations. Different from the time-based
key management scheme in [1], the masked initial keys in our scheme are
constructed in an ingenious way. These masked initial keys are transformed
from the initial keys for the generations within the node’s generation win-
dow Gw. For a group of nodes deployed at generation j, their sub-keyring
S − KRj containing the masked initial keys for the subsequent generations
j + 1 ≤ l < j +Gw − 1, is given as follows:
S −KRj = {Kj,l|Kj,l = H(IKl ‖ j)}, (4.1)
where IKl is the initial key for the l-th generation.
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Figure 4.2: The key rings preloaded to nodes at different generations
This process can be detailed as follows. In order to form the sub-keyring
S − KRj , the BS first picks up (Gw − 1) initial keys for the subsequent
(Gw − 1) generations. Each of these keys is appended with the generation
number of the group, which is j, and hashed using a secure hash function like
SHA-1 [122] or SHA-256 [123], depending on the key size. These hashed
values are stored in the sub-keyring. In this way, we customize the keys
belonging to a subsequent generation to be used in another generation without
storing the actual initial keys, owing to the one-way property of the secure
hash functions.
To sum up, the keyring of a sensor node contains two parts:
1. the initial key assigned to the current generation;
2. the masked initial keys for up to (Gw − 1) subsequent generations.
More formally, for a node deployed at generation j, its keyring KRj is shown
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as follows:
KRj = {IKj, Kj,j+1, . . . , Kj,j+Gw−1}. (4.2)
4.4.2 Predistribution of Key Materials
Before deployment, a node uwhich belongs to the generation j is preloaded with the
current Network key NKj , an individual key Kmu , and a keyring KRj . The keyring
consists of one initial key and (Gw − 1) masked initial keys for each upcoming
generation. Because a sensor node may communicate with nodes at most (Gw − 1)
generations, the maximum number of keys in the keyring of each node is Gw.
The BS is preloaded with the Network key NK1 before it is deployed into the
network. After deployment, the BS is responsible Network key updating. The
Network key can be updated periodically or on each membership change in some
security-critical environments. The BS always keeps the latest Network key. It
is not necessary to store all the individual keys at the BS. Instead, it stores only
the Master key Km and generates the individual key with a specific node when it
wants to unicast messages to the node. In addition, the BS stores P initial keys
corresponding to the lifetime of the network.
4.4.3 Pairwise Key Establishment
After the keyring is created, the nodes are deployed at the sensor field generation
by generation. Two situations exist for the establishment of pairwise keys.
1. Since all sensor nodes deployed at generation j contain the initial key IKj ,
they can establish pairwise keys using IKj . Suppose two nodes u and v
belong to the same generation j, they compute their pairwise keys as follows:
• Node u broadcasts a HELLO message including its ID and generation j
and then waits for a response from the neighboring node v which is de-
ployed in the same generation. Node v sends node u a response message
including its ID and a MAC.
u→ ∗ : IDu, j, nonce;
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v → u : IDv,MAC(Kjv , IDu | IDv)
where Kjv = fIKj(IDv).
• Both u and v can compute a pairwise key independently. In order to
keep consistency, the pairwise key is computed by Kjuv = fKju(IDv) if
IDu < IDv or Kjvu = fKjv(IDu) if IDu > IDv.
2. For any two nodes belonging to different generations, the establishment pro-
cess of pairwise key is different. Let us suppose that node u deployed at
generation g and another node v deployed at generation h (1 ≤ g < h ≤
g +Gw − 1). They compute their pairwise keys as follows:
Kghuv = fKgh(IDu | IDv).
Node u is already preloaded with the key Kgh before deployment. From the
point of view of node v, Kgh is the masked initial key for group deployed
at the previous generation g. Therefore, it is not in node v’s keyring. For-
tunately, node v can calculate Kgh. As discussed in the previous subsection,
Kgh = H(IKh ‖ g), where H is a secure one-way hash function. Node v is
deployed at generation h, and therefore it stores the initial key IKh. By using
IKh, it calculates the key Kgh and then calculates Kghuv .
4.4.4 Pseudo-code of the Proposed Protocol
To sum up, we present a pseudo-code of the proposed protocol as follows:
Sub-program
1 Key generator KG(l); ‘l is the length of key’
2 MAC function MAC(K,m);
3 Pseudo-random function fK(m);




2 p, ‘life-time of network, measured by number of generation’
3 Gw, ‘life-time of nodes’
4 n, ‘average number of one-hop neighbors of a node’
5 nonce;
6 Precomputation of key materials
7 NK1 = GK(l) ‘generate Network key’;
8 Km = KG(l) ‘generate Master key’;
9 For each node u to be deployed in the network
10 Kmu = fKm(IDu) ‘generate the individual key’
11 end
12 For i = 1 : p
13 KG(l)
14 end ‘generate the initial keys for p generations {IK1, . . . , IKp}’
15 For j = 1 : p
16 For i = j + 1 : j +Gw + 1
17 Kj,i = H(IKi | j)
18 end
19 end‘generate key ring for nodes deployed at the generation j’
20 Predistribution of key materials
21 preload {NK1, Km} ∪ {IK1, . . . , IKp} to the BS
22 if a node u is deployed to the network at generation j, preload {NKj, Km} ∪
{IKj, Kj,j+1, . . . , Kj,j+Gw−1} to node u
23 Pairwise key establishment
24 For each node in the network, broadcast Hello message
25 u→ ∗ : IDu, j, nonce
26 a node v receives the Hello message
27 v → u : IDv,MAC(Kjv , IDu | IDv)
28 If u and v belongs to the same generation j
29 If IDu < IDv,
30 Kjuv = fKju(IDv)
31 else Kjvu = fKjv(IDu)
145
32 else if v belongs to generation h
33 Kjhuv = fKjh(IDu | IDv).
4.4.5 Node Revocation and Rekeying
Rekeying occurs either periodically or after membership changes or node compro-
mise is detected. Periodical rekeying and Network key rekeying on node addition
are much easier than rekeying when the node leaves. In normal periodical rekeying,
the BS encrypts the new Network key with the old Network key and broadcasts the
encrypted message through the network. All authenticated nodes will receive the
new Network key. Network key rekeying on node addition can be performed in the
same way with an extra unicast step. The Base Station encrypts the new Network
key with the individual key and unicasts it to the newly joined nodes.
Node revocation is incurred by energy depletion or node compromise. We clas-
sify it as active revocation when node is power off and passive revocation when
node is compromised. When a node u’s power is to be exhausted, node u encrypts a
revocation message with the current Network key NKj and broadcasts it as follows:
u→ ∗ : IDu ‖ timestamp ‖ ENKj(Rov | IDu | timestamp).
At the same time, node u erases all the keys it has, including the Network key, the
individual key, and pairwise keys shared with its neighboring nodes. The neighbor-
ing nodes which share a pairwise key will erase the pairwise key once they receive
the revocation message. Network rekeying is unnecessary as the revoked node u’s
behavior is normal and no key materials are disclosed.
In the case of node compromise, the compromised node must be passively
revoked by the Coordinator. A node revocation announcement must be authenti-
cated to prevent an outsider adversary from impersonating the BS. In our proposed
scheme, we follow the same rekeying method as that of LEAP. Once a node u is
identified as compromised, the BS renews the group key and sends a message iden-
tifying the compromised node u and providing an authentication key fK′g(0) for the
new Network key. Each neighbor node that receives the message deletes the pair-
wise key shared with u. Then the BS encrypts the new Network key and sends it
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to its neighbor routers which in turn authenticate the new Network key and then
send it to their neighbors and so on until all nodes receive the new Network key.
In this recursive process, we assume that a breadth-first spanning tree is established
by a routing protocol and the router has a basic management function. This manner
of hop-by-hop flooding incurs significant overhead for sensor nodes. Fortunately,
Network rekeying on node compromise is a relatively less frequent event.
4.5 ZigBee Key Management
4.5.1 ZigBee Network Topologies and Types of Keys
As depicted in Figure 4.3, the ZigBee network supports Star, Tree, and Mesh topolo-
gies. ZigBee network may comprise three types of devices: Coordinator, Router,
and end device. In particular, a ZigBee network must have a Trust Center. The
Trust Center is usually the Coordinator, which provides key management and other
security services. In the Star topology, the network is controlled by the Coordina-
tor, which is responsible for initiating and maintaining the devices on the network,
while the end devices communicate with the Coordinator [124]. In Mesh and Tree
topologies, the Coordinator is responsible for starting the network and for choosing
certain key network parameters, but the network may also be extended through the
use of ZigBee Routers [118]. Nowadays, the most important and promising ZigBee
application profiles seem to be Home Automation [125] and Smart Energy [126].
Our research focuses on the latter since it considers security as a major issue and
includes precise mechanisms for secure communications.
In terms of key types, ZigBee uses Master key, Link key, and Network key for
authentication and encryption.
• Master key. The Master key is not used to encrypt data. Instead, it is used to
authenticate the node when the node joins the network and as an initial shared
secret between two devices when they generate Link keys.
• Link key. The Link key is unique for a pair of devices and is used for end-to-
end encryption. In particular, the key shared by a device and the Trust Center
is called Trust Center Link (TCL) key. The TCL key is established during
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Figure 4.3: The topologies of ZigBee networks
the join procedure and is used to protect application level messages and stack
commands.
• Network key. The Network key is shared by all devices and is used for broad-
cast management and to control communications. A high security Network
key must always be sent encrypted over the air [127].
4.5.2 Security Problems of ZigBee Key Management
Two basic security requirements of network communication are forward secrecy
which prevents a departing or expelled device from having continued access to fur-
ther communication, and backward secrecy which prevents a newly joined device
from accessing the previous communication. Usually, these two requirements are
achieved by a timely key revocation and rekeying mechanism. Rekeying a group
before the addition of a new member is simple, while rekeying the group after a
member leaves is far more complicated [128]. The ZigBee specification provides a
backward secrecy mechanism but leaves the issue of forward secrecy unresolved.
The ZigBee specification dictates that the Trust Center should refresh the Net-
work key periodically, but it does not specify either the refresh period or any event
that triggers the Network key refresh. It says nothing about key refreshment upon
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a device’s departure. No effective measure is adopted to safeguard Network key
and Link key on membership change. All the same, the revoked devices can access
all communications encrypted by these keys. The adversary may compromise the
device and exploit the Network key to spoof and inject bogus routing information.
More seriously, the adversary may launch highly disruptive routing attacks such as
sinkhole attack and selective forwarding attack [118].
As far as the two ways to refresh the Network key are concerned, none of them
is effective. The overdue Network key is used to refresh the new Network key in
the broadcast-based refresh method. While in the unicast-based refresh method,
the new Network key is encrypted with each device’s Transport key and delivered
to each device in a one-to-one fashion. This solution is secure but has scalability
limitations.
As to the Link between two devices, the ZigBee specification does specify how
to deal with it when one of the two device leaves the network or how to inform its
neighbors when a device leaves the network.
4.5.3 The Enhanced Key Management of the ZigBee Specifica-
tion
The proposed solution can be directly used to enhance the key management ser-
vices of the ZigBee tree architecture (As shown in Figure 4.3). We assume that the
Coordinator has the function of the Trust Center and the Routers have cluster man-
agement function. The corresponding relationship of the entities in the proposed
solution and the ZigBee specification is shown in the Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: The corresponding relationship of the entities in the proposed solution and
the ZigBee specification
Entities in the proposed solution Entities in the ZigBee specification
The BS The Coordinator
Routers Cluster heads
Ordinary sensor nodes End devices
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We mentioned that ZigBee uses three types of keys for authentication and en-
cryption. The corresponding relationship of the keys in the proposed solution and
the ZigBee specification is shown in the Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: The corresponding relationship of the keys in the proposed solution and the
ZigBee specification
Keys in the proposed solution Keys in the ZigBee specification
Master key Master key
Link key Pairwise key
TCL key Individual key
Network key Network key
4.5.4 Authentication for Node Admission Control in ZigBee Spec-
ification
Secure node admission avoids the situation where unauthorized nodes join the net-
work. In the ZigBee specification, the Coordinator controls the policy of node ad-
mission. Each authorized node is preloaded with a common network security key
prior to deployment. The Coordinator checks the validity of the common Network
key. Only those nodes possessing the correct Network key should be permitted
to join the network. This authentication method does not take the Network key
updating into consideration. What this means, firstly, is that the Network key is re-
newed over the generations while the nodes still request admission with the original
Network key in later generations. Secondly, the authentication is not secure if the
Network key is disclosed.
In the enhanced key management services, we use the TCL key for authentica-
tion as it is the unique key shared by each node and the Coordinator. The Master
key Km is stored by the Coordinator and does not change over time. Suppose a
node u is requesting for admission, the authentication process can be displayed as
follows:
u→ the Coordinator : IDu ‖ nonce ‖MAC(Kmu , IDu | nonce).
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The Coordinator generates the TCL key Kmu = fKm(IDu) and uses it to check
the correctness of the MAC value. If the MAC value is correct, node u passes the
authentication and joins the network. Otherwise, node u is rejected from joining the
network.
4.6 Security Evaluation
The advantage of the proposed protocol is that it embodies security improvement of
LEAP [29], the time-based key management scheme [1], and the ZigBee security
services. The goal of this section is to evaluate the security of our proposal and
compare it with the refereed papers. We attempt to discuss the defences against
node capture attack and the degree of resilience of the different schemes.
4.6.1 Advantages over LEAP and the Time-based Scheme
We assume that when a node is compromised, the key material stored in the node
will be extracted by the adversary. The key material will be utilized to attack the
rest of the network. In [1], the resilience of schemes is described as the additional
portion of network that an adversary can compromise using the key material ob-
tained from x compromised nodes. We still use this definition in this section. The
security of the LEAP scheme depends on the security of the initial key IK. The
whole network can be compromised once the initial key KI is disclosed. The dam-
age resulting from a disclosure of an initial key IK is localized by the time-based
key management scheme [1]. The lifetime of the network is divided into P gen-
erations and each generation has its initial key. A compromised initial key IKa at
generation Ta affects only the nodes deployed at generation Ta rather than the whole
network. In order to provide connectivity between nodes deployed at different gen-
erations, the preloaded master key for different generation is the same. However,
as we mentioned in Section 4.2, the pairwise key does not exclusively belong to the
two end nodes. If three nodes are preloaded with the same master key, the pairwise
keys between any two groups of them are known by the other group. Once a node
is captured, the pairwise keys shared by the other two nodes will be compromised
as well. This property makes the scheme vulnerable to attacks against forward and
backward secrecy.
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In our scheme, either the pairwise key Kjuv or K
gh
uv exclusively belongs to the
two end nodes. For example, the pairwise key Kjuv shared by node u and v which
are deployed at generation j is shared only by them and the pairwise keyKghuv shared
by node u deployed at generation g and v deployed at generation h is confined to the
two end nodes deployed at these two generations. We take Kghuv as example. Nodes
deployed at generations other than g and h have no right to access this key. This is
because the masked initial key Kgh is preloaded to the nodes which is deployed at
generation g and can be calculated by nodes if and only if these node are deployed
at generation h and have the initial key IKh in their key ring. As a result, a sensor
node w, which is deployed at any other generation l (for l 6= g & l 6= h) cannot
calculate a masked initial key Kgh. Three conditions exist according to the value of
l:
• l < h. The node w needs IKh to calculate Kgh. Even though the node w has
the masked initial key Klh = H(IKh ‖ l), it cannot derive IKh from Klh due
to the one-way property of the secure hash function H .
• h < l ≤ g + Gw − 1. The node u is preloaded with the masked initial key
Kgl = H(IKl ‖ g) and the node v is preloaded with the masked initial key
Khl = H(IKl ‖ l). Even the node w can calculate Kgl and Khl, it cannot
derive IKh or Kgh due to the one-way property of the secure hash function
H .
• l > g +Gw − 1. The node u has powered off at the generation l.
It is clear that the masked initial key Kgh is known only by the nodes deployed
at generations g and h. No node deployed at any other generation can calculate the
key that is unique to the generation g and h. Hence, an attacker has to spend extra
effort if s/he wants to acquire the pairwise key between the nodes u and v that are
deployed at the generations g and h, respectively. This has an advantage over the
scheme in LEAP and the time-based key management scheme [1] in restricting the
information that an attack acquires if s/he captures a node.
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4.6.2 Advantages over ZigBee Specification
In the proposed solution for multi-phase ZigBee architecture, each node u which is
to be powered off broadcasts a revocation message to its neighbors and erases all
the keys it has, including the Network key, the TCL key, and Link keys shared with
its neighboring nodes. The neighboring nodes which share a Link key will erase
the Link key. In this case, Network rekeying is unnecessary as the leaving node has
actively erased all the keys it has.
In the case where node compromise is detected, the Network key must be re-
freshed and node revocation announcement is authenticated to prevent possible at-
tacks. Our solution follows the recursive rekeying method of LEAP.
In the case of node addition, the Network key must also be refreshed in order
to maintain backward secrecy. The key refreshment in this case is as easy as pe-
riodically rekeying. In the proposed solution, nodes are periodically added to the
network in batches. In practical applications, nodes perform a normal operation
such as sensing and monitoring the environment during a normal phase. At the be-
ginning of each new generation, a batch of new nodes is deployed to the network.
There is a corresponding relationship between the generation and period for node
addition. In the time-based model, the beginning of the new generation occurs with
node addition so that the number of generations approximately equals the periods
of node addition [1]. Usually, the main purpose of node addition is to complement
the network and keep network connectivity so the frequency of node addition is not
necessarily high. In addition, in our model, the size of the initial key pool is the




The key connectivity of a group Nt which is deployed at generation t of the time-
based key management scheme [1] is assessed from two aspects. One is Nt’s prob-
ability of sharing keying materials with prospective sensor nodes, ppros(t) and the
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other is the probability of sharing keying materials with pre-deployed sensor nodes
and nodes deployed at the current generation Gt, ppre(t). According to the scheme,
when a sensor node is deployed at generation t, only the pre-deployed nodes which
have the master key, which is derived from the initial key IKt of the generation t,
can establish a pairwise key with it. Because each node is preloaded with the initial
key of the current generation and m master keys of randomly chosen generations
after deployment, the probability of sharing key material with other prospective
nodes is m
P−t where P is the number of total generations (Please refer to [1] for
the process of calculation). The variation 1 ≤ t < P . When P − t ≤ m, the
master keys of all remaining generations will be preloaded to the nodes deployed
at generation t so that the key connectivity probability ppros(t) is 1 and keeps 1 for
the subsequent generations. We make a comparison of the probabilities that Nt es-
tablishes the pairwise key with prospective groups in our scheme and the scheme
in [1] in Figure 4.4. In order to facilitate the comparison, we keep the size of key
pool (the same as the number of generations of a network) 500. The three curves
in Figure 4.4 demonstrate the conditions of [1] when m equals 100, 150, and 200,
respectively. As shown in the figure, the probability ppros increases as the index the
generation t increases. In our scheme, the group Nt can always share keying ma-
terial with groups in its generation window [t, t + Gw − 1] with 100% probability.
The variation 1 ≤ m ≤ P − 1, it is easy to reach the conclusion that the more
master keys a sensor node has in [1], the higher is the probability of key connec-
tivity. In our scheme, more than (Gw − 1) preloaded master keys do not increase
the key connectivity probability as (Gw − 1) master keys are enough to reach 100%
probability.
In terms of ppre(t), it can be calculated by using ppros. If we assume that sensor





where 1 means that a sensor node can establish pairwise keys with nodes de-
ployed at the same generation with 100% probability. In fact, it is the average value
of the probabilities of key connectivity with each preloaded and the current group
of sensor nodes. Figure 4.5 describes the change tendency of probability ppre for
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Figure 4.4: The comparison of the probabilities that Nt establishes pairwise keys with
prospective groups in our scheme and the scheme in [1]
Figure 4.5: The comparison of the probabilities that Ni establishes pairwise key with
pre-deployed sensors and the sensors being deployed in the same generation in our
scheme and the scheme in [1]
various m when the number of generations P is fixed at 500.
Different from the scheme in [1], when a sensor node is deployed at generation
t, it is preloaded with the initial key IKt and (Gw−1) master keys for the subsequent
(Gw − 1) generations. The node can establish pairwise keys with nodes in at most
(2Gw−1) generations with 100% probability as long as both of them are still viable.
As described in Figure 4.6, a node deployed at generation j can establish pairwise
keys with nodes deployed from generation (j − Gw + 1) to generation j by using
its initial key IKj and establish pairwise keys with nodes deployed from generation
(j + 1) to generation (j + Gw − 1) by using the preloaded master keys for each
generation. In the time-based scheme [1], a node is preloaded with m master keys
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Figure 4.6: Nodes deployed at generation j can establish pairwise nodes with at most
2Gw − 1 generations with 100% probability
of randomly- chosen generations. Some of these master keys might not be used
before the node is power off. Suppose a node is deployed at generation j and is
viable at most Gw generations, those master keys of the generations from (j +Gw)
to P are useless.
In the RGM key predistribution scheme [121], two conditions are discussed
regarding key connectivity. One is the key sharing probability of the node pairs
deployed at the same generations and the other is the key sharing probability of
node pairs deployed at different generations. These two key sharing probabilities
are different since different parts of keyring are utilized for connections at these two
conditions.
In the RGM scheme, the key sharing probability of node pairs deployed at the
same generation is denoted as Psg. In fact, RGM scheme is an extension of the basic
random key predistribution scheme [3]. The single-phase case of RGM scheme
is totally the same as [3]. Suppose the size of key pool for each generation is
P and each node stores m current generation keys in its keyring, the key sharing
probability that a node pair shares at least one key is
Psg = 1− C(P −m,m)
C(P,m)
. (4.3)
The key sharing probability of node pairs deployed at the same generation is
denoted as Pdg. A node can derive m past generation keys from its m current gen-
eration keys. Each node stores n future generation keys for each future generation
in its generation window. This is equivalent to the case where a node has a sub-
keyring with m keys and another node has a sub-keyring with n keys, which are
chosen from the same key pool of P keys. Hence, the key sharing probability that a
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node pair has at least one key in common is
Psg = 1− C(P,m+ n)C(m+ n,m)
C(P,m)C(P, n)
. (4.4)
It is supposed that m ≥ n in RGM scheme. It means Psg ≥ Pdg. The overall key
connectivity of RGM scheme is a value within the range [Pdg, Psg]. The maximum
value of key connectivity of RGM scheme is Psg which is the same as that of the
basic random key predistribution scheme. It is obvious that the key connectivity
probability of RGM scheme is lower than that of our solution, which is 1.
4.7.2 Complexity Analysis
Storage cost
The storage overhead is affected by the degree of the network. The degree of the
network is usually defined as the average number of immediate neighboring nodes
of a given node. It is proportional to the density of nodes in a network and may be
a value from 10 to 20 for a reasonably dense network [129]. Here we use the same
assumption that the degree of the networks in LEAP [29] and our protocol is d. The
storage overhead of the time-based scheme [1] and RGM [121] are not related to
the degree of the network.
In LEAP, each node stores three keys for each neighbor, including a pairwise
key, a cluster key and a key chain with L values. In addition, each node stores a
network key and a master key. The total number of keys that each node stores is
(3d+ L+ 2).
In the time-based key management scheme, each node is preloaded with an
individual key shared with the BS and one initial key and m master keys. All of the
other keys are established based on the preloaded keys. According to our analysis
in Section 4.2, this scheme cannot guarantee 100% key connectivity.
In the RGM scheme, each node stores m current generation keys and n future
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generation keys for each future generations. A node whose generation window is
Gw may establish communication with at most (Gw − 1) next generations Hence,
each node has to store (Gw − 1)× n+m keys.
In the proposed protocol, the storage is determined by the memory of a node and
generations that a node can survive. The number of generations is approximately
equal to the number of node additions. Therefore, the higher the frequency of node
additions, the larger is the number of generations that a network has. According
to our scheme, each node is preloaded with a Network key, an individual key, an
initial key and Gw − 1 masked initial keys. So the total preloaded number of key
materials is Gw+2. After the phase of pairwise key establishment, each node stores
d + 2 keys, including d pairwise keys and an individual key and a Network key.
Suppose a sensor node surviving 100 generations has to store 100 keys including
one initial key and 99 masked initial keys. These node can establish pairwise keys
with nodes in 199 generations with 100% probability. The modern sensor nodes
such as MICA-Z have 128KB program memory, 4KB runtime memory, and 512KB
external memory [130]. Suppose the size of a key is 128bits, our scheme requires
only 1.6KB memory. Our scheme has a reasonable storage requirement for modern
sensor nodes.
Computation and communication cost
In LEAP [29], the time-based scheme [1], RGM [121], and the proposed solution,
each node broadcasts a hello message to find its neighboring nodes when it joins
the network. Both time or energy consumption are the same in this step for these
four schemes. However, time and energy consumption varies in these four schemes
for Link key establishment. In LEAP, all the nodes are deployed at the same time.
We take nodes u and v as example, u and v establish Link key with algorithm
Kjuv = fKju(IDv) if IDu < IDv or K
j
vu = fKjv(IDu) if IDu > IDv. While in the
proposed solution, nodes are deployed to network generation by generation. Neigh-
boring nodes deployed in the same generation establish the pairwise key with the
same algorithm as that in LEAP. While for the node u deployed at generation g and
another node v deployed at generation h(1 ≤ g < h ≤ g +Gw − 1), they calculate
their pairwise keys with algorithm Kghuv = fKgh(IDu | IDv). We have to mention
that even though [1] adopts the same Link key establishment algorithm, it cannot
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of time consumption of LEAP and the proposed solution
guarantee 100% key connectivity and the established pairwise key does not exclu-
sively belong to the two generations. In RGM, all the shared generation keys con-
tribute to the pairwise key. The pairwise key is the hash value of the concatenation
of all the shared generation keys. The calculation does not increase computation
overhead while strengthening the security. However, RGM does not guarantee that
any two nodes share at least one generation key. That is, it cannot reach 100% key
connectivity probability. It does not consider path key establishment as the basic
random key predistribution scheme [3].
We suppose the degree of network varies from 10 to 20 with span 2 in LEAP and
the proposed scheme. In the proposed scheme, we assume that half the neighboring
nodes for a specific node are deployed in the same generation and the remaining
neighboring nodes are deployed in the different generations. The length of ID of
each node is 4 bytes and the key length is 128 bits. We run the pairwise key es-
tablishment algorithm with MATLAB. Figure 4.7 shows a comparison of the time
consumption.
4.8 Conclusion
Although the LEAP key management mechanism is welcomed due to its multiple
keying mechanism and apparently strengthens the security of ZigBee, the security
of all types of keys is mainly dependent on that of an initial key. It is assumed that
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the initial deployment phase is secure and the key is erased from sensor nodes after
the initialization phase. However, the same key should be used again for node addi-
tion after that phase while the new node can be captured before removing the initial
key. A time-based key management scheme was proposed to eliminate the effect of
disclosure of the initial keys. This scheme does disperse the damage resulting from
the disclosure of the initial key with the cost of reduced key connectivity and other
security vulnerabilities. We identified the security problems of LEAP and the time-
based key management schemes and presented a robust key management scheme
for multi-phase HWSNs. We identified security issues of the ZigBee specification
in particular its key management mechanism and showed that the proposed robust
key management solution can be directly used to enhance the key management ser-
vices of the ZigBee specification. We demonstrated the advantages of the proposed
solution with sound analysis, comparison, and simulation.
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5Keyed Hash Chain Based Key
Predistribution Scheme
5.1 Introduction
Many previous researches focus on flat topology of wireless sensor networks which
comprise only homogeneous nodes. This type of network is simple and efficient
small-scale networks, but, it lacks scalability. In a homogeneous network, the sensor
node which performs the data aggregation and forwarding function will run out of
power in advance because it receives higher traffic volume. This in turn leads to the
collapse of the whole network. An alternative way to extend the network life is to
randomly and periodically rotate the responsibility of the data aggregation function
to all nodes as the scheme proposed in [131]. However, this rotation raises the
requirement of stronger hardware capabilities. Both [132] and [133] demonstrated
the performance bottleneck of homogeneous networks.
HWSNs consist of heterogeneous nodes, including a large number of low-end
nodes and a small number of high-end nodes. Low-end nodes have a tiny mem-
ory and very limited data processing capability; while high-end nodes have more
storage space and stronger data processing capability. High-end nodes are deployed
together with low-end nodes. They aggregate data and forward the aggregated data
to the BS. Also, high-end nodes which work as cluster heads help the BS to manage
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the network. Addition and revocation operations can be performed within a cluster.
In this way, the influence of a compromised node can be localized within a cluster
rather than affecting the whole network. Therefore, HWSNs provide scalability and
security benefits.
As applications gain more ground, security issues in wireless sensor networks
have attracted more concern. There have been several attempts to secure WSNs,
although all of them have their pros and cons and none gives a satisfactory perfor-
mance. Security is a challenging problem in WSNs due to the constraint on memory
and energy at low-end nodes. Asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA
public key techniques, while applicable to wired networks even general ad hoc net-
works, may not be suitable for sensor networks. It is well known that ECC can
obtain the same security level as RSA with a shorter key length. A 160-bit ECC
key has the same security level as a 1024-bit RSA key [134]. However, the research
in [135] demonstrated that the Diffie-Hellman key agreement process using the El-
liptic Curve asymmetric key algorithm in an ad hoc network is between one to two
orders of magnitude larger than the key exchange process based on the AES sym-
metric key algorithm in a regular non ad hoc network. Therefore, we approach the
problem using Symmetric Key Cryptography.
In this chapter, we focus on the design of a key predistribution solution for
HWSNs. The proposed solution is more efficient and effective. This solution sup-
ports the establishment and renewal of five types of keys in the network because a
single key can not satisfy different communication requirements. In the proposed
solution, we utilize a keyed hash chain to reduce storage overhead. Unlike exist-
ing keyed hash chain based schemes, sensor nodes store only commitments for the
corresponding key chains. Even though one or more nodes are compromised, no se-
cret information is disclosed. We define a new cluster mechanism which improves
the key sharing probability between the sensors and their cluster head. All keys
involved in this solution are symmetric keys.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we describe the
HWSN model that is assumed throughout the chapter. In Section 5.3, we provide
the full details of the solution. Then, we study the establishment of other types
of keys in Section 5.4. We analyze the security and performance of the proposed
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Figure 5.1: The network model of the proposed key predistribution scheme
solution in Sections 5.5 and 5.6 respectively. Finally, we summarize the work of
this chapter in Section 5.7.
5.2 Network Model and Design Goal
5.2.1 Network Model
WSNs are application-specific networks. No scheme can be a one-fits-all security
scheme. Therefore, it is important to define a network model according to a specific
application. In this chapter, we focus on a military HWSN scenario. The entities
involve a BS, a small number of cluster head (CH) nodes and a large number of
ordinary sensor nodes. All of these entities form a heterogeneous network structure.
The root level is the BS, the second level consists of powerful cluster heads, and the
bottom lever includes a large number of low-cost sensor nodes. An example of such
a network model is shown in Figure 5.1.
1. The BS is an infrastructure and assumed to be secure. Because it is usually
located far from the wireless network, in our model, it takes charge of the
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network by manipulating cluster heads. The interaction between the BS and
low-end sensor nodes is not involved in this solution.
2. CHs are equipped with high powered batteries, large memory storages, strong
data processing capabilities and wide radio communication range. More im-
portantly, they are equipped with tamper-resistant hardware. Each CH can
communicate with sensors within its cluster, the BS, and the peer cluster
heads.
3. The ordinary sensor nodes have limited battery power, small memory space,
weak data processing capability, and short radio range. Sensor nodes are
mobile but with limited mobility. To reduce the energy consumption, a node
communicates only with its CH or neighboring nodes within the same cluster.
We assume that the BS will not be compromised. A CH might be compromised
but the adversaries cannot get the secret data stored on it. However, we assume that
if an ordinary node is compromised, all the information it holds will be exposed to
the attacker. Further, for simplicity, we assume cluster heads and sensor nodes are
uniformly and randomly distributed. For scalability, both cluster head and sensor
nodes can be added as needed. For security, the compromised cluster heads and
nodes can be revoked.
5.2.2 Design Goal
Our goal is to increase security and key connectivity probability of the previous key
predistribution schemes with reduced storage overhead at ordinary nodes. In view
of the fact that no single keying mechanism is appropriate for all secure commu-
nications that are needed in WSNs, we also consider the establishment of different
types of keys to secure communication at different levels. The proposed solution
will meet the following security or performance requirements:
• The solution supports the establishment of five types of keys, including:
1. a master key shared between CHs and the BS for sending aggregated
data;
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2. authentication keys shared by a CH and its cluster nodes for verifying
messages shared by them;
3. pairwise keys shared by neighboring nodes within a cluster for intra-
cluster node-to-node communication;
4. a cluster key for each cluster for broadcasting within a cluster; and
5. pairwise keys shared by cluster heads for inter-cluster communications.
• Authentication is required for all types of packets, whereas confidentiality
may be required only for some sensitive data. Also, authentication of new
nodes is also necessary as a new node might be an adversarial one.
• The scheme should reduce the storage overhead of ordinary sensor nodes and
not introduce too much communication and computation overhead.
• The scheme should be resilient against node capture attacks. Once a node is
compromised, it discloses only the pairwise keys that it stores. The revocation
of some ordinary nodes does not affect the whole network operation.
5.3 The Proposed Solution
In this section, we present a key predistribution solution specifically for HWSNs.
The essence of the suite of key management is a keyed hash chain based key pre-
distribution scheme. Just like existing key predistribution schemes in [4] and [136],
the solution includes three stages: key pool generation, key ring assignment and
common key discovery. Here we introduce two definitions which will facilitate the
understanding of the scheme.
Definition 5.1. The keyed hash function is the foundation of a keyed hash chain.
A keyed hash function H takes a key K and a binary string M of arbitrary length
as input, and outputs a binary string of fixed length, which is called hash value h:
h = H(K,M). A keyed hash function H satisfies the following two properties:
1. Given a key K and a string M , it is easy to compute h such that h =
H(K,M);
165
2. Given a hash value h and a string M , it is computationally infeasible to find
a key K such that H(K,M) = h;
Definition 5.2. A keyed hash chain in this chapter can be derived as follows:
1. generating a random key seed value X and generation key K;
2. repeatedly applying the same keyed hash function to produce the hash chain.
Assume that the expected length of the key chain C is L, then the j-th key of
the key chain C is generated as follows:
kj =
{
H(K,X), if j = 0,
H(K, kj−1), if j = 1, . . . , L− 1. (5.1)
5.3.1 Key Pool Generation
The size of a key pool should be determined before it is generated. The optimum
size of the key pool is constrained by the expected probability of key sharing, the
expected resilience capability, and the number of keys stored by each node. The
number of keys on each node fully depends on the node’s memory. We point out
that the size of a key pool should maintain an acceptable key sharing probability
and a reasonable resilience capability for the network.
Unlike a large key pool that is generated in the random key predistribution
scheme [3], a small key pool which stores only generation keys is adopted in our
solution. Suppose the expected number of keys is P and the length of each key
chain is L. X is a publicly known seed. gki (M = dP/Le and 1 ≤ i ≤ M ) are
generation keys. H is a keyed hash function. Each generation key gki has unique
ID IDGi. Input the seed X and a generation key gki to the hash function H , the
j-th key of the key chain Ci is generated as follows:
ki,j =
{
H(gki, X), if j = 0,
H(gki, ki,j−1), if j = 1, . . . , L.
(5.2)
The last factor ki,L is called the commitment of the key chain Ci. We call it
Commiti for simplicity. It is used for authentication and it does not belong to
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the key pool. Each commitment Commiti has a unique ID IDCi. There is a corre-
sponding relation between IDGi and IDCi. That is, we refer to the same key chain
Ci when we talk about the key chain that corresponds to either IDGi or IDCi.
By iterating the above hash algorithm, we generate M key chains as well as the
commitment for each key chain. It is assumed that no common keys exist between
any two key chains. That is, Ci ∩ Cj = φ for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ M and i 6= j. Table 5.1
displays the structure of a keyed hash chain based key pool. In addition, the BS also
generates a master key KM .
Table 5.1: The structure of a hash chain based key pool
Generation key Generation Key ID Hash chain Keys Commitment Commitment ID
gk1 IDG1 C1 k1,0, . . . , k1,L−1 k1,L IDC1
gk1 IDG2 C2 k2,0, . . . , k2,L−1 k2,L IDC2
...
...
... . . .
...
...
gkM IDGM CM kM,0, . . . , kM,L−1 kM,L IDCM
5.3.2 Key Ring Assignment
• Before deployment, each sensor Si is preloaded with r randomly selected
commitments {(i1, Commiti1), . . . , (ir, Commitir)}. We denote the set of
IDs of {i1, . . . , ir} as [IDs]Si . In addition, each node Si is preloaded with an
authentication key KM,Si = H(KM , IDSi).
• Each CHa is preloaded with T (T À r) randomly selected generation keys
together the corresponding commitments {(a1, gka1 , Commita1), . . . , (aT , gkaT ,
CommitaT )} where a1, . . . , aT are IDs of commitments. We denote the set
of IDs (a1, . . . , aT ) as [IDs]CHa . Note that we refer to the same key chain Ci
when we talk about the key chain that corresponds to either IDGi or IDCi,
CHa stores only IDs of commitments rather than IDs of both commitments
and generation keys. In addition, each CHa is preloaded with the master key
KM .
After the key ring assignment stage, both cluster heads and sensor nodes are
uniformly and randomly deployed into the network.
167
5.3.3 Common Key Discovery
• Cluster Formation. Each cluster head CHa broadcasts a Hello message to its
neighboring nodes with a random delay in order to avoid the collision of the
Hello message from neighboring CHs. The Hello message is (IDCHa , [IDs]CHa)
where [IDs]CHa is the set of IDs of the generation keys stored in CHa.
A node within the network can receive several Hello messages because of
large communication range of CHs. Suppose a node Si receives three Hello
messages from CHa, CHb, and CHc respectively. Si makes a compari-
son between the intersections [IDs]CHa ∩ [IDs]Si , [IDs]CHb ∩ [IDs]Si , and
[IDs]CHc ∩ [IDs]Si . If |[IDs]CHb ∩ [IDs]Si| ≥ |[IDs]CHc ∩ [IDs]Si| >
|[IDs]CHa ∩ [IDs]Si|, Si will choose the CHb as its cluster head. Si also
record CHb as the backup cluster head. Other nodes also perform as the node
Si.
In our scheme, a HWSN is partitioned into many distinct clusters after the de-
ployment. Each cluster has a cluster head and a set of sensor nodes. To reduce
the energy consumption and the redundant traffic loads in a network, sensor
nodes communicate only with their cluster head and neighboring nodes. We
assume that two nodes have no interaction if they are located in two clusters.
• Neighborhood Discovery. Each sensor node Si broadcasts a Hello message
within a short range. Suppose CHa is the cluster head of the node Si, the
Hello message is (IDSi , IDCHa , [IDs]Si) where [IDs]Si is the set of IDs of
commitments. Suppose one of its neighboring node Sj receives the mes-
sage, Sj first checks whether or not Si belongs to the same cluster. If it
does not belong to the same cluster, Sj will discard the message. Other-
wise, Sj further compares [IDs]Si and [IDs]Sj . If [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = φ,
Sj just acknowledges with a Hello reply message. Otherwise, Sj will re-
ply with [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj . Sj adds Si together with [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj to
its neighboring nodes list. After node Si receives the reply message from
neighboring node Sj , Si will add Sj together with [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj to its
neighboring nodes list. Here we suppose neighboring nodes list is a list of
two-tuples. Suppose Si neighboring nodes are Sa, Sb andSc. Si will store
{Sa, [IDs]Si∩[IDs]Sa} ‖ {Sb, [IDs]Si∩[IDs]Sb} ‖ {Sc, [IDs]Si∩[IDs]Sc}.
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This process continues until all the sensor nodes have obtained the neighbor-
hood information.
The procedures are as follows:
1. Si ⇒ ∗ : IDSi , IDCHa , [IDs]Si;
2. if CHa 6= CHb, Sj discards the message;
if CHa = CHb & [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = φ,
Sj → Si: IDSj ;
if CHa = CHb & [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj 6= φ,
Sj → Si: IDSj , [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj ;
Sj adds IDSi and [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj to its neighboring nodes list;
3. Si adds IDSj and [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj to its neighboring nodes list;
Here, ⇒ denotes broadcast and → denotes unicast. No authentication mech-
anism is involved in this stage. It is a general assumption that adversaries do
not launch active and explicit pinpoint attacks on the nodes during deploy-
ment and initialization which usually does not last too long.
• Shared Pairwise Key Establishment. The node Si sends messages to its cluster
head CHa. The message contains the node’s ID IDSi , nonce, neighboring
nodes list, and MAC on all these values. Suppose Sj is a neighboring node
of Si, the cluster head CHa determines the pairwise key for Si and Sj by
generating a random number k, where 0 ≤ k ≤ L− 1. k is used as an index
in the key chain for selecting the pairwise key. After that CHa disseminates
the shared key information to Si and Sj . In our solution, all the common keys
contribute to the shared pairwise key. The shared-key information consists
of the following parts: (1) IDs of neighboring nodes (Si and Sj), (2) the
result of ⊕ on all the shared generation keys and commitments. If [IDs]Si ∩
[IDs]Sj = φ, CHa will generate a generation key gki,j for them. If [IDs]Si ∩
[IDs]Sj = {l}, CHa will send gkl ⊕ Commitl to Si and Sj . If [IDs]Si ∩
[IDs]Sj = {m,n}(1 ≤ m,n ≤ M and m 6= n), CHa will send gkm ⊕
Commitm ⊕ gkn ⊕ Commitn to Si and Sj . For the conditions where two
neighboring nodes share more than two commitments, CHa does the same
operation. (3) k, (4) nonce, and (5) MAC which is calculated on all these
values using corresponding authentication keys KM,Si and KM,Sj .
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The procedures are as follows:
1. Si ⇒ CHa: IDSi , nonce, neighboring nodes list, MACKM,Si ;
2. If [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = φ,
CHa → Si: IDSi , IDSj , EKM,Si (gki,j), n, nonce, MACKM,Si ;
CHa → Sj: IDSi , IDSj , EKM,Sj (gki,j), k, nonce, MACKM,Sj ;
If [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = {l},
CHa → Si: IDSi , IDSj , gkl ⊕ Commitl, k, nonce, MACKM,Si ;
CHa → Sj: IDSi , IDSj , gkl ⊕ Commitl, k, nonce,MACKM,Sj ;
If [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = {m,n},
CHa → Si: IDSi , IDSj , gkm⊕Commitm⊕gkn⊕Commitn, n, nonce,
MACKM,Si ;
CHa → Sj: IDSi , IDSj , gkm⊕Commitm⊕gkn⊕Commitn, n, nonce,
MACKM,Sj ;
CHa iterates the above procedures to determine the shared pairwise keys for
Si with all the nodes in Si’s neighboring nodes list.
After Si receives the message from CHa, Si will proceed as follows:
1. Si authenticates the message by verifying the message with its authen-
tication key KM,Si . If the verification fails, Si will discard the message.
Otherwise, Si calculates [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj .
2. If [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = φ, Si computes the key Hk(gki,j, X) shared by
it and Sj .
If [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = {l}, Si first computes the generation key gkl =
Commitl ⊕ gkl ⊕ Commitl. Then Si computes Hk(gkl, X) shared by
it and Sj .
If [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = {m,n}, Si first computes the generation key
gkm ⊕ gkn = Commitm ⊕ Commitn ⊕ gkm ⊕ Commitm ⊕ gkn ⊕
Commitn. Then Si computes Hk(gkm ⊕ gkn, X) shared by it and Sj .
For the conditions where Si and Sj share more than two commitments,
the key recovery operations are the same.
• Special Condition. There is a special condition where two nodes share a
commitment, while their CH does not have the corresponding generation key.
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For this condition, CH will turn for help to its neighboring cluster heads. The
neighboring CH which has the corresponding generation key will encrypt and
send it to the CH.
5.4 Establishment of Other Types of Keys
As discussed in previous chapters, no single keying mechanism can satisfy all types
of secure communications in HWSNs. Therefore, we explore ways to establish
other types of keys for the networks. From the aforementioned description, we
know that CHs share the master key KM with BS. Each node Si shares a pairwise
key with its cluster head KM,Si = H(KM , IDSi). Also we have discussed how
to establish pairwise keys between neighboring nodes within a cluster. In real ap-
plications, a cluster key CK shared by all nodes in a cluster is needed in order to
broadcast a message within a cluster, and a network key NK which is shared by all
the nodes in the network is also needed in order to share information throughout the
network. Furthermore, the communication between CHs is also necessary. We now
discuss the establishment of these keys in turn.
5.4.1 Establishment of Cluster Key within a Cluster
A specific cluster key for each cluster can facilitate secure broadcast within the clus-
ter. In our solution, the cluster key CKa is generated by CHa. After its generation,
CHa will encrypt with the shared key between itself and each node. Finally, cluster
head CHa sends the following message to a cluster member Si:
CHa → Si : EKM,Si (CKa),
where KM,Si is the shared key between CHa and node Si.
The cluster key must be updated with each membership change. The updating of
the session key is similar to the establishment of a new session key. CHa generates
a new session key and encrypts it with a key shared between itself and legal nodes.
Finally, CHa sends the encrypted session key to legal nodes in the cluster.
In practical applications, a node may broadcast messages to its neighboring
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nodes. We do not explore how to share a key between neighboring nodes as the
aforementioned broadcasting happens infrequently. If a node wants to share a mes-
sage with its neighboring nodes, it encrypts the message with the pairwise keys and
then links up the encrypted messages with the IDs of the expected nodes. When a
node receives the message, it checks whether its ID is included in the message. If
so, it decrypts the corresponding part. Otherwise, it discards the message.
5.4.2 Establishment of Network Key within the Whole Network
The establishment of Network key NK is much easier than the establishment of
other types of keys. The BS picks up a Network key NK and sends it to each
cluster head. The cluster head encrypts the NK with its cluster key and broadcasts
it to its cluster nodes. This level-by-level process distributes the cost of transmitting
the Network key. This routine can be followed for the renewal of the Network key as
well. However, membership change happens from time to time, and as a result, the
Network key has to be renewed frequently. A better option is to remove the Network
key if network-wide broadcasting does not occur frequently. When the BS wants
to share information with all the nodes in the network, it broadcasts the message to
cluster heads. Cluster heads then broadcasts messages within their clusters. In this
way, the workload of Network key establishment and renewal is removed.
5.4.3 Establishment of Pairwise Keys between Clusters
In order to maintain secure communication between clusters, each cluster head has
to agree on pairwise keys with other cluster heads. The pairwise key shared by two
cluster heads CHa and CHb is generated as follows:
KCHa,CHb = H(KM , IDCHa ‖ IDCHb),
where H is a hash function, KM is the master key, and ‖ is the operation of con-
catenation. The pairwise keys established in this way guarantee that sensor nodes
cannot decrypt messages shared by cluster heads. However, the communication
between two cluster heads can be seen by other cluster heads.
So far, we have discussed the establishment of five types of keys. Please refer
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to Table 5.2 for details.
Table 5.2: Five types of keys in the proposed solution
Key Entities Function
Master key BS and CHs Maintain secure communication
KM between BS and CHs
Authentication key CH and Si Authenticate messages
KM,Si shared by CH and Si
pairwise key Si and Sj Maintain secure communication
KSi,Sj between Si and Sj
cluster key CHa and Maintain secure broadcasts
CKa cluster nodes within the cluster
pairwise key CHa and CHb Maintain secure communication
KCHa,CHb between CHa and CHb
5.5 Security Evaluation
In this section, we discuss several security issues related HWSNs, including node
revocation, addition of new nodes, and resilience against node capture attack. We
demonstrate that our scheme satisfies these security requirements.
5.5.1 Node Revocation
In existing keyed hash chain based schemes [4, 136], the compromise of a node will
result in the disclosure of all the key chains corresponding to generation keys which
it stores. While in our scheme, a node is only preloaded with commitments rather
than the specific generation keys or key chains. In the procedure of shared pairwise
key establishment, all the common keys contribute to the shared pairwise key.
1. If [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = φ or the set [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj has at least two el-
ements, the shared pairwise key is not in the key pool. In this condition, if
either of nodes Si and Sj is compromised, neither their shared key chains
nor any other network-wide secret information is disclosed. Therefore, only
neighboring nodes delete the pairwise keys they share with the compromised
node once a sensor is compromised by an adversary. The cluster head will
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send a revocation message to neighboring nodes of the compromised node.
The message is authenticated by the key shared between the cluster head and
its nodes. The cluster head will add the ID of the compromised node to the
Revoked Node List.
2. If the set [IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = {l} has only one element, the shared pairwise
key is the k-th key of the key chain Cl. In this condition, if either of nodes
Si and Sj is compromised, the keys kl,k, . . . , kl,L−1 of the key chain Cl will
be disclosed. Even though this condition takes up very little proportion and
the damage of a compromised node has been greatly reduced in the proposed
scheme, it does produce damages in the highly sensitive environments. We
can restrict the procedure of shared pairwise key establishment: if the set
[IDs]Si ∩ [IDs]Sj = {l} has only one element, their cluster head CHa sends
gkl⊕Commitl⊕noncel rather than gkl⊕Commitl, where noncel is a nonce
which ensures that the shared pairwise key of Si and Sj is not a specific key
in the key chain Cl.
5.5.2 Addition of New Nodes
The addition of new nodes is necessary for key management schemes in order to
realize scalability property or substitute compromised nodes. However, it poses a
challenge to security schemes because a newly deployed sensor could have been
compromised. Therefore, an efficient way to authenticate new nodes is of great
importance. Recall that cluster heads have the master key KM , each new sensor
Snew is preloaded with a authentication key which is KM,Snew = H(KM , IDSnew).
After the node Snew is deployed in the network, Snew sends join request to a cluster
head CHa. The request is given as:
Snew → CHa : IDSnew ‖ nonce ‖MACKM,Snew (IDSnew , nonce). (5.3)
CHa firstly checks whether IDSnew is included in the Revoked Node List. If
IDSnew is included in the Revoked Node List, CHa discards the message. Other-
wise, CHa generates KM,Snew and then authenticates the node Snew by verifying
the MAC. After that, Snew determines its neighboring nodes as described in the
stage of Neighborhood Discovery. We do not discuss the attacks launched by a
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compromised node which has not been detected by the cluster head.
5.5.3 Resilience against Node Capture Attack
Because of the open nature of wireless communication, an adversary not only can
eavesdrop on all traffic but also can inject packets or replay messages. Also, an ad-
versary may inject new nodes into the network. In our scheme, all the sensitive data
is authenticated by MAC or encrypted by corresponding keys. When a new node
is added into the network, the first step is to check its validity. This authentication
process prevent the captured node from rejoining the network.
It is infeasible to set up tamper-resistance hardware for each sensor node. Once
node capture attack is launched, all the information the compromised node holds
will be known to the attacker. Therefore, it is required that key predistribution
schemes are resilient against node compromise attack. Usually, the resilience is
measured by the expected number of compromised links due to key revealing of
captured nodes [4].
In the scheme [4], there areM key chains in total. Each sensor node is preloaded
with r key chains. The probability that a given key does not belongs to a sensor node
is 1− r
M
. If there are n compromised nodes, the probability that a given key is not
compromised is (1− r
M
)n. The probability of total number of compromised keys is
as follows:
p¯ = 1− (1− r
M
)n. (5.4)
In our scheme, a node stores only commitments rather than generation keys.
Once a node is compromised, only commitments and the pairwise keys it shares
with cluster head and its neighboring nodes are disclosed. Because of the one-way
property of the hash function, the adversary cannot obtain any key on the key chain
from the commitments. We discussed two conditions in subsection Node Revoca-
tion. In the second condition, if two nodes Si and Sj have only one commitment
Commitl in common, the shared pairwise key is a specific key of the key chain Cl.
The subsequent keys of the key chain Cl can be calculated with the shared pairwise
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key. In the worst condition, the shared pairwise key is the first key of the key chain
Cl. The compromise of either Si or Sj will result in the disclosure of the whole key
chain Cl. Hence, in the proposed solution, the probability of total number of com-
promised keys does not depend on the number of preloaded commitments. Instead,
it depends on the probability that a node has only one common commitment with
its neighbors. We assume that each node has d neighbors and the probability that
a node has only one common commitment with its neighbors is µ, the probability
that a given key is not disclosed by a compromised sensor node is 1− µ∗d
M
. If there
are n compromised nodes, the probability that a given key is not compromised is
(1− µ∗d
M
)n. The probability of total number of compromised keys is as follows:




The storage overhead of our scheme is the same as that of [4]. The major difference
is that nodes store commitments rather than generation keys. In this section, we
show that the proposed scheme can significantly reduce the storage load, while
providing a higher key sharing probability among nodes than that of [4].
The memory of a sensor is fixed after the sensor is produced. The largest number
r of commitments stored on each sensor is constrained by the memory of the sensor.
Once r is set, the larger of key pool size P is, the smaller probability that two nodes
share a key; the smaller the key pool size K is, the larger is the impact on other
sensors’ communication when a fixed number of sensor is compromised. We want
to find the largest key pool size where the probability of a node and its cluster head
sharing a key chain is no less than a threshold p.
Suppose the number of key chains is M . A sensor node has C(M, r) different
ways of selecting r commitments from a key pool with the size P .
C(M, r) =
M !
r!(M − r)! . (5.6)
A cluster head has C(M,T ) different ways of selecting T generation keys from a
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key pool with the size P .
C(M,T ) =
M !
T !(M − T )! . (5.7)
Therefore, the total number of ways for a sensor node to pick up r commitments
and a cluster head to pick up T generation keys respectively is C(M, r)C(M,T ).
C(M, r)C(M,T ) =
M !
r!(M − r)! ×
M !
T !(M − T )! . (5.8)
In [4], the probability that a sensor node and a cluster head node share a common
key can be given as follows:
p
[4] = 1− Pr[a node and a cluster head node do not share any key]
= 1− (M − r)!(M − T )!
M !(M − r − T )! . (5.9)
In our scheme, we use a new cluster mechanism which can increase the proba-
bility of key sharing between sensor nodes and their clusters. In order to simplify
the analysis, we assume that each node can receive broadcast messages from three
cluster heads. The node chooses a cluster head with whom it shares the largest
number of commitments as its cluster head. Therefore, the probability that a sensor
node and its cluster head share a common key can be given as follows:
pour = 1− Pr[a node does not share any key with three cluster heads]
= 1− (C(M, r)C(M − r, T )
C(M, r)C(M,T )
)3. (5.10)
In order to highlight the advantage of our solution, we also repeat the probability







Figure 5.2: Comparison of key sharing probability for different key pool sizes in
schemes [3, 4, 5] and the proposed solution
where m is the number of keys stored by each sensor node.
p
[5] = 1−
(P − l)!(P − L)!
P !(P − l − L)! , (5.12)
where l is the number of keys picked by a low-end sensor node and L is number of
keys picked by a high-end sensor node.
We derive the probability of sharing at least one key for schemes [3, 4, 5] and
our scheme in Figure 5.2. In Figure 5.2, we assume the key pool size in schemes
[3] and [5] ranges from 1000 to 10000, with an incremental of 1000. Suppose
the length of each key chain is 10, the key pool size in scheme [4] and our scheme
ranges from 100 to 1000, with an incremental of 100. The corresponding parameters
[T, r, L, l,m] are [80, 5, 500, 20, 100]. The relationship between these parameters is
L × l = m2, L > T , and l > r. From Figure 5.2, we can see that the proposed
scheme achieves a higher probability of key sharing while maintains low storage
overhead.
It is easy to reach the conclusion that the probability of key sharing between
a node and its cluster head increases with the number of commitments in sensor
nodes. In Figure 5.3, we show our scheme always has a higher key sharing prob-
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Figure 5.3: The relation between the key sharing probability and sensors’ storage over-
head in [4] and the proposed solution
ability than scheme [4] for different key pool sizes and different number of keys
stored in sensors.
For keyed hash chain based random key predistribution scheme, one of the main
problems is how to determine the length of the key chain. Once the key pool size is
fixed, the longer the key chain, the smaller number is the number of key chains. A
small number of key chains produces less storage overhead. However, in terms of
security, a long key chain may weaken the security of the scheme. How to obtain
the best key chain length which maintains an acceptable security level and storage
overhead is an open problem.
5.7 Conclusion
We have presented a key management solution for hierarchical WSNs in this chap-
ter. The essence of the key management scheme is a keyed hash chain based key
predistribution scheme. The solution has the following properties:
1. It supports the establishment and renewal of five types of keys in the network
because a single key cannot satisfy different communication requirements.
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2. Each sensor node stores only several commitments instead of generation keys.
On the one hand, it reduces storage overhead; on the other hand, the network
is still secure even though a large number sensor nodes are compromised.
However, in the previous schemes, once a node is compromised, all the key
chains corresponding to the generation keys stored on the node will be dis-
closed.
3. A new cluster mechanism is used to increase the key sharing probability be-
tween the sensors and their cluster head. This mechanism also facilitates the
management of clusters. Hence, the proposed solution is more suitable for
HWSNs than existing schemes.
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6Fully Anti-collusive Hash Chain
Based Self-healing Key Distribution
6.1 Introduction
Group communication is being widely used for various applications ranging from
healthcare to warfare. The life of a group communication network is usually par-
titioned into short time-periods called ‘sessions’. One or several group managers
generate and distribute a session key to group users at initialization stage. All data
broadcasted within the group should be encrypted with the session key so that only
authorized users with session key can access the secret messages. In order to main-
tain secure communication, the session key must be updated with sessions with each
membership change. Therefore, key distribution as well as subsequent key updating
are cornerstones of secure dynamic group communication. Existing key distribution
schemes can be categorized as either key distribution over reliable channels and or
key distribution over unreliable channels. Key distribution over reliable channels
guarantees that data will be delivered to its destination punctually and therefore re-
quires a strong infrastructure such as a wired network and substantial bandwidth.
Key distribution messages can be delayed when they are delivered through unreli-
able channels such as wireless ad hoc networks or WSNs. In particular condition,
some messages might never reach authorized users. Individual interactions between
members and the group manager, such as requests and re-transmission, in a large
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group will incur much communication overhead and place a heavy burden on the
group manager who might already be heavily burdened. In particular, many digital
content and multi-media distribution systems are based on a uni-directional broad-
cast distribution channel, such as satellite or cable [137]. It is impossible to request
or re-transmit via this communication channel. Therefore, key distribution via un-
reliable channel produces more constraints and challenges.
Key distribution over a reliable channel has attracted much research interest and
many efficient schemes have been proposed [29, 138, 139]. However, these schemes
are more appropriate for wired networks than wireless networks. Staddon et al. [80]
in 2002 coined the term ‘self-healing key distribution’ which addresses the problem
of how to distribute session keys over unreliable channels. Since then, self-healing
key distribution has been a hot research topic.
As discussed in Chapter 2, hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes
[6, 7, 86, 92, 93, 94, 95] are more efficient than their counterparts which are based
on other cryptographic primitives. Both forward and backward secrecy can be as-
sured by dual directional hash chains. The collusion between users whose life cy-
cles have finished and the newly joined users can be resisted by assigning XOR
random number to session key recovery. However, how to resist collusion of re-
voked users whose life cycles have not finished and the newly joined users is an
unsolved problem. Table 6.1 made an all-around comparison between the existing
hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes. In this table,
√
represents
that the scheme has the corresponding property and × represents that the scheme
does not have the corresponding property. t wise represents that the scheme can re-
voke at most t users. ‘Partial’ represents that the schemes [6, 7, 93] can only resist
the collusion of the users whose life cycles have finished and newly joined users.
Du et al. in [116] pointed out that the scheme [93] is invalid for resisting collu-
sion of the newly joined users and revoked users whose lifetimes have not expired.
After verification, we found that the schemes [6, 7] cannot resist such collusion at-
tack, either. In the same paper, Du et al. proposed a new self-healing mechanism
which aims to totally anti-collude in hash chain based self-healing key distribution
schemes. However, we find Du’s scheme cannot resist collusion of the newly joined
users and revoked users whose life cycles have expired, to say nothing of collusion
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Table 6.1: Performance comparison of hash chain based self-healing key distribution
schemes
Scheme Performance Measure
Forward and backward secrecy Resisting collusion number of revoked users
[85] both, t-wise t-wise ×
[94] both × ×
[86] both t-wise × at most t
[92] both × according to the monotone
decreasing structures
[95] both × ×
[93] both Partial according to the monotone
decreasing structures
[6] both t-wise Partial at most t
t-wise
[7] both Partial according to the monotone
decreasing structures
resistance of the newly joined users and revoked users whose life cycles have not
expired.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 6.2, we summary
the contribution of the proposed solution. In Section 6.3, we introduce evaluation
indicators of self-healing key distribution schemes. In Section 6.4, we analyze the
breach of collusion attack against hash chain based self-healing key distribution
schemes and proposed an unified attack approach. In Section 6.5, we launch two
attacks against Du et al.’s scheme with the proposed unified attack approach. In
Section 6.6, we discuss the feasibility of the two possible solutions for collusion
attack. In Section 6.7, we present a classification of attacks and define the security
model. In Section 6.8, we describe a specific construction according to the security
model defined in the previous section. In Section 6.9, we provide a proof of security
of our proposed scheme under an appropriate framework and the defined model. In
Section 6.10, we focus on performance analysis and compare several hash chain
based schemes. We conclude the chapter in last section.
6.2 The Contribution of the Proposed Scheme
The contribution of this chapter is three-fold.
• We propose a unified approach of collusion attack against hash chain based
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self-healing key distribution schemes. And then we show the approach can
be used to launch two attacks against the scheme in [116] which claimed that
it can resist the collusion of revoked users, whose life cycle has not expired
and the newly joined users.
• We propose a fully anti-collusive self-healing key distribution scheme with
implicit authentication. Performance evaluation shows that our scheme can
resist such collusion attack at an acceptable cost. As far as we know, this is
first time that a solution has been proposed to address attacks by the revoked
users whose life cycle have not expired and the newly joined users in hash
chain based self-healing key distribution schemes.
• Implicit authentication is realized with acceptable storage and computation
cost.
6.3 Evaluation Indicators of Self-healing Key Distri-
bution Schemes
As can be seen in the review of related works, besides availability, integrity, confi-
dentiality, authentication and non-reputation traditional security requirements, some
particular evaluation indicators for self-healing key distribution should be high-
lighted due to a list of characteristics of WSNs [140]. The performance of a self-
healing key distribution scheme can be evaluated by:
1. Security. The Security here refers to not only forward secrecy and back-
ward secrecy but also collusion resistance. Vector space-secret-sharing-based
schemes [90, 91] satisfy these security requirements. Shamir’s secret-sharing-
based schemes [80, 81, 87, 89] satisfy t-wise security requirements where t is
the degree of the secret polynomial. While existing hash chain based schemes
[86, 92, 95] only meet forward and backward secrecy. The improved schemes
[6, 7, 93] can resist collusion only between the users whose life cycle have
finished and the newly joined users. How to resist the collusion between the
revoked uses, whose life cycle have not finished, and the new joined users is
a problem to be solved.
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2. Efficiency. The resource-limited property of sensor nodes must be given fully
consideration when we design protocols for WSNs. In key management
schemes, the energy required for computation is three orders of magnitude
less than that required for communication [141]. In addition, the energy con-
sumed for computation much depends on algorithm and hardware. Hence,
the first concern is to reduce communication overhead.
3. Scalability. WSNs may scale up to thousands of sensors. Network man-
agement is more complex and available bandwidth decreases as the scale in-
creases. Also, revocation should be localized within a short range rather than
the whole network. Scalability also implies that operations are finished in a
timely manner despite frequent changes to group node topology and density.
6.4 A Unified Approach of Collusion Attack against
Hash Chain Based Self-healing Key Distribution
Schemes
Hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes reduce storage, computa-
tion, and communication overheads greatly. However, the one-way property of the
hash function produces a new security problem. A session key is computed from
the forward key and backward key in schemes [86, 92, 95]. If the forward key seed
and backward key seed can be obtained, then all the session keys can be worked
out. Therefore, the schemes [86, 92, 95] are vulnerable to collusion attack. There is
an extreme occasion when the coalition of a user who is authorized only for the first
session and the other user who is authorized only for the m-th session can calculate
all the session keys {SK2, . . . , SKm−1} which they were not authorized to do. Tian
et al. addressed the collusion problem in [93]. Random numbers corresponding to
the life cycle are pre-assigned to each user when it joins the network. A session key
is computed from three parts: forward key, backward key, and random number. This
approach successfully blocks the collusion of the newly joined users and those users
whose life cycle has expired. However, this approach cannot resist the collusion of
the revoked users whose life cycle has not expired and the newly joined users. Sup-
pose a user Ui is revoked at session t (l < t < v) before its life cycle (l, v) finishes.
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Ui has random numbers {rt+1, . . . , rv} and can compute forward keys for sessions
(t + 1, v). If a user Ui colludes with another user Uj who joins the network after
session v, it can get backward keys for session (t+ 1, v) and furthermore computes
session keys {SKt+1, . . . , SKv}. A similar attack can be launched against [6, 7].
From the collusion attack against the schemes in [6, 7, 93], we arrive at the con-
clusion that the forward key chain and the backward key chain themselves are not
sufficient to resist collusion attack even though some masking mechanism are used
to protect the backward hash key chain. The breach of collusion attack lies in the
masking mechanism. As long as the masking mechanism is broken, the computa-
tion of the backward key chain does not relate to users’ state.
6.5 Two Attacks with the Unified Approach
In this subsection, we consider two attacks against the scheme with the unified
attack approach. One attack is launched by a revoked user itself whose life cycle
has not expired, and the other attack is launched by the collusion of a revoked
user, whose life cycle has finished, and a newly joined user. In order to facilitate
understanding, we briefly introduce the approach in [116] (Please refer to [116] for
detail). Du et al.’s scheme is as follows:
Setup. The group manager (GM) chooses m t-degree (t < m) polynomi-
als h1(x), . . ., hm(x) ∈ Fq[x] and generates m random numbers r1, . . . , rm ∈
Fq. Each user Ui whose life cycle is (l, v) receives the personal secret includ-
ing {hl(i), . . . , hv(i)}, {rl, . . . , rv}, forward key KFl and backward key KBm−v+1







j is the j-th forward key in the forward key
chain, KBm−j+1 is the j-th backward key in the backward key chain, and cj is a
random number corresponding to the session j.
Broadcast. In the j−th session, the GM chooses a random number cj from
a finite field Fq where q is a large prime. Then the GM computes the broadcast
polynomial Wj(x) = Aj(x)Cj + hj(x), where Aj(x) is the revocation polynomial
which is computed from the revoked user set Rj . Thirdly, the GM computes the set
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Cj = {cjr1(c1 + c2), cjr2(c2 + c3), . . . , cjrj−2(cj−2 + cj−1), cjrj−1cj−1}. Finally,
the GM broadcasts the message Bj = {Wj(x), Cj, Rj}.
Key Recovery. Any authorized user Ui receives the broadcast message Bj can
recover cj = (Wj(i) − hj(i))/Aj(i). Then, Ui computes KFj by hashing KFl and
KBm−j+1 by hashingK
B
m−v+1 with hash functionH . Finally, Ui gets the j−th session
key SKj = (KFj +K
B
m−j+1)cj .
Self-healing. Suppose a user Ui whose life cycle is (l, v) receives broadcast
message Bj1 in session j1 but misses broadcast message Bj in session j, where
1 ≤ l < j < j1 ≤ v ≤ m. Ui can recover the lost session SKj as follows:




m−j+1 by hashing K
B
m−v+1 with hash func-
tion H .
2. Ui computes cj1 from Bj1 = {Wj1(x), Cj1 , Rj1} as described in the procedure
of Key Recovery. By dividing each item of set Cj1 by cj1 , Ui gets a new set
C ′j1 = {r1(c1 + c2), r2(c2 + c3), . . . , rj1−2(cj1−2 + cj1−1), rj1−1cj1−1}.
3. Ui has a private random number set {rl, . . . , rv}which includes {rj, . . . , rj1−1}.
ui divides respectively each item of the setC ′′j1 = {rj(cj+cj+1), . . . , rj1−2(cj1−2
+cj1−1), rj1−1cj1−1} by corresponding item of the set {rj, . . . , rj1−1}. Ui
works out the set {(cj + cj+1), . . . , (cj1−2 + cj1−1), cj1−1}. Ui finally works
cj out by a serial of substraction operation in reverse order. Therefore Ui can
recover the lost key SKj = (KFj +K
B
m−j+1)cj .
6.5.1 Attack Launched by Revoked Nodes
We introduce an attack launched by a revoked user itself whose life cycle has not
expired. Suppose a user Ui whose life cycle is (l, v). It is revoked at session l <
j < v. If Ui is not removed from the network, it can receive broadcast message
Bj = {Wj(x), Cj, Rj} at session j among which Cj = {cjr1(c1 + c2), cjr2(c2 +
c3), . . . , cjrj−2(cj−2+cj−1), cjrj−1cj−1}. BecauseUi is an authorized user at session
j−1, ui gets r1(c1+c2), r2(c2+c3), . . . , rj−3(cj−3+cj−2), rj−2cj−2}. By comparing
the corresponding items in the two sets, ui can get cj easily. Ui gets forward key
KFj and backward key K
B




m−j+2 respectively. Thus Ui
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computes SKj = (KFj + K
B
m−j+1)cj . Furthermore, Ui can compute session keys
SKj+1, . . . , SKv in the same way.
6.5.2 Attack Launched by Collusion
Here we introduce an attack launched by a collusion between a revoked user whose
life cycle has expired and a newly joined user. Suppose a user Ui whose life cy-
cle is (l, v) receives broadcast message Bv = {Wv(x), Cv, Rv} at session v. Ui
can recover cv from Wj(x) as described in the procedure of Key Recovery. By di-
viding each item in the set Cv = {cvr1(c1 + c2), cvr2(c2 + c3), . . . , cvrv−2(cv−2 +
cv−1), cvrv−1cv−1} by cv, Ui gets {r1(c1+c2), r2(c2+c3), . . . , rv−2(cv−2+cv−1), rv−1
cv−1}.
Even if Ui’s life cycle finishes at session v, Ui can receive broadcast message
Bv+1 = {Wv+1(x), Cv+1, Rv+1}, among whichCv+1 = {cv+1r1(c1+c2), cv+1r2(c2+
c3), . . . , cv+1rv−1(cv−1+cv), cv+1rvcv}. With the information obtained from session
v, Ui can work out cv+1 = (cv+1r1(c1+c2))/(r1(c1+c2)) = . . . = (cv+1rvcv)/(rvcv).
Ui can also compute forward key KFv+1 by one hash operation on K
F
v . If ui col-
ludes with any newly joined user Uj whose life cycle starts after session v + 2,
they can compute backward key KBm−v and further compute session key SKv+1 =
(KFv+1 +K
B
m−v)cv to which they are not authorized.
Here we consider an extreme occasion. Suppose a user Ui is only authorized
for the first session and the other user Uj is only authorized for the last session
m. Ui can work out {c1, c2, . . . , cm−1} and {KF1 , KF2 , . . . , KFm−1} by using its per-
sonal key and public broadcast messages {B1, B2, . . . , Bm−1}. Uj can work out
{KBm, KBm−1, . . . , KB2 }. Ui and Uj collude can recover session keys {SK2, SK3, . . .
, SKm−1} which they are not authorized to access. In some commercial or military
applications, such disclosure of session keys may lead to disastrous consequences.
6.6 Two Possible Solutions for Collusion Attack
On the one hand, in order to maintain security, a part of the key material should be
related to the user’s status. Once a user is revoked before its life cycle expires, the
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GM should change the broadcast messages so that the revoked user cannot recover
the session key from the broadcast message with the personal key. On the other
hand, in order to keep the self-healing mechanism working, a non-revoked user can
recover the lost session keys from the changed broadcast messages with its initial
configuration. We do not consider reconfiguration of the non-revoked users as it is
infeasible to configure nodes one by one in a large-scale network. The possibility of
retransmission by unicast is also excluded as there is no pairwise keys for the GM
and the users to secure the sensitive unicast messages. After ruling this out, we have
two possible solutions. One solution is to select a new backward hash chain once
a user is revoked before its life cycle has expired, and the other solution is to mask
new random number in the corresponding broadcast message. We show in Figure
6.1 that the first possible solution does not work.
Suppose a user a whose life cycle is (t0, t2) is revoked at session t1. The back-
ward hash chain for life cycle (t0, t1) is generated by the seed S0. A new hash chain
which is generated by the seed S1 is used start from session t1. If there is any user is
revoked at session t3, the GM discards the hash chain generated by S1 and utilizes a
new one generated by the seed S2. Suppose a user b joins the network between life
cycle (t2, t3). b is pre-assigned several backward keys generated by S1. By iterative
hash operations on any of the pre-assigned backward key, b obtains all the backward
keys for life cycle (t1, t2). If a and b collude, they can recover all the session keys
for life cycle (t1, t2).
6.7 Security Model
6.7.1 A Classification of Attacks
We classify the attacks as outside attacks or inside attacks. The outside attacks
refer to the attacks launched by users who are never involved in the communica-
tion group. Correspondingly, inside attacks are launched by users who are or will
be authorized users of a communication group. Existing self-healing key distribu-
tion schemes are supposed to repel outside attacks under the assumption that the
attackers cannot acquire a personal key from the compromised or captured node.
That is, the outside attackers cannot obtain any information from the compromised
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Figure 6.1: An example of re-selecting new hash chain once a user is revoked before
its life cycle expires
nodes. This assumption can be achieved by some hardware techniques. Each node
is installed with a tamper-resistance component. As to the inside attacks, we con-
sider an attack scenario where an adversary can compromise one or more nodes.
Specifically, we consider three different cases with differing degrees of damage.
• In the first scenario, we consider an attack launched by the revoked member
subset and by the newly joined member subset separately.
• In the second scenario, we consider an attack is launched by the coalition of
users whose life cycles have finished and the newly joined users. This attack
incurs more serious damage.
• The third scenario cause the severest damage, the attack is launched by the
coalition of users whose life cycles do not expire and the newly joined users.
This solution is designed to have a spectrum of broader impacts: it will
• focus on the fully anti-collusive property besides forward and backward se-
crecy; and
• achieve implicit authentication.
6.7.2 Definition of Security Model
Let U = {U1, . . . , Un} be the finite universe of the network. The communication
group is a dynamic subset of U and R ⊂ 2U is a monotone decreasing access
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Table 6.2: Notations used in the proposed scheme
Ui the i-th user
n the total number of users in the network
m the total number of sessions
GF (q) a field of order q
Si the personal secret of user Ui
SKj the session key for session j
Bj broadcast message for session j
Rj the set of the revoked users before and in session j
Jj the set of the joined users after session j
Gj the authorized users in session j
KBi the i-th backward key
structure of subsets of users. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The notations
in Table 6.2 are used throughout the chapter.
To further clarify our goals and facilitate the later presentation, based on our
analysis in Section 6.5, according to but not constrained by the security model of
[6, 7, 93], we define the self-healing key distribution scheme from three aspects.
Definition 6.1 defines self-healing key distribution scheme with revocation capa-
bility. Definition 6.2 defines forward and backward secrecy. Definition 6.3 and
Definition 6.4 defines resisting collusion properties.
Definition 6.1. (Session key distribution with privacy and implicit authentication
[6, 7, 93])
1. The scheme is a session key distribution scheme with privacy if
(a) for any user Ui ∈ Gj , the session key SKj is efficiently determined from
Bj and Si.
(b) for any set Rj ⊆ U , where Rj ∈ R and Ui 6∈ Rj , it is computationally
infeasible for users in Rj to determine the personal key Si.
(c) it is computationally infeasible to compute session key SKj from either
m broadcast B1, . . . , Bm alone or n personal keys S1, . . . , Sn.
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2. The scheme hasR-revocation capability if, given anyRj ⊆ U , whereRj ∈ R,
the GM can generate a broadcast message Bj , such that for all Ui 6∈ Rj , Ui
can efficiently verify the truth of Bj and recover the session key SKj , but the
revoked users cannot.
3. The scheme has self-healing capability if the following is true for any j (1 ≤
j1 < j < j2 ≤ m) if each Ui ∈ Gj1 , who has not been revoked after session
j1 and before session j2, can recover all session keys SKj for j = j1, . . . , j2,
from broadcasts Bj1 , Bj2 and its personal key Si.
Definition 6.2. [6, 7, 93] The scheme guarantees both R-wise forward and back-
ward secrecy if
1. for any set Rj ⊆ U , where Rj ∈ R, it is computationally infeasible for the
users Ui ∈ Rj together to obtain any information about SKj , even with the
knowledge of group keys SK1, . . . , SKj−1.
2. for any set Jj ⊆ U , where Jj ∈ R, it is computationally infeasible for the
members Ui ∈ Jj together to obtain any information about SKj , even with
the knowledge of group keys SKj+1, . . . , SKm after session j.
Definition 6.3. Let B ⊂ Rl be a subset of users whose life cycles expire at
session r while revoked at session l(l < r). Let C ⊂ Js be a subset of users who
join the group from session s with 1 ≤ l < s ≤ m. That is, B and C are two disjoint
subsets. Suppose B ∪ C ⊂ R. The coalition B ∪ C doses not get any information
about session keys SKj , for any l ≤ j < s. That is, the scheme is able to resist
R-wise collusion of the revoked users whose life cycles have not finished and the
newly joined users.
Definition 6.4. Let B ⊂ Rr be a subset of users whose life cycles have expired
before session r and let C ⊂ Js be a subset of users who join the group from session
s with r < s. That is, B and C are two disjoint subset. Suppose B ∪ C ⊂ R. The
coalition B ∪ C does not obtain any information about session keys SKj , for any
r ≤ j < s. That is, the scheme is able to resist R-wise collusion of the users whose
life cycles have finished and the newly joined users.
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6.8 The Construction of a Fully Anti-collusive Self-
healing Key Distribution Solution
Following the idea of [6, 7], which slightly reduces storage and computation over-
head of [93], we present a fully anti-collusive self-healing key distribution scheme
with implicit authentication. The self-healing key distribution scheme comprises
five procedures, each of which we describe one by one.
In our setting, the communication group is a dynamic subset of U . An unreliable
broadcast channel is available, and time is defined by a global clock. The GM
sets up and maintains the communication by performing addition and revocation
operations. All operations take place in GF (q), where q is a large prime number
(q > n). Let H : GF (q) → GF (q) be a cryptographically secure one-way hash
function. Let us consider a vector space secret sharing scheme realizing Γ = 2U−R
over the set U . For simplicity, suppose that there exists a public map
ψ : U ∪ {GM} → GF (q)l (6.1)
which defines Γ as a vector space access structure. The use of a specific ψ fixes the
properties of the scheme.
Setup. The GM uses a CSPRNG of large enough period to produce a sequence
of m random numbers r1, . . . , rm ∈ GF (q)l. The GM randomly picks an initial
backward key seed SB from GF (q). In the pre-processing time, the GM computes
the backward hash chain of length (m+1) by repeatedly applying the one-way hash
function H on the backward key seed KB0 = S
B. For 1 ≤ i ≤ m + 1 , the hash
sequences are generated as follows:
{KB0 = SB, H(KB0 ), . . . , Hm(KB0 ), Hm+1(KB0 )}
The last hash value KBm+1 = H
m+1(KB0 ) is used for implicit authentication. The
key for session j is computed as SKj = KBm−j+1 + rj .
Each user Ui is assigned a pre-arranged life cycle (s, t) where 1 ≤ s < t ≤ m.
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Ui will be involved in k = t − s + 1 number of sessions. The GM randomly
chooses vectors u1, . . . , um ∈ GF (q)l and computes secret vectors for each user
Ui. The user Ui receives its private key Si from the GM consisting of: (1) k random
numbers corresponding to the sessions which the user Ui will participate in; (2)
secret vectors {us · ψ(i), . . . , ut · ψ(i))}; and (3) KBm+1. The GM sends the private
key to user Ui via a secure channel between them, as shown below:
Si = {rs, . . . , rt||us · ψ(i), . . . , ut · ψ(i)||KBm+1} (6.2)
In our setting, we allow a revoked user to rejoin the group at a later session with
a new identity. However, in existing hash chain based self-healing key distribution
schemes [86, 92, 95], rejoining is prohibited.
Broadcast. Without loss of generality, we take the broadcast Bj as example. In
session j = 1, . . . ,m, suppose Rj ∈ R represent the set of revoked users in and
before session j. The GM chooses a subset of users Wj = U \ Gj with minimum
cardinality such that Wj ∪ Rj ∈ Γ¯0. The computation of broadcast Bj can be
classified two conditions.
1. At least one user is revoked at session j. Suppose a user Ul whose life
cycle is (s, t) is revoked at session j (s < j < t), the random numbers
{rj, rj+1, . . . , rt} should be changed in order to keep backward secrecy. The
GM generates new random numbers {rj′ , r(j+1)′ , . . . , rt′} with CSPRNG and
computes zj = KBm−j+1+uj ·ψ(GM) ∈ GF (q) and zj′ = rj′+uj ·ψ(GM) ∈
GF (q) broadcasts the message Bj = {zj ∪ zj′} ∪ {(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk)) : Uk ∈
Wj∪Rj}. The GM has to include the broadcast Bj′ = zj′∪{(Uk, uj ·ψ(Uk)) :
Uk ∈ Wj ∪Rj} to the subsequent broadcasts for self-healing reasons.
2. No user is revoked at session j. The GM computes zj = KBm−j+1 + uj ·
ψ(GM) ∈ GF (q) and broadcasts the message Bj = zj ∪ {(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk)) :
Uk ∈ Wj ∪Rj}. It is unnecessary to include Bj in the subsequent broadcasts.
In order to facilitate understanding, we use the example shown in Figure 6.2.
Suppose a network life-time is divided into 10 sessions.
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Figure 6.2: An example of different conditions for broadcast
1. Suppose a user a whose life cycle is (2, 5) is revoked at session 4 and the
other user b whose life cycle is (3, 6) is revoked at session 5. The GM has
to renew random numbers r4, r5, r6 to r4′ , r5′ , r6′ . The GM calculates z4 =
KB7 + u4 · ψ(GM) and z4′ = r4′ + u4 · ψ(GM). Then the GM broadcasts
B4 = {z4 ∪ z4′} ∪ {(Uk, u4 · ψ(Uk)) : Uk ∈ W4 ∪ a}. In sessions 5 and 6, the
GM performs a similar computation and then broadcasts B4′ ∪ B5 at session
5 and B4′ ∪B5′ ∪B6 at session 6.
2. No user is revoked at session 8. The GM computes z8 = KB3 + u8 · ψ(GM)
and broadcasts the message B8 = z8∪{(Uk, u8 ·ψ(Uk)) : Uk ∈ W8∪{a, b}}.
Then the GM broadcasts B4′ ∪ B5′ ∪ B6′ ∪ B8. It is unnecessary to include
B7 in the broadcast message for session 8.
Key Recovery. When an authorized user Ui receives the broadcast message
Bj at session j, since Ui ∈ Gj has {(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk))}Uk∈Wj∪Rj and its personal
key, it computes uj · ψ(GM) using {(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk))}Uk∈Wj∪Rj∪{Ui} because Wj ∪
Rj ∪ {Ui} ∈ Γ. In effect, as long as Wj ∪ Rj ∪ {Ui} ∈ Γ, the result ψ(GM) =∑
Uk∈Wj∪Rj∪{Ui} λkψ(Uk) holds for some λk ∈ GF (q). Therefore, uj · ψ(GM) =∑
Uk∈Wj∪Rj∪{Ui} λkuj · ψ(Uk). From the broadcast information Bj , Ui recovers the
backward keyKBm−j+1 = zj−uj ·ψ(GM), Ui verifies whether the equationKBm+1 =
Hj(KBm−j+1). If the equation holds, it shows that Bj has not been tampered during
transmission. Ui computes the j-th the current session key SKj = KBm−j+1 + rj .
Otherwise, Ui discards Bj .
If the GM renewed the random number rj to rj′ , Ui further recovers rj′ = zj −
uj · ψ(GM) after gets KBm−j+1. Finally, Ui computes the j-th session key SKj =
KBm−j+1 + rj′ .
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Adding/Revoking Users. When a new user wants to join the communication
group, the user gets in touch with the GM. The GM assigns a life circle (s, t) and an
unused identity v ∈ GF (q) to the new user. GM computes the personal secret key
Sv = {rs, . . . , rt||us · ψ(v), . . . , ut · ψ(v))||KBm+1} to this new user via the secure
communication channel between them. If any random number of {rs, . . . , rt} has
been renewed, the GM uses the new random number to replace the old one. The
revocation happens when the GM detects a user is compromised or a user’s right
should be limited in respect to some applications. The GM puts the revoked user’s
ID to Rj and generates new random numbers for the crossposting sessions and
masks the new random numbers before broadcasting them.
Self-healing. Suppose Ui is a user who receives session broadcast messages Bj1
and Bj2 in session j1 and j2 respectively, where 1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m, but no broadcast
message Bj for the session j, where j1 < j < j2. Ui can still recover all the lost
session keys Kj (j1 < j < j2) as follows.
1. Ui recovers KBm−j2+1 from the broadcast message Bj2 in session j2 and re-
peatedly applies the one-way hash function to it to obtain the backward keys
for all j (j1 < j < j2).
2. If none of the random numbers {rj1+1, . . . , rj2−1} was renewed, Ui recovers
all the session keys SKj = KBm−j+1 + rj , for j1 < j < j2. Otherwise, Ui has
to firstly recover the renewed random numbers from the broadcast message
and then compute SKj = KBm−j+1 + rj′ .
We use the same example as that described in Figure 6.2.
1. If a user c whose life cycle is (5, 8) receives broadcast message B4′ ∪ B5 at
session 5 andB4′∪B5′∪B6′∪B8 session 8, but misses broadcast messages for
session 6 and 7. c recovers backward key KB3 from B8 and further recovers
KB4 and K
B
5 by iterative hashing. c recovers the random number r6′ from B6′ .
c then recovers SK6 = KB5 + r6′ and SK7 = K
B
4 + r7.
2. The other user d whose life cycle is (7, 9) receives broadcast message B4′ ∪
B5′ ∪B6′ ∪B9 at session 9, but misses broadcast messages for sessions 7 and










In this section, we evaluation from two aspects. More specifically, we firstly prove
the security of the proposed solution under an appropriate framework and then
demonstrate that the proposed solution meets the security requirements of the de-
fined security model.
6.9.1 Proof under an Appropriate Framework
We have discussed three cases of inside attacks in Section 6.5. Correspondingly, we
define the attack goal in three ways. In the first scenario, the subset of revoked users
and the subset of the newly joined users launch an attack respectively to jeopardize
forward and backward secrecy. In the second scenario, the coalition of users whose
life cycles have finished and the newly joined members launch an attack in order to
obtain the session keys that they are not authorized to access. In the third scenario,
the coalition of both revoked users whose life cycle have not expired and the newly
joined users launch an attack to acquire all the session keys to which they had no
authorization. We prove our scheme is secure against these three cases of inside
attacks. More precisely, we can prove Theorem 6.1 which states forward and back-
ward secrecy, and Theorem 6.2 which states the capability of collusion resistance of
our Construction in an appropriate framework.
Theorem 6.1. Our construction is secure, self-healing session key distribution
scheme with privacy and implicit authentication, R-revocation capability with re-
spect to Definition 6.1, and achieves R-forward and backward secrecy with respect
to Definition 6.2.
Proof: We first show that our construction is computationally secure with re-
spect to revoked users under the difficulty of inverting a one-way hash function.
That is, our construction satisfies forward secrecy. i.e. for any session j, it is com-
putationally infeasible for any set of revoked users from R before and in session j
to compute the session key SKj with non-negligible probability, given the V iew
consisting of personal keys of revoked users, broadcast messages before, in and af-
ter session j and session keys before session j. In fact, forward secrecy implies
R-revocation capability to some extent.
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Consider a coalition of revoked users from R, say Rj ∈ R, who are revoked in
and before session j. The users are not authorized to access the j-th session key
SKj . We can model this coalition of users from R as a polynomial-time algorithm
A′ that takes V iew as input and outputs its guess for SKj . We say thatA′ is success-
ful in breaking the construction if it has a non-negligible advantage in determining
the session key SKj . Then using A′, we can construct a polynomial time algorithm
A for inverting one-way function H and have the following claim:
Claim: A inverts one-way hash function H with non-negligible probability if
A′ is successful.
Proof: Given any instance y = H(x), A generates an instance V iew for A′ as








A sets the j-th session key SKj = KBm−j+1 + rj .
A randomly chooses m vectors u1, . . . , um ∈ GF (q)l. Each user Ui ∈ U re-
ceives its personal secret keys (uri · ψ(Ui), . . . , usi · ψ(Ui)) corresponding to its
life cycle (ri, si) from A via the secure communication channel between them. In
this setting, Γ = 2U \ R is a monotone increasing access structure of authorized
users over U and determined by the family of minimal qualified subsets Γ0, which
is called the basis of Γ. Now Rj ⊆ R implies Rj 6∈ Γ.
Let Gj be the set of all non-revoked users in session j. At the j-th session, A
chooses a subset of usersWj ⊂ U \Gj with minimal cardinality such thatWj∪Rj ∈
Γ¯0. A then computes broadcast message Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m as:
Bj = zj ∪ {(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk)) : Uk ∈ Wj ∪Rj} (6.3)
where zj = KBm−j+1+uj·ψ(GM). A also choose j−1 random numbers r1, . . . , rj−1 ∈
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GF (q). Then A sets V iew as
y =

us · ψ(Uk) for Uk ∈ B ∪ C and 1 ≤ s ≤ m;
Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m;
r1, . . . , rj−1;
SK1, . . . , SKj−1.
(6.4)
Remark: The V iew here is different than that in the proof in [86, 92]. The V iew
in [86, 92] do not include the random numbers r1, . . . , rj−1 ∈ GF (q).
A gives V iew to A′, which in turn selects X ∈ GF (q) and nj ∈ GF (q) ran-
domly, sets the j-th session key to be SK ′j = X + nj and returns SKj′ to A. A
checks whether SKj′ = SKj . If not, A chooses at random x′ ∈ GF (q) and outputs
x′.
Note that from V iew, A′ knows {uj · ψ(Uk) : Uk ∈ Wj ∪ Rj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}
and at most j − 1 random numbers r1, . . . , rj and session keys SK1, . . . , SKj−1.
Consequently A′ has knowledge of at most j − 1 backward keys KBm, . . . , KBm−j+2.
Observe that SK ′j = SKj provided A
′ knows (1) the backward key KBm−j+1 and
(2) the random rj or rj′ .
Condition (1) occurs if either of the following two holds:
1. A′ is able to compute uj · ψ(GM) from V iew. From View, A′ knows {uj ·
ψ(Uk) : Uk ∈ Wj ∪ Rj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, where Wj ⊂ U \ Gj has minimal
cardinality with Wj ∪ Rj ∈ Γ¯0 and will not be able to compute uj · ψ(GM)
by the property of ψ. Observe that uj · ψ(GM) is a linear combination of
{uj · ψ(Uk) : Uk ∈ B} if and only if B ∈ Γ. Consequently, A′ will not be
able to recover KBm−j+1 from Bj as described above.
2. A′ is able to choose X ∈ GF (q) so that the following relations hold:
KBm = H
j−1(X), . . . , KBm−j+2 = H(X) (6.5)
This occurs with a non-negligible probability only if A is able to invert the
199
one-way hash function H . In that case, A returns x = H−1(y).
The condition (2) occurs if either of the following two holds:
1. A′ is able to choose nj ∈ GF (q) so that nj = rj or nj = rj′ . This occurs
with a negligible probability 1/q.
2. A′ is able to deduce rj ∈ GF (q) or rj′ ∈ GF (q) from V iew. From V iew,
A′ knows r1, . . . , rj−1 ∈ GF (q). Observe that r1, . . . , rj−1 are generated
by CSPRNG, if A′ is able to reduce rj or rj′ from known random numbers
r1, . . . , rj−1, then the CSPRNG is insecure, thereby leading to a contradiction.
The above arguments show that ifA′ is successful in breaking the security of our
construction, thenA is able to invert the one-way hash function and break CSPRNG.
Hence, our construction is computationally secure for forward secrecy under the
difficulty of inverting the one-way hash function and breaking CSPRNG. A quite
similar proof can be conducted for backward secrecy of our construction. The only
difference is that the coalition of new users knows the backward keys but they do
not know the random numbers r1, . . . , rj−1 and consequently are unable to compute
the past session keys for which they had no authorization. We omit the proof here.
Theorem 6.2. Our Construction can resist collusion attack with respect to Defi-
nition 6.3 and Definition 6.4.
Proof: We consider a coalition of B ∪ C ⊂ R, where B ⊂ Rl is a subset of
users whose life cycles expire at session r while revoked at session l(l < r) and
C ⊂ Js is a set of users who join the group from session s with l < s. We show the
users in B ∪ C together are not authorized to access the j-th session key SKj for
l ≤ j < s− 1.
Also, we can model this coalition of users from B ∪ C as a polynomial-time
algorithm A′ that takes V iew as input and outputs its guess for SKj . We say that
A′ is successful in breaking the construction if it has a non-negligible advantage in
determining the session key SKj .
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Here we only consider the condition that r < s. A first generates an instance
View for A′ as follows:
y =

us · ψ(Uk) for Uk ∈ B ∪ C and 1 ≤ s ≤ m;
Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m;
Bl′ , . . . , Br′ ;
SB;
{r1, . . . , rr−1} ∪ {rs, . . . , rm};
{SK1, . . . , SKr−1} ∪ {SKs . . . , SKm}.
A gives V iew to A′, which in turn selects random number nj ∈ GF (q) ran-
domly, sets the j-th session key to be SKj′ = KBj−m+1 + nj and returns SKj′ to
A. A checks whether SKj′ = SKj . If not, A chooses a random x′ ∈ GF (q) and
outputs x′.
A′ can compute KBm−j+1 = H
m−j+1(SB) because it knows SB from V iew.
Note that from V iew, A′ knows random numbers {r1, . . . , rr−1} ∪ {rs, . . . , rm}
and session keys {SK1, . . . , SKr−1}∪{SKs . . . , SKm}. Observe that SKj′ = SKj
providedA′ knows the random rj′ for sessions (l, r) and rj for sessions (r+1, s−1).
For sessions (l, r), this condition occurs if any one of the following three holds:
1. A′ is able to choose nj ∈ GF (q) so that nj = rj′ . This occurs with a
negligible probability 1/q.
2. A′ is able to deduce rj′ ∈ GF (q) from V iew. From V iew, A′ knows
{r1, . . . , rr} ∪ {rs−1, . . . , rm} and Bl′ , . . . , Br′ . Observe that {r1, . . . , rr} ∪
{rs−1, . . . , rm} are are generated by CSPRNG, ifA′ is able to deduce rj′ from
known random numbers {r1, . . . , rr} ∪ {rs−1, . . . , rm}, then the CSPRNG is
insecure, and thus leads to a contradiction.
3. A′ is able to reduce rj′ ∈ GF (q) from V iew. From V iew,A′ knowsBl′ , . . . , Br′ .
Observe that the random number rj′ is masked by uj · ψ(GM). For each ses-
sion j, the subset revoked usersRj ∈ R can get vectors {(Uk, uj·ψ(Uk))}Uk∈Wj∪Rj
where Wj ∪Rj /∈ Γ, and this does not obtain any information of uj · ψ(GM)
as it has minimal cardinality with Wj ∪Rj ∈ Γ¯0 and will not be able to com-
pute uj · ψ(GM) by the property of ψ. We arrive at this conclusion because
for any scalar v ∈ GF (q) there exists at least one vector u ∈ GF (q)l such
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that {
u · ψ(GM) = v
u · ψ(Uk) = uj · ψ(Uk) for any Uk ∈ Wj ∪Rj
because Wj ∪ Rj /∈ Γ. Notice that the number of vectors u satisfying this
system of equations is independent of the value v. Therefore, A′ is unable to
deduce random numbers rl′ , . . . , rr′ .
A quite similar proof can be conducted for sessions (r + 1, s − 1). Similarly,
we can prove that the Definition 6.3 is correct for the condition that r ≥ s. We can
prove that our construction can resist collusion attack with respect to Definition 6.4
in the same way. The only difference is that there is no the third condition as the
broadcast messages Br+1, . . . , Bs−1 do not include any information about random
numbers rr+1, . . . , rs−1.
The above arguments show that if A′ is successful in breaking the security of
our construction, then A can break CSPRNG or ψ. Hence, our construction is
computationally secure for resisting R-collusion under the hardness of breaking
CSPRNG and ψ.
6.9.2 Proof under the Defined Security Model
We now demonstrate that our construction satisfies all the conditions required by
Definition 6.1.
1. The scheme is a session key distribution scheme.
(a) A non-revoked user Ui ∈ Gj can recover the session key SKj efficiently
from broadcast message Bj and personal key Si. As can be seen in the pro-
cedure of Key Recovery.
(b) For any set Rj ⊆ U , where Rj ∈ R and non-revoked user Ui 6∈ Rj
whose life cycle is (ri, si), we show that the coalition Rj cannot compute
personal secret (uri · ψ(Ui), . . . , usi · ψ(Ui)) of Ui. For any session j, Ui uses
its uj · ψ(Ui) and rj as its personal secret. Since the coalition Rj ∪Wj 6∈ Γ,
the values {us ·ψ(Uk) : Uk ∈ Rj∪Wj, 1 ≤ s ≤ m} is not enough to compute
uj ·ψ(Ui) by the property of ψ. So it is computationally infeasible for coalition
in Rj to determine uj · ψ(Ui) for Ui 6∈ Rj . Moreover, the random numbers
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r1, . . . , rm are generated by CSPRNG. The coalition Rj cannot guess rj with
knowledge of r1, . . . , rj−1 due to the security of CSPRNG.
(c) The session key SKj for session j is computed from two parts: back-
ward key KBm−j+1, and random number rj or rj′ , where rj is parts of per-
sonal key received from the GM before or when it joins the session group
and KBm−j+1 = zj − uj · ψ(GM) and rj′ = zj′ − uj · ψ(GM) are recovered
from the broadcast message Bj . So the personal secret keys alone do not give
any information about any session key. Since backward seed SB is chosen
randomly, the backward key KBm−j+1 is random. Furthermore, the broadcast
B1, . . . , Bm determine z1, . . . , zm and z1′ , . . . , zm′ in some sessions. How-
ever, the scalar uj · ψ(GM) perfectly masks the backward key and new ran-
dom number rj′ . So it is computationally infeasible to determine session key
SKj from broadcast message Bj or personal key Si alone.
2. The scheme has R-revocation capability. We have demonstrated that it is
impossible in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
3. The scheme has self-healing capability as can be seen from the procedure of
Self-healing.
We will show that our construction satisfies both the forward and backward
secrecy required by Definition 6.2.
1. Forward Secrecy. Only those sets belongs to Γ can recover the ψ(GM) and
further recover the session key SKj . Because of the fact that Rj ∪ Wj ⊆
R 6∈ Γ, the coalition of R cannot recover ψ(GM). Furthermore, because
of the one-way property of H , it is computationally infeasible to compute
KBs from K
B
t for s < t. That is, even Rj know the sequence of backward
keys KBm, . . . , K
B
m−j+2, it cannot compute backward key K
B
m−j+1 for session
j and consequently SKj from the sequence. In addition, the random numbers
strengthen the forward secrecy of our scheme.
2. Backward Secrecy. When a new user Ul joins the group starting from session
j, the GM gives Ul at most rj, . . . , rm random numbers. Let Jj ⊆ U is the set
of users who join after the current session j. It is computationally infeasible
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for Jj to recover random numbers r1, . . . , rj−1 even with the knowledge of
group keys after session j under the security of CSPRNG. Correspondingly,
Jj cannot recover session keys SK1, . . . , SKj−1.
We demonstrate that our construction can resist collusion attack required by
Definition 6.3.
Let B ⊂ Rl be a subset of users whose life cycles expire at session r while
revoked at session l(l < r). Let C ⊂ Js be a subset of users who join the group
from session s with l < s. That is, B and C are two disjoint subset. B∪C ⊂ R can
not recover SKj for sessions j = l, . . . , s− 1 from broadcast Bj and their personal
secrets.
Case 1: r < s: In order to recover session keys SKj(j = l, . . . , s − 1), B ∪
C require the knowledge rl′ , . . . , rr′ , rr+1, . . . , rs−1. B ∪ C know {r1, . . . , rr} ∪
{rs, . . . , rm} and Bl′ , . . . , Br′ . {r1, . . . , rr} ∪ {rs, . . . , rm} are are generated by
CSPRNG. B ∪ C cannot deduce rl′ , . . . , rr′ from them. B ∪ C cannot deduce
rj′ ∈ GF (q) from Bl′ , . . . , Br′ , either. Observe that the random number rj′ is
masked by uj · ψ(GM). For each session j, the subset revoked users Rj ∈ R can
get vectors {(k, uj · ψ(k))}k∈Wj∪Rj where Wj ∪Rj 6∈ Γ, and this does disclose any
information of uj · ψ(GM) as it has minimal cardinality with Wj ∪ Rj ∈ Γ¯0 and
will not be able to compute uj ·ψ(GM) by the property of ψ. Therefore, B ∪C are
unable to deduce random numbers rl′ , . . . , rr′ . For the same reason, B ∪ C cannot
deduce rr+1, . . . , rs−1 from broadcast messages Br+1, . . . , Bs−1.
Case 2: r ≥ s: In order to recover session keys SKj(j = l, . . . , s − 1), B ∪ C
require the knowledge rl′ , . . . , r(s−1)′ . B ∪ C know {r1, . . . , rr} ∪ {rr, . . . , rm} ∪
{rs′ , . . . , r(r−1)′} and Bl′ , . . . , Br′ . rl′ , . . . , r(s−1)′ . B ∪ C know {r1, . . . , rr} ∪
{rr, . . . , rm} ∪ {rs′ , . . . , r(r−1)′} are are generated by CSPRNG. B ∪ C cannot de-
duce rl′ , . . . , r(s−1)′ from them. B∪C cannot deduce rj′ ∈ GF (q) fromBl′ , . . . , B(s−1)′ ,
either. Therefore, B ∪ C are unable to deduce random numbers rl′ , . . . , r(s−1)′ .
We can demonstrate that our construction can resist the collusion required by
Definition 6.4 in the same way.
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Table 6.3: Performance comparison in the j-th session of representative hash chain
based self-healing key distribution schemes and the proposed scheme
Scheme
Performance measure Security properties
Storage Communication Computation Forward & Backward Collusion
overhead overhead overhead secrecy resistance
C1 in [86] (m− j + 2)logq (t+ 1)logq 2t+ 1 both t-wise ×
C2 in [86] (m− j + 2)logq (t+ 1)logq 2(t2 + t) both t-wise ×
[92] (m− j + 2)logq (tj + 1)logq 2(t2j + tj) both R-wise ×
[93] (2ki + 1)logq (tj + 1)logq 2(t2j + tj) both R-wise partial
[6] 2kilogq (t+ 1)logq 2t+ 1 both t-wise partial
[7] 2kilogq (tj + 1)logq 2(t2j + tj) both R-wise partial
Our scheme (2ki + 1)logq > (tj + 1)logq 2(t2j + tj) both R-wise
√
6.10 Performance Evaluation
We classify the schemes [6, 7, 86, 92, 93] and our scheme into two categories ac-
cording to the masking mechanism. One category is Shamir’s (t, n) threshold secret
sharing masking mechanism based schemes [6, 86] and the other is vector space se-
cret sharing masking mechanism based schemes [7, 92, 93] and our scheme. In
fact, Shamir’s (t, n) threshold scheme can be seen as a particular case of the vector
space secret sharing scheme. The maximum number of revoked users in [6, 86]
is fixed to t which is the degree of polynomial, while the vector space secret shar-
ing mask mechanism based schemes realize a flexible access structure. Table 6.3
demonstrates the advantages that our construction has over other hash chain related
schemes [6, 7, 86, 92, 93] regarding storage overhead, communication overhead,
and computation overhead at user end rather than at the GM and security proper-
ties.
6.10.1 Storage Overhead
If we set ki = si − ri + 1, a user Ui whose life cycle is (ri, si) has to store (2ki +
1)logq bits personal secret including k secret vectors, k random numbers and 1
hash value. Particularly, Ui requires (2m + 1)logq bits memory if Ui is authorized
to all the m sessions. If Ui joins in j-th session and belongs to all the subsequent
sessions, it has to store [2(m − j + 1) + 1]logq bits personal key. Compared with
the storage overhead of schemes in [6, 7, 93], the logq bits increase are used for
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implicit authentication. Dutta et al. claimed that the constructions in [86, 92] have
the same storage overhead (m − j + 1)logq as the scheme 2 in [87]. We argue
that authors overlooked storage overhead brought by the forward key seed. In Table
6.2, we correct the storage overhead for the two papers. If we denote the storage
overhead of [86, 92] as S
[86,92] and storage overhead of our construction as Snew,
we have the following result:

Snew < S[86,92] if ki < dm−j+12 e
Snew = S[86,92] if ki = dm−j+12 e
Snew > S[86,92] if ki > dm−j+12 e
(6.6)
Furthermore, the storage overhead (m− j +2)logq of [86, 92] for users joining
from session j is a fixed value. the storage overhead 2kilogq of [6, 7] and (2ki +
1)logq of [93] and the proposed construction are fixed values as well. As can be
seen easily, the storage overhead has nothing to do with the total number of users
n within the communication group. That is, neither of them increases with the
network expansion.
Here we present a concrete example. Suppose m = 100, j = 25, and logq = 64,
so (m− j +1)/2 = 38. The storage overhead for users who join the session in j-th
session is 4928 bits in [86, 92]. While in our construction, if a user is only involved
in ki ≤ 38 session, it stores (2ki + 1) × 64 ≤ 4928 bits personal key. When a
user is involved in k > 38 sessions, our construction has more storage overhead.
The extra storage overhead comes from random numbers. However, it is used to
resist collusion which is the explicit difference between schemes in [86, 92] and our
scheme.
6.10.2 Communication Overhead
The broadcast messageBj at the j-th session consists of a set of identities of revoked
users and their vectors corresponding to session j. One can ignore the communi-
cation overhead for the set of identities because the user identities can be selected
from a small finite field [81]. In our scheme, the length of vectors depends on the
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particular function ψ which is related to the set Wj ∪ Rj . In Table 6.2, tj denotes
|Wj ∪ Rj|, where Wj ⊂ U \ Gj and Rj 6∈ Γ is the set of all revoked users for
sessions in and before j with minimum cardinality such that Wj ∪Rj ∈ Γ¯0.
If no user is revoked before its life cycle finishes, our construction has the same
communication overhead as that of [7]. We notice that if tj = t, both our construc-
tion and that of [7] have the same broadcast length [6]. If tj < t, our construction
and [7] have lower communication overhead than [6]. Furthermore, [6] constrained
the revoked number to the threshold t. If more than t users were revoked, the se-
curity of [6] can not be guaranteed. Our construction removes the limitation and
is therefore more practical. Let |Rj| be the number of revoked users in and before
session j. Similarly, we denote the communication overhead of the constructions in
[6] as C
[6] and communication overhead of our construction as Cnew&[7], we have
the following result:

Cnew&[7] < C[6] if |Rj| < t
Cnew&[7] = C[6] if |Rj| = t
Cnew&[7] = (tj + 1)logq
while [6] collapses if |Rj| > t
(6.7)
The communication comparison result is shown in Figure 6.3.
Our solution incurs more communication overhead if some users are revoked be-
cause the new random numbers should be masked when subsequently broadcasted.
In the worst condition, at least one user is revoked at each session. The broadcast
message at session j can be denoted as {B1′ ∪ . . . ∪ B(j−1)′ ∪ Bj}. Because the
communication overhead for the set of identities can be ignored, the communica-
tion overhead of Bj is (tj+2). For any l < j, the communication overhead of Bl′ is
(tl +1). Therefore, the communication overhead at session j is (1+
∑j
k=1(tk +1))
which is still much less than that of [90, 91]. In a real network environment, each
user is assigned a pre-arranged life cycle which is a limited number of sessions. It
takes time to compromise a user. The general condition is that there are only very
few sessions to the end of its life cycle when a user is compromised. Only very
few random numbers need to be renewed. Correspondingly, the communication
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Figure 6.3: The comparison of communication overhead between [6, 7], and our con-
struction especially when no user is revoked before its life cycle expires
overhead produced by broadcasting renewed random numbers is acceptable.
6.10.3 Computation Overhead
The computation in key recovery includes addition and multiplication over the fi-
nite field GF (q) and hash operation. Here we measure the computation overhead
by the number of multiplication operations. We ignore the computation cost for the
addition and hash operations. We argue that the measurement will hold because
computation costs for addition and hash operations can be ignored compared with
that for multiplication. Even though our scheme achieves implicit authentication
and is more secure, the computation overhead that it produces can be ignored. This
is because implicit authentication is realized by the hash operation and new random
number rj′ is masked by uj · ψ(GM) which has been worked out in backward key
computation. The authorized user recovers ψ(GM) from the set Wj ∪ Rj and the
corresponding vectors as well as its personal identity and vector. We still use tj
to denote |Wj ∪ Rj|, the computation overhead of our construction is 2(t2j + tj)
multiplications which is the same as that of [7]. It can be easily concluded that our
construction has the same computation overhead as [6] when tj = t, and our con-
struction has lower computation overhead than [6] when tj < t. The computation
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Figure 6.4: The comparison of computation overhead of [6, 7], and our construction
overhead of our construction continues to increase with tj when tj > t while [6]
collapse. If we denote the computation cost for [6] as Comp
[6] and that for our
construction and [7] as Compnew, the following result holds.

Compnew < Comp[6] if |Rj| < t




while [6] collapses if |Rj| > t
(6.8)
This computation comparison has been shown in Figure 6.4. It is easy to see that
our scheme is more computationally efficient than [6] if |Rj| < t and both of them
have the same computation overhead if |Rj| = t. The construction in [6] collapses
if more than t users are revoked, while our construction is still secure.
6.11 Conclusion
We made an in-depth analysis of the breach of collusion attack against hash chain
based self-healing key distribution schemes in this chapter and proposed an unified
approach for collusion attack. Then we launched two attacks against Du’s scheme
[116] which claims that it can resist a collusion attack by a coalition of revoked
users whose life cycle has not expired and the newly joined users with the proposed
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unified attack approach. We proposed two possible solutions for collusion attack
and ruling one of the solutions out. We developed a self-healing key distribution
solution with implicit authentication . We considered general access structures in-
stead of threshold ones to provide more flexible performance for self-healing key
distribution. This would suit various wireless network environments. The scheme
has realized a general monotone decreasing structure for the family of subsets that
can be revoked instead of a threshold one in polynomial-based schemes. Most im-
portant of all, the scheme can resist collusion between the newly joined users and
revoked users whose life cycle has not expired, in addition to forward and back-
ward secrecy. As far as we know, it is the first time that such a collusion attack
has been repelled by hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes. The
schemes have been analyzed using an appropriate security model to prove that they







We discussed the advantages of self-healing key distribution in previous chapters.
Self-healing key distribution schemes enable large and dynamic groups of users
over an unreliable network to establish group keys for secure communication over
an unreliable channel in the manner that is resistant to packet loss. The goal of self-
healing key distribution schemes is that even if in a certain session the broadcast
is lost, the group users are still able to recover the session key from the broadcasts
received before and after the session, without requesting additional transmissions
from the group manager. Hence, non-interactive self-healing key distribution solu-
tions are not only favorable but also necessary.
We devoted to solve the collusion attack problem in hash chain based self-
healing key distribution schemes in [93]. Each user is assigned with a pre-arranged
life cycle when it joins the network and forcefully revoked when its life cycle fin-
ishes. Different from previous schemes [86, 94, 95], we added XOR random num-
bers operation to Broadcast. The scheme not only keeps the forward and backward
211
secrecy but also collusion resistance property. Dutta et al. addressed the problem
of achieving collusion resistance following the same approach of [93] in [7] which
further reduces the storage and computation overhead. Jiang et al. proposed a novel
HBT-based self-healing key distribution scheme in [112] which has less computa-
tion overhead at user end. A HBT with the scale of maximum life cycle of network
is generated by interactively hash operation on a seed. Each session key is mapped
to a leaf node in the HBT. We propose a HBT-based self-healing key distribution
scheme which has more flexible access structure than [112].
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 7.2, we introduce the
contribution of the proposed solution. In Section 7.3, we propose system parameters
and security model. In Section 7.4, we present a construction of implicitly authen-
ticated HBT-based self-healing key distribution scheme. In Section 7.5, we analyze
the security of the scheme under security model. In Section 7.6, we make a com-
parison of our scheme with several representative schemes regarding the efficiency.
Finally in Section 7.7, we conclude this chapter.
7.2 The Contribution of the Proposed HBT-based Self-
healing Key Distribution Scheme
The contribution of the proposed solution is two-fold. Firstly, we propose an HBT-
based self-healing key distribution scheme following approach of [112]. The scheme
achieves more flexible access structure than that of [112]. The proposed scheme not
only keeps forward and backward secrecy but also collusion resistance property.
Secondly, implicit authentication rather than MAC is used to detect tamper attack.
Such an authentication manner does not increase message size and computation
cost. Performance analysis shows that the scheme is lightweight in storage and
computation overhead without degrading security.
7.3 System Parameters and Security Model
Let U = {U1, . . . , Un} be the finite universe of the network. The communication
group is a dynamic subset of U and R ⊂ 2U is a monotone decreasing access
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structure of subsets of users. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and Gj be the
group in session j. In addition, the notations in Table 7.1 are used throughout the
chapter.
Table 7.1: Notations used in the HBT-based self-healing key distribution scheme
GM the group manager
Ui the i-th user
n the total number of users in the network
m the maximum life cycle of the network
GF (q) a field of order q
Si the personal secret of user Ui
SKj the session key for session j
Bj broadcast message for session j
Rj the set of the revoked users before and in session j
Jj the set of the joined users after session j
FK(h, j) the j-th forward key
BKj the j-th backward key
To further clarify our goals and facilitate the later presentation, according to
the security model of [93], we define the self-healing key distribution scheme from
three aspects. Definition 7.1 defines self-healing key distribution scheme with re-
vocation and implicit authentication capability. Definition 7.2 defines forward and
backward secrecy. Definition 7.3 defines collusion resistance properties.
Definition 7.1. (Self-healing key distribution with revocation and implicit au-
thentication capability.)
1. The scheme is a session key distribution scheme with privacy if
(a) for any user Ui ∈ Gj , the session key SKj is efficiently determined from
Bj and Si.
(b) for any set Rj ⊆ U , where Rj ⊆ R and Ui 6∈ Rj , it is computationally
infeasible for users in Rj to determine the personal key Si.
(c) it is computationally infeasible to compute session key SKj from either
m broadcasts B1, . . . , Bm alone or n personal keys S1, . . . , Sn.
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2. The scheme has R-revocation and implicit authentication capability if given
any Rj ⊆ U , where Rj ⊆ R, the GM can generate a broadcast message Bj ,
such that for all Ui 6∈ Rj , Ui can efficiently verify the truth of Bj and recover
the session key SKj , but the revoked users cannot.
3. The scheme has self-healing capability if the following is true for any session
j(1 ≤ j1 < j < j2 ≤ m) if each Ui ∈ Gj1 , who has not been revoked
after session j1 and before session j2, can recover all session keys SKj for
j = j1, . . . , j2, from broadcasts Bj1 , Bj2 and its personal key.
Definition 7.2. The scheme guarantees both R-wise forward and backward se-
crecy if
1. for any set Rj ⊂ U , where Rj ⊆ R, and all Ui ∈ Rj are revoked in and
before session j, it is computationally infeasible for the users in Rj together
to get any information about SKj , even with the knowledge of session keys
SK1, . . . , SKj−1.
2. for any set Jj ⊂ U , where Jj * R, and all users Ui ∈ Jj join in and af-
ter session j, it is computationally infeasible for the users Ui ∈ Jj together
to get any information about SKj , even with the knowledge of group keys
SKj+1, . . . , SKm.
Definition 7.3. Let B ⊂ Rs be a subset of users whose life cycles expire at
session s. Let C ⊂ Jt be a subset of users who join the network from session t with
1 ≤ s < t ≤ m. That is, B and C are two disjoint subsets. Suppose B ∪ C ⊂ R.
The coalition B ∪ C cannot get any information about session keys SKj , for any
session s + 1 ≤ j < t. That is, the scheme is able to resist R-wise collusion of the
revoked users and the newly joined users.
7.4 The Construction of the HBT-based Self-healing
Key Distribution
Following the idea of the schemes in [93, 112], we present a HBT-based self-healing
key distribution scheme.
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In our setting, the communication group is a dynamic subset of users of U . An
unreliable broadcast channel is available. The GM sets up and controls the group
by performing addition and revocation operations. All of operations take place in
GF (q), where q is a large prime number (q > n). H : GF (q) → GF (q) is a
cryptographically secure one-way hash function.
Let us consider a vector space secret sharing scheme realizing Γ = 2U −R over
the set U . For simplicity, we suppose that there exists a public map
ψ : U ∪ {GM} → GF (q)l (7.1)
which defines Γ as a vector space access structure. The use of a specific ψ fixes the
properties of the scheme.
The self-healing key distribution scheme is composed of five procedures. We
describe the procedures one by one.
Setup. The GM randomly picks two initial key seeds, forward key seed FK(0, 1)
and backward key seed BK, from GF (q). In the pre-processing time, the GM
computes one hash binary tree with m leave nodes and one backward hash chain of
length m+ 1.
• The generation of HBT. For simplicity, we call compound operation of hash
H(·) and left shift LeftShift(·) as LH(·) and compound operation of hash
H(·) and right shift RightShift(·) as RH(·). The GM generates the left and
right intermediate values in the first level by applying LH(·) andRH(·) to the
initial seed FK(0, 1), respectively. By the same way, the GM generates all
intermediate and leaf nodes in the binary tree with depth h = dlog2me. Each
leaf node in the HBT is related to a forward key. Figure 7.1 demonstrates
a HBT for a network whose life cycle is m. The forward key for the first
session is FK(h, 1), the forward key for the second session is FK(h, 2), and
correspondingly the forward key for the last session is FK(h,m). Figure 7.2
is a specific example with m = 8.
• The generation of backward hash chain. The GM computes the backward
hash chain by repeatedly applying the same one-way hash function H on
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Figure 7.1: The hash binary tree for a network whose life cycle is m
backward key seedBK. The generated hash chain is {BK1, . . . , BKm, BKm+1}.
The last element BKm+1 is used for implicit authentication.
The session key for session j is computed as:
SKj = FK(h, j) +BKm−j+1. (7.2)
Each user Ui is assigned a pre-arranged life cycle (si, ti) where 1 ≤ si <
ti ≤ m. Ui is involved in ki = ti − si + 1 sessions. The GM chooses random
vectors v1, . . . , vm ∈ GF (q)l and computes secret vectors for each user Ui. The
user Ui receives its private key Si from the GM consisting of: (1) forward key
or intermediate forward key seed corresponding to the life cycle (si, ti); (2) se-
cret vectors (vsi · ψ(Ui), . . . , vti · ψ(Ui)). The GM sends the private key to user
Ui via the secure channel between them. We make an example for the selec-
tion of forward key or forward key seed in Figure 7.2. Figure 7.2 demonstrates
a network whose life cycle is 8. For a user whose life cycle is (1, 5), the GM as-
signs {FK(1, 1), FK(3, 5)} to this node. It is unnecessary to distribute the set
{FK(3, 1), FK(3, 2), FK(3, 3), FK(3, 4), FK(3, 5)} to this user. The user can
calculate the required forward key by applying LH(·) or RH(·) on the intermedi-
ate forward key seed. For an extreme scenario that a node’s life cycle is (1, 8), a
forward key seed FK(0, 1) is enough for it to calculate all forward keys.
Broadcast. In session j = 1, . . . ,m, suppose Rj ∈ R represents the set of all
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Figure 7.2: An example of a hash binary tree with m=8
revoked users in and before session j and Gj represents the set of all non-revoked
users in session j. The GM chooses a subset of users Wj ⊂ U \Gj with minimum
cardinality such that Wj ∪ Rj ∈ Γ¯0. The GM computes zj = BKm−j+1 + vj ·
ψ(GM) ∈ GF (q) and broadcasts the message Bj = zj∪{(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk)) : Uk ∈
Wj ∪Rj}.
Key Recovery. When a non-revoked user Ui receives the key distribution mes-
sage Bj for session j, since Ui ∈ Gj has {(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk))}Uk∈Wj∪Rj and its per-
sonal key, it computes uj · ψ(GM) using {(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk))}Uk∈Wj∪Rj∪{Ui} because
Wj ∪ Rj ∪ {Ui} ∈ Γ. In effect, as long as Wj ∪ Rj ∪ {Ui} ∈ Γ, the result
ψ(GM) =
∑
Uk∈Wj∪Rj∪{Ui} λkψ(Uk) holds for some λk ∈ GF (q). Therefore,
uj · ψ(GM) =
∑
Uk∈Wj∪Rj∪{Ui} λkuj · ψ(k). From the broadcast information Bj ,
Ui recovers the backward key
BKm−j+1 = zj − uj · ψ(GM). (7.3)
Ui can check the validity of the recovered BKm−j+1. If Hj(BKm−j+1) 6= BKm+1,
the broadcast message is tampered during transmission, Ui discards the message.
Otherwise, Ui computes the j-th forward key FK(h, j) by applying the hash func-
tion to the assigned intermediate forward key seed if it does not have a forward key.
Finally Ui calculates the current session key
SKj = FK(h, j) +BKm−j+1. (7.4)
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Adding/Revoking Users. When a new user Ul wants to join the network, the user
gets in touch with the GM. The GM assigns a life cycle (sl, tl) to the new user. The
GM assigns a forward key or intermediate forward key seed corresponding to the
life cycle (sl, tl) and secret vectors {usl · ψ(Ul), . . . , utl · ψ(Ul)} to this new user
over the secure communication channel between them.
Our scheme supports implicit revocation. When a user Ui life cycles (si, ti)
finishes, its ID will be added to Rj by the GM. The GM will construct broadcasts
for the subsequent sessions with new access structure. In addition, we allow a
revoked user to rejoin the group in later sessions with a new identity. However, for
existing hash chains based self-healing key distribution schemes [86, 95], rejoining
is not permitted.
Self-healing. Suppose Ui is a user who receives session broadcast message Bj1
and Bj2 in session j1 and j2 respectively, where 1 ≤ si ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ ti ≤ m, but
not broadcast message Bj for the session j, where j1 < j < j2. Ui can still recover
all the lost session keys SKj (j1 < j < j2) as follows:
1. Ui recovers from the broadcast message Bj2 in session j2, the backward key
BKm−j+1 and repeatedly applies the one-way hash function to this and com-
putes all the backward keys corresponding to sessions j (j1 < j < j2).
2. Ui computes the forward keys FK(h, j) for all j (j1 < j < j2) by repeat-
edly applying hash functions LH(·) or RH(·) to the intermediate forward key
seed.
3. Ui recovers all the session keys Kj = FK(h, j)+BKm−j+1, for j1 < j < j2.
7.5 Security Evaluation
In this section, we evaluation from two aspects. We firstly prove the security of the
HBT-based solution under an appropriate framework and then demonstrate that the
HBT-based solution meets the security requirements of the defined security model.
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7.5.1 Proof under an Appropriate Framework
We can prove Theorem 7.1 which states forward and backward secrecy, and Theo-
rem 7.2 which states the capability of collusion resistance of our construction in an
appropriate framework.
Theorem 7.1. Our construction is a secure, self-healing session key distribution
scheme with privacy, R-revocation and implicit authentication capability with re-
spect to Definition 7.1, and enjoys R-forward and backward secrecy with respect to
Definition 7.2.
Proof: Our goal is R-wise forward and backward secrecy. We first show that our
construction is computationally secure with respect to revoked users under the dif-
ficulty of inverting the one-way function. That is, our construction satisfies forward
secrecy. For any session j, it is computationally infeasible for any set of revoked
users from R before and on session j to compute with non-negligible probability
the session key Kj , given the V iew consisting of personal keys of revoked users,
broadcast messages before, on and after session j and session keys of revoked users
before session j. In fact, to some extent, forward secrecy implies R-revocation
capability.
Consider a coalition of revoked users from R, say Rj ∈ R, who are revoked in
and before session j. The users in Rj are not entitled to know the j-th session key
Kj . We can model this coalition of users from R as a polynomial-time algorithmA′
that takes V iew as input and outputs its guess for Kj . We say that A′ is successful
in breaking the construction if it has a non-negligible advantage in determining the
session key Kj . Then using A′, we can construct a polynomial time algorithm A
for inverting the one-way function H and have the following claim:
Claim: A inverts one-way function H with a non-negligible probability if A′ is
successful.
Proof: Given any instance y = H(x) of one-way function H , A first generates
an instance V iew for A′ as follows: A randomly selects a backward key seed SF ∈
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Fq and constructs the following backward key chain by repeatedly applying H to y:
BK1 = y,BK2 = H(y), BK3 = H
2(y), . . . ,
BKj = H
j−1(y), . . . , BKm = Hm−1(y). (7.5)
A computes the j-th forward key FKh,j and sets the j-th session key
SKj = FK(h, j) +BKm−j+1. (7.6)
A chooses at random m vectors u1, . . . , um ∈ GF (q)l. Each user Ui ∈ U with
life cycle (si, ti) receives its personal secret keys (usi · ψ(Ui), . . . , uti · ψ(Ui)) and
the intermediate forward key seed from A via the secure communication channel
between them. In this setting, Γ = 2U \R is a monotone increasing access structure
of authorized users over U , Γ is determined by the family of minimal qualified
subsets, Γ0, which is called the basis of Γ. Now Rj ⊆ R implies Rj 6∈ Γ.
Let Gj be the set of all non-revoked users in session j. At the j-th session, A
chooses a subset of usersWj ⊂ U \Gj with minimal cardinality such thatWj∪Rj ∈
Γ¯0. A then computes broadcast message Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m as:
Bj = zj ∪ {(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk)) : Uk ∈ Wj ∪Rj} (7.7)
where zj = BKm−j+1 + uj · ψ(GM). Then A sets V iew as
y =

us · ψ(Uk) for all Uk ∈ Rj ∪Wj
and s = 1, . . . ,m;
Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m;
FK(0, 1);
SK1, . . . , SKj−1.
(7.8)
A gives V iew to A′, which in turn randomly selects X ∈ GFq, sets the j-th
session key to be SKj′ = FK(h, j) +X and returns SKj′ to A. A checks whether
SKj′ = SKj . If not, A chooses a random x′ ∈ GF (q) and outputs x′.
A′ can compute the j-th forward key FK(h, j) for j = 1, . . . ,m because it
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knows FK(0, 1) from V iew. Note that from V iew, A′ knows {uj · ψ(Uk) : Uk ∈
Wj ∪ Rj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m} and session keys SK1, . . . , SKj−1. Consequently, A′
has knowledge of at most j − 1 backward keys BKm, . . . , BKm−j+2. There is
SKj′ = SKj provided that A′ knows the backward key BKm−j+1.
The condition occurs if the following holds:
(a) A′ is able to compute uj · ψ(GM) from V iew. From View, A′ knows {uj ·
ψ(Uk) : Uk ∈ Wj ∪ Rj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m}, where Wj ⊂ U \ Gj has minimal
cardinality with Wj ∪ Rj ∈ Γ¯0 and will not be able to compute uj · ψ(GM)
by the property of ψ. Observe that uj · ψ(GM) is a linear combination of
{uj · ψ(Uk) : Uk ∈ B} if and only if B ∈ Γ. Consequently, A′ is not able to
recover BKm−j+1 from Bj .
(b) A′ is able to choose X ∈ GFq so that the following relations hold:
BKm = H
j−1(X), . . . , BKm−j+2 = H(X). (7.9)
This occurs with a non-negligible probability only if A is able to invert the
one-way function H . In that case, A returns x = H−1(y).
The above arguments show that if A′ is successful in breaking the security of
our construction, then A is able to invert the one-way hash function.
Hence our construction is computationally secure for forward secrecy under the
difficulty of inverting the one-way function. A quite similar proof can be conducted
for the backward secrecy of our construction. The only difference is that the coali-
tion of new users knows the backward keys but they don’t know the forward keys.
We omit the proof here.
Theorem 7.2. Our Construction can resist collusion attack with respect to Defi-
nition 7.3.
Proof: Consider a coalition from B ∪ C ⊂ R, where B ⊆ Rs is a set of users
removed from the group before session r and C ⊆ Jt is a set of users who join the
group from session s with s < t. We show the users in B ∪ C together are not
entitled to know the j-th session key Kj for any s ≤ j < t− 1.
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Also, we can model this coalition of users from B ∪ C as a polynomial-time
algorithm A′ that takes V iew as input and outputs its guess for Kj . We say that
A′ is successful in breaking the construction if it has a non-negligible advantage in
determining the session key Kj .
A first generates an instance V iew for A′ as follows:
y =

uj · ψ(Uk) for all Uk ∈ B ∪ C and j = 1, . . . ,m;
Bj for j = 1, . . . ,m;
{FK(h, 1), . . . , FK(h, s− 1)};
{FK(h, t) . . . , FK(h,m)};
BK;
{K1, . . . , Ks−1} ∪ {Kt, . . . , Km}.
(7.10)
A gives V iew to A′, which in turn selects FK(h, j′) randomly, sets the j-th
session key to be SKj′ = FK(h, j′) + BKj−m+1 and returns SK ′j to A. A checks
whether SKj′ = SKj . If not, A chooses a random x′ ∈ GF (q) and outputs x′.
A′ can compute the j-th backward key BKm−j+1 = Hm−j+1(BK) because
it knows BK from V iew for j = 1, . . . ,m. Note that from V iew, A′ knows
{FK(h, 1), . . . , FK(h, s−1)} ∪ {FK(h, t) . . . , FK(h,m)} and session keys {SK1,
. . . , SKs−1} ∪ {SKt, . . . , SKm}. Observe that SKj′ = SKj provided A′ knows
the forward key FK(h, j). This condition holds if and only if theA′ is able to invert
the one-way function.
The above arguments show that ifA′ is successful in breaking the security of our
construction, then A can break the one-way hash function. Hence, our construction
is computationally secure for resisting R-coalition under the difficulty of breaking
one-way hash function.
7.5.2 Proof under the Defined Security Model
We now demonstrate that our construction satisfies all the conditions required by
Definition 7.1 to Definition 7.3. We first show that our construction realizes self-
healing key distribution scheme with revocation capability. More precisely, we can
prove our construction under the security model described in subsection 7.2.
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We now show that our construction satisfies all the conditions required by Defi-
nition 7.1.
1. The scheme is a session key distribution scheme.
(a) A non-revoked user Ui ∈ Gj can recover the session key SKj efficiently
from broadcast message Bj and personal key Si. As can be seen in procedure
Key Recovery.
(b) For any set Rj ⊆ U , where Rj ∈ R and Ui 6∈ Rj , we show that the
coalition Rj knows nothing about the personal secret (u1 · ψ(Ui), . . . , uj ·
ψ(Ui), . . . , um · ψ(Ui)) of Ui. For any session j, Ui uses its uj · ψ(Ui) as its
personal secret. Since the coalition Rj 6∈ Γ, the values {us · ψ(Uk) : Uk ∈
Rj, 1 ≤ s ≤ m} is not enough to compute uj · ψ(Ui) by the property of ψ.
So it is computationally infeasible for coalition in Rj to determine uj · ψ(Ui)
for Ui 6∈ Rj .
(c) The session key SKj for session j is computed from two parts: forward
key FK(h, j) and backward keyBKm−j+1 where FK(h, j) is or can be com-
puted from the parts of personal key received from the GM before or when
it joins the session group and BKm−j+1 = zj − uj · ψ(GM) is recovered
from the broadcast message Bj . So the personal secret keys alone do not give
any information about any session key. Since backward seed BK is chosen
randomly, the backward key BKm−j+1 is random as well. Furthermore, the
broadcast B1, . . . , Bm determine z1, . . . , zm but the scalar uj · ψ(GM) per-
fectly hide the backward key sequence because zj = BKm−j+1+uj ·ψ(GM).
So it is computationally infeasible to determine session key Kj from broad-
cast message Bj or personal key Si alone.
2. The scheme has R-revocation capability. For each session j, let Rj ∈ R
be a collection of revoked users collude. It is infeasible for the coalition
Rj to compute the j-th session key SKj because knowledge of Kj implies
the knowledge of backward key BKm−j+1 or disclosing of personal secret
uj · ψ(Ui) of Ui 6∈ Rj . A user Ui ∈ Rj knows, from the broadcast Bj , vector
{(Uk, uj · ψ(Uk))}Uk∈Wj∪Rj and its personal key uj · ψ(Ui) ∈ GF (q) where
Ui ∈ Wj ∪ Rj /∈ Γ, and this does get any information on uj · ψ(GM). We
reach this conclusion because for any scalar s ∈ GF (q), there exists at least
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one vector u ∈ GF (q)l such that
{
u · ψ(GM) = s
u · ψ(Uk) = uj · ψ(Uk) for any Uk ∈ Wj ∪Rj (7.11)
because Wj ∪ Rj /∈ Γ. Notice that the number of vectors u satisfying this
system of equations is independent of the value s.
3. The scheme has self-healing capability as can be seen from the procedure of
Self-healing.
We will show that our construction satisfies the forward and backward secrecy
required by Definition 7.2.
1. Only those sets belonging to Γ can recover the ψ(GM) and further recover
the session key SKj . Because of the fact that Rj ⊆ R /∈ Γ, the coalition
of R cannot recover ψ(GM). Furthermore, because of the one-way property
of H , it is computationally infeasible to compute BKs from BKt for s < t.
That is, even though the users might know the sequence of backward keys
BKm, . . . , BKm−j+2, still cannot compute backward key BKm−j+1 for ses-
sion j and consequently SKj from the sequence. Therefore, our construction
guarantees the forward secrecy.
2. The correctness is based on the one-way property of the hash function. In
order to know SKs (s < j), Ul ∈ Jj requires the knowledge of the s-th for-
ward key FK(h, s). However, when a new user Ul joins the group starting
from session j, the GM gives j-th forward key FK(h, j) and the intermediate
forward key seed corresponding to Ul’s life cycle. Therefore, it is computa-
tionally infeasible for the newly joined users to trace back previous forward
key FK(h, s) for s < j. Hence, we can claim that our scheme maintains
backward secrecy. In fact, the backward secrecy is independent of secret vec-
tors.
We show our construction has the collusion resistance property required by Def-
inition 7.3.
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The scheme has the capability of collusion resistance. LetB ⊂ Rs be a coalition
of users removed from the group before session s and let C ⊂ Jt be a coalition of
users who join the group from session t with s < t such that B ∪C /∈ Γ. The secret
information held by users in B ∪ C and broadcast in all the sessions do not receive
any information about SKj for sessions j = s, . . . , t− 1. This is true because they
know, in the worst case, the coalition knows Si = (ut · ψ(Ui), . . . , um · ψ(Ui)) ∈
GF (q)m−t+1 for Ui ∈ C, Si = (u1 · ψ(Ui), . . . , us−1 · ψ(Ui)) ∈ GF (q)m−t+1 for
Ui ∈ B, and B1, . . . , Bm. For each session s ≤ j ≤ t − 1, the coalition can
obtain backward key BKj from C, However, the coalition cannot receive forward
key FK(h, j). The session key SKj is computed from forward key and backward
key. The coalition B ∪C cannot obtain the forward key. it is easy to see that all the
guesses for SKj with s ≤ j ≤ t− 1 have the same probability.
7.6 Performance Evaluation
7.6.1 Storage Overhead
For each user Ui whose life cycle is (si, ti), the storage overhead comes from its
personal key. We set ki = ti − si + 1 which is the number of sessions that Ui
attends. The storage overhead for mask vectors is kilogq and the storage overhead
for key seeds varies with different si and ti. In the best circumstances, si and ti
are the starting point and the end point of a subtree, respectively. Ui has to store
only one intermediate forward key seed. The worst condition occurs when si and ti
are separate nodes in the HBT. Ui has to store 2dlogkie − 4 intermediate key seeds
and 2 forward keys. The total storage overhead for key seeds is (2dlogkie − 2)logq
bits. Compared to schemes in [7, 93], our scheme reduces storage overhead for
forward keys at Ui to logarithm level of Ui’s life cycle. We take a HBT with 8 leaf
nodes as examples (As shown in Figure 7.2). If Ui’s life cycles is (1, 4), Ui only
stores intermediate key seed FK(1, 1). In an extreme condition, Ui’s life cycle is
(1, 8), the root seed FK(0, 1) is enough for Ui to calculate all the forward keys. The
worst condition occurs when Ui’s life cycle is (2, 7), Ui has to store 2(dlog[(7− 2+
1)/2]e)logq = 2(dlog(7− 2 + 1)e − 1)logq = 4logq bits. It is the total length of 2




The communication overhead is measured by the size of the message. The broadcast
message Bj at the j-th session consists of two parts. The first part is a masked
vector. The second part is a set of identities of revoked users and their vectors
corresponding to session j. One can ignore the communication overhead for the set
of identities, because the user identities can be selected from a small finite field [81].
In our scheme, the length of vectors depends on the particular function ψ which is
related to the set Wj ∪Rj . We set tj = |Wj ∪Rj|, where Wj ⊂ U \Gj and Rj 6∈ Γ
is the set of all revoked users for sessions in and before j with minimum cardinality
such that Wj ∪Rj ∈ Γ¯0. The communication cost for session j is (tj + 1)logq bits.
Table 7.2: Performance comparison among the constructions in [7] and our construc-




[93] (2ki + 1)logq (tj + 1)logq 2(t2j + tj)
[7] 2kilogq (tj + 1)logq 2(t2j + tj)
Our construction (2dlogkie − 2)logq (tj + 1)logq 2(t2j + tj)
7.6.3 Computation Overhead
The computation cost comes from the calculation during Key Recovery. The cal-
culation includes multiplication over the finite field GF (q), hash operation, and
addition. We ignore computation cost for the addition and hash operations and
measure the computation overhead by the number of multiplication operations. The
measurement is held because the computation cost produced by the addition and
hash operation is negligible compared with that for multiplication. Even though our
scheme achieves implicit authentication by the hash method and is more secure, its
computation overhead can be ignored. The HBT-based scheme requires fewer hash
operations for forward key computation, the minimum number of hash operation is
0, while the maximum number of hash operation is dlog2me which is the depth of
HBT. In general hash chain based schemes [86, 93, 95], the minimum number of
hash operations for forward key recovery is 0, while the maximum number of hash
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operation is (m − 1). The authorized users recover ψ(GM) from the set Wj ∪ Rj
and the corresponding vectors as well as its personal identity and vector. The com-
putation overhead of our construction is 2(t2j+ tj) multiplications which is the same
as that of [7].
In Table 7.2, we summarize a comparison of the proposed scheme with the
schemes in [7, 93] which reach the same security level.
7.7 Conclusion
An implicitly authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme is proposed in this
chapter. We adopt a HBT-based technique rather than a simple hash chain. The
HBT-based technique helps to reduce storage overhead and computation overhead
brought by Key Recovery. The scheme achieves more flexible access structure than
that of [112] with vector space secret sharing based access structure. The proposed
scheme not only maintains forward and backward secrecy, but it also has a collu-
sion resistance property. Implicit authentication which is used to detect tamper at-
tack against broadcast messages strengths the security of the scheme. Performance






8Mutual-healing Key Distribution and
Authentication on Broadcast
8.1 Introduction
Key management including key distribution and key update is significant for main-
taining private communications in any dynamic networks [51, 62, 80, 81, 82, 94,
142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149]. WSNs, being dynamic networks, therefore
rely on a secure key management. This is because membership frequently changes
in large dynamic group communications of WSNs. In order to maintain the secu-
rity of communications, the session key has to be updated with each membership
change. Therefore, one of the important questions is how to distribute and update
session keys in a secure and efficient way for large dynamic WSNs. In recent years,
many schemes for distributing session keys for large group communications have
been proposed. According to the literature review in Chapter 2, we know there
are different key updating mechanism. For example, LKH-based schemes [150]
and OFT-based schemes [62, 142] aim to reduce the size of the rekeying message.
Broadcast encryption addresses the problem of sending encrypted messages to a
large node group so that the encrypted messages can only be decrypted by a dy-
namic changing privileged subset [103, 151, 152]. The EBS-based approach was
proposed in [52], and then utilized for wireless sensor networks in [51, 153]. The
members store fewer keys than does the LKH tree for the multicast group of the
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same size. All these works in the literature have assumed that the underlying net-
works are reliable. However, how to distribute session keys for unreliable wireless
networks, in a manner that is resistant to packet loss, is an issue that has not been
addressed adequately.
Packet loss happens frequently in WSNs. The key distribution broadcast for a
particular session might never reach some nodes. A simple solution is to request
re-transmission. On the one hand, both the requesting and re-transmission mes-
sages would incur more communication overhead. In a very large communication
group, such individual interactions place a heavy burden on the group manager.
On the other hand, nodes may reveal their current locations by sending messages
within some high security environments. All these issues can be addressed by a
self-healing key distribution mechanism. With the self-healing mechanism, nodes
do not need to send any requesting message to the group manager and do not need to
update their personal keys. In this regard, self-healing key distribution schemes are
non-interactive and therefore can reduce the network traffic, decrease the workload
on the group manager, and lower the risk of node exposure through traffic analysis.
Therefore, self-healing key distribution schemes are desirable for reasons of both
efficiency and security in WSNs.
However, a node in a WSN may miss its last broadcast message. This node is
therefore not able to recover its session key for the last session in a self-healing key
distribution scheme. This is because self-healing key distribution needs the broad-
cast messages the node received in the previous sessions and those in the subsequent
sessions (assuming that the current session is the one where broadcast messages are
lost). To tackle this scenario, a mutual-healing key distribution mechanism will be
introduced. Mutual-healing key distribution can help a node which missed the last
broadcast message to recover the session key for this last session. Recalling infor-
mation given in previous chapters, broadcasts transferred over a wireless channel
are vulnerable to various attacks. Hence, authentication is necessary to ensure the
origin, integrity, and freshness of broadcasts.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 8.2, we present the
motivation for the technical exploration of the mutual-healing mechanism and au-
thenticated self-healing key distribution. In Section 8.3, we explain the contribution
230
of the two schemes proposed in this chapter. In Section 8.4, we briefly introduce
identity-based cryptography and digital signature based on pairings. This knowl-
edge facilitates understanding of the proposed solutions. In Section 8.5, we present
system parameters, a security model and a formal definition of mutual-healing key
distribution. In Section 8.6, a construction for mutual-healing key distribution is
proposed. In Sections 8.7 and 8.8, we provide security evaluation and performance
evaluation, respectively. In Section 8.9, we propose a construction of authenticated
self-healing key distribution. In Section 8.10 and Section 8.11, we evaluate the se-
curity and performance of the authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme,
respectively. In Section 8.12, we conclude this chapter.
8.2 The Motivation of the Proposed Schemes
8.2.1 The Motivation of the Technical Exploration of Mutual-
healing Mechanism
More et al. in [89] pointed out that the protocol in [80] suffers from inconsis-
tent robustness in that some session keys cannot be recovered if the corresponding
broadcast messages is lost, no matter how many other update messages are received.
For example, if the broadcast message for the last session gets lost, nodes cannot
recover the last session key by themselves even though they receive all the other
broadcast messages. Subsequently, they used a sliding window to make error re-
covery consistently robust. That is, after the initial Setup procedure, any lost key
can be recovered as long as two sufficiently close broadcast messages (one before
it and the other after it) are received. A similar technique was used in [88]. The
size of the window can be dynamically adjusted according to the condition of net-
works. Both [89] and [88] guarantee that authorized nodes can recover window size
session keys as long as they receive corresponding broadcast messages. However,
how to recover the session key if the last broadcast message is lost or more than the
number of sliding window broadcast messages are lost, has never been addressed
clearly. Obviously, it is impossible to make nodes completely self-healing accord-
ing to existing self-healing key distribution mechanisms.
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Moreover, there are concrete applications, such as live and pay-per-view TV,
that have a strict requirement of freshness, where it is desirable that customers lose a
minimal number of broadcast messages. In group communication, the last session is
usually of great importance. The authorized nodes should never miss it. Therefore,
it is important to design counteracting measures to deal with the aforementioned
issues.
Bohio et al. in [97] considered the idea of mutual-healing so that if a node
has missed more than a fixed number of broadcast messages, it does not have to
keep on waiting. Instead, it can obtain assistance from its neighbors. With the help
of its neighbors, the node can recover the missed session key and further recover
the encrypted content before it becomes outdated. Similarly, if a node misses the
last broadcast message, it cannot recover the last session key by performing self-
healing. To provide a countermeasure for this situation, it can look for assistance
from its neighboring nodes. However, the paper [97] dealt only with the feasibility
of mutual-healing without providing any technical details.
8.2.2 The Motivation of Authentication on Broadcast
Broadcasts are vulnerable to various types of attacks due to the open nature of
WSNs. Authentication ensures the origin of communication entities and integrity
of communication content. Authentication is vital in WSNs. However, it is by no
means a simple task to authenticate broadcasts with general self-healing key dis-
tribution schemes, excluding hash chain based schemes. Even if we can preload
sensor nodes with a network-wide key for authentication, the renewal may hap-
pen frequently due to dynamic addition or revocation of nodes. The renewal of
the network-wide key places a heavy burden on the network. We have proposed
an implicit authentication solution to hash chain based self-healing key distribution
schemes in Chapters 6 and 7. As is well known, authentication based on PKC has
an advantage over that based on Symmetric Key Cryptography because no secret
key has to be shared by the entities. Motivated by this advantage, we consider im-
plementing authentication in bilinear pairings based self-healing key distribution.
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8.3 The Contribution of the Proposed Schemes
We have narrowed the study of mutual-healing key distribution to effectively au-
thenticate requesting nodes in Chapter 3. In this chapter, we formally address the
mutual-healing key distribution. We define a security model of a computationally
secure mutual-healing key distribution scheme. This security model outperforms
those in [80, 81] in two aspects. The first one is that there is no threshold for the
number of revoked nodes. The scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of non-
authorized nodes. The second one is that a node can recover from a single broadcast
message all keys associated with sessions in which it belongs to the session group.
These two properties add flexibility to the self-healing key distribution scheme. We
propose a self-healing key distribution scheme using bilinear pairings. The scheme
is characterized by several desirable features. Firstly, it is collusion-free for any
coalition of non-authorized nodes. Secondly, the private key has nothing to do
with the number of revoked nodes and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed.
Thirdly, the storage overhead for nodes is a constant. Subsequently, we discuss the
requirements, provide a formal definition, and develop the technical details of the
mutual-healing mechanism. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that a
formal security model of mutual-healing has been presented. It is also the first time
that a mutual-healing key distribution technique has been developed.
In this chapter, we implement bilinear pairings based authenticated self-healing
key distribution scheme. The authentication method takes advantage of the pub-
lic key pair of the group manager. It is the first time that the authentication on
self-healing key distribution broadcasts using an short digital signature has been
addressed. The security of our scheme relies on the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman
problem in the random oracle model.
8.4 Identity-based Cryptography and Digital Signa-
ture Based on Pairings
8.4.1 Identity-based Cryptography
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In identity-based cryptography, the public key of a user is some unique infor-
mation about the identity of the user. Identity-based schemes can allow any party
to generate a public key from a known identity value such as an ASCII string. A
trusted third party, called PKG, generates the corresponding private keys. There-
fore, any party without using certificates can verify the public key of a user. This
eliminates the need for a public key distribution infrastructure.
Shamir [104] proposed the first identity-based cryptography to alleviate many of
the problems inherent in managing certificates in 1985. Boneh and Franklin [105]
proposed the first practical identity-based encryption scheme in 2001. Since then,
many ID-based cryptographic schemes have been proposed using bilinear pairings.
Inspired by the idea of [105], Du et al. proposed a broadcast encryption scheme
for key distribution in [106]. By extending the broadcast encryption scheme, we
propose a mutual-healing key distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks.
8.4.2 Digital Signature Based on Pairings
Digital signature is essential to ensure the authenticity of messages in low-bandwidth
communication, low-storage and less computation networks. Compared with the
traditional Public Key Cryptography, the extinct advantage of ID-based cryptog-
raphy is the elimination of computation and memory requirements for certificate
management. Many ID-based digital signature schemes based on bilinear pairings
have been proposed so far. Cha et al. in [154] proposed an ID-based signature
scheme using gap Diffie-Hellman groups. Paterson et al. in [155] proposed an ID-
based signature scheme using the same computational primitives as the ID-based
encryption scheme of [105]. This scheme is more efficient than [156], which is also
claimed to be an efficient digital signature scheme. Hess in [157] designed an effi-
cient ID-based signature scheme based on pairings which offered advantages over
[154, 155, 156]. The security of the scheme relies on the hardness of the Diffie-
Hellman problem based on bilinear pairings. Our authenticated self-healing key
distribution scheme adopts this efficient digital signature.
8.4.3 An Efficient Digital Signature Scheme
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Here we briefly review the efficient digital signature scheme of [157]. Suppose
the system parameters are params = {G1, G2, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2} (refer to Sec-
tion 3.2.20 for parameters definition). The public/private key pair of the signer is
(QID, SID). All the parameters are defined as aforementioned in ID-based Public
Key Infrastructure. A hash function H3 : {0, 1}∗ ×G2 → (Z/qZ)× is available for
the signer and verifiers.
Sign: To sign a message m the signer chooses an arbitrary P1 ∈ G∗1 where
G∗1 = G1 \ {0}, picks a random integer k ∈ (Z/qZ)× and computes:
• r = e(P1, P )k;
• v = H3(m, r);
• u = vSID + kP1.
The signature is the pair (u, v) ∈ (G1, (Z/qZ)×).
Verify: On receiving a message m and signature (u, v), the verifier computes:
• r = e(u, P ) · e(H1(ID),−Ppub)v;
• Accept the signature if and only if v = H3(m, r).
8.5 Security Model and Definition for Mutual-healing
Key Distribution
In this section, we present system parameters, a security model and a formal defini-
tion for mutual-healing key distribution.
8.5.1 System Parameters
Let U = {u1, . . . , un}(n > 2) be the finite universe of nodes. Each node ui has a
unique identifier IDi. A broadcast unreliable channel is available, and time is de-
fined by a global clock. A GM sets up and manages, by means of adding and revok-
ing operations, a communication group which is a dynamic subset of U . m denotes
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the number of sessions. Let Gj ⊆ U be the communication group established by
the group manager in session j. Each node is preloaded with a public/private key
pair (Qi, Si) before deployment. The public/private key pair is used to recover the
session keys as long as node ui is not removed by the GM from the group. Let
Rj ⊆ Gj−1 denote the set of revoked group nodes in session j and Jj ⊂ U \ Gj−1
denote the set of nodes who join the group in session j with Rj ∩ Jj = φ. Hence,
Gj = (Gj−1 ∪ Jj) \ Rj for j ≥ 2 and by definition G1 = U . Moreover, for
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the session key Kj is randomly chosen by the GM according to the
uniform distribution. For any non-revoked node ui ∈ Gj , the j-th session key Kj
is determined by the broadcast message Bj and the personal public/private key pair
(Qi, Si).
8.5.2 Security Model
Just as self-healing means that nodes are capable of recovering lost group keys on
their own, mutual-healing implies that nodes help each other to recover some lost
group keys. The central concept of mutual-healing is that if a node has missed more
than a fixed number of broadcast messages or the last broadcast message, it can
obtain assistance from its neighboring nodes. The neighboring nodes within the
same session group cooperate with each other by forwarding broadcast messages
which their neighboring nodes have missed. In this way, the robustness of the self-
healing key distribution mechanism is achieved.
To further clarify our design goal and facilitate understanding of the proposed
solution, according to but not constrained by the security model of [86], we define
the mutual-healing key distribution security model from four perspectives. Def-
inition 8.1 defines self-healing key distribution scheme with revocation capability.
Definition 8.2 defines mutual-healing key distribution scheme Definition 8.3 defines
forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Definition 8.4 defines collusion resistance
properties.
Definition 8.1. Let U = {u1, . . . , un} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
1. The scheme is a session key distribution with privacy if
(a) for any node ui, the session key Kj is efficiently determined from Bj and
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the personal public/private key pair (Qi, Si).
(b) for any set R ⊆ U and ui 6∈ R, it is computationally infeasible for node
in R to determine the personal private key Si.
(c) what node {u1, . . . , un} learn from Bj cannot be determined from broad-
casts or personal key pairs alone. That is, if we consider separately either
the set of m broadcasts {B1, . . . , Bm} or the set of n personal key pairs
{(Q1, S1), . . . , (Qn, Sn)}, then it is computationally infeasible to compute
session key Kj from either set.
2. The scheme has revocation capability. In particular, there is no upper limi-
tation of revocation. For each session j and Rj ⊂ U , the GM can generate
a broadcast message Bj such that for all ui 6∈ Rj can efficiently recover the
session key Kj , but the revoked nodes in Rj cannot even know all the infor-
mation broadcast in sessions 1, . . . , j.
3. The scheme is self-healing if the following is true for any r, 1 ≤ r < j ≤ m:
For any node ui ∈ Gr who is also a member in session j, the session key Kr
is efficiently determined by (Qi, Si) and Bj .
Definition 8.2. Let U = {u1, . . . , un} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The scheme is
mutual-healing if the following is true:
1. For any node ui ∈ U , if it misses more than a fixed number of broadcast mes-
sages or the last broadcast message, it can generate and broadcast an effective
requesting message to its neighbors.
2. For any ui’s neighboring node uj , it can verify whether ui is its qualified
neighboring node or a malicious one. If ui is a qualified neighboring node
and uj is an authorized node for the requested broadcast, uj generates and
sends a responsive message to ui.
3. The requester ui can verify whether or not the responser uj is its neighbor. If
uj is its neighbor, ui can decrypt the responsive message and thus obtain the
requested broadcast message.
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Definition 8.3. Let U = {u1, . . . , un} and j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The scheme guaran-
tees both forward secrecy and backward secrecy if:
1. for any set R ⊆ U , and all ui ∈ R are revoked before session j, it is computa-
tionally infeasible for the nodes in R together to obtain any information about
Kj , even with the knowledge of group keys K1, . . . , Kj−1 before session j;
and
2. for any set J ⊆ U , and all ui ∈ J join after session j, it is computationally
infeasible for the nodes in J together to get any information about Kj , even
with the knowledge of group keys Kj+1, . . . , Km after session j.
Definition 8.4. Let B ⊂ Rr ∪ . . . ∪ R2 be a coalition of nodes who are revoked
from the group before session r and let C ⊂ Js ∪ . . . ∪ Jm be a coalition of nodes
who join the group from session s with r < s.
The scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of non-authorized nodes if the
coalition B ∪ C does not obtain any information about session keys Kj , for any
r ≤ j < s.
8.6 The Construction of Mutual-healing Key Distri-
bution Scheme
In this section, we will present a mutual-healing key distribution scheme for WSNs.








Figure 8.1: The process of the mutual-healing key distribution scheme.
The process of the proposed mutual-healing key distribution scheme is shown
in Figure 8.1, where the panes represent operations which must be executed in each
round, and the dashed panes represent the operations which may not be executed in
every round.
The proposed mutual-healing scheme is computationally secure. All parame-
ters and symbols used in this section have been defined in Sections 8.4 and 8.5.
Otherwise, they will be defined in this section.
Setup. The GM obtains both public system parameters and all the public keys of
possible nodes from the ID-based PKI. The GM choosesm session keysK1, · · · , Km
from Z∗q . The session keys are independent of each other and are according to the
uniform distribution. We also use the system parameters proposed in Section 8.5.
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Broadcast. Suppose |Gj| denotes the number of nodes in session j. For each
session 1 ≤ j ≤ m, according to the session group Gj , the GM computes QV1 =∑n







1 1 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
... . . . 0
1 0 0 . . . 1
 (8.1)
Let a′i represents the transposition of ai. The GM also constructs |Gj| − 1 aux-
iliary keys
QVi = (Q1, Q2, . . . , Q|Gj |)× a
′
i 2 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|, (8.2)
which means QV2 = Q1 + Q2, QV3 = Q1 + Q3, . . . , QV|Gj | = Q1 + Q|Gj |. The
broadcast message is then formed by computing, for a random rj ∈ Z∗q ,
U1 = rjP, Ui = rjQVi 2 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|, (8.3)
where P is a generator for a BDH group G1 as shown in Chapter 3.
We define Vj = Kj ⊕ H2(e(Ppub, rjQV1)). Let zj = (Ui(1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|), Vj).
The GM broadcasts the ciphertext to the set of nodes Gj . The ciphertext for the j-th
broadcast is in the following form: Bj = {z1, . . . , zj}.
Key Recovery. When a node ui ∈ Gj receives the broadcast message Bj , it sets
a vector a1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with |Gj| elements, and only the i-th element is









The node ui can solve the following system of equations using Cramer’s Rule
or other algebraic methods.
(x1, x2, . . . , x|Gj |)× Aj = (1, 1, . . . , 1). (8.5)
With (x1, x2, . . . , x|Gj |), ui gets






 = QV1 . (8.6)
In order to decrypt the ciphertext, ui needs to compute e(Ppub, rQV1). With the
knowledge of the private key Si, it can do so via:
e(Ppub, rjQV1)
= e(Ppub, rj(x1Qi + x2QV2 + . . .+ x|Gj |QV|Gj |))
= e(Ppub, rjx1Qi) · e(Ppub, rj(x2QV2 + . . .+ x|Gj |QV|Gj |))
= e(rjP, x1sQi) · e(Ppub, x2rjQV2 + . . .+ x|Gj |rjQV|Gj |)
= e(U1, x1Si) · e(Ppub, x2U2 + . . .+ x|Gj |U|Gj |). (8.7)
Then, ui can recover the session key




Self-healing. Without loss of generality, suppose ui lost the broadcast message
for a session t < j. As long as it belongs to the session group Gt, it can pick up
the polynomial zt from the broadcast message Bj and forms the |Gt| × |Gt| matrix
At as operations in the procedure of Key Recovery. Then ui solves the following
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system of equations:
(x1, x2, . . . , x|Gt|)× At = (1, 1, . . . , 1). (8.9)
With (x1, x2, . . . , x|Gt|), ui gets






 = QV1 . (8.10)
After that, with the knowledge of its private key Si, ui computes e(Ppub, rtQV1)
as follows:
e(Ppub, rtQV1)
= e(Ppub, rt(x1Qi + x2QV2 + . . .+ x|Gt|QV|Gt|))
= e(Ppub, rtx1Qi) · e(Ppub, rt(x2QV2 + . . .+ x|Gt|QV|Gt|))
= e(rtP, x1sQi) · e(Ppub, x2rtQV2 + . . .+ x|Gt|rtQV|Gt|)
= e(U1, x1Si) · e(Ppub, x2U2 + . . .+ x|Gt|U|Gt|). (8.11)
Finally, ui recovers the lost session key




One may wonder how ui obtains Vt if the t-th broadcast message is lost. In fact,
ui could get the broadcast message Bj . Then ui retrieved the polynomial zj from
Bj . Finally, ui could obtain Vt from zj . If more than one broadcast message is lost,
the operations of session key recovery are the same as those aforementioned.
Mutual-healing. Here we consider the mutual-healing between neighboring
nodes in wireless communication networks and present a practical technique to re-
alize it.
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Many wireless networks have an intrinsic property nodes are stationary. There-
fore, we can bind the Location-based Keys (LBKs) of nodes to both their identities
and geographic locations rather merely their identities or locations as in conven-
tional schemes. Based on their LBKs, two neighboring nodes can perform node-
to-node neighborhood authentication. In order to reduce communication overhead,
we impose a restriction whereby mutual-healing happens only between one-hop
neighboring nodes. In order to realize mutual-healing capability, the scheme has to
execute a range-based location operation after the Setup procedure.
There are many methods for localizing nodes. We adopt the first method in
[21]. This step can be completed within several minutes after the deployment of
networks. We assume that a group of mobile robots are dispatched to sweep across
the whole network field along pre-planned routes. Mobile robots have capability of
positioning, as well as more powerful computation and communication capacities
than ordinary nodes have. The leading robot equipped with a master secret k. To
localize a node, say ui, mobile robots run the secure range-based localization proto-
col given in [158] or [159] to measure their respective absolute distance to node ui
and co-determine li, the location of ui. Subsequently, the leading robot calculates
LKi = kH(IDi ‖ li), and sends ({LKi ‖ li}Qi , hQi(LKi ‖ li)) to ui. {M}k means
encrypting message M with key k, and hk(M) refers to the Message Integrity Code
(MIC) of message M under key k.
Upon receipt of the message, node ui first uses its private key to decrypt LKi
and li and then regenerates the MIC. If the result matches what the robot sent, ui
saves LKi and li for subsequent use. Following this process, all the nodes can be
furnished with their respective locations and LBKs. After that, mobile robots leave
the sensing field and the leading robot has to securely erase k from its memory.
During subsequent network operations, the addition of nodes may be necessary in
order to maintain good network connectivity. The localization of new nodes can be
done in the same manner.
It is generally supposed that adversaries do not launch active and explicit pin-
point attack on nodes during deployment and initialization which usually does not
last too long. According to [21], this assumption in range-based location operations
is reasonable in that mobile robots are much fewer than ordinary nodes and can be
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equipped with tamper-proof hardware and be placed under a super monitor.
During the procedures of self-healing key distribution, if a node has missed more
than a fixed number of broadcast messages or the last broadcast message, it looks
for assistance from its neighboring nodes.The mutual-healing process includes three
steps. We will introduce them one by one.
1. Mutual-healing request. Suppose a node ui wishes to receive broadcast mes-
sage Bt, ui locally broadcasts an authentication request including its identity
IDi, location li and the sequence number of the expected broadcast message
t.
2. Mutual-healing response. Upon receipt of a request, the neighboring node
uj first needs to ascertain that the claimed location li is within its one-hop
communication range by verifying if the Euclidean distance ‖ li − lj ‖≤ R,
where R is one-hop communication distance.
If the inequality does not hold, node uj simply discards the request. Other-
wise, uj calculates a shared key as Kji = e(LKj, H(IDi ‖ li)). Then it uni-
casts a reply to node ui including its identity IDj , location lj and encrypted
broadcast message (Bt)Kji .
• ui → ∗ : IDi, li, t;
• uj → ui : IDj, lj, (Bt)Kji;
3. Verification. Upon receiving the response, node ui also first checks if the
inequality ‖ li − lj ‖≤ R holds. If the inequality does not hold, ui directly
discards the message received from uj . Otherwise, ui proceeds to derive a
shared key as Kij = e(LKi, H(IDj ‖ lj)) = Kji between it and the node uj
whereby to decrypt the message (Bt)Kji and obtain the broadcast messageBt.
Using the broadcast message Bt and its public/private key pair, the authorized
node ui can recover the lost session keys.
Adding/Revoking Nodes. If a new node unew applies for joining the session j,
the GM firstly checks the validity of its identity. If it is an authorized node, in the
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procedure of Broadcast, the GM constructs a new (|Gj| − 1) × |Gj| matrix and
computes new QVi (1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|) which should include Qnew.
If a node urov is revoked from the session j, what the GM should do is construct
a new (|Gj|−1)×|Gj|matrix and computing new QVi (1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|) which should
exclude Qrov.
The adding and revoking operations are very efficient in our scheme. If adding
or revoking more than one node, the operations are the same as those aforemen-
tioned.
8.7 Security Evaluation of the Mutual-healing Key
Distribution Scheme
Security analysis for the proposed mutual-healing key distribution scheme will be
provided in this section. More precisely, we show that our construction satisfies all
the security requirements in our security model described in Section 8.5.
8.7.1 Property 1: Self-healing Key Distribution
We show our construction satisfies the security requirements described in Definition
4.1.
1. The scheme is a session key distribution scheme. (a) Any node ui ∈ Gj can
recover the session key Kj from Bj and the personal public/private key pair
(Qi, Si). This is because when a node ui ∈ Gj receives the broadcast message
Bj , it sets a vector c1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with |Gj| elements, and only
the i-th element is 1. Define a new matrix Cj using ci with i = 1, 2, ..., |Gj|.









The node ui can solve the following system of equations using Cramer’s Rule
or other algebraic methods.
(x1, x2, . . . , x|Gj |)× Cj = (1, 1, . . . , 1). (8.14)
With (x1, x2, . . . , x|Gj |), ui gets






 = QV1 . (8.15)
In order to decrypt the ciphertext, ui needs to compute e(Ppub, rQV1). With
the knowledge of the private key Si, ui can do so via:
e(Ppub, rjQV1)
= e(Ppub, rj(x1Qi + x2QV2 + . . .+ x|Gj |QV|Gj |))
= e(Ppub, rjx1Qi) · e(Ppub, rj(x2QV2 + . . .+ x|Gj |QV|Gj |))
= e(rjP, x1sQi) · e(Ppub, x2rjQV2 + . . .+ x|Gj |rjQV|Gj |)
= e(U1, x1Si) · e(Ppub, x2U2 + . . .+ x|Gj |U|Gj |). (8.16)
Then, ui can recover the session key Kj by




(b) Any coalition R ⊆ U of non-authorized nodes cannot derive the pri-
vate key Si of any authorized node ui 6∈ R. This is because each node is
preloaded with a public/private key pair (Qi, Si) before deployment. The key
pairs are computed by an ID-based PKI which can realize public and pri-
vate keys without certificate management [160]. Because it is infeasible to
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solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem SID = sQID, any coalition R ⊆ U of
non-authorized nodes cannot derive the private key Si of any authorized node
ui 6∈ R.
(c) It is computationally infeasible to compute session key Kj from either
broadcast messages or personal public/private key pairs. This is because the
j-th session key is computed from Vj and e(Ppub, rjQV1). On the one hand,
Vj is taken from the broadcast message while e(Ppub, rjQV1) = e(U1, x1Si) ·
e(Ppub,
∑|Gj |
i=2 xiUi). Therefore, only the authorized nodes who holds corre-
sponding private key Si can recover the session key. They cannot get any
session key only from the broadcast messages. On the other hand, the per-
sonal public/private key pairs of nodes are computed by the ID-based PKI.
The session keys are chosen by the GM. They are independent of one an-
other. Therefore, The coalition of nodes cannot obtain any session key except
through their public/private key pairs {(Q1, S1), . . . , (Qn, Sn)}.
2. There is no threshold for the revocation in the proposed scheme. This means
any number of nodes who are compromised or malicious can be revoked and,
although they work together, they cannot work out the private key of any
non-revoked authorized node. In our scheme, the broadcast messages are
computationally related to the authorized nodes’ public/private key pairs. On
the one hand, only those nodes which hold the corresponding private keys
can recover the session keys from the masked broadcast messages. On the
other hand, even though all the revoked unauthorized nodes work together,
they cannot obtain the private key of any non-revoked authorized node due to
the difficulty of solving DLP.
3. The proposed scheme has a self-healing capability. It can also enable a node
to recover from a single broadcast message all keys associated with sessions
in which it belongs to the session group. It is a stronger self-healing key
distribution scheme.
Without loss of generality, suppose ui ∈ Gt lost the broadcast message for a
session t where t < j. It selects a polynomial zt from the broadcast message
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where a1 = (0, 0, ..., 0, 1, 0..., 0) (note: the i-th bit is 1 and all other bits are
0).
Then ui solves the following system of equations.
(x1, x2, . . . , x|Gt|)× At = (1, 1, . . . , 1). (8.19)
With (x1, x2, . . . , x|Gt|), ui gets






 = QV1 . (8.20)
After that, with the knowledge of its private key Si, ui computes e(Ppub, rtQV1)
as follows:
e(Ppub, rtQV1)
= e(Ppub, rt(x1Qi + x2QV2 + . . .+ x|Gt|QV|Gt|))
= e(Ppub, rtx1Qi) · e(Ppub, rt(x2QV2 + . . .+ x|Gt|QV|Gt|))
= e(rtP, x1sQi) · e(Ppub, x2rtQV2 + . . .+ x|Gt|rtQV|Gt|)
= e(U1, x1Si) · e(Ppub, x2U2 + . . .+ x|Gt|U|Gt|). (8.21)
Finally, ui recovers the lost session key





8.7.2 Property 2: Mutual-healing Key Distribution
We show that we securely establish mutual-healing property between neighboring
nodes. More specifically, this satisfies the security requirements described in Defi-
nition 8.2.
1. It can be seen in the step for the Mutual-healing request that any node ui ∈
U , if it misses more than a fixed number of broadcast messages or the last
broadcast message, can generate and broadcast the requesting message to its
neighbors. The broadcast message is composed of its identity IDi, location
li and the sequence number of the expected broadcast message t.
2. A false requesting node might send an request with a forged location within
node u′js range. Since the false requesting node does not hold the LBK cor-
responding to the forged location, even though it deceives uj into believing it
is in u′js range, it can not recover the session key from the broadcast message
that uj sends. Therefore, it obtains any useful information from uj . There are
some false requesting nodes which might mount a DoS attack by continuously
sending bogus mutual-healing requests to lure legitimate nodes into endlessly
verifying such messages. Because the number of neighbors of any node is
limited in reality, abnormally many mutual-healing requests are highly likely
to be an indicator of malicious attacks. If this situation occurs, node uj will
discard the requesting message and refuse assistance.
3. Upon receiving the reply, node ui also first checks whether uj is its neigh-
bor. This check is the baseline defence against an attack where adversaries
surreptitiously tunnel authentication messages between ui and a virtually non-
neighboring node. Without the location check, ui will falsely believe that the
broadcast messages come from its neighbors. If the first check is true, then ui
checks whether the message received from uj is effective. ui can recover the
requested broadcast message if the second check is true.
If a requester receives too many replies, it decrypts only a fixed number of
messages in order to conserve its limited resources and avoid an exhausting-
resource attack. Furthermore, we assume that there are efficient mechanisms
available for authorized nodes to report such an abnormality to the sink.
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8.7.3 Property 3: Forward Secrecy and Backward Secrecy
We show that our construction satisfies forward secrecy and backward secrecy de-
scribed in Definition 8.3.
In this scheme, due to the special construction of broadcast messages, only the
current authorized nodes can recover the session keys by using their private keys.
As described previously, any coalition of non-authorized nodes cannot derive the
private key of any authorized node. Furthermore, session keys are independent of
each other and are according to the uniform distribution. All of these features imply
the forward secrecy and backward secrecy of our scheme.
8.7.4 Property 4: Collusion-free Property
We show that our construction is collusion-free for the new joined nodes and the
revoked nodes described in Definition 8.4.
Our scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of non-authorized nodes, includ-
ing the revoked nodes and the newly joined nodes. In our scheme, if one node
wants to obtain the session key, it should compute e(U1, x1Si) in the procedure of
Key Recovery. Therefore, only the authorized nodes can recover the session key. In
addition, due to the difficulty of solving DLP, any coalition of non-authorized nodes
cannot derive the private keys of authorized nodes from their public keys.
8.7.5 The Limitation of the Proposed Scheme
The proposed mutual-healing scheme relies on identity and location-based keys.This
implies that the proposed scheme can only be used over the wireless networks where
nodes are stable. It is not trivial to realize mutual-healing in mobile wireless net-
works. In fact, the mutual-healing mechanism is more useful in mobile wireless net-
works because mobile WSNs have lower network connectivity than stable WSNs.
Therefore, it is significant to investigate new methods to realize the mutual-healing
feature in mobile wireless networks.
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8.8 Performance Evaluation of the Mutual-healing Key
Distribution Scheme
Unlike existing papers, we take advantage of a bilinear pairings based broadcast
encryption to design the self-healing procedures in the proposed mutual-healing key
distribution scheme. In this section, we first analyze the efficiency for self-healing
procedures followed by the one for mutual-healing procedures.
8.8.1 Cost of Self-healing Procedures
Storage overhead
In terms of storage overhead, each node stores only its public/private key pair and
the GM’s public key Ppub. Therefore, the storage overhead for end nodes is a con-
stant. In previous secret sharing-based self-healing key distribution schemes, the
personal key could be reused on the condition that fewer than the threshold number
of users were revoked. In the proposed scheme, the private key has nothing to do
with the number of revoked nodes and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed.
In addition, our scheme enables a node to recover from a single broadcast message
all the keys associated with sessions in which it belongs to the session group.
Computation overhead
Generally speaking, the GM takes up more resources than end nodes and thus can
perform more complex computation. We elaborate on analyzing the computation
overhead at nodes. In the j-th session, all the computations in the procedure of Key
Recovery are as follows:
1. Solving a set of linear equations with |Gj| variables;
2. |Gj| scalar multiplications in the cyclic additive group G1;
3. |Gj|-1 additions in the cyclic additive group G1;
4. Two pairings computation;
5. One hashing computation;
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6. One XOR operation.
Generally speaking, the computation of the pairing is the most time-consuming
in pairings-based cryptosystems. Although there have been many papers talking
about the complexity of pairings and how to speed up the computation of bilinear
pairings ([161] and [162]), the computation overhead of bilinear pairings are still
larger than the scalar multiplication, let alone other types of computation. There-
fore, the main computation overhead of the scheme comes from (4).
Communication overhead
The communication overhead comes from broadcast messages Bj = {z1, . . . , zj}.
zj is composed of Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|) and Vj . Therefore, the size of zj increases in
direct proportion to the number of |Gj|. The length of broadcast is (
∑j
i=1 |Gi|logq+
jlogq) where logq is the size of a session key.
8.8.2 Cost of the Mutual-healing Procedures
The mutual-healing procedures achieves all the security requirements and is effi-
cient. Each node only has to store another pair of LBK and its location in order to
achieve mutual-healing property. Therefore, the storage overhead is still a constant.
In terms of communication overhead, only two interactions are involved. In the first
step, the broadcast message is composed of the requester’s identity, location and the
sequence number of the expected broadcast message. Furthermore, the message is
broadcasted within one-hop communication range. The communication overhead
of this step is very small. The second interaction may include one or several uni-
casts. The unicast message is composed of the responser’s identity, location, and
encrypted the broadcast message. Therefore, the size of these unicast messages
is a constant. The computation overhead at the responser includes generating a
shared key and encrypting the requested message and the computation overhead at
the requester includes generating a shared key and decrypting the requested mes-
sage. Because mutual-healing does not occur very often, the computation overhead
would not consume too much of the involved nodes’ resources.
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8.9 Authenticated Self-healing Key Distribution
8.9.1 System Parameters and Security Model
In the proposed authentication self-healing key distribution scheme, the same pa-
rameters as that in subsection 7.5.1 are used. In addition, the GM can acquire
all the system parameters params = {G1, G2, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2} and its private
key s from an ID-based PKI. The GM keeps s as secret and makes params and
H4 : {{G1}∗×{0, 1}∗}∗×G2 → (Z/qZ)× public (here {G1}∗ represents a certain
number ofG1). The GM is preloaded with a pair of public/private keys (QGM , SGM)
which is used for signature and its verification.
The security model in the proposed scheme is the same as that in Chapter 6. We
do not repeat it here.
8.9.2 The Construction of Authenticated Self-healing Key Dis-
tribution
The authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme proposed in this section is a
computational security scheme. It includes several procedures. In the procedure of
Broadcast, the GM will sign the broadcast message which is used to recover session
keys. Subsequently, at the beginning of Key Recovery, the nodes check the integrity
and correctness of the broadcast message first. If the broadcast message is changed
during the process of delivery, the group users will discard it.
Setup. The GM obtains both public system parameters and all the public keys of
possible nodes from an ID-based PKI. The GM choosesm session keysK1, · · · , Km
from Z∗q . The session keys are independent of each other and according to uniform
distribution.
Broadcast. Suppose |Gj| denotes the number of users in session j. For each
session 1 ≤ j ≤ m, according to the public keys of users in the session group Gj ,
the GM computes QV1 =
∑n









1 1 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
... . . . 0
1 0 0 . . . 1
 (8.23)
Let a′i represents the transpose of ai. The GM also constructers |Gj| − 1 auxiliary
keys
QVi = (Q1, Q2, . . . , Q|Gj |)× a
′
i 2 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|, (8.24)
which means QV2 = Q1 + Q2, QV3 = Q1 + Q3, . . . , QV|Gj | = Q1 + Q|Gj |. The
broadcast message is then formed by computing, for a random rj ∈ Z∗q ,
U1 = rjP, Ui = rjQVi 2 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|, (8.25)
Vj = Kj ⊕H2(e(Ppub, rjQV1)) (8.26)
Let zj = (Ui(1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|), Vj). The broadcast message for j-th broadcast in the
following form:
Bj = {z1, . . . , zj}. (8.27)
The GM chooses an arbitrary Pj ∈ G∗1, picks a random integer kj ∈ (Z/qZ)×
and computes:
• tj = e(Pj, P )kj ;
• vj = H4(Bj, tj);
• wj = vjSGM + kjPj .
The signature for Bj is then the pair (wj, vj) ∈ (G1, (Z/qZ)×). Finally, the GM
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broadcasts the message Bj together with the signature (wj, vj) to the set of users
Gj .
Key Recovery. When a node ui ∈ Gj receives the message Bj and the sig-
nature (wj, vj), it computes tj = e(wj, P ) · e(QGM ,−Ppub)vj and H4(Bj, tj). If
vj 6= H4(Bj, tj), it discards the incorrect message. Otherwise, it computes the ses-
sion key from the broadcast message. The operation is the same as that in the Key
Recovery procedure of mutual-healing key distribution scheme.
The operation of Self-healing and Adding/Revoking Nodes is the same as that in
corresponding procedures of mutual-healing key distribution scheme, too.
8.10 Security Evaluation of the Authenticated Self-
healing Key Distribution Scheme
According to the construction described in Section 8.8, we can say that our con-
struction realizes an authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme using bilin-
ear pairings. This scheme is simple without the deficiencies that occurred in [94]
and [144]. According to the exact security proofs for the signature scheme in [157],
the signature is secure under the random oracle model. In the procedure of Key
Recovery, the receivers will first check the validity of the signature. If the verifi-
cation fails, the broadcast message must be changed during the transmission. The
receivers will not waste time on a useless broadcast message. While in a general
self-healing key distrusting scheme without augmentation, the nodes do not know
whether or not the recovered session keys are correct.
The scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of non-authorized nodes. In this
scheme, if a node wants to obtain session keys, it should compute e(U1, x1Si) in
the procedure of Key Recovery. Therefore, only the authorized nodes can recover
the session key. In addition, due to the hardness of solving DLP, any coalition of
non-authorized nodes can not derive the private keys of authorized nodes from their
public keys. Furthermore, session keys are independent of each other and according
to uniform distribution, which subsumes forward secrecy and backward secrecy of
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the scheme.
8.11 Performance Evaluation of the Authenticated Self-
healing Key Distribution Scheme
Different from the previous schemes, we utilize a short signature to authenticate
broadcast of self-healing key distribution. There is a reasonable assumption that
the GM takes up more resources than do the ordinary nodes and therefore can store
more information and perform more complex computation as well as communica-
tion. This is the reason that in the process of efficiency analysis, we elaborate only
on the analysis of the various overhead of ordinary nodes.
Storage overhead. Each node stores only its public/private key pair. Therefore,
the storage overhead for each node is a constant. Because H1 is a mapping from
{0, 1}∗ to G∗1 and the order of G1 is q, so the length of all the public keys is 2logq.
The private keys are computed from the master key s ∈ Z∗q and the public key, so
the size of private keys is 2logq. Therefore, the storage overhead for each group
user is 4logq, which is a constant number.
Communication overhead. The communication overhead comes from the broad-
cast message Bj = {z1, . . . , zj} and the signature (wj, vj). zj is composed of Ui
(1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|) and Vj . The size of Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj|) is 2logq and the size of Vj is
logq bits. Therefore, the length of zj equals to (2|Gj| + 1)logq, which increases in
direct proportion to |Gj|. The signature (wj, vj) ∈ (G1, (Z/qZ)×). wj is a point in
G1, so the bit size of wj is 2logq. vj is a value in (Z/qZ)×), so the bit size of vj is
logq. Consequently, the bit size of broadcast message is [
∑j
i=1 2|Gi|+(j+3)]logq,
which is related to the total number of users
∑j
i=1 |Gi| in all the communication
groups for different sessions and increases in direct proportion to session number j.
Computation overhead. All the computation in the procedure of Key Recovery
is as follows:
1. Solving a set of linear equations with |Gj| variables;
2. |Gj|+ 1 scalar multiplications in the group G1;
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3. |Gj| additions in the group G1;
4. Four pairings computation. Two for the verification of signature and the other
two for recovering the session key;
5. Two hashing computations;
6. One XOR operation.
In subsection 8.8.1, we mentioned that bilinear pairing computation is more
time-consuming than scalar multiplication, let alone addition, hash and XOR oper-
ation. Therefore, the main computation overhead of the authenticated self-healing
key distribution scheme is four pairing computation.
8.12 Conclusion
A mutual-healing key distribution scheme using bilinear pairings is proposed in this
chapter. A security model and formal definition for mutual-healing key distribution
were discussed. The proposed new scheme achieves several desirable features. The
storage overhead for each node is a constant. The scheme is collusion-free for any
coalition of non-authorized nodes. Each authorized node’s private key has nothing
to do with the number of revoked nodes and can be reused only if it is not disclosed.
While in secret sharing-based self-healing key distribution schemes, the personal
key can be reused on the condition that fewer than the threshold number nodes are
revoked. In addition, our scheme enables a node to recover from a single broadcast
message all keys associated with sessions in which it belongs to the session group.
As far as we know, it is the first practical mutual-healing key distribution scheme.
Authenticated self-healing key distribution can confirm network users with the
received broadcast actually originated from the group manager. An authenticated
self-healing key distribution scheme based on bilinear pairings has been proposed
in this chapter. The authentication is carried out with a short signature which is
both computation and communication efficient. It enables the nodes to check the in-
tegrity and correctness of the broadcast messages before carrying out more complex
key recovery operations. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first pairing-based





9A Hybrid Key Management Scheme
for Hierarchical Wireless Sensor
Networks
9.1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks are fundamental building block of pervasive computing.
Security issues become more important as application of WSNs becomes more ma-
ture. The robustness of security primitives mainly depends upon the strength of its
key management mechanism. In WSNs, the required cost for key management is
strongly subject to restriction by the node’s available resources.
It is well known that Public Key Cryptography has some clear advantages over
Symmetric Key Cryptography. It is not necessary to agree on a session key for the
two communication parts like that in symmetric key algorithms. Key distribution
is very easy in a PKC-based cryptosystem. Public key certificates may be freely
distributed in advance or at the point of use. The keys are trusted on the basis of a
CA. Another important advantage is that, unlike symmetric key algorithms, PKC-
based cryptosystem can guarantee authentication, not only privacy. However, the
main disadvantage of using public key systems is that they are not as efficient as
symmetric key algorithms. It is generally acknowledged that PKC is infeasible in
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WSNs due to its energy-consuming property.
In Chapter 2, we have reviewed some PKC-based solution for sensor networks.
In the first trial of PKC-based key management for HWSNs [68], three key manage-
ment schemes were proposed, among which SACK is based purely on Symmetric
Key Cryptography, SACK-P is based purely on PKC, and SACK-H is the hybrid
of both Symmetric Key Cryptography based and PKC-based approaches. However,
both SACK-P and SACK-H are stiffly transformed from the basic SACK scheme
which is based on Symmetric Key Cryptography. They cannot be seen as an origi-
nal PKC-based key management scheme. Due to its design defect, the operations of
scalability in these three schemes are trivial. Node addition and revocation involves
interaction between cluster heads and the BS. If node addition and revocation hap-
pens frequently in the network, the authentication operations will collapse the BS.
As for the other purely PKC-based schemes [69, 70, 73] and the hybrid scheme
[71], they rely on too strong assumption or have unacceptable cost.
In this chapter, we will propose a hybrid key management solution for HWSNs.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 9.2, we present the motivation of
the design of the hybrid key management solution for HWSNs. In Section 9.3, we
present the hybrid key management scheme for HWSNs in detail. In Section 9.4 and
Section 9.5, we evaluate the performance and security of the proposed scheme and
make a comparison with existing key management schemes for HWSNs from the
perspective of performance and security. In Section 9.6, we draw the conclusion.
9.2 Motivation of the Proposed Hybrid Key Manage-
ment Scheme
Recently deployed WSNs are increasingly following a hierarchical design. HWSNs
have several advantages. As depicted in Figure 9.1, a HWSN typically consists of
a BS, a few powerful cluster head (we alternatively call them H-nodes in this chap-
ter), and a large number of low-cost sensor nodes (we represent it with L-nodes). It
is assumed that the BS has numerous resources and is trustworthy. H-nodes have
a large memory and strong data processing capability. They are responsible for
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Figure 9.1: The hierarchical wireless sensor network topology
cluster management and data aggregation. The effect of node addition and revoca-
tion operations can be localized into one or several clusters. This property provides
resilience and security benefits. In addition, because only H-nodes bear the respon-
sibility of aggregating and transmitting data to the BS, L-nodes can be equipped
with a tiny memory and very limited data processing capability. The cost of the
network is reduced. Many popular key management schemes for HWSNs with sin-
gle key mechanism overlooked the architecture and resource distinction of different
tiers. A practical design of key management should take the heterogeneity into con-
sideration. Otherwise, the key management scheme itself will exhaust the L-nodes.
We propose a key management scheme which takes advantage of the hetero-
geneous property. It puts the burden of energy-consuming algorithms on the H-
nodes and lightweight algorithms on the L-nodes. It utilizes pairings-based Public
Key Cryptography at upper level and efficient symmetric key cryptosystem in lower
level. This is an advantage over general PKC-based key management which might
quickly exhaust the energy of low-cost nodes in HWSNs. The hierarchical topol-
ogy also provides flexibility. The lower level can choose an appropriate keying
algorithm according to the dominated communication mode. For example, group
key distribution schemes are suitable for group communication dominated environ-
ments, while key predistribution schemes are more appropriate for pairwise com-
munication dominated environments. The proposed key management note support
only the establishment of pairwise keys for peer communication but also cluster key
for multicast and network key for broadcast.
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9.3 The Proposed Framework
9.3.1 Network Model
We consider a HWSN scenario in this chapter. The entities involve a BS, a small
number of H-nodes and a large number of L-nodes. All of these entities form a
three-level network structure according to various clustering criteria. The root is
the BS. It is natural to let H-nodes serve as cluster heads in the second level. The
bottom level includes a large number of L-nodes. An example of such a network
model has been shown in Figure 9.1.
1. The BS is an infrastructure and is assumed to be secure because it is usu-
ally located far from the wireless network. In our model, it takes charge
of the network by manipulating cluster heads. Different from the SACK-P
and SACK-H schemes in [68], interaction between BS and L-nodes is not
involved.
2. Each cluster head is equipped with high power battery, large memory storage,
strong data processing capabilities and good communication component. It
can communicate with L-sensors within the cluster, peer cluster heads, and
the BS. Cluster heads are responsible for aggregating sensing data and for-
ward the date to the BS.
3. Each sensor node has limited battery power, small memory space, weak data
processing capability, and short radio range. Sensor nodes are static but in-
herently support small scale mobility. To reduce energy consumption, a node
communicates only with its cluster head or peer neighboring nodes within
the same cluster. We assume that if a node is compromised, all the informa-
tion it holds will be exposed to adversaries. Each L-node senses environment
information around it and relays data to its cluster head.
9.3.2 The Proposed Hybrid Key Management Scheme
We present a hybrid key management scheme specifically designed for HWSNs in
this section. The scheme takes advantage of the different capabilities at different
levels. It uses resource-consuming ECC-based cryptography at the BS and cluster
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heads and efficient AES at L-nodes. The scheme combines the merits of both Public
and Symmetric Key Cryptography.
The BS works as a CA which generates ECC-based public/private key pairs, one
pair for the BS itself and others for cluster heads. The BS selects an elliptic curve
over a prime field Fp which satisfies the equation E : y2 = (x3 + ax + b)modp.
Its parameters are T = {a, b, P, n, p} where a, b ∈ Fp are coefficients of the elliptic
curve equation, which satisfies 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0, P = (xP , yP ) is the base point of
the elliptic curve E(Fp), n is the order of P and p is a prime which is the order of
prime field Fp. The private key is an integer r and the corresponding public key
is rP , denoted as (xr, yr), which is a point on E(Fp). Here we refer to [163] for
a description in detail of how the field and other parameters should be selected in
practice for efficiency and security.
Each cluster head has a unique identity and has both cryptographic algorithms
ECC/AES installed on it. A master key Km and the basic keying materials, such
as the graph E : y2 = (x3 + ax + b)modp and the basic point P for ECC are pre-
installed on each cluster head as well. In addition, each cluster head is preloaded
with the BS’s public key and a unique ECC public/private key pair so that there is no
requirement of tamper-resistant hardware to prevent the key pair from disclosure.
Each L-node u is preloaded with the node secret xu. For simplicity, we suppose
that both cluster heads and L-sensors nodes are uniformly and randomly distributed
in the deployed area. After deployment, clusters are formed in the network. Some
efficient clustering algorithms with relevant attributes and objectives [164] can be
used. At the end of cluster formation phase, each cluster head stores a public key
list of all of its neighboring cluster heads. Each L-node stores the public keys of its
cluster head and the back-up cluster head.
Each cluster equals a small communication group. The potential key manage-
ment framework depends on the communication mode. For the broadcast communi-
cation dominated group, efficient group key establishment and renewal schemes are
preferred. However, for peer communication dominated group, efficient and secure
pairwise key establishment is the better option. OFT [56] is an efficient key manage-
ment algorithm for a small group. However, the OFT algorithm can easily succumb
to collusion attacks. Ku et al. [62] fixed the breach of collusion attacks in the OFT
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method with the increased communication overhead of O((logn)2) for group rekey-
ing in one node revocation. Wang et al. presented a new method in [165], which is
more efficient than the OFT method and can resist collusion attack. Simplicio et al.
surveyed the pairwise key establishment schemes in [166]. Both arbitrated keying
schemes and predistribution schemes can be used to efficiently establish pairwise
keys. In the proposed scheme, we only consider broadcast communication domi-
nated mode at the lower level. That is, the improved OFT scheme [165] is used at
the lower level. For the peer communication dominated environment, only the lower
level key establishment algorithm switches from the OFT scheme to an arbitrated
keying scheme or key predistribution scheme.
There are four types of communication: the BS broadcasts to cluster heads, the
BS unicasts to a cluster head, peer communication between cluster heads, cluster
head broadcasts within its cluster. The corresponding keys should be established
in order to keep communication secure. The process of key establishment is as
follows:
1. In the proposed key management framework, the master key Km shared by
the BS and all the cluster heads can be used for broadcast communication
from the BS to cluster heads. Km must be renewed when a cluster head is
compromised or node cluster head joins the network.
2. The BS has a public key list of all cluster heads. Each cluster head is preloaded
with the BS’s public key. The unicast between them is achieved with a public
key algorithm. If unicast happens frequently, they can agree on a symmetric
key with the protection of a public key algorithm.
3. Any two neighboring cluster heads CHa with private key Ia and CHb with
private key Ib can establish a pairwise key exclusively shared to themselves.
In fact, the process of key establishment can be combined with message ex-
change. The pairwise key is established during the first round of message
exchange and both of them store the pairwise key for future communication.
The process is presented as follows:
• CHa calculates Ka,b = IaIbP and sends {IDa, EKa,b(M, timestamp),
timestamp} to CHb, where E is symmetric encryption algorithm.
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• When CHb receives the message sent by CHa, CHb firstly checks the
freshness of the timestamp. If is outdated, CHb discards the message.
Otherwise, CHb further checks whether it has a pairwise key shared
with CHa. If it already has the established pairwise key, CHb decrypts
the message with the pairwise key. Otherwise, CHb searches CHa’s
public key by indexing IDa. And then CHb calculates Kb,a = Ka,b =
IbIaP and decrypts DKb,a(M) with a symmetric decryption algorithm.
If DKb,a(M) is readable, CHb stores the pairwise key and continues
secure communication with CHa using the key Ka,b. The key Ka,b is
known only by cluster heads CHa and CHb. It is an authenticated key
exchange scheme.
4. Each L-node establishes a shared key known only to itself and the cluster head
with the preloaded node secret xu as described in the [56]. After establishing
the shared keys with all nodes in its cluster, the cluster head creates the OFT
tree and numbers its nodes. A variety of methods can be used in this step.
Some implementation issues of the OFT tree were discussed at the end of
[56]. Each cluster equals a small communication group. The cluster head
maintains a binary logical key tree. Each node is associated with a leaf node
in the tree. The leaf node key is the shared key exclusively belonging to the
node and the cluster head. Next, each node computes the cluster key after
receiving crucial information from the cluster head. the cluster key is the root
node key. We suppose that there is a separate secure channel between the
cluster head and each node during this phase.
9.3.3 Rekeying
Rekeying issue is critical in determining the efficiency of any key management pro-
tocol. Node addition and revocation incur rekeying operations. Now we describe
our rekeying algorithm for four possible circumstances.
1. When a cluster head CHnew joins the network;
CHnew has been configured with related cryptographic algorithms and preloaded
with related key materials, such as its public/private key pair.
• CHnew → the BS: IDnew, its public key InewP , Join request;
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• The BS checks the validity of CHnew’s public key InewP . If it is not
valid, The BS rejects the joining request. Otherwise, the BS renews the
master key Km to K ′m and sends it to the new cluster head CHnew.
The BS → CHnew: {EInewP (K ′m, timestamp), timestamp};
• The BS broadcasts {EKm(K ′m, timestamp), timestamp} to all the other
cluster heads;
• Each cluster head decrypts {EKm(K ′m, timestamp), timestamp} with
Km and gets the new master key K ′m.
2. When a cluster head CHrov leaves the network.
If a cluster head is forced to leave the network due to power depletion, it can
send a Leave request message to the BS. If a cluster head is compromised
by an adversary, the misbehavior of the compromised cluster head can be de-
tected by its neighboring cluster heads. The BS runs the revocation operation
once it receives the report.
• The BS creates a new network key K ′m, BS → CHj: EIjP (K ′m)(j 6=
rov), IDrov;
• Each cluster head CHj decrypts EIjP (K ′m) with its private key Ij and
gets the new master key K ′m;
• Each CHj which shares pairwise key with CHrov deletes the shared
pairwise key.
3. When a node joins the cluster CHi.
When the new node passes the authentication, it is assigned an individual key
shared with the cluster head. Then the cluster head creates a new leaf node
in the key tree for it. The new node is associated with a new leaf node in
the key tree. Then the cluster head performs the rekeying operations as that
in [165]. We assume a node m8 joins a cluster as shown in Figure 9.2. m8
is assigned with the individual key K8. Then the cluster head performs the
rekeying operations as follows:
(a) generates a random number r and encrypts it with the current cluster
key K, then broadcasts it to the nodes in the cluster.
The cluster head → {m1, . . . ,m7} : EK(r).
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Figure 9.2: The One-way Function Tree of a cluster in the proposed scheme
(b) renews the keys on the path from the root to the new node m8 using the
hash function F with the random number r and the current cluster key
as inputs.
K ′ = F (K, r); K ′5−8 = F (K5−8, r); K
′
7−8 = F (K7−8, r);
(c) encrypts these new keys K ′, K ′5−8, K
′
7−8 with the individual key K8 and
unicasts EK8(K
′, K ′5−8, K
′
7−8) it to the new node m8.
The nodes {m1, . . . ,m7} can decrypt EK(r) and obtain the random number
r. Then with r, each node in {m1, . . . ,m7} can renew keys on the path from
itself to the root. The new node m8 can obtain the keys on the path from itself
to the root with the individual key. At the end of this step, each node in the
cluster can calculate a new cluster key K ′.
4. When a node is evicted from the network.
When a node’s power is off or compromised by an adversary, the node must
be evicted from the network. The cluster head generates new key material
and sends it to the remaining members encrypted individually with the appro-
priate subgroup keys unknown to the evicted node as depicted in [165]. Each
remaining node decrypts the key material with the appropriate subgroup key
and calculates the root key, that is, the renewed cluster key.
Here we assume a node m3 is evicted from the cluster as shown in Figure
9.2. The cluster head performs the rekeying operations. The cluster head
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generates a random number r′ and encrypts it with the sub-cluster keys K1−2,
K4, K5−8 and then broadcasts them to appropriate sub-clusters.
The cluster head → {m1,m2} : EK1−2(r′);
The cluster head → m4 : EK4(r′);
The cluster head → {m5 . . . ,m8} : EK5−8(r′);
The remaining nodes {m1,m2,m4, . . . ,m8} can obtain r′ with the appropri-
ate sub-cluster key. Then each node renews the keys on the path from itself
to the root.
9.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed hybrid key manage-
ment scheme and compare it with existing the key management schemes in [68, 71]
and the schemes in [69, 70, 73] respectively. All of these schemes target HWSNs.
More specifically, the schemes in [68, 71] are hybrid key management schemes for
HWSNs and the schemes in [69, 70, 73] are complete PKC-based key management
scheme for HWSNs. We discuss several important issues in HWSNs, including
broadcast authentication, resilience, and flexibility.
9.4.1 Key Space Requirement
All of existing PKC-based and hybrid key management schemes and the proposed
scheme guarantees 100% key connectivity with different storage cost. Both the
schemes [69, 70] compute the total key space requirement without considering the
heterogeneity of nodes. The analysis is done at cluster heads and L-nodes excluding
the BS as it is assumed that the BS has no energy/memory constraints. Assume that
the number of cluster heads and L-nodes in an HWSN is m and n, respectively. It is
a practical assumption that m¿ n. When the nodes are uniformly deployed in the
network, there are dn/me nodes in each cluster. Each cluster head can keep one-
hop communication with at most dm/4e cluster heads and each L-node can keep
one-hop communication with at most dn/(4m)e L-nodes within the same cluster.
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• In SACK-P in [68], each sensor node stores the public keys of sensor nodes
and cluster head of its cluster except for its private key. There are dn/me
nodes in each cluster on average. Thus, each node has to store (dn/me + 2)
keys in total. Each cluster head has public keys of other cluster heads and the
BS except for its private key. In addition, each cluster head stores the public
keys of nodes in its cluster. There are (m+ dn/me+2) keys in all. SACK-H
in [68] uses Public Key Cryptography for communication between the BS and
cluster heads and Symmetric Key Cryptography for communication within a
cluster. Each cluster head stores its public/private key pair and public keys
of other cluster heads and the BS. So there are (m + 2) keys stored by each
cluster head. Each node stores only one symmetric key for cluster-wide com-
munication. For the scheme in [71], each L-node must store (λ+1) elements
for each chosen space to compute a key with the Blom key predistribution
scheme. Each L-node carries k spaces and each cluster head carries m space.
The total key space requirement at each L-node is dn/me(λ + 1) and that
at each cluster head is m(λ + 1). In addition, each cluster head stores its
private/public key pair and the public key of the BS and other cluster heads.
• In the centralized ECC key management scheme in [69], each cluster head is
preloaded with public keys of all L-nodes, plus a pair of public/private key
for itself, and a key KH for authentication purpose. Thus, a cluster head is
preloaded with (n + 3) keys. Each L-node is preloaded with its private key
and the public key of the cluster heads. Given the protection from tamper-
resistant hardware, the same public/private key pair can be used by all cluster
heads. Thus, each node is preloaded with 2 keys. In the distributed ECC key
management scheme, each cluster head is preloaded with its public/private
key and the authentication key KH . Each L-node is preloaded with its pub-
lic/private key pair and public keys of all the cluster heads. In the distributed
key establishment scheme, the assumption of having tamper-resistant hard-
ware in cluster heads can be removed. Different ECC key pairs are used. So
each L-node is preloaded with m + 2 keys. Many possible conditions are
considered in [70]. We consider only the same condition that all nodes are
uniformly spread throughout the network. Each L-node stores (dn/me + 1)
number of keys and each cluster head stores (dn/me + m + 1) keys. The
key space is not clearly addressed in [73]. We know that each L-node has
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Figure 9.3: Comparison of key space requirements at cluster heads for different
schemes for different sizes of networks
to know its neighbors’ public key in order to compute pairwise keys. Each
cluster head stores pairwise keys for its members and the public key of the
BS and the other cluster heads.
• In our proposed scheme, each cluster head stores a symmetric master key
Km, a public/private key pair and public keys of the BS and the neighboring
cluster heads. Suppose each cluster head neighbors with m/4 cluster heads,
each cluster head has to store (3+dm/4e+1(symm)) keys. The neighboring
cluster heads can securely establish a symmetric key with each other. Each
L-node stores public keys for its cluster head and the back-up cluster head
plus 2 symmetric keys for communication within the cluster.
Table 9.1: Key space requirements of existing key management schemes
Tiers
Purely PKC-based schemes Hybrid schemes
C D SACK-P [70] [73] [71] SACK-H Our Scheme
in [69] in [69] [68] [68]
Cluster n+ 3 3 m+ dn/me m+ dn/me m+ dn/me+ 2 dn/me(λ+ 1) m+ 2 dm/4e+ 3
heads +2 +1(symm)
L-nodes 2 m+ 2 dn/me+ 2 dn/me dn/me+ 1 m(λ+ 1) + (m+ 2) 1(symm) 2 + 2(symm)
We summaries the key space requirements of existing schemes in Table 9.1. C
and D in [69] represent the centralized and distributed schemes in [69], respectively.
NIST guidelines state that ECC keys should be twice the length of equivalent
strength symmetric key algorithms. So, for example, a 160-bit ECC key would
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Figure 9.4: Comparison of key space requirements at L-nodes of different schemes for
different sizes of networks
have roughly the same strength as a 64-bit symmetric key [69]. Suppose that
the length of each public key is 160-bit and that of each symmetric key is 64-
bit. We plot the key space requirements of different schemes for different sizes
of WSNs in Figure 9.3 and Figure 9.4. The x-axis is composed of discrete points. It
takes values of (200, 400, 600, 800, 1000, 1200, 1400), the corresponding values of
m are (4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28). The y-axis is the required memory size for different
schemes. We do not include the centralized schemes in [69, 71] in Figure 9.3 and
Figure 9.4. The scheme in [69] has a clear disadvantage and the maximum number
of compromised nodes of [71] is constrained by λ. As can be seen, our scheme
has low key space requirements at both cluster heads end and L-nodes end. In the
network of m = 20 cluster heads and n = 1000 sensor nodes. The memory re-
quirement for cluster head is 1280 bits and 448 bits. It is reasonable for the popular
sensor node MICA2 which has a 4KB primary memory.
9.4.2 Scalability
We have discussed the rekeying scheme incurred by membership change. When a
new cluster head joins the network, the BS renews the master key Km and sends it
to the new cluster head with unicast and broadcast to existing cluster heads. When
a cluster head leaves the network, the BS encrypts the renewed master key with
the public key of each cluster head and sends it to the corresponding cluster head.
Unlike the scheme in [68], the BS does not intervene in each node addition or re-
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vocation in our scheme. Each cluster manages the node addition and revocation
operations. The effect of membership change is localized to a cluster. In addition,
the storage overhead of sensor nodes does not increase with network scale. In this
way, our scheme achieves good scalability. The scalability of the proposed key
management scheme was not mentioned in [69]. The BS is responsible for ran-
dom number renewal of the whole network [70]. It leads to poor scalability of the
scheme.
9.5 Security Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate performance of the proposed hybrid key management
scheme and compare it with existing the key management schemes in [68, 71] and
the schemes in [69, 70, 73], respectively. We discuss several issues in HWSNs,
including resilience, broadcast authentication, and flexibility.
9.5.1 Resilience
Network resilience is defined as its resilience against node compromise attack in
[68]. Our scheme uses Public Key Cryptography for upper level communication
and Symmetric Key Cryptography for lower level communication. Each cluster
head stores the public keys of its neighboring cluster heads and each pair of neigh-
boring cluster heads has a different shared key. A cluster head compromise does
not reveal any keying information except its own private key and a few public keys.
Each sensor is given a common symmetric key for cluster wide communication via
the OFT scheme. Nodes compromise affects only the communication of that par-
ticular cluster. If compromised nodes can be found immediately, rekeying method
can be applied for damage control. Therefore, appropriate methods which can de-
tect node compromise as early as possible are required. SACK-H and [73] have
the same degree of resilience as our scheme as they adopt the same rekeying mech-
anism. SACK-P and the scheme in [69] have better resilience since Public Key
Cryptography is used in the lower level. The resilience of [71] is constrained by
λ. More than λ compromised nodes within a cluster can work out all the pairwise
keys for the specific cluster. The scheme in [70] has the best resilience with largest
computation and communication cost.
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9.5.2 Broadcast Authentication
Both SACK-H and SACK-P did not address the property of broadcast authentica-
tion. Authentication on broadcast messages was realized with the ECDSA algo-
rithm [167] in [69]. When a cluster head broadcasts a message, such as the rout-
ing information, within the cluster, a signature over the message is generated by
the cluster head and verified by nodes. However, the ECDSA algorithm computes
kP during the signature generation phase and multiple scalar multiplications, such
as (kP + 1Q), during the signature verification phase. Vanstone verified that the
signature verification of ECDSA takes twice the time it does for signature gener-
ation considering the same security level in [168]. Therefore, this authentication
mechanism creates a bottleneck due to too much computation overhead at low-cost
nodes. Lightweight authentication mechanisms are a better substitute for energy-
consuming signature algorithms. In addition, the asymmetric requirement of en-
ergy for the authentication should be given full consideration. That is, the energy-
consuming computation should be performed by powerful cluster heads and com-
paratively easy computation should be performed by sensors. We do not include
the authentication property in the proposed key management scheme. If broadcast
authentication is required, we recommend the broadcast authentication technique
proposed in [30]. The technique supports a potentially large number of broadcast
senders. It also provides two approaches to revoking the broadcast authentication
capability from compromised senders.
9.5.3 Flexibility
The flexibility of the scheme is two-fold. Firstly, the key management framework
of the lower level can be switched according to the communication mode. Group
key management schemes such as [165] can be used for the broadcast communica-
tion dominated environment, while the pairwise key establishment scheme can be
used for the peer communication dominated environment. Secondly, it is flexible
in regards to the key selection. Each cluster is able to select the cluster key and re-
new it without the intervention of the BS. The purely PKC-based key management
schemes in [69, 70, 73] are not flexible in these two aspects.
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9.6 Conclusion
A hybrid key management scheme for hierarchical wireless sensor networks is pro-
posed in this chapter. The scheme uses the best features of both Public Key Cryp-
tography and Symmetric Key Cryptography and the difference in the computational
capabilities of different nodes. Our scheme is proven to be secure and has the fol-
lowing advantages.
1. It is flexible in terms of the key selection. Each cluster is able to select its
own cluster key for its own convenience, and can change its cluster key from
CK to CK ′ for security reasons without the intervention of the BS.
2. The key space requirement of L-nodes is a small constant and is reasonable
for the popular sensor node MICA2 which has a 4KB primary memory. The
key space requirement of cluster heads is lower than most of existing schemes.
3. The rekeying approach is efficient. The scheme can be applied to large-scale
networks. The scheme can also be applied to peer communication dominated
environments if we replace the OFT rekeying algorithm with the key predis-
tribution scheme. The upper level algorithm remains unchanged.
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10
Conclusion and Future Work
10.1 Introduction
Key management plays an important role in network security. It serves as the cor-
nerstone of the security framework. Key management for group communication
and traditional networks has been intensively studied. However, those techniques
can not be applied to WSNs directly or even with minor revision due to the unique
nature of the latter. The development of WSNs introduces revolutionary paradigms
for network deployment and application. Almost all of the WSN security mecha-
nisms are built upon solid key management infrastructures. Key management for
sensor network security has attracted a lot of research interest in the past few years.
However, it is evident from the literature that many unaddressed technical problems
still exist in this field.
In our research, we focused on developing advanced solutions to address prob-
lems relating to:
• Key management for WSNs;
• Establishment of different types of keys;
• Implicit authentication or PKC-based authentication mechanism;
• Self-healing mechanism and mutual-healing key distribution mechanism.
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In order to solve the technical problems arising from the four areas of key man-
agement in WSNs as discussed above, we break them down to six research issues.
In the next section, we will recapitulate on the different issues that we have iden-
tified and addressed in this thesis. In Section 10.3, we highlight the contributions
which have been made by the thesis to the literature as a result of our having suc-
cessfully addressed the different issues. In Section 10.4, we identify some areas for
future work and in Section 10.5 we conclude the chapter.
10.2 Recapitulation of Research Issues
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, key predistribution has been considered as the
most suitable key management model for sensor networks. However, almost all
existing key predistribution schemes are designed for distributed WSNs and they
have several weaknesses. HWSNs have incomparable advantages over distributed
wireless sensor networks in terms of scalability and resilience against node capture.
If we take advantage of the hierarchical structure of networks with hierarchical key
predistribution, some desirable properties will be achieved. The storage overhead
can be further reduced and key connectivity can be further increased if we substitute
the randomly generated key pool with keyed hash chains. We have to eliminate the
side effects of the one-way property of hash chain.
LEAP [29] is the first key management scheme which support establishment of
multi-level keys in wireless sensor networks. Whereas both LEAP [29] and its im-
provement [1] have some technical deficiencies which have been outlined in Chap-
ter 3. We noted that time-based key management scheme [1] eliminates the effect
of disclosure of the initial key successfully with the cost of lower key connectiv-
ity probability. Hence, our research emphasis is on increasing the key connectivity
probability in regards to this technical problem.
Hash chain based self-healing key distribution schemes are the most efficient
self-healing key distribution schemes among the schemes in the same league. How-
ever, the types of self-healing key distribution schemes are vulnerable to collusion
attack. Although one more effort has been made to resist collusion attack, none of
them has quite assessed the breach or presented a perfect approach. Mutual-healing
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is a complementary mechanism which achieves self-healing key distribution. Al-
though this notion is not new, to the best of our knowledge, the technical details
have not been explored to date. We have mentioned that we do not propose an in-
dependent authentication approach in this thesis. Instead, we consider embedding
implicit authentication or lightweight PKC-based authentication in self-healing key
distribution.
Although HWSNs have many advantages over flat ones, many existing key man-
agement schemes have overlooked the heterogeneity of different levels. Hybrid so-
lutions can make full use of heterogeneity of HWSNs. To date, no practical hybrid
key management solution has been proposed for HWSNs.
In summary, the research issues addressed in this thesis are as follows:
• Developing an algorithm supporting the establishment of different types of
keys whose security does not depend on the security of the initial key;
• Developing a hash chain based key predistribution algorithm which improves
key connectivity probability and robust against node capture attack;
• Developing a hash chain based self-healing key distribution algorithm which
is thoroughly robust against collusion attack;
• Developing a secure HBT-based self-healing key distribution algorithm with
implicit authentication;
• Exploring the technical details of the mutual-healing key distribution and em-
bedding a lightweight PKC-based authentication in bilinear pairings based
self-healing key distribution;
• Developing a practical hybrid key management algorithm for HWSNs.
10.3 Contribution of the Thesis
The major contribution of this thesis to existing literature is that it proposes a con-
ceptual framework for practical design of key management for HWSNs security.
Following the conceptual framework, several solutions are developed for specific
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research issues. The solutions can be categorized according to three types of cryp-
tosystems:
1. Symmetric Key Cryptography based solutions:
• A Robust key management algorithm for multi-phase hierarchical wire-
less sensor networks;
• A hash chain based key predistribution algorithm;
• A fully anti-collusive hash chain based self-healing key distribution al-
gorithm;
• A HBT-based self-healing key distribution algorithm with implicit au-
thentication.
2. PKC-based solutions:
• A mutual-healing key distribution algorithm;
• Authenticated bilinear pairings based self-healing key distribution algo-
rithm.
3. A Hybrid solution:
• A practical hybrid key management algorithm.
10.3.1 Contribution 1: The solution for robust key management
for multi-phase hierarchical wireless sensor networks
The first major contribution of this thesis is the development of an robust key man-
agement protocol for multi-phase hierarchical wireless sensor networks. The work
was presented in Chapter 4. Before the presentation of the solution, we rehearsed
the technical problems arising from LEAP [29] and the time-based key manage-
ment scheme [1] and the importance of multi-phase deployment of WSNs. The
understanding of these deficiencies helps to pinpoint the security requirements and
development of a robust key management protocol for multi-phase HWSNs.
The main features of the proposed solution are as follows:
279
• Following the idea of [1], we divided the lifetime of a sensor network into
many generations. Each generation has its initial key. The initial keys for
different time slots are independent of each other. However, in the proposed
solution, we take the lifetime of nodes into the consideration, a node whose
lifetime is Gw generations is preloaded with an initial key and Gw−1 masked
initial keys. The key predistribution method prevents memory waste and in-
creases key connectivity probability.
• We utilized a unique masking mechanism which ensures that nodes deployed
at different time slots can agree to pairwise keys and the pairwise keys belong
exclusively to the two nodes.
• The proposed solution provides a perfect mechanism for maintaining forward
and backward secrecy. We addressed the issue of key updating in the case of
membership change.
• We identified the security weaknesses of key management services of the
ZigBee specification and showed that the proposed key management protocol
can be directly applied to enhance the key management services of the ZigBee
specification.
The proposed solution successfully addressed the technical problems of LEAP
[29] and the time-based key management scheme [1]. The solution can be seam-
lessly integrated with ZigBee networks for more comprehensive and effective key
management services.
10.3.2 Contribution 2: The solution for hash chain based key
predistribution
The second major contribution of this thesis is the development of hash chain based
key predistribution algorithm for hierarchical WSNs. This work was presented in
Chapter 5. The main features of this solution are as follows:
• The structure of the key pool is much different from that in random key pre-
distribution schemes. Instead, generation of a large key pool with a great
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number of random keys, a small key pool with very limited number of gener-
ation keys and their IDs as well as their commitments, is generated.
• Each sensor is preloaded with IDs and commitments of a small number of
generation keys without actual generation keys. Each cluster head is preloaded
with a large number actual generation keys, their IDs and commitments. This
key predistribution method can resist node capture attack and increase key
connectivity probability with low memory requirement.
• We utilized a different clustering method in the proposed scheme to improve
key connectivity probability.
The comparison with existing works shows that the proposed solution greatly re-
duced storage overhead at low-cost nodes, and at the same time, increased resilience
against node capture attack. In addition, the introduction of a new clustering mech-
anism gives the scheme a higher key connectivity probability.
10.3.3 Contribution 3: The solution for fully anti-collusive hash
chain based self-healing key distribution
The third major contribution of this thesis is the development of a solution for fully
anti-collusive hash chain based self-healing key distribution. This work was pre-
sented in Chapter 6. The main features of this solution are as follows:
• We pinpointed the breach of collusion attack in hash chain based self-healing
key distribution schemes and proposed a unified approach of collusion attack.
• We presented two attacks against Du et al.’s scheme [116] with the proposed
unified attack approach. One attack is launched by revoked nodes and the
other attack is launched by collusion between a revoked user, whose life cycle
has finished, and a newly joined user.
• We proposed two possible solutions for collusion attack. After ruling one out,
we prove that the only feasible solution is achieved by masking new random
numbers in the corresponding broadcast messages.
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• We redefined the security model which provides more strict security require-
ments and proposed a fully anti-collusive hash chain based self-healing key
distribution scheme.
The security of the proposed solution is proved under an appropriate model.
It shows that the proposed solution can fully resist collusion attack in hash chain
based self-healing key distribution schemes. The performance analysis and the
comparison with the same types of schemes demonstrated that the proposed so-
lution achieves a fully anti-collusive property with acceptable overhead.
10.3.4 Contribution 4: The solution for HBT-based self-healing
key distribution with implicit authentication
The fourth major contribution of this thesis is the development of a solution for
HBT-based self-healing key distribution with implicit authentication. This work
was presented in Chapter 7. The main features of this solution are as follows:
• We replaced Shamir’s secret sharing with vector space secret sharing. The
number of revoked nodes is not constrained by the threshold secret sharing
scheme.
• We embedded implicit authentication in the HBT-based self-healing key dis-
tribution scheme with very little computation cost.
According to security proof, the HBT-based scheme not only maintains forward
and backward secrecy, but it also has a collusion resistance property. The perfor-
mance analysis shows that storage overhead of the proposed solution is almost a
constant and the computation overhead produced by Key Recovery is also greatly
reduced.
10.3.5 Contribution 5: The solution for mutual-healing key dis-
tribution and authenticated bilinear pairings based self-
healing key distribution
The fifth major contribution of this thesis is the development of a solution for
mutual-healing key distribution and a solution for authenticated bilinear pairing
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based self-healing key distribution. This work was presented in Chapter 8. The
main features of these two solutions are as follows:
• We pointed out that the only requirement of mutual-healing is to effectively
authenticate requesting nodes and the only feasible way is to endow each
node with a public/private key pair so that they can perform node-to-node
authentication on demand.
• We proposed a security model and a formal definition of mutual-healing key
distribution.
• We bound each node both with its identity and location rather merely either
one or the other of them. A public/private key pair can be calculated from
each node’s identity and its location. Each node stores its location and LBK
pair which can be used for authentication on requesting nodes.
• We proposed an authenticated bilinear pairings based self-healing key distri-
bution with short signature.
As far as we know, this is the first time that the technical details of mutual-
healing key distribution has been explored. The storage overhead for each node is
a constant and the key pair can be reused only if it is not disclosed. Hence, this is
scheme can be used for long-life WSNs. It is also the first authenticated bilinear
pairings based self-healing key distribution scheme to be developed. It enables
the nodes to check the integrity and correctness of the broadcast messages before
carrying out more complex key recovery operations.
10.3.6 Contribution 6: The solution for practical hybrid key
management in HWSNs
The sixth major contribution of this thesis is the development of a solution for prac-
tical hybrid key management for HWSNs. This work was presented in Chapter 9.
The main features of these two solutions are as follows:
• We utilized ECC-based Public Key Cryptography for upper level communi-
cation and efficient Symmetric Key Cryptography for lower level communi-
cation.
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• The proposed solution provides flexible options. The potential key manage-
ment framework depends on the communication mode. For the broadcast
communication dominated group, efficient group key establishment and re-
newal schemes are preferred. While for a peer communication dominated
group, efficient and secure pairwise key establishment, such as key predistri-
bution, is a better option.
The proposed solution was proven to be secure and has several advantages.
Firstly, each cluster head is fully autonomous. Secondly, the memory requirement
of low-cost nodes is a small constant and the memory requirement of a cluster head
is lower than that of most existing key management schemes. Thirdly, the rekeying
approach is very efficient and scalability is achieved.
10.4 Future Work
We have demonstrated that this thesis has sufficiently achieved the research objec-
tives for key management in hierarchical wireless sensor networks. However, there
is some future work for further investigation in order to strengthen the proposed
solutions.
• We have identified the security weaknesses of key management for ZigBee
networks and in Chapter 4 proposed the solution for enhanced security. Wire-
lessHART [169] and ISA100 [169] are two standards for WSNs and are at-
tracting more and more attention. Both of them provide a stronger key man-
agement function than that of ZigBee standard. However, the key manage-
ment function of WirelessHART and ISA100 is still inadequate, especially
for certain environments with high security requirements. In future work, we
intend to investigate the security weaknesses of WirelessHART and ISA100
standards and propose the solutions for them.
• The proposed mutual-healing scheme relies on identity and location based
keys. This implies that the proposed scheme can be used only over the wire-
less networks where nodes are stable. It is significant to achieve mutual-
healing in mobile wireless networks. In fact, the mutual-healing mechanism
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is more useful in mobile wireless networks because mobile wireless networks
have lower network connectivity than stable wireless networks. Therefore, it
is important to investigate new methods to achieve the mutual-healing feature
in mobile wireless networks.
• In this thesis, we presented the procedures for developing general key man-
agement protocols. The performance of the proposed solutions has been ver-
ified based on analysis. Although the actual feasibility of solutions can prob-
ably only be verified through practical implementation, analysis results ob-
tained in this thesis are a useful preliminary step to the implementation. In
future, we will implement the proposed key management protocols in appro-
priate simulation environment in order to test the protocols’ viability.
10.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have recapitulated the work that we have undertaken in this
thesis. We highlighted research achievements according to the identified research
issues. We then presented a brief description of the further work that we intend to
undertake in order to strengthen the proposed solutions.
The work that we have undertaken in this thesis has been published extensively
as a part of proceedings in peer-reviewed international journals and conferences.
We have attached some selected publications in Appendix A. A complete list of all
the publications arising as a result of the work documented in this thesis is attached
at the beginning of the thesis.
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a b s t r a c t
How to establish secure session keys is one of the central tasks for wireless sensor network
communications. General key distribution schemes for traditional computer networks could not be
directly shifted to wireless sensor network environments as broadcast messages may be lost due to
sensor network internal factors or external attacks. Self-healing key distribution schemes, therefore,
have been proposed to address packet loss issues since 2002. The essential issue that self-healing key
distribution mechanism addressed is the fixed-number of broadcast messages (excluding the last
broadcast message) loss. In other words, a node could not recover its new session keys if a node has
missed more than a fixed number broadcast messages or the last broadcast message in a self-healing
key distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks. This paper aims to address this emerged issue
and provide a new key distribution scheme: mutual-healing key distribution scheme for wireless sensor
networks. This mutual-healing key distribution can enable a node in a wireless sensor network to
recover its new session key although its last broadcast message was lost. A formal definition for mutual-
healing key distribution will also be proposed in this paper. The proposed mutual-healing key
distribution scheme is based on bilinear pairings. The scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of non-
authorized nodes. Each node’s private key has nothing to do with the number of revoked nodes and can
be reused as long as it is not disclosed. The storage overhead for each node is a constant.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Key management including key distribution and key update is
significant for maintaining private communications in any dynamic
networks (Balenson et al., 1999; Ku and Chen, 2003; Staddon
et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Jiang et al., 2007; Han et al., 2007; Han
et al., 2009; Hong and Kang, 2005; Hu and Han, 2009; Hu et al.,
2010; Eltoweissy et al., 2004a; Lu et al., 2006; Sufi et al., 2010;
Xi et al., 2010). Wireless sensor networks, especially mobile ad hoc
networks, as one of dynamic networks, therefore rely on a secure
key management. This is because membership frequently changes
in large dynamic group communications of wireless sensor
networks. In order to keep the security of communications, the
session key has to be updated on each membership change.
Therefore, one of the important questions is how to distribute and
update session keys in a secure and efficient way for large dynamic
wireless sensor networks. In recent years, many schemes on
distributing session keys for large group communication have
been proposed. These existing schemes focused on different key
updating mechanism. For example, LKH (Logical Key Hierarchy)-
based schemes (Wong et al., 2000) and OFT (One-way Function
Tree) based schemes (Balenson et al., 1999; Ku and Chen, 2003)
devote to reduce the size of the rekeying message. Broadcast
encryption addresses the problem of sending encrypted messages
to a large node group so that the encrypted messages can only be
decrypted by a dynamic changing privileged subset (Fiat and
Tessa, 2001; Halevy and Shamir, 2002; Naor and Pinkas, 2000). EBS
(Exclusion Basis System) based approach was proposed in
Eltoweissy et al. (2004b), and then be put into use for sensor
networks in Eltoweissy et al. (2004a) and Moharrum et al. (2006).
The members store less number of keys than LKH tree for the
multicast group of the same size. All these literatures supposed
that underlying networks are reliable. However, how to distribute
session keys for unreliable wireless networks, in a manner that is
resistant to packet loss, is an issue that has not been addressed
deeply.
Packet loss happens frequently in wireless sensor networks.
The key distribution broadcast for a particular session might
never reach some nodes. A naive solution is requesting re-
transmission. On the one hand, both requesting and re-transmis-
sion messages would incur more communication overhead. In a
very large communication group, such individual interactions
place a heavy burden on the group manager. On the other hand,
nodes may reveal their current locations by sending messages in
some high security environments. All these issues can be
addressed by self-healing key distribution schemes (Staddon
et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Blundo et al., 2004; More et al., 2003;
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Sa´ez, 2005a, b; Dutta and Mukhopadhyay, 2007; Muhammad and
Ali, 2005; Jiang et al., 2007; Zou and Dai, 2006; Dutta et al., 2007;
Han et al., 2009; Hong and Kang, 2005; Kausar et al., 2007). Self-
healing key distribution enables large and dynamic group nodes
to establish group keys over an unreliable network for secure
communications. The main property of self-healing key distribu-
tion schemes is that, even if at the beginning of certain sessions
some broadcast packets get lost, group nodes are still capable of
recovering the session key for those sessions simply by using the
broadcasts they have received at a previous session and the
packets they will receive at a subsequent one. In this kind of
scheme, nodes do not need to send any requesting message to the
group manager and do not need to update their personal keys. In
this regard, self-healing key distribution schemes are noninter-
active ones which can hence reduce the network traffic, decrease
the workload on the group manager, and lower the risk of node
exposure through traffic analysis. Therefore, self-healing key
distribution schemes are desirable for both efficiency and security
reasons in wireless sensor networks.
An emerged scenario is a node in a wireless sensor network
may miss its last broadcast message. This node is therefore not
able to recover its session key for the last session in a self-healing
key distribution scheme. This is because self-healing key
distribution needs the broadcast messages the node received in
the previous sessions and those in the subsequent sessions
(Suppose the current session is the one where broadcast messages
are lost). To tackle this scenario, mutual-healing key distribution
mechanism will be introduced. Mutual-healing key distribution
can help a node who missed the last broadcast message to recover
the session key for this last session.
Possible applications: Group communications over low-cost
channels in different fields can benefit from mutual-healing key
distribution mechanism, especially for those settings in which
session keys need to be used for a short time-period, due to
frequent adding or deleting nodes. For example, video conference
for commercial content distribution or electronic services in
which the contents are highly sensitive. Self-healing key distribu-
tion schemes are also good levers in military-oriented operations,
scientific explorations and rescue missions. The nodes in these
environment are powered by batteries. They may experience
short-term off-line and rejoin the group once the power is on
again. Also the nodes may move in and out of communication
range frequently and experience burst packet losses.
Contribution. The contribution of this paper are the following.
First of all we define a security model of computationally secure
self-healing key distribution scheme. This definition outperforms
those in Staddon et al. (2002) and Liu et al. (2003) in two aspects.
The first one is that there is no threshold on the number of
revoked nodes. The scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of
non-authorized nodes. The second one is that a node can recover
from a single broadcast message all keys associated with sessions
in which it belongs to the session group. These two properties add
flexibility to self-healing key distribution scheme. We propose a
self-healing key distribution scheme using bilinear pairings. The
scheme is highlighted by several desirable features. Firstly, it is
collusion-free for any coalition of non-authorized nodes. Sec-
ondly, the private key has nothing to do with the number of
revoked nodes and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed.
Thirdly, the storage overhead for node is a constant. Subsequently,
we discuss the requirement, state formal definition, and develop
technical details of mutual-healing mechanism. It is the first time
to realize mutual-healing key distribution technique.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section 2, we present an overview of earlier works in the area of
self-healing key distribution, mutual-healing, and Identity-based
cryptography. In Section 3, we briefly introduce the preliminaries
to be used in the design of mutual-healing key distribution
protocol. In Section 4, we give system parameters, security model
and a formal definition. In Section 5, a concrete construction for
mutual-healing key distribution is proposed. In Section 6, we
provide security analysis and efficiency comparison. We conclude
this paper and point out future research in Section 7.
2. Related works
2.1. Self-healing key distribution schemes
The first self-healing key distribution with revocation scheme
was introduced by Staddon et al. (2002). They presented formal
definitions, lower bounds on the resources as well as some
constructions. However, the constructions given in this paper
suffer from high storage overhead and communication overhead.
Since then, self-healing key distribution has been one of the hot
research topics. Subsequent works focus on improving perfor-
mance or adding some new properties which make the self-
healing key distribution mechanism more flexible or more robust.
Liu et al. generalized the definitions in Staddon et al. (2002) and
gave some constructions in Liu et al. (2003). The scheme reduces
communication overhead and storage overhead by introducing a
novel personal key distribution technique. Blundo et al. (2004)
showed an attack that can be applied to the first construction in
Staddon et al. (2002), developed a new mechanism under a
slightly modified framework. More et al. (2003) used a sliding
window to address three problems in Staddon et al. (2002). The
three problems were inconsistent robustness, high overhead and
expensive maintenance costs. Dutta et al. developed a new self-
healing key distribution scheme in Dutta and Mukhopadhyay
(2007). The scheme has significant improvement in terms of both
storage overhead and communication overhead. The schemes
(Staddon et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Blundo et al., 2004; More
et al., 2003; Dutta and Mukhopadhyay, 2007) are based on
Shamir’s secret sharing. They have a common property: the
maximum number of revoked nodes is constraint to the degree of
the polynomial. Sa´ez (2005a,b) considered applying vector space
secret sharing instead of Shamir’s secret sharing schemes to
design self-healing key distribution scheme. He made use of
general monotone decreasing structures for the family of subsets
of nodes that can be revoked instead of a threshold one. All of the
schemes (Staddon et al., 2002; Liu et al., 2003; Blundo et al., 2004;
More et al., 2003; Sa´ez, 2005a, b; Dutta and Mukhopadhyay, 2007)
are unconditionally secure.
Computationally secure self-healing key distribution schemes
emerged recently. They achieved good properties at the cost of
slight relax security requirements. Jiang et al. proposed an
efficient self-healing group key scheme with time-limited node
revocation based on DDHC (dual directional hash chains) in Jiang
et al. (2007). The performance of the proposed scheme was
evaluated by both theory analysis and experiment data. The
results showed that the scheme made a good balance between
performance and security. The scheme in Dutta et al. (2007) also
based on hash function. It reduced communication overhead and
computation overhead greatly without any increase in the storage
overhead.
In general, according to the security level, the existing
self-healing key distribution schemes can be classified as
unconditionally secure self-healing key distribution schemes
and computationally secure self-healing key distribution scheme.
The former has more strict security while the latter is more
flexible and efficient. According to the cryptographic primitives,
the schemes can be classified as polynomial secret sharing based
schemes, vector space secret sharing based schemes, and hash
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function based schemes. Polynomial secret sharing is the most
common technique used to realize self-healing key distribution. It
was used in the pioneering paper (Staddon et al., 2002) and was
followed by several subsequent works. However, the maximum
number of revoked nodes is constraint to the degree of the
polynomial. Vector space secret sharing based self-healing key
distribution schemes consider a monotone decreasing family of
revoked subset of nodes instead of a threshold structure. This
general case makes the self-healing scheme more flexible and
suitable for practical application. Both forward and backward
securities can be guaranteed by hash function based self-healing
key distribution schemes. However, the feature of resisting
collusion of revoked nodes and new joined nodes cannot be
assured, due to the properties of one-way hash function.
2.2. Motivation for mutual-healing key distribution
We cannot deny the novel property of the self-healing idea.
However, some improvements are still necessary for the original
scheme (Staddon et al., 2002). For example, it may allow an
authorized subset of nodes in the group to sponsor a new node
without the help of the group manager. Sa´ez (2005b) considered
the feature that a coalition of nodes sponsor a node outside the
group for one session. This feature added a dynamic character to
the self-healing key distribution scheme. There are still other
schemes (Hong and Kang, 2005; Kausar et al., 2007) which focus
on improving the efficiency.
More et al. (2003) pointed out that the protocol in Staddon
et al. (2002) suffered from inconsistent robustness. The so-called
inconsistent robustness is that some session keys cannot be
recovered if the corresponding broadcast messages are lost, no
matter how many other update messages are received. For
example, if the broadcast message for the last session gets lost,
nodes cannot recover the last session key by themeless even they
receive all the other broadcast messages. Subsequently, they used
a sliding window to make error recovery consistently robust. That
is, after the initial SET-UP procedure, any lost key can be recovered
as long as two sufficiently close broadcast messages (one before it
and the other after it) are received. Similar technique was used in
Zou and Dai (2006). The size of the window can be dynamic
adjusted according to the condition of networks. Both More et al.
(2003) and Zou and Dai (2006) guaranteed that authorized nodes
can recover window size session keys as long as they receive
corresponding broadcast messages. However, how to recover the
session key if the last broadcast message gets lost or more than
sliding window number broadcast messages get lost has never
been addressed clearly. Obviously, it is impossible to make nodes
completely self-healing according to existing self-healing key
distribution mechanism.
In view of some concrete applications, such as live and pay-
per-view TV, have strictly requirement of freshness. The custo-
mers would better lose only a limited number of broadcast
messages. In the group communication, the last session usually is
of great importance. The authorized nodes would never like to
miss it. Therefore it is significant to detect counterpart measures
to deal with the aforementioned issues.
Muhammad and Ali (2005) considered incorporating the self-
healing feature to SD(Subset Difference) method, which was first
proposed by Naor et al. (2001). Some optimization techniques
that can be used to reduce the overhead caused by the self-
healing capability were proposed in the paper. At last, the idea of
mutual-healing was discussed. One motivation behind mutual-
healing was that, if a node has missed more than a fixed number
of broadcast messages, it does not have to keep on waiting.
Instead it can get assistance from its neighbors. Similarly, if a node
misses the last broadcast message, it cannot recover the last
session key by performing self-healing. To provide a counter-
measure for this situation, it can look for assistance from its
neighboring nodes too. However, the paper (Muhammad and Ali,
2005) only talked about the feasibility of mutual-healing without
exploring any technical detail.
2.3. Identity-based cryptography
In identity-based cryptography, the public key of a user is
some unique information about the identity of the user. Identity-
based schemes can allow any party to generate a public key from
a known identity value such as an ASCII string. A trusted third
party, called the private key generator (PKG), generates the
corresponding private keys. Therefore, any party without using
certificates can verify the public key of a user. This eliminates the
need for a public key distribution infrastructure.
Shamir (1984) proposed the first identity-based cryptography
to alleviate many of the problems inherent with managing
certificates in 1984. Boneh and Franklin (2001) proposed the first
practical identity-based encryption scheme in 2001. Since then,
many ID-based cryptographic schemes have been proposed using
bilinear pairings. Inspired by the idea of Boneh and Franklin
(2001), Du et al. proposed a broadcast encryption scheme for key
distribution in Du et al. (2005). By extending the broadcast
encryption scheme, we will proposed a mutual-healing key
distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly describe bilinear pairings, BDH
(bilinear Diffie–Hellman) assumption and ID-based PKI (public
key infrastructure).
3.1. Bilinear pairings and BDH assumption
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of order q for a large prime
q. G1 is a cyclic additive group and G2 is a cyclic multiplicative
group. We assume that the discrete logarithm problems in both
G1 and G2 are hard. Let e : G1  G1-G2 be a pairing which satisfies
the following conditions:
 Bilinearity: e(aP,bQ)¼e(P, Q)ab, for 8P,QAG1 and 8a,bAZq; Non-degeneracy: there exists PAG1 and QAG1, such that
eðP,Q Þa1; That is, for any point P,QAG1, e(P, Q)¼1 iff P¼O.
 Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute
e(P,Q) for any P,QAG1.
BDH parameter generator: A BDH parameter generator IG is a
probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 0okAZ,
runs in polynomial time, and output the description of two groups
G1 and G2 of the same order q and the description of an admissible
bilinear map e : G1  G1-G2.
BDH problem: Given /P,aP,bP,cPS for some a,b,cAZq, com-
putes eðP,PÞabcAG2.
BDH assumption: There is no polynomial time algorithm to
solve the BDH problem.
3.2. ID-based public key infrastructure
DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem). Given two group elements
P and Q, to find an integer nAZq, such that Q¼nP when such an
integer exists.
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ID-based PKI involves a trusted KGC(key generation center)
and nodes. Nodes’ private keys are calculated by KGC and send to
the node via a secure channel. The basic operations consist of set
up and private key extraction. When we use bilinear pairings to
construct ID-based private/public keys, the operations can be
implemented as follows: KGC runs BDH parameter generator to
generate two groups G1, G2 and a bilinear pairing e : G1  G1-G2.
It chooses an arbitrary generator PAG1 and defines two crypto-
graphic hash functions: H1 : f0,1g-G1,H2 : G2-f0,1g.
 Set up: KGC chooses a random number sAZq and set Ppub¼sP.
Then KGC publishes system parameters params ¼ {G1, G2, q, P,
Ppub, H1,H2}, and keeps s as master-key, which is only known
by him.
 Private key extraction: A node submits its identity to KGC. KGC
computes the node’s public key QID¼H1(ID) and private key
SID¼sQID, then privately returns SID¼sQID to the node.
4. Security model and definition for mutual-healing key
distribution
In this section, we present system parameters, security model
and formal definition for mutual-healing key distribution, and a
new key distribution scheme.
4.1. System parameters
Let U¼{u1,y,un} be the finite universe of nodes. Each node ui
has a unique identifier IDi. A broadcast unreliable channel is
available, and time is defined by a global clock. GM (Group
Manager) sets up and manages, by means of adding and revoking
operations, a communication group which is a dynamic subset of
U. m denotes the number of sessions. Let GjDU be the
communication group established by the group manager in
session j. Each node is preloaded with a public/private key pair
(Qi, Si) before deployment. The public/private key pair is used to
recover the session keys as long as node ui is not removed by GM
from the group. Let RjDGj1 denote the set of revoked group
nodes in session j and Jj U\Gj1 denote the set of nodes who join
the group in session j with Rj \ Jj ¼f. Hence, Gj ¼ ðGj1 [ JjÞ\Rj for
jZ2 and by definition G1¼U. Moreover, for jAf1, . . . ,mg, the
session key Kj is randomly chosen by GM and according to the
uniform distribution. For any nonrevoked node uiAGj, the j-th
session key Kj is determined by the broadcast message Bj and the
personal public/private key pair (Qi, Si).
4.2. Mutual-healing key distribution security model
The idea of mutual-healing was discussed in Muhammad and
Ali (2005) without exploring any technical detail. Just as self-
healing means that nodes are capable of recovering lost group
keys on their own, mutual-healing implies that nodes help each
other in recovering some lost group keys. The central concept of
mutual-healing is that if a node has missed more than a fixed
number broadcast messages or the last broadcast message, it can
get assistance from its neighboring nodes. The neighboring nodes
in the same session group cooperate with each other forwarding
broadcast messages which their neighboring nodes miss. By this
way the robustness of self-healing key distribution scheme is
achieved.
It was claimed in Muhammad and Ali (2005) that two
requirements are necessary for mutual-healing. They are the
authentication on the requesting node and the authorization on
the requested session key. On the one hand, in order to avoid
attacks on their limited resource, effective authentication on the
requesting node must be developed to identify misbehaving
nodes. On the other hand, any entities in this communication
networks can access broadcast messages because broadcast
messages are broadcasted in plain-text within the communication
group. We argue that the second authentication is unnecessary.
Instead, the neighboring nodes only need to forward the broad-
cast message which corresponds to the requested session key. If
the requesting node is authorized for the session, it would be able
to recover the session key. Otherwise, even unauthorized nodes
receive the broadcast message from their neighbors, they can not
recover the session key.
To further clarify our design goal and facilitate understanding
of readers, according but not constraint to the security model of
Dutta et al. (2007), we define the mutual-healing key distribution
security model from four aspects. Definition 4.1 defines self-healing
key distribution scheme with revocation capability. Definition 4.2
defines mutual-healing key distribution scheme Definition 4.3
defines forward secrecy and backward secrecy. Definition 4.4 defines
resisting collusion properties.
Definition 4.1. Let U¼{u1,y, un} and jAf1, . . . ,mg.
1. The scheme is a session key distribution with privacy if
(a) for any node ui, the session key Kj is efficiently determined
from Bj and the personal public/private key pair (Qi, Si).
(b) for any set RDU and ui=2R, it is computationally infeasible
for node in R to determine the personal private key Si.
(c) what node u1, y, un learn from Bj cannot be determined
from broadcasts or personal key pairs alone. That is, if we
consider separately either the set of m broadcasts {B1, y,
Bm} or the set of n personal key pairs {(Q1, S1),y, (Qn, Sn)},
then it is computationally infeasible to compute session
key Kj from either set.
2.
The scheme has revocation capability. Particularly, there is no
upper limitation of revocation. For each session j and RjAU,
GM can generate a broadcast message Bj such that for all ui=2Rj
can efficiently recover the session key Kj, but the revoked
nodes in Rj cannot even knowing all the information broadcast
in sessions 1, y, j.
3. The scheme is self-healing if the following is true for any r,
1rro jrm: For any node uiAGr who is also a member in
session j, the session key Kr is efficiently determined by (Qi, Si)
and Bj.
Definition 4.2. Let U¼{u1,y,un} and jAf1, . . . ,mg. The scheme is
mutual-healing if the following is true:
1. For any node uiAU, if it misses more than a fixed number of
broadcast messages or the last broadcast message, it can
generate and broadcast effective requesting message to its
neighbors.
2. For any ui’s neighboring node uj, it can verify whether ui is its
qualified neighboring node or a malicious one. If ui is a
qualified neighboring node and uj is an authorized node for the
requested broadcast, uj generates and sends responsive
message to ui.
3. The requester ui can verify whether the responser uj is its
neighbor or not. If uj is its neighbor, ui can decrypts the
responsive message and thus get the requested broadcast
message.
Definition 4.3. Let U¼{u1, y, un} and jAf1, . . . ,mg. The scheme
guarantees both forward security and backward security if
1. for any set RDU, and all uiAR are revoked before session j, it is
computationally infeasible for the nodes in R together to get
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any information about Kj, even with the knowledge of group
keys K1, y, Kj1 before session j.
2. for any set JDU, and all uiA J join after session j, it is
computationally infeasible for the nodes in J together to get
any information about Kj, even with the knowledge of group
keys Kj+1, y, Km after session j.
Definition 4.4. Let B Rr [ . . . [ R2 be a coalition of nodes who are
revoked from the group before session r and let C  Js [ . . . [ Jm be a
coalition of nodes who join the group from session s with ros.
The scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of non-
authorized nodes if the coalition B [ C doses not get any
information about session keys Kj, for any rr jos.
5. The proposed mutual-healing key distribution scheme
In this section, we will present a mutual-healing key distribu-
tion scheme for wireless sensor networks. The proposed mutual-






(6) ADDING AND REVOKING NODE.
We need to point out the scheme is computationally secure
scheme. All parameters and symbols used in this section have
been defined in Sections 3 and 4. Otherwise, they will be defined
in this section.
5.1. System set-up
GM obtains both public system parameters and all the public
keys of possible nodes from the ID-based PKI. GM chooses m
session keys K1,y, Km from Z

q. The session keys are independent
to each other and according to the uniform distribution. We also
use the system parameters proposed in Section 3.
5.2. Broadcast
Suppose jGjj denotes the number of nodes in session j. For each
session 1r jrm, according to the session group Gj, GM computes
QV1 ¼
Pn










1 1 0 . . . 0
1 0 1 . . . 0
^ ^ ^ & 0





Let aiu represents the transpose of ai. GM also constructs jGjj1
auxiliary keys
QVi ¼ ðQ1,Q2, . . . ,QjGj jÞ  aiu, 2r ir jGjj,
which means QV2 ¼ Q1þQ2,QV3 ¼Q1þQ3, . . . ,QVjGj j ¼Q1þQjGj j. The




U1 ¼ rjP, Ui ¼ rjQVi ð2r ir jGjjÞ,
where P is a generator for a BDH group G1 as shown in Section 3.2.
Vj ¼ Kj  H2ðeðPpub,rjQV1 ÞÞ
Let zj ¼ ðUið1r ir jGjjÞ,VjÞ. GM broadcasts the ciphertext to the set
of nodes Gj. The ciphertext for the j-th broadcast is in the
following form: Bj¼{z1, y, zj}.
5.3. Key recovery
When a node uiAGj receives the broadcast message Bj, it sets a
vector ai¼(0,y,0,1,0,y,0) with jGjj elements, and only the i-th










The node ui can solve the following system of equations using
Cramer’s rule or other algebraic methods.
ðx1,x2, . . . ,xjGj jÞ  Aj ¼ ð1,1, . . . ,1Þ:
With ðx1,x2, . . . ,xjGj jÞ, ui gets









In order to decrypt the ciphertext, ui needs to compute
eðPpub,rQV1 Þ. With the knowledge of the private key Si, it can do via:
eðPpub,rjQV1 Þ ¼ eðPpub,rjðx1Qiþx2QV2 þ . . . þxjGj jQVjGj j ÞÞ
¼ eðPpub,rjx1QiÞ  eðPpub,rjðx2QV2 þ . . . þxjGj jQVjGj j ÞÞ
¼ eðrjP,x1sQ iÞ  eðPpub,x2rjQV2 þ . . . þxjGj jrjQVjGj j Þ
¼ eðU1,x1SiÞ  eðPpub,x2U2þ . . . þxjGj jUjGj jÞ:
Then, ui can recover the session key







Without loss of generality, suppose ui lost the broadcast
message for a session to j. As far as it belongs to the session group
Gt, it picks up the polynomial zt from the broadcast message Bj and
forms the jGtj  jGtj matrix At as operations in the procedure of
KEY RECOVERY. Then ui solves the following system of equations.
ðx1,x2, . . . ,xjGt jÞ  At ¼ ð1,1, . . . ,1Þ:
With ðx1,x2, . . . ,xjGt jÞ, ui gets









After that, with the knowledge of its private key Si, ui computes
eðPpub,rtQV1 Þ as follows:
eðPpub,rtQV1 Þ ¼ eðPpub,rtðx1Qiþx2QV2 þ . . . þxjGt jQVjGt j ÞÞ
¼ eðPpub,rtx1QiÞ  eðPpub,rtðx2QV2 þ . . . þxjGt jQVjGt j ÞÞ
¼ eðrtP,x1sQ iÞ  eðPpub,x2rtQV2 þ . . . þxjGt jrtQVjGt j Þ
¼ eðU1,x1SiÞ  eðPpub,x2U2þ . . . þxjGt jUjGt jÞ:
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Finally, ui recovers the lost session key





One may wonder how ui got Vt if the t-th broadcast message
was lost. In fact, ui could get the broadcast message Bj. Then ui
retrieved the polynomial zj from Bj. Finally, ui could obtain Vt from
zj. If more than one broadcast messages get lost, the operations of
session key recovery are the same as aforementioned.
5.5. Mutual-healing
Here we consider the mutual-healing between neighboring
nodes in wireless communication networks and present a
practical technique to realize it.
Many wireless networks have an intrinsic property that nodes
are stationary. Therefore, we can bound LBKs (the location-based
keys) of nodes to both their identities and geographic locations
rather merely their identities or locations as in conventional
schemes. Based on their LBKs, two neighboring nodes can perform
node-to-node neighborhood authentication. In order to reduce
communication overhead, we restrict that mutual-healing only
happens between one-hop neighboring nodes. In order to realize
mutual-healing capability, The scheme has to execute range-
based location operation after SET-UP procedure.
There are many methods to localize nodes. We adopt the first
method in Zhang et al. (2006). This step may complete within
several minutes after the deployment of networks. We assume
that a group of mobile robots are dispatched to sweep across the
whole network field along preplanned routes. Mobile robots have
GPS (Global Positioning System) capability, as well as more
powerful computation and communication capacities than ordin-
ary nodes have. The leading robot equipped with the a master
secret k. To localize a node, say ui, mobile robots run the secure
range-based localization protocol given in Capkun and Hubaux
(2005) or Zhang et al. (2005) to measure their respective absolute
distance to node ui and co-determine li, the location of ui.
Subsequently, the leading robot calculates LK i ¼ kHðIDiJliÞ, and
sends /fLK iJligQi ,hQi ðLK iJliÞS to ui. {M}k means encrypting message
Mwith key k, and hk(M) refers to the MIC (message integrity code)
of message M under key k.
Upon receipt of the message, node ui first uses its private key
to decrypt LKi and li and then regenerates the MIC. If the result
matches with what the robot sent, ui saves LKi and li for
subsequent use. Following this process, all the nodes can be
furnished with their respective locations and LBKs. After that,
mobile robots leave the sensor field and the leading robot have to
securely erase k from its memory. During subsequent network
operations, Adding nodes may be necessary in order to maintain
good network connectivity. The localization of new nodes can be
done in the same manner.
It is general supposed that adversaries do not launch active
and explicit pinpoint attack on nodes during deployment and
initialization which usually dose not last too long. According to
Zhang et al. (2006), this assumption in range-based location
operation is reasonable in that mobile robots are much fewer than
ordinary nodes and can be equipped with tamper-proof hardware
and putting them under super monitor.
During the procedures of self-healing key distribution, if a
node has missed more than a fixed number broadcast messages or
the last broadcast message, it looks for assistance from its
neighboring nodes. The realization of mutual-healing includes
three steps. We will introduce them one by one.
5.5.1. Mutual-healing request
Suppose node ui wishes to receive broadcast message Bt, ui locally
broadcasts an authentication request including its identity IDi,
location li and the sequence number of the expected broadcast
message t.
5.5.2. Mutual-healing response
Upon receipt of a request, the neighboring node uj first needs
to ascertain that the claimed location li is within its one-hop
communication range by verifying if the Euclidean distance
JliljJrR, where R is one-hop communication distance.
If the inequality does not hold, node uj simply discards the
request. Otherwise, uj calculates a shared key as Kji ¼
eðLK j,HðIDiJliÞÞ. Then it unicasts a reply to node ui including its
identity IDj, location lj and encrypted broadcast message ðBtÞKji .
 ui- : IDi,li,t;
 uj-ui : IDj,lj,ðBtÞKji ;
5.5.3. Verification
Upon receiving the response, node ui also first checks if the
inequality JliljJrR holds. If the inequality does not hold, ui
directly discards the message received from uj. Otherwise, ui
proceeds to derive a shared key as Kij ¼ eðLK i,HðIDjJljÞÞ ¼ Kji
between it and the node uj whereby to decrypt the message
ðBtÞKji and get the broadcast message Bt. Using the broadcast
message Bt and its public/private key pair, the authorized node ui
can recover the lost session keys.
5.5.4. Adding and revoking node
If a new node unew applies for joining the session j, GM checks the
validity of its identity firstly. If it is an authorized node, in the
procedure of BROADCAST, GM constructs a new ðjGjj1Þ  jGjjmatrix
and computes new QVi ð1r ir jGjjÞ which should include Qnew.
If a node urov is revoked from the session j, what GM should do
is constructing a new ðjGjj1Þ  jGjj matrix and computing new
QVi ð1r ir jGjjÞ which should exclude Qrov.
Fig. 1. The process of the mutual-healing key distribution scheme, where the
panes are operation which must be executed in each round, the dashed panes
represent the operations which may not be executed in every round.
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The adding and revoking operations are very efficient in our
scheme. For the condition that adding or revoking more than one
node, the operations are the same as aforementioned.
Figure 1 shows all the procedures involved in a mutual-healing
key distribution scheme.
6. Security and efficiency
Security analysis for the proposed mutual-healing key dis-
tribution scheme will be provided in this section. Performance
discussion for the scheme will also be presented.
6.1. Security of the proposed scheme
In this subsection, we analyze the security of the proposed
scheme. More precisely, we show that our construction satisfies
all the security requirements in our security model described in
Section 4.2.
6.1.1. Property 1: Self-healing key distribution
We show our construction satisfies the security requirements
described in Definition 4.1.
1. The scheme is a session key distribution scheme.
(a) Any node uiAGj can recover the session key Kj from Bj and
the personal public/private key pair (Qi, Si). This is
because: When a node uiAGj receives the broadcast
message Bj, it sets a vector ci¼(0,y,0,1,0,y,0) with jGjj
elements, and only the i-th element is 1. Define a new











The node ui can solve the following system of equations
using Cramer’s rule or other algebraic methods.
ðx1,x2, . . . ,xjGj jÞ  Cj ¼ ð1,1, . . . ,1Þ:
With ðx1,x2, . . . ,xjGj jÞ, ui gets









In order to decrypt the ciphertext, ui needs to compute
eðPpub,rQV1 Þ. With the knowledge of the private key Si, ui
can do so via:
eðPpub,rjQV1 Þ ¼ eðPpub,rjðx1Qiþx2QV2 þ . . . þxjGj jQVjGj j ÞÞ
¼ eðPpub,rjx1QiÞ  eðPpub,rjðx2QV2 þ . . . þxjGjjQVjGj j ÞÞ
¼ eðrjP,x1sQ iÞ  eðPpub,x2rjQV2 þ . . . þxjGj jrjQVjGj j Þ
¼ eðU1,x1SiÞ  eðPpub,x2U2þ . . . þxjGj jUjGj jÞ:
Then, ui can recover the session key Kj by






(b) Any coalition RDU of non-authorized nodes cannot derive
the private key Si of any authorized node ui=2R. This is
because each node is preloaded with a public/private key
pair (Qi, Si) before deployment. The key pairs are computed
by an ID-based PKI which can realize public and private
keys without certificate management (Han et al., 2004).
Because it is infeasible to solve the discrete logarithm
problem SID¼sQID, any coalition RDU of non-authorized
nodes cannot derive the private key Si of any authorized
node ui=2R.
(c) It is computationally infeasible to compute session key Kj
from either broadcast messages or personal public/private
key pairs. This is because the j-th session key is computed
from Vj and eðPpub,rjQV1 Þ. On the one hand, Vj is taken from
the broadcast message while






Therefore, only the authorized nodes who holds corre-
sponding private key Si can recover the session key. They
cannot get any session key only from the broadcast
messages. On the other hand, the personal public/private
key pairs of nodes are computed by the ID-based PKI. The
session keys are chosen by the GM. They are independent
of one another. Therefore, The coalition of nodes cannot
get any session key only by their public/private key pairs
{(Q1, S1), y, (Qn, Sn)}.
2. There is no threshold for the revocation in the proposed
scheme. This means any number of nodes who are compro-
mised or malicious can be revoked and although they work
together they cannot work out the private key of any
nonrevoked authorized node. In our scheme, the broadcast
messages are computationally related to the authorized nodes’
public/private key pairs. On the one hand, only nodes who
hold the corresponding private keys can recover the session
keys from the masked broadcast messages. On the other hand,
even all the revoked unauthorized node work together
they cannot get the private key of any nonrevoked authorized
node due to the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm
problem.
3. The proposed scheme has the self-healing capability. It can
also enable a node to recover from a single broadcast message
all keys associated with sessions in which it belongs to the
session group. It is a stronger self-healing key distribution
scheme.
Without loss of generality, suppose uiAGt lost the broadcast
message for a session twhere to j and . It selects polynomial zt
from the broadcast message Bj and constructs a jGtj  jGtj










where ak¼(0,0,y,1,0y,0) (note: the kth bit is 1 and all other
bits are 0) and k¼ 1,2, . . . ,jGtj.
Then ui solves the following system of equations.
ðx1,x2, . . . ,xjGt jÞ  At ¼ ð1,1, . . . ,1Þ:
With ðx1,x2, . . . ,xjGt jÞ, ui gets
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After that, with the knowledge of its private key Si, ui computes
eðPpub,rtQV1 Þ as follows:
eðPpub,rtQV1 Þ ¼ eðPpub,rtðx1Qiþx2QV2 þ . . . þxjGt jQVjGt j ÞÞ
¼ eðPpub,rtx1QiÞ  eðPpub,rtðx2QV2 þ . . . þxjGt jQVjGt j ÞÞ
¼ eðrtP,x1sQ iÞ  eðPpub,x2rtQV2 þ . . . þxjGt jrtQVjGt j Þ
¼ eðU1,x1SiÞ  eðPpub,x2U2þ . . . þxjGt jUjGt jÞ:
Finally, ui recovers the lost session key






6.1.2. Property 2: Forward security and backward security
We show our construction satisfies forward security and
backward security described in Definition 4.2.
In this scheme, due to the special construction of broadcast
messages, only the current authorized nodes can recover the
session keys by using their private keys. As described before, any
coalition of non-authorized nodes cannot derive the private key of
any authorized node. Furthermore, session keys are independent
to each other and according to the uniform distribution. All of
these features imply forward security and backward security of
our scheme.
6.1.3. Property 3: Collusion-free property
We show our construction is collusion-free for the new joined
nodes and the revoked nodes described in Definition 4.3.
Our scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of non-
authorized nodes, including the revoked nodes and new joined
nodes. In our scheme, if one node wants to obtain session key, it
should compute e(U1,x1Si) in the procedure of KEY RECOVERY.
Therefore, only the authorized nodes can recover the session key.
In addition, due to the difficulty of solving DLP, any coalition of
non-authorized nodes cannot derive the private keys of author-
ized nodes from their public keys.
6.1.4. Property 4: Mutual-healing key distribution
We show that we securely realize mutual-healing property
between neighboring nodes. More specifically, the realization
satisfies the security requirements described in Definition 4.4.
1. It can be seen in the step of MUTUAL-HEALING REQUEST that any
node uiAU, if it misses more than a fixed number of broadcast
messages or the last broadcast message, it can generate and
broadcast the requesting message to its neighbors. The broadcast
message is composed of its identity IDi, location li and the
sequence number of the expected broadcast message t.
2. A false requesting node might send an request with a forged
location within node uj’s range. Since the false requesting node
does not hold the LBK corresponding to the forged location,
even it deceive uj into believing it is in uj’s range, it cannot
recover the session key from the broadcast message that uj
sends. Therefore, it get any useful information from uj. There
are some false requesting nodes who might mount DoS (denial
of service) attack by continuously sending bogus mutual-
healing requests to allure legitimate nodes into endless
verifying of such messages. Because the number of neighbors
of any node is limited in reality, abnormally many mutual-
healing requests are highly like an indicator of malicious
attacks. If this situation happens, node uj will discard the
requesting message and stop assistance.
3. Upon receiving the reply, node ui also first checks whether uj is
its neighbor. This check is the baseline defense against the
attack that adversaries surreptitiously tunnel authentication
messages between ui and a virtually non-neighboring node.
Without the location check, ui will falsely believe that the
broadcast messages come from its neighbors. If the first check
is true, then ui checks whether the message received from uj is
effective. ui can recover the requested broadcast message if the
second check is true.
If a requester receives too many replies, it only decrypts a fixed
number messages in order to save its limited resource and
avoid exhausting-resource attack. Furthermore, we assume
that there are efficient mechanisms available for authorized
nodes to report such an abnormality to the sink.
6.2. The analysis of efficiency
Different from the existing papers, we take advantage
of a bilinear pairings-based broadcast encryption to design the
self-healing procedures in the proposed mutual-healing key
distribution scheme. In this section, we first analyze the efficiency
for the self-healing procedures followed by the one for mutual-
healing procedures.
In terms of storage overhead, each node only stores its public/
private key pair and GM’s public key Ppub. Therefore, the storage
overhead for end nodes is a constant. Furthermore, the private key
has nothing to do with the number of revoked nodes and can be
reused as long as it is not disclosed. In addition, our scheme
enables a node to recover from a single broadcast message all keys
associated with sessions in which it belongs to the session group.
Generally speaking, GM takes up more resources than end
nodes and thus can perform more complex computation. We
elaborate on analyzing the computation overhead at nodes. In the
j-th session, all the computations in the procedure of KEY
RECOVERY are as follows: (1) Solving a set of linear equations
with jGjj variables; (2) jGjj scalar multiplications in the cyclic
additive group G1; (3) jGjj1 additions in the cyclic additive
group G1; (4) Two pairings computation; (5) One hashing
computation; (6) One XOR operation. Generally speaking, the
computation of the pairing is the most time-consuming in
pairings-based cryptosystems. Although there have been many
papers talking about the complexity of pairings and how to speed
up the computation of bilinear pairings (Barreto et al., 2002;
Galbraith et al., 2002), the computation overhead of bilinear
pairings are still larger than the scalar multiplication, let alone
other types of computation. Therefore, the main computation
overhead of the scheme comes from (4).
The communication overhead comes from broadcast messages
Bj¼{z1, y,zj}. zj is composed of Uið1r ir jGjjÞ and Vj. Therefore,
the size of zj increases in direct proportion to the number of jGjj.
The length of broadcast is
Pj
i ¼ 1 jGijlogqþ jlogq. log q is the size of
session key.
The mutual-healing procedures achieves all the security
requirements and is efficient. Each node only has to store another
pair of LBK and its location in order to achieve mutual-healing
property. Therefore, the storage overhead is still a constant. In
terms of communication overhead, only two interactions are
involved. In the first step, the broadcast message is composed of
the requester’s identity, location and the sequence number of the
expected broadcast message. Furthermore, the message is broad-
casted within one-hop communication range. The communication
overhead of this step is very small. The second interaction may
include one or several unicasts. The unicast message is composed
of the responser’s identity, location, and encrypted the broadcast
message. Therefore, the size of these unicast messages is a
constant. The computation overhead at the responser includes
generating a shared key and encrypting the requested message
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and the computation overhead at the requester includes generat-
ing a shared key and decrypting the requested message. Because
mutual-healing happens not very often, the computation over-
head would not consume too much resource of the involved
nodes.
7. Conclusion and future research
A mutual-healing key distribution scheme using bilinear
pairings is proposed in this paper. Security model and formal
definition for mutual-healing key distribution were discussed. The
proposed new scheme achieves several desirable features. The
storage overhead for each node is a constant. The scheme is
collusion-free for any coalition of non-authorized nodes. Each
authorized node’s private key has nothing to do with the number
of revoked nodes and can be reused only if it is not disclosed.
While in secret sharing-based self-healing key distribution
schemes, the personal key can be reused on the condition that
less than threshold number nodes are revoked. In addition, our
scheme enables a node to recover from a single broadcast
message all keys associated with sessions in which it belongs to
the session group.
The proposed mutual-healing scheme relies on identity and
location-based keys. This implies that the proposed scheme can
only be used over the wireless networks where nodes are stable. It
is not trivial to realize mutual-healing in mobile wireless
networks. In fact, the mutual-healing mechanism is more useful
in mobile wireless networks because mobile wireless networks
have lower network connectivity than stable wireless networks.
Therefore, it is significant to investigate new methods to realize
the mutual-healing feature in mobile wireless networks.
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The objective of self-healing key distribution is to enable group users to recover session keys by
themselves, without requesting additional transmissions from the group manager (GM), even when
they miss some broadcast messages. One major benefit of the self-healing key distribution mechanism
is the reduction of energy consumption due to the elimination of such additional transmission.
Also in some applications, e.g., uni-directional broadcast channel from the GM, the self-healing key
distribution mechanism seems to be the ideal solution. Desired features of self-healing key distribution
schemes include energy awareness, short broadcast message, efficient users addition, revocation and
so on.A primary challenge is managing the trade-off between providing an acceptable level of security
and conserving scarce resources in particular energy which is critical for wireless network operations.
Over a decade, a great number of self-healing key distribution schemes have been proposed for
establishing a group key amongst a dynamic group of users over an unreliable, or lossy, network. In
this paper a comprehensive survey is conducted on the state-of-the-art in the field of self-healing key
distribution. First, we clarify the security requirements of self-healing key distribution scheme for
their special application environment. Then, we present a classification of self-healing key distribution
schemes according to different cryptographic primitives, and give an insight to their features and
goals. Furthermore, we consider several problems, namely authentication on broadcast messages,
sponsorization and mutual-healing, related to the robustness of self-healing key distribution schemes.
At last, we delineate their similarities and differences and outline several future research directions.
Keywords: wireless security; self-healing key distribution; one way hash function; subset difference rekeying;
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1. INTRODUCTION
Group communication can enjoy the benefit of communication
efficiency from broadcast in distributing secret digital content.
However, there is a challenge of effectively controlling access
to the transmitted data. The broadcast by itself does not provide
any mechanisms for preventing non-group members from the
group communication. One common method for enabling
secure broadcast communication is distributing a session key
to group users and updating it on each operation of adding
or revoking users. All messages broadcasted within the group
during a certain sessions are communicated securely through
encryption under the session key. Although the sensitivity
of the broadcasted messages makes session keys essential
to secure group communication, distributing session keys
become an issue, especially distributing session keys for large
dynamic communication groups. Researchers have proposed
many different key distribution schemes. These schemes can
be divided into two main classes according to the underlying
networks. One is key distribution over reliable networks and the
other is key distribution over unreliable networks. The problem
of distributing keys over a reliable channel has received much
attention [1–4]. The research on self-healing key distribution
for establishing keys over an unreliable network began in
2002. Since then, self-healing key distribution, as one of the
techniques for wireless security, has been one of the hot research
topics.
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The target of key distribution is to establish and maintain
secure channels between the group manager (GM) and multiple
group users. Session keys need to be updated as long as
membership changes in order to maintain security and resilience
to attacks [5]. The updated session key prevents a new user
from decoding messages broadcasted before it joins the group
and a revoked user from accessing the group communication
after it leaves the group. However, distributing the session keys
to authorized users is a complex problem. Although rekeying a
group before the join of a new user is trivial (send the new group
key to the old group users encrypted with the old group key),
rekeying the group after a user leaves is far more complicated.
The old key cannot be used to distribute a new one, because the
leaving user knows the old key. Therefore, the GM must provide
another scalable mechanism to update the session keys.
A naive scheme for key updating within a group withnusers is
to have the GM assign a pair-wise key shared between the group
manger and the intended user during the phase of initiation. In
order to update a session key, the GM encrypts it with the pair-
wise keys shared between them and then unicasts the encrypted
messages. On receiving the messages, the intended user can
recover the session key using the shared key. In fact, this method
is not simple or scalable. In each round of key updating, the
group manager has to encrypt the group key and unicast the
encrypted key n times. Therefore, both the computation and
communication overhead brought by this operation are O(n).
Even though the operation is simple, the overheads of the
scheme in large dynamic groups are too high to afford.
Mobile wireless networks are often highly volatile [5, 6].
Wireless nodes may move in and out of range frequently, and
there is usually no infrastructure support to guarantee reliable
delivery of messages. Thus, a message sent to a group may
or may not reach all the group users. The problem of packet
loss should be highlighted in an unreliable network. The key
distribution broadcast for a particular session might never reach
all users. Individual interactions, such as requesting and re-
transmission, in large group will induce more communication
overhead and place a heavy burden on the GM. In addition,
users may reveal their current location by sending messages
in some high-security environments. Particularly, many digital
content and multi-media distribution systems are based on a
uni-directional broadcast distribution channel, such as satellite
or cable [7]. It is impossible to request or re-transmit under these
communication channel. The main property of self-healing key
distribution is that, even if at the beginning of certain sessions
some broadcast packets get lost, group users are still capable
of recovering the session key for those sessions simply by
using the broadcasts they have received at a previous session
and the packets they will receive at a subsequent one. This
noninteractive key distribution scheme reduces the network
traffic, decreases the work load on the GM and lowers the risk of
user exposure through traffic analysis. Therefore, self-healing
key distribution schemes are desirable for both efficiency and
security reasons.
1.1. Application
This survey is motivated by an investigation of the security
in several settings in which session keys need to be used for
a short time-period or need to be updated frequently, due to
frequent changes in the membership. Self-healing is a good
property for key distribution in wireless sensor networks, where
the nodes/devices are powered by batteries and have the unique
feature of moving in and out of range frequently. Also there
might be situations where some users are not constantly on-
line or experience burst packet losses. It can rejoin the group
once the power is on again. All these considerations can take
great advantage from self-healing key distribution schemes
with revocation capability. Military-oriented applications as
well as rescue missions and scientific explorations, where
the adversary may intercept, modify and/or partially interrupt
the communication, are few important examples which can
benefit from self-healing key distribution schemes. Self-
healing key distribution schemes have also found applications
in broadcast communication, pay-per-view TV, information
service delivering sensitive content/information to authorized
recipients over low-cost and uni-directional communication
channel.
1.2. Contribution
The objective of this paper is to highlight the features and
performance/security attributes of self-healing key distribution
schemes. We describe the procedures of self-healing key
distribution and present a classification of existing self-
healing key distribution schemes according to the different
cryptographic primitives that they are based on. The classifi-
cation enables identification of common architectural elements
and features, and to expose common vulnerabilities of each
class of the existing schemes. In order to delineate their
similarities and differences, we make a thorough comparison of
their security and performance. Subsequently, we discuss three
considerations to strengthen the robustness of self-healing key
distribution schemes. Finally, we outline some problems to be
solved and several future research directions. We expect that our
survey provides a guideline and certain criteria to fairly evaluate
the performance of self-healing key distribution schemes.
1.3. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we
introduce the desirable features of self-healing key distribution
schemes. In Section 3, we classify the self-healing key
distribution schemes from different aspects. In Section 4, we
present the classic model and general procedures of self-
healing key distribution schemes. In Section 5, we give an
overview of existing works in the area of self-healing key
distribution according to their classification. Then, in Section 6,
we discuss three aspects, namely authentication on broadcast
messages, sponsorization and mutual-healing, which can be
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used to strengthen the robustness of self-healing key distribution
schemes. A compositive analysis of the existing schemes was
proposed in Section 7. We outline the problems to be solved and
future works in this field in Section 7. At last, conclusions are
provided in Section 8.
2. DESIRABLE FEATURES OF SELF-HEALING KEY
DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
Self-healing key distribution can be considered as a branch
of key distribution. Key distribution schemes should meet
availability, integrity, confidentiality, authentication and non-
reputation traditional security requirements. The same is true of
self-healing key distribution schemes. In addition, according to
the feature and application environment of self-healing key dis-
tribution, some particular evaluation measurements should be
highlighted. The first one is security. The security here includes
not only forward and backward secrecy but also collusion resis-
tance between the newly joined nodes and the revoked nodes.
Considering the wireless application environment, storage and
bandwidth are regarded as constrained resources as well as com-
putational power. Therefore, storage, communication and com-
putation overheads should be as low as possible. Furthermore,
the group may become too large to be managed by a single party,
thus raising the issue of scalability. A self-healing key distribu-
tion scheme used in a resource-limited environment seeks to
minimize the workloads of both GM and end users in order to
augment the scalability. To sum up, the performance of self-
healing key distribution scheme can be evaluated by:
(i) Forward and backward secrecy. Forward secrecy is used
to prevent a revoked user from continued accessing the
session key even if it keeps receiving the broadcast
messages. Backward secrecy is used to prevent a new
user from decoding messages broadcasted before it
joins the group. When a group requires forward and
backward secrecy, the session key must be changed for
every membership change [8].
(ii) Collusion resistance. The collaboration of the newly
joined users and the revoked users must not be able
to recover the session keys which they are not entitled
to. This is a stronger and practical security requirement.
(iii) Efficiency. The condition of limited storage, commu-
nication and computation ability must be given full
consideration. In self-healing key distribution schemes,
storage overhead refers to the number of private keys
that group users store in their memory; computation
overhead means the necessary computation load to
generate session key by the GM and the necessary
computation cost to recover session key by end users;
and communication overhead is measured by the size
of messages delivered by the GM in the process of dis-
tributing session keys.
(iv) Scalability. Self-healing key distribution operations
should be finished in a timely manner despite a varying
TABLE 1. Classification of self-healing key distribution schemes.
Unconditionally Computationally
secure secure




[10]–[11], [12] [13], [14], [15]
Vector space secret
sharing
[16], [17] [18], [19], [20]
Hash chain None [21]–[19], [15, 20]
SDR None [22], [23]
Bilinear pairing None [24]
number of users and node densities. The fraction of the
available bandwidth occupied by network management
traffic should be kept as low as possible. Any increase in
management traffic will reduce the available bandwidth
for payload data accordingly. Hence, scalability of self-
healing key distribution schemes is crucial.
3. CLASSIFICATION OF SELF-HEALING KEY
DISTRIBUTION SCHEME
The success of a self-healing key distribution scheme is
determined in part by its ability to securely and efficiently
recover session key in low-cost wireless networks. Self-
healing key distribution schemes can be broadly classified into
unconditionally secure and computationally secure schemes.
Unconditionally, secure schemes based on information theory,
which is generally considered to have been founded in 1948
by Claude Shannon in his seminal work [9] and are defined by
entropy function H(·). While computationally secure schemes
are based on one or several open hard problems. The first
and several subsequent self-healing key distribution schemes
are unconditionally secure. More and more research works
are computationally secured in recent years. The existing self-
healing key distribution schemes can be classified into more
classes with regard to different cryptographic primitives that
they based on. They are polynomial secret sharing, vector space
secret sharing, hash chain, subset difference rekeying (SDR) and
bilinear pairings based self-healing key distribution schemes.
Table 1 shows a classification based on the two criteria:
unconditionally secure vs. computationally secure and different
cryptographic primitives they based on.
4. THE MODEL AND PROCEDURES OF
SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
The life span of a network is partitioned into time intervals called
sessions. m denotes the number of sessions, which should be
determined in advance in some schemes. LetU = {U1, . . . , Un}
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be the finite universe of users. Each user Ui has a unique
identifier IDi . A broadcast unreliable channel is available, and
time is defined by a global clock. The GM sets up and manages,
by means of joining and revoking operations, a communication
group which is a dynamic subset of U . All the operations
take place in a fixed range (here we suppose the range is Fp,
where p is a sufficiently large prime number). Let Gj ⊆ U
be the communication group established by the GM in session
j (j = 1, . . . , m). Each user Ui ∈ Gj holds a personal key Si ,
received from the GM before or when joining Gj . The personal
key is used to recover the session keys as long as Ui is not
removed by the GM from the group. Figure 1 depicts a general
communication model.
Let Rj ⊆ Gj−1 denote the set of revoked group users
in session j and Jj ⊂ U \ Gj−1 denotes the set of users
who join the group in session j with Rj ∩ Jj = φ. Hence,
Gj = (Gj−1 ∪ Jj ) \ Rj for j ≥ 2 and by definition G1 = U .
Moreover, for session j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the session key Kj is
chosen independently and according to the uniform distribution
on Fp. For any non-revoked user Ui ∈ Gj , the j -th session key
Kj is determined by broadcast information Bj and personal
key Si . All the aforementioned notions are used throughout
the paper.
4.1. The general model of self-healing key distribution
scheme
Self-healing key distribution schemes are defined under security
models. The pioneering self-healing key distribution scheme
[10] is unconditionally secure and defined by entropy function
H(·) (see [25] for more details). The subsequent models are
slightly modified versions of the basic one.
To clarify the performance of the schemes and facilitate the
later analysis, we mention the following formal security model
of the self-healing key distribution scheme with revocation
capability. Here we consider the original communication model.
Suppose there arenusers and a GM. The life-time of the network
is divided into m sessions. t is the maximum number of users
that can be revoked in the life-time of the network. We define the
general self-healing key distribution scheme from two aspects.
Definition 1 defines self-healing key distribution scheme with
revocation capability. Definition 2 defines the properties of
security including forward secrecy, backward secrecy and the
capability of collusion resistance.
Definition 1. Let U be the universe of users of a network,
m be the maximum number of sessions and t be the maximum
number of users that can be revoked by the GM.
(i) The scheme is a session key distribution scheme if the
following conditions are true:
(a) For any user Ui ∈ Gj , the key Kj is determined by Bj
and Si . Formally, it holds that:
H(Kj |Bj , Si ) = 0. (1)
(b) What users learn from the broadcast Bj and their
own personal key cannot be determined from the
broadcasts or personal keys alone. That is:
H(K1, . . . ,Km|B1, . . .Bm)
= H(K1, . . . ,Km|SG1∪...∪Gm)
= 0. (2)
(ii) The scheme has t-revocation capability if, for each
session j , let R = Rj ∪ . . . ∪ R1, such that |R| ≤ t , the
GM can generate a broadcast Bj such that the collusion
of all revoked users in R cannot recover Kj . Formally,
it holds that:
H(Kj |B1, . . .Bj , SR) = H(Kj ) (3)
where SR denotes the set of personal keys of all users
in R.
FIGURE 1. The general communication model of self-healing key distribution schemes.
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(iii) The scheme is self-healing if the following property is
satisfied:
Every Ui ∈ Gr , who has not been revoked after
session r and before session s, from broadcast messages
Br and Bs , where 1 ≤ r < s ≤ m, can recover all keys
Kl , for l = r, . . . , s. Formally, it holds that:
H(Kr , . . . ,Ks |Br ,Bs , Si ) = 0. (4)
Definition 2. Let U = {U1, . . . , Un} and j ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
The scheme guarantees both forward and backward secrecy if
the following properties are satisfied:
(i) For any set R ⊆ U , and all the users in R are revoked
before session j , it is computationally infeasible for the
Ui ∈ R together to get any information about Kj , even
with the knowledge of group keys K1, . . . , Kj−1 before
session j . Formally, it holds that:
H(Kj |B1, . . . ,Bm, {Si}Ui∈R,K1, . . . , Kj−1)
= H(Kj) (5)
(ii) For any set J ⊆ U , and all Ul ∈ U join after session
j , it is computationally infeasible for the users in J
together to get any information about Kj , even with the
knowledge of group keys Kj+1, . . . , Km after session j .
Formally, it holds that:
H(Kj |B1, . . . ,Bm, {Si}Ui∈R,Kj+1, . . . , Km)
= H(Kj) (6)
(iii) Let C ⊆ Rr∪, . . . ,∪R1 be a coalition of users removed
before session r and let D ⊆ Js∪, . . . ,∪Jm be a
coalition of users who join the group from session s.
Let |C ∪ D| ≤ t . Then, such a coalition does not get
any information about keys Kj , for any r ≤ j < s.
Formally, it holds that:
H(Kr , . . . ,Ks−1|B1, . . . ,Bm, SC, SD)
= H(Kr , . . . ,Ks−1) (7)
In Definition 1, Condition (i) states that every user Ui , from
the broadcast Bj and its own personal key Si , recovers the
current session key Kj ; while, personal keys and broadcasts
alone, do not give any information about any session key.
Condition (ii) means the GM is able to revoke at most
t users from the group. Condition (iii) characterizes the self-
healing property: any two broadcasts are enough to recover
all lost session keys for the ‘sandwich’ sessions. In Definition
2, Conditions (i) and (ii) describe the forward secrecy and
backward secrecy, respectively. Condition (iii) defines the
feature of resisting collusion. It states that a coalition of or less
t revoked users and the newly joined users cannot obtain any
information about the current session key.
4.2. A lower bound on personal keys
Here we emphasize a lower bound on personal keys, which
can be neglected easily, for unconditionally self-healing key
distribution scheme.
Theorem 1. In any unconditionally secure self-healing key
distribution scheme with key space of size p, for any user Ui
belonging to the group since session j , it holds that
H(Si) ≥ (m − j + 1) logp
Therefore, each user who joins group in session j must store
a personal key of at least (m− j +1)logp bits. (see [10, 16, 26]
for proof.)
4.3. The procedures of self-healing key distribution
schemes
Self-healing key distribution entails five basic procedures,
namely Setup, Broadcast, Key Recovery, Adding or Revoking
Users and Self-healing. The basic procedures in a general self-
healing key distribution are described in Fig. 2. The entities in
self-healing key distribution scheme includes a GM and a great
number of end users. The GM is responsible for the procedures
of Setup, Broadcast and Adding or Revoking Users. The end
FIGURE 2. The basic procedures in a general self-healing key
distribution, where the small panes are operation which must be
executed in each round, the small dashed frames represent the
operations which may not be executed in some round of the scheme.
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users perform Key Recovery and Self-healing. In Fig. 2, The
large pane 1 includes the operations performed by the GM,
while the large pane 2 includes all the operations performed by
the end users.
4.3.1. Setup
The GM chooses and releases system parameters. It also
generates and privately distributes personal keys to current
group users. It is supposed that the personal keys are distributed
in a off-line manner or there is a secure channel between the
group manager and each user in this procedure. At last, the GM
chooses m session keys K1, · · · ,Km from a fixed key space (for
example Fp). These session keys are independent to each other
and according to uniform distribution.
4.3.2. Broadcast
Let |Gj | denote the number of users in session j . For each
session 1 ≤ j ≤ m, according to the session group Gj , the GM
computes and broadcasts message Bj so that only authorized
users can recover the session key from the broadcast message
and their personal keys. At the same time, the construction of
broadcast message should meet the properties of forward and
backward secrecy as well as the property of collusion resistance.
4.3.3. Key recovery
When an authorized user Ui ∈ Gj receives the broadcast
message Bj , it can recover the session key for the j th session
using its personal key and the received broadcast message.
4.3.4. Adding or revoking users
When the GM wants to add a new user from session j , it will
generate and privately distribute personal key to the new user
so that the new user can recover session keys in subsequent
sessions. Similarly, if the GM wants to revoke a user from
session j , it will add or delete some information related to the
revoked user in the procedure of Broadcast so that the revoked
user cannot recover the session keys in subsequent sessions.
Both forward and backward secrecy as well as the property of
collusion resistance should be guaranteed in this procedure.
4.3.5. Self-healing
If a user misses some broadcast messages before session j , when
it receives the broadcast message in session j , it can recover all
the lost session keys using its personal key and the broadcast Bj .
The only requirement that must be satisfied, in order for the user
to recover the lost keys, is the membership in the group both
before and after the sessions in which the broadcast messages
containing the keys are sent.
Among these procedures, Setup only happens at the period
of initialization. Broadcast and Key Recovery are performed in
each session. While Adding or Revoking Users is not necessarily
happen in each session. Self-healing is triggered by the loss
of broadcast messages. It happens only in the sessions before
which the broadcast messages get lost.
5. TYPICAL SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION
SCHEMES
In this section, we present an overview of existing works in
the area of self-healing key distribution according to their
classification. Here we omit the proof of security of each
scheme because the security of each scheme was proved in
the corresponding referenced paper. Nevertheless, we make a
thorough analysis and comparison on performance of schemes
in the same classification.
5.1. Polynomial secret-sharing-based self-healing key
distribution schemes
The idea of self-healing key distribution scheme was introduced
by Staddon et al. in the pioneering work [10]. Formal
definitions, lower bounds on the resources as well as some
constructions of self-healing key distribution scheme were
proposed in it. The GM, at the beginning of each session,
sends packets over an unreliable broadcast channel in order
to provide a key to each user of the group. Combined with the
pre-distributed secret key, every authorized user can recover
the session key from the packets. By this way, the GM can
launch multiple sessions during a certain time interval, by
adding/removing users to/from the initial group. The self-
healing feature in key distribution scheme enables a GM to
distribute session key for a dynamic group over an unreliable
network. If, at the beginning of a certain session, some
broadcasted packets get lost, then users are still capable of
recovering the session key for that session simply by using the
packets they have received at the beginning of one of a previous
session and the packets they will receive at the beginning of
a subsequent one, without requesting additional transmission
from the GM. The only requirement that a user must satisfy
in order to recover the lost keys through self-healing is its
membership in the group both before and after the sessions
in which the broadcast messages containing the keys are sent.
Such approach reduces network traffic and the work load on the
GM as well as the risk of user exposure through traffic analysis.
Since then, self-healing key distribution has been one of hot
research topics.
This scheme explored the way to extend the lifetime of the
basic self-healing key distribution scheme. After a set of m
session has expired, the operation of rekeying is necessary
before distributing new session keys due to the changed mem-
bership and released personal keys of the revoked users. A
straightforward method is to redistribute a new set of personal
keys to each user, and proceeds as before. Another method is
to do polynomial interpolation in the exponent. This is accom-
plished through the broadcast of random values from the GM.
This operation allows each user to evolve their personal keys
from one set of m sessions to the next, thus making the scheme
long-lived without any unicasts from the GM. The second
method in significant bandwidth saving over the first one.
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Liu et al. generalized the definitions in [10] and presented
several constructions in [27]. The scheme introduced a novel key
distribution scheme first by using both revocation polynomial
and mask polynomial. Then they added the self-haling feature
to the basic key distribution scheme, thus the scheme reduces
communication and storage overhead greatly. Furthermore, they
developed two techniques that allow a trade-off between the
broadcast message size and the recoverability of lost session
keys. The first technique deals with possibly frequent but short-
term communication failures and the second technique aims at
situations where there are relatively long term but infrequent
communication failures. The two methods further reduced the
size of broadcast messages in these two conditions, respectively.
An unreasonable requirement of [27] is that the set of revoked
group users must change monotonically. That is, Rj1 ⊆ Rj2 for
sessions j1 and j2 (1 < j1 < j2 < m). Otherwise, a group user
who is revoked in session j1, rejoins the group in a later session
j2, can recover the key for session j1. Therefore, the scheme is
prone to a rejoin–collusion attack and does not allow temporary
revocation.
More et al. [11] addressed the three problems discussed in
[10] using a sliding window mechanism. The three problems
are inconsistent robustness, high overhead and expensive
maintenance cost. The scheme achieved good performance.
Above all, the usage of a sliding window mechanism makes error
recovery consistently robust. In addition, the GM is entitled
to spread the cost of personal key distribution over multiple
sessions, rather than having to distribute new personal keys
to all users at the same time. Furthermore, reusing masking
polynomial reduces personal key storage and broadcast size
dramatically.
Blundo et al. [28] proposed a new mechanism for imple-
menting self-healing key distribution. Moreover, they described
a secure and efficient construction which has optimal memory
storage and communication complexity. Shortly after that, they
in [26] presented an attack on the first construction discussed
in [10]. Then, they proposed a new self-healing key distribu-
tion scheme, which requires low storage and communication
overhead. Finally, they slightly modified the security model,
in order to extend the self-healing key distribution model, and
proposed a scheme which enables a user to recover from a
single broadcast message all keys associated with sessions in
which it is a user of the communication group. They pointed
out two problems of the long-lived ‘Construction 5’ in [10].
In [10], the values that are used for computing the instances
of the personal key are sent by means of a single broadcast
message at the beginning of each new set of m sessions. Since
the network is not reliable, if some user does not receive such a
message, She will get out from the corresponding m sessions.
This problem is solved by sending with each broadcast the
values that are used for evolving the personal key in each
session. For the solution of the first problem, the involved cost
of modular exponentiation operations is too high to afford for
low-cost wireless networks. This solution is turned out to be
infeasible. The second problem lies in the join operation in the
presence of new users. It cannot be solved by slight modifying
‘Construction 5’ given in [10] and ‘Scheme 4’ given in [26] in
order to enable a secure join. It is still an open problem.
Hong et al. proposed a new self-healing key distribution
scheme in [29]. It is one of efficient unconditionally secure self-
healing key distribution scheme.As the original self-healing key
distribution scheme, it includes five procedures:
(i) Setup: The GM randomly chooses m t-degree
polynomials s1(x), . . . , sm(x) ∈ Fp[x] and m session
keys K1, . . . , Km ∈ Fp. Both polynomials and session
keys are independent on each other and according to
uniform distribution. Then, the GM privately sends
personal key Si = {s1(i), . . . , sm(i)} to Ui(i =
1, . . . , n).
(ii) Broadcast: LetWj = {rj1 , . . . , rjwj } be the set of revoked
user IDs for sessions in and before j such that |Wj | =
wj ≤ t , and let rj (x) = (x − rj1 ), . . . , (x − rjwj ). The
broadcast message for the j -th (j = 1, . . . , m) session
is in this form:
Bj = {P1(x), . . . , Pj (x)} ∪ {Wi}i=1,...,j ,
where Pj (x) = rj (x)Kj + sj (x).
(iii) Key Recovery: When a user Ui ∈ Gj receives the j -th
broadcast message, it evaluates the polynomial rj (x) at
point i, and computes current session key by computing
Kj = Pj (i) − sj (i)
rj (i)
.
(iv) Adding or Revoking Users: When the GM wants to
add a new user starting from the r-th session, it gives
a unused unique identity i ′ ∈ Fp, computes personal
keys corresponding to the current and future sessions
{sk(i ′)}(k = r, . . . , m) and privately sends the keys to
this new user. When the GM wants to revoke a user Ui′
starting from session s, it adds the identity i ′ ∈ Fp to
Wj for j = s, . . . , m.
(v) Self-healing: For any Ui that is a user in session r and
s(1 ≤ r < s ≤ m), it can recover {Pr(i), . . . , Ps(i)}.
By the method described in Key Recovery, Ui can
subsequently recover the whole sequence of session
keys Kr, . . . , Ks .
Compared with previous schemes, this scheme has good
combined performance. It is optimal in terms of user
memory storage and more efficient in terms of communication
complexity.
The papers [10, 11] focus on unconditionally secure self-
healing key distribution. The definitions and constructions were
stated in terms of the entropy function. Blundo et al. [30]
analyzed current definitions of self-healing key distribution.
They showed that no protocol can achieve the security
requirements stated in [10] and [27] and identified where the
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proposed schemes fail. They also showed that a previously
derived lower bound on the size of the broadcast messages that
the GM has to send in order to establish session keys, proved
in [10] and also used in [27], does not hold. After analysis,
they proposed a new definition of self-healing key distribution
and showed that it can be achieved by concrete schemes. Some
lower bounds on the resources, such as user memory storage and
communication complexity, required for implementing such
schemes were given finally and showed that these lower bounds
are tight through simple constructions.
Dutta claimed that they realized unconditionally secure self-
healing key distribution schemes in [31] and [32]. The storage
overhead in these two papers is (t + 1) logp, where t is the
maximum number of compromised users andp is the key space.
However, this claim cannot hold. Indeed, in [10], [16] and [26],
it has been proved that a lower bound on the size of the storage
overhead is equal to (m− j + 1) logp, where m is the life-time
of the network, j is order of the current session and logp is the
size of the distributed key. According to the above-mentioned
bound, one cannot design an unconditional secure self-healing
scheme for m sessions by giving to each user a (t+1) logp-size
secret key which is updated by a broadcast message. The papers
[10], [16] and [26] are referenced by both [31] and [32], but it
seems that the authors missed this lower bound.
Zou and Dai [33] proposed a new self-healing scheme based
on a novel concept of access polynomial. It overcomes some
shortcomings of the existing schemes yet still possesses all the
advantages of them. We should point that the communication
overhead in [33] comes from broadcast Bj which is composed
by 2m + 2 polynomials. As far as the polynomial Pj (x) is
concerned,Pj (x) = Aj(x)·Sj (x)+H(x). BothSj (x) andH(x)
are t degree polynomials, and the degree of Aj(x) amounts
to (|Gj | + 1) where |Gj | is the number of users in current
communication group. Generally speaking, |Gj | is larger than t .
Therefore, the claim that communication overhead is O(mt) is
incorrect.
Tian et al. introduced and improved a secret-sharing scheme
in [13]. Then, they applied the secret-sharing scheme to the
design of a self-healing key scheme. The new scheme achieves
several nice properties. First, the scheme reduces the storage
overhead of personal key to a constant. Secondly, the scheme
cancels the requirement of secure channel in setup phase. In
addition, the long-lived scheme is much more efficient than
those in [10] and [26]. However, the efficiency improvements
are obtained by relaxing the security slightly. The scheme is
a computationally secure scheme. By introducing a one-way
key chain, Dutta et al. proposed two constructions of scalable
self-healing key distribution with t revocation capability in
[14]. The schemes reduce both communication and computation
overheads greatly without increasing the storage overhead. At
the same time, forward and backward secrecy are achieved.
However, there is a fatal defect in their constructions. The
collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked
users can recover all the session keys which they were not
authorized to.
In terms of storage overhead, the schemes require that each
user stores a personal key for each session. It comes from
the procedure of Setup and after receiving the session key
distribution broadcast. Communication overhead comes from
the procedure of Broadcast. Generally speaking, the broadcast
message for the j -th session consists of identifiers of a set
of revoked users. Since the user identities can be selected
from a small finite field , one can ignore the communication
overhead brought by the identifies of all the revoked users set
[29]. Computation overhead is introduced by the procedures
of Key Recovery and Self-healing. It is supposed that the GM
has more resource to operate computation while end users have
limited computational ability. Therefore, we talk only about
the computation cost at users’ end. For different cryptographic
primitives the schemes based on, the computation overhead
varies.
To clarify the performance of the proposed schemes, we
present a thorough comparison of them. Table 2 summarizes the
comparison in terms of storage, communication, computation
overheads and several security parameters. We use C to denote
Construction and S to denote Scheme, for example, C3 in [10]
TABLE 2. Performance comparison among different polynomial secret-sharing based self-healing key distribution schemes.
Forward and Secure
Storage Communication Computation backward Collusion channel in
Method overhead overhead overhead secrecy resistance initialization
C3 in [10] (m − j + 1)2 logp (mt2 + 2mt + m + t) logp 2mt2 + 3mt − t Both, t-wise At most t Yes
S3 in [27] 2(m − j + 1) logp [(m − j + 1)t + (m + 1)] logp mt + t + 2tj + j Both, t-wise At most t Yes
S2 in [26] (m − j + 1) logp (2tj + j) logp 2j (t2 + t) Both, t-wise At most t Yes
C1 in [29] (m − j + 1) logp (tj + j − t − 1) logp j (2t + 1) Both, t-wise At most t Yes
[28] (m − j + 1) logp (t + 1)tj logp j (2t2 + 3t) Both, t-wise At most t Yes
[13] logp (t + 1)j logp j (logp + 2t2 + 2t) Both, t-wise At most t No
C1 in [14] (m − j + 1) logp (t + 1) logp 2t + 1 Both, t-wise No Yes
C2 in [14] (m − j + 1) logp (t + 1) logp 2(t2 + t) Both, t-wise No Yes
The Computer Journal, Vol. 54 No. 4, 2011







Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes for Wireless Networks 557
denote the ‘Construction 3’ in [10]. We suppose the life-span
of schemes is m sessions. j represents the order of a session, t
represents the maximum number of users that can be revoked
and logp represents the length of private and session keys. The
storage overhead is measured by the length of personal key.
The communication overhead comes from broadcast messages.
For a user Ui at the j -th session, the computation overhead
is incurred by recovering all previous session keys up to the
j -session (worst case) by self-healing mechanism [14]. The key
recovery operations include computing one or more points on
polynomials (such as operations in [27, 29]) or recovering a
t degree polynomial by using Lagrange formulation (such as
operations in [13, 14, 26, 28]) or both (such as operations in
[10]). Computing a point on a t degree polynomial requires at
most t multiplication operations and division can be regarded
as multiplication when we calculate computation overhead.
Compared with the overhead brought by multiplication, the
overhead brought by addition and hash operations can be
neglected. Therefore, the computation cost for each user is 2t+1
of ‘Construction 1’in [14], whereas the computation complexity
of the scheme of ‘Construction 1’ in [29] is j (2t +1). Recovery
of a t degree polynomial by using Lagrange formulation requires
2{(t+1)2 −(t+1)} = 2(t2 + t) multiplication operations. Thus
the computation overhead of ‘Scheme 2’ in [26] is 2j ((t2 + t))
and that of ‘Construction 2’ in [14] is 2((t2 + t)). t-wise for
forward and backward secrecy means these schemes can keep
forward and backward secrecy for the coalition of at most t
unauthorized users. The capability of resisting collusion means
the scheme is secure even at most t newly joined users and
revoked users collude to recover the session keys that they do
not authorized to access. Up to now, the scheme in [13] has
been the only self-healing key distribution scheme without the
requirement of secure channel between members and the GM
in initialization stage.
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FIGURE 3. This figure demonstrates storage overhead of four
representative schemes when m varies from 0 to 100 and j = m/2.
In most of the previous schemes, storage and communication
overhead increases with the order of a session. Computation
overhead for the current session key is fixed in each session
while computation overhead for self-healing mechanism
increases with the order of session too. Without loss generality,
we set j = m/2. In addition, we assume that p is a 64-bit
integer. Suppose the maximum number of sessions m = 100
and the number of revoked users vary from 0 to 100. We further
use figures to illustrate the performance of the existing schemes.
For simplicity, we compare only several representative schemes.
They are ‘Construction 1’ in [13, 26, 29], and ‘Construction 1’
in [14].
Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate the increase in tendency in terms
of storage, communication and computation overhead for the
four self-healing key distribution schemes, respectively. As can
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FIGURE 4. Communication overhead of four representative schemes
when t varies from 0 to 100, m = 100 and j = m/2 = 50.
Given t=50, the computation overhead increases with j execept scheme 
[13]




















FIGURE 5. Computation overhead of four representative schemes
when j varies from 1 to 100 given t = 50.
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be seen from the figures, the scheme in [13] has lowest storage
overhead, while the Construction 2 in [14] is the best scheme
in terms of communication and computation overhead.
5.2. Vector space secret-sharing-based self-healing key
distribution schemes
Sáez [16] considered applying vector space secret-sharing
instead of polynomial secret-sharing schemes to realize self-
healing key distribution scheme. The scheme makes use of
general monotone decreasing structures for the family of subsets
of users that can be revoked instead of a threshold one.
Thus the scheme achieves more flexible performance than
polynomial secret-sharing-based schemes. Another advantage
of the scheme is that the distance between the broadcasts used to
recover the lost one is variable. The reason for this modification
is to allow adjusting the length of broadcasts according to the
condition of networks. In the same year, Sáez [17] considered
the possibility that a coalition of users sponsors a user outside
the group for one session. First, the formal definition and some
bounds on the required amount of information were given.
Then a general construction of a family of self-healing key
distribution schemes with sponsorization was presented. The
sponsorization mechanism strengthens the robustness of the
scheme. An authorized subset of users in the group has the
ability to invite a new user to join the group without the help of
the GM. Both [16] and [17] are unconditionally secure schemes.
The model in [17] not only includes Definitions 1 and 2 but also
includes Definition 3.
Definition 3. The scheme has the property of sponsorization.
This means that the three following properties are satisfied:
(i) Every user Ul ∈ Gj can generate a proof of
sponsorization P jli to sponsor a user Ui ∈ Gj for
session j using his personal key. In other words:
H(P
j
li |Sl) = 0. (8)
(ii) A user Ui ∈ Gj that receives enough sponsorization
from a subset of users A ⊂ Gj with A ∈  can compute
the key Kj in the same conditions that users in Gj . That
is: for A ∈ , A ⊂ Gj , i ∈ Gj and r ≤ j ≤ s, there
exists
H(Kj |P jAi, Br, Bs) = 0 (9)
(iii) Suppose that a coalition of usersUi1 , . . . , Uiu ∈ Gj , not
revoked before session j , have received sponsorization
from subsets of users C1, . . . , Cu ∈ , respectively,
with C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cu = {Ul1 , . . . , Ulv } ⊂ Gj . This
action is performed in such a way that usersUl1 , . . . , Ulv
sponsor subsets of users D1, . . . , Dv ∈ S, respectively,
with D1 ∪ . . . ∪ Dv = {Ui1 , . . . , Uiu} ⊂ U − Gj ;
therefore, P jC1i1 , . . . , P
j
Cuiu
= P jl1D1 , . . . , P jlvDv . In these
conditions, such a coalition does not get any information
about the value of key Kj . Formally, it holds that:
H(Kj |P jC1i1 , . . . , P jCuiu , Br, Bs) = H(Kj) (10)




, . . . , P
j
Cuiu
= P jl1D1 , . . . , P jlvDv , C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Cu ={Ul1 , . . . , Ulv } ⊂ Gj , D1∪. . .∪Dv = {Ui1 , . . . , Uiu} ⊂
U − Gj and r ≤ j ≤ s.
In Definition 3, Condition (i) describes the property of
sponsorization: the information used to sponsor is computed
from the personal key. Condition (ii) describes the fact that
the information obtained from enough sponsorizations with the
correspondent broadcast allows to compute the personal key of
the session. Condition (iii) describes the security requirement:
a coalition of users outside Gj sponsored by not enough users
cannot obtain any information about the value of the keyKj . The
key remains secure even if every user receives sponsorization
of a coalitions in S.
The self-healing key distribution scheme with sponsorization
includes six procedures. The process was described in Fig. 2
of [34].
(i) Setup: The GM randomly chooses t × t matrices
P1, . . . , Pm and session keys K1, . . . , Km ∈ GF(q).
For each session j = 1, . . . , m, the group manager
computes the vector zj = Kj + ψ(D)Pj ∈ GF(q)T .
For each Ui ∈ G1, the GM computes the person key
Si = (ψ(i)P1, . . . , ψ(i)Pm) ∈ GF(q)tm. The use of
specific function ψ fixes the properties of the scheme.
(ii) Broadcast: In j th session, Suppose Rj ⊂ Gj−1 with
R1 ∪ . . . ∪ Rj ∈ R if j ≥ 2. By definition, we have
R1 = φ. The GM chooses a maximal non-authorized
subset of users Wj ∈ R0 = 0 such that R1 ∪ . . .∪Rj ⊂
Wj and Wj ∩ Gj = ψ with minimum cardinality. The
broadcast Bj in session j = 1, . . . , m is given in the
form of Bj = B1j ∪B2j . The first part B1j is composed of
vectors zj and each zj is divided into two parts (xj , yj )
where the xj is the first part of the binary representation
of every component of zj and yj is the second part. Then
B1j = (Xj , Yj ), where
Xj =
{
xj if j = 1, 2
x1 + x2, . . . , x1 + xj−1, xj if j = 3, . . . , m
Yj =
{
yj , ym + yj+1, . . . , ym + ym−1 if j = 1, 2
yj if j = m − 1,m
The second part of the broadcast is defined as follows:
B2j =
{
{(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj j = 1, 2
B2j−1 ∪ {(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj j ≥ 3
(iii) Key recovery: When a non-revoked user Ui receives
the key distribution message Bj for session j , since
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Ui ∈ Gj has {(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj and its personal
key, it computes ψ(D)Pj using {(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj∪{i}
because Wj ∪{i} ∈ . In fact, as far as Wj ∪{i} ∈ , the
result ψ(D) = ∑k∈Wj∪{i} λkψ(k) holds for some λk ∈
GF(q). Therefore, ψ(D)Pj = ∑k∈Wj∪{i} λkψ(k)Pj .
From the broadcast information Bj , then Ui recovers
the j th session key
Kj = zj − ψ(D)Pj .
(iv) Self-healing: The phase can be seen as an iterative
algorithm of Key recovery. If a user Ui receives two
broadcast message Br and Bs , it can recover the
polynomials zr , zr+1, . . . , zs . If Ui is an authorized user
for session j (j = r, . . . , s), it performs the exact
operation on each zj and {(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj as it does
in the procedure of Key recovery. Then it can recover the
session keys Kr, . . . , Ks .
(v) Adding or revoking users: If the GM wants to add
users Jj ⊂ U in session j , the GM computes
Si = (ψ(i)Pj+1, . . . , ψ(i)Pm) ∈ GF(q)t(m−j+1)
and send it to each user Ui ∈ Jj as its personal key
through the secure channel between them.
If the GM want to revoke users Rj ⊂ Gj−1 in session
j , what the GM should do is adding the identifiers of
users in Rj to Wj and constructing a new broadcast
message. The revoked users cannot decode the broadcast
message Bj .
(vi) Sponsored addition of users: If a user Ul ∈ Gj wants to
sponsor a user Ui ∈ Gj for session j , then it computes
(l, ψ(l)Pjψ(i)) from its personal key (l, ψ(l)Pj ) and
privately sends it to Ui . Then the sponsored user can
compute the current session key. See [17] for detail of
key computation by the sponsored user.
In fact, polynomial secret-sharing-based self-healing key
distribution scheme is a particular case of vector space secret-
sharing-based scheme. In the class of polynomial secret-
sharing-based schemes, the access structure is fixed to the
degree of the underlying polynomial. Therefore, vector space
secret-sharing-based schemes achieve more flexible properties.
The schemes [16, 17] use the same vector space
secret-sharing mechanism. The storage, communication and
computation overheads are much similar. In terms of storage
overhead, each user has to store a personal key of size
(m − j + 1) logp in [16] and [17]. The storage overhead is
optimal with respect to Theorem 1 in [16]. The communication
overhead comes from the broadcast which depends on the
particular function ψ used. According to [16], the broadcast
can be divided into two parts. The first part of broadcast
is defined as (xj , yj ). The total number of broadcast bits is
(1 + (t + 1)(m − 1 − t/2)) logp. According to [17], B11
and B1m have 1/2tm logp bits and B1j for j = 1,m has
1/2t (m− 1) logp bits. Then the total number of broadcast bits
is 1/2t (m2 −m+2) logp. The second part of broadcast in both
[16] and [17] is composed of the identities of revoked users and
its purpose is to perform the rejection capability as well as the
recovery of the session key. Its length depends on the history of
rejected subsets. Since the user identities can be chosen from a
small finite field, we can ignore the communication overhead
for the broadcast of all those revoked sets. The computation
overhead of [16] and [17] is 2∑jl=1(t2l + tl) because the user
Ui has to compute ψ(D)Pj = ∑k∈Wj∪{i} λkψ(k)Pj for each
lost key. Here we use Table 3 to highlight the features of
the two schemes. The schemes [18–20] are hash chain-based
self-healing key distribution schemes with vector space secret-
sharing-based masking mechanism. The performance of them
will be compared in Table 4.
5.3. SDR-based self-healing key distribution schemes
SDR [35] is a stateless rekeying method. In this protocol, a key
server maintains a logical key tree and every user is mapped
to a leaf node of the key tree. In each rekeying operation, the
key server partitions the current group into a minimal number
of subsets, and then encrypts the new group key with the
common key of each subset, respectively. In this scheme, the
communication overhead is independent of the group size, thus
the scheme is scalable. One of the advantage of the scheme is
that there is no dependency between the keys used in different
rekeying operations. In order to decode the current group key, a
user only needs to receive the keys that are transmitted by the key
server during the current rekey operation. This property makes
the SDR scheme very attractive for secure multicast applications
where users may go offline frequently or experience burst packet
losses.
The SDR method has good performance in key recovery
operation and is secure against the collusion of any number of
revoked users. In contrast, polynomial-based key distribution
TABLE 3. Comparison of features of vector space secret-sharing-based self-healing key distribution schemes.
Storage Communication Computation Resisting
Scheme overhead overhead overhead collusion Sponsorization
[16] (m − j + 1) logp (1 + (t + 1) 2∑jl=1(t2l + tl ) Yes No
(m − 1 − t/2)) logp
[17] t (m − j + 1) logp 0.5t (m2 + m + 2) logp 2∑jl=1(t2l + tl ) Yes Yes
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TABLE 4. Summary on the one-way hash function based self-healing key distribution schemes.
Storage Communication Computation Partial collusion
Scheme Cryptographic primitives overhead overhead overhead resistance
C1 of [14] hash function and polynomial secret
sharing
(m − j + 1) logp (t + 1) logp 2t + 1 No
[18] hash function and vector space secret
sharing
2(ti − si + 1) logp (tj + 1) logp 2(tj 2 + tj ) No
[36] hash function and XOR operation (m − j + 2) logp j logp constant No
[19] hash function, vector space secret sharing
and XOR operation
(2ti − 2si + 3) logp (tj + 1) logp 2(tj 2 + tj ) Yes
C1 in [15] hash function, polynomial secret sharing 2(ti − si + 1) logp (t + 1) logp 2t (t + 1) Yes
C2 in [15] hash function, polynomial secret sharing 2(ti − si + 1) logp (t + 1) logp 2(t + 1) Yes
[20] hash function, vector space secret sharing (ti − si + t + 2) logp (tj + 1) logp 2(tj 2 + tj ) Yes
proposed by Liu et al. [27] has the similar message size and has
the feature that group users can recover group on its own under
some conditions. However, this protocol has a constraint which
may limit its application. That is, the maximum number of users
that can be revoked during the life-long time of networks has
to be pre-determined and must not be exceeded for the sake of
security. The maximum number of users that can be revoked is
depend on the degree of the polynomial. The higher the degree
of the polynomial is, the larger the number of the users that can
be revoked, and the larger the communication and computation
overhead is and vice versa.
Zhu et al. first addressed adding self-healing feature to SDR
in [22]. The key idea is to bind the ability of a user to recover a
lost group key to its membership duration. They used a one-
way hash key chain such that revoked users and new users
cannot collude to recover the keys that they should not know.
The notions are different from those used in the general self-
healing key distribution schemes. The scheme can be displayed
as follows:
(i) In each group rekeying, the GM generates a key chain
of size m + 1. Let the keys in the key chain generated
for the rekeying at T (i) be Km(i), . . . , K1(i),K0(i),
where K0(i) = H(K1(i)) = H 2(K2(i))) = . . . =
Hm(Km(i))) and H is a one-way hash function such
as SHA-1. Due to the one-wayness of the hash
function, a user who knows Kji can compute all the
keys Kj−1(i), . . . , K0(i) independently, but it cannot
compute all of the keysKj+1(i), . . . , Km(i).K0(i) is the
group key that all the users should use for data encryption
between T (i) and T (i + 1).
(ii) The users in the group are considered to be partitioned
into m+1 subgroups, depending upon their membership
duration, each subgroup is associated with a separate
key from the one-way key chain generated in the first
step. Specifically, Kj(i) is the key intended for the users
that joined the group at T (i − j) for 0 ≤ j < m, and
Km(i) is the key intended for users that joined at or before
T (i − m).
(iii) The GM broadcasts m encrypted keys as shown below:
{K0(i − m)}K0(i−m−1)⊕Km(i), . . . ,
{K0(i − 1)}K0(i−2)⊕K1(i).
The communication overhead of this protocol is very small.
To allow an authorized user to recover the previous s group keys,
the number of additional encryption keys to be transmitted is at
most 3s.
Bohio et al. [23] considered incorporating the self-healing
feature to SDR rekeying method too. Some optimization
techniques that can be used to reduce the overhead caused by the
self-healing capability are proposed in the paper. In addition,
the idea of mutual-healing was discussed. One motivation
behind mutual-healing is that, if a node has missed a key
updating message, it does not have to wait until the next update
broadcast to recover the previous session key, instead it can
acquire assistance from its neighboring nodes to recover that key
instantly. The procedures of self-healing and mutual-healing are
displayed in Fig. 6.
However, the SDR scheme itself has a limitation. The
positions of the revoked users in the tree cannot be reused. This
deficiency discounts the feasibility of SDR-based self-healing
key distribution schemes accordingly.
5.4. Hash chain-based self-healing key distribution
schemes
Jiang et al. [21] proposed an efficient self-healing group
key scheme with time-limited node revocation based on dual
directional hash chains (DDHCs). The performance of the
proposed scheme under poor broadcast channel was evaluated
by both theoretical analysis and numerical results. The result
shows that the scheme tolerates high channel loss rate, and
hence makes a good balance between performance and security.
Therefore, it is suitable for wireless networks.
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FIGURE 6. The basic procedures in a self-healing and mutual-healing
key distribution scheme, where the small panes are operation which
must be executed in each round, the small dashed frame represents the
operations which may not be executed in some round of the scheme.
As aforementioned, the schemes [14, 18] are based on hash
chain. The difference is that [14] utilizes polynomial secret-
sharing masking mechanism, thus the maximum number of
the revoked users is constrained by the degree of polynomial
while [18] adopts general access structure thus achieves flexible
property. The proposed self-healing technique enables better
performance over previous approaches in terms of storage,
communication and computation complexity. They provided
proof of the security of the proposed scheme under an
appropriate security framework. The proof shows that the
scheme is computationally secure and achieves both forward
and backward secrecy. Kausar et al. [36] proposed a simpler
self-healing key distribution scheme. In their scheme, all
broadcast messages are masked with XOR operation. The
scheme is efficient in terms of storage and computation
overhead. However, the operation of dealing with compromised
node are too cockamamie to afford. If one compromised node
is detected, all nodes are forced to be re-initialized.
Due to the efficiency of hash function, these schemes reduce
both communication and computation overheads greatly. At
the same time, forward and backward secrecy were achieved.
However, there is a fatal defect in these constructions. The
collusion between the newly joined users and the revoked users
will recover all the session keys which they are not entitled
to. Tian et al. in [19] dealt with the problem gracefully. They
assigned each user Ui a pre-arranged life cycle (si, ti). Random
numbers which is related to the users’ membership are used in
the procedure of Key recovery. Compared with the scheme in
[18], the scheme in [19] not only keeps forward and backward
secrecy but also resists collusion between the newly joined users
and the revoked users. As far as we know, this is the first time to
defend collusion attack against hash chain based self-healing
key distribution schemes. The schemes in [15, 20] slightly
reduced storage and computation overheads of the scheme [19]
with polynomial secret-sharing masking mechanism and vector
space secret-sharing masking mechanism, respectively. In our
recent research, we found that the schemes [15, 19, 20] can
only resist collusion between the users whose life cycles have
finished and newly joined users. They in fact could not resist
collusion attacks of newly joined users and revoked users whose
life cycles have not yet expired. How to resist collusion of newly
joined users and revoked users whose life cycles have not yet
expired is an unsolved problem.
Similarly, the self-healing key distribution scheme [19] is
composed of five procedures.
(i) Setup: The GM produces a sequence of m random
numbers r1, . . . , rm by using a pseudo-random number
generator of large enough period. The GM randomly
picks two initial key seeds, SF and SB , from GF(q). In
the pre-processing time, it computes two hash chains of
equal length m by repeatedly applying the same one-way
hash function H on each seed KF0 = SF and KB0 = SB .
For 1 ≤ j ≤ m, the hash sequences are generated as
follows:
{KF0 = SF ,H(KF0 ), . . . , H j (KF0 ), . . . , Hm(KF0 )}
{KB0 = SB,H(KB0 ), . . . , H j (KB0 ), . . . , Hm(KB0 )}
The session key of the j th session is computed as:
SKj = KFj + (KBm−j+1 ⊕ rj )
The GM randomly chooses vectors P1, . . . , Pm ∈
GF(q)l . For each session j = 1, . . . , m, the GM pre-
computes the scalar zj = KBm−j+1 + ψ(D)Pj ∈
GF(q). Each user Ui is first assigned a prearranged life
cycle (s, t) where 1 ≤ s < t ≤ m, thus Ui will be
involved in k = t − s + 1 number sessions. The GM
privately send personal key Si to Ui . It is in the following
form:
(KFs ‖rs, . . . , rt‖(ψ(i)Ps, . . . , ψ(i)Pt))
It is composed of a forward key KFs for ses-
sion s, k random numbers and secret vectors
(ψ(i)Ps, . . . , ψ(i)Pt)
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(ii) Broadcast: Suppose Rj ⊆ Gj−1 with R1 ∪ . . .∪Rj ∈ R
for session j . By definition R1 = φ. The GM chooses a
maximal non-authorized subset of users Wj ∈ R0 = 0
such that R1 ∪ . . . ∪ Rj ⊂ Wj and with minimum
cardinality. The broadcast Bj = B1j ∪ B2j in session




{(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj j = 1, 2
B2j−1 ∪ {(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj j ≥ 3
(iii) Key recovery: When an authorized user Ui received the
key distribution messageBj for session j , sinceUi ∈ Gj
has {(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj and its personal key, it computes
ψ(D)Pj using {(k, ψ(k)Pj )}k∈Wj∪{i} because Wj ∪
{i} ∈ . Therefore, ψ(D)Pj = ∑k∈Wj∪{i} λkψ(k)Pj .
From the broadcast information Bj , Ui can recover the
backward key
KBm−j+1 = zj − ψ(D)Pj .
At last, Ui computes the j th forward key KFj =
Hj−1(SF ) and evaluates the current session key
SKj = KFj + (KBm−j+1 ⊕ rj ).
(iv) Adding or revoking users: When the GM wants to add a
new user the communication group, the GM assigns a life
circle (s, t) and an unused identity v ∈ GF(q) to the new
user. The group manager computes the personal secret
key Sv = (KFs ‖rs, . . . , rt ||ψ(v)Ps, . . . , ψ(v)Pt))
and send it to this new user via the secure communication
channel between them.
When the GM wants to revoke a user from the
communication group, the GM adds the revoked user
to the non-authorized subset of users such that R1 ∪
. . . ∪ Rj ⊂ Wj and with minimum cardinality. Then
the GM constructs the broadcast message based on Wj .
Only authorized users can recover session keys from the
broadcast message due to the special construction of the
broadcast message.
The broadcast Bj = B1j ∪B2j in session j = 1, . . . , m
is given as follows.
(v) Self-healing: Suppose Ui is a user who receives
broadcast messages Bj1 and Bj2 in session j1 and j2,
respectively, where 1 ≤ j1 < j2 ≤ m, but misses
broadcast message Bj for the session j , where j1 <
j < j2, Ui , can still recover all the lost session keys Kj
(j1 < j < j2) as follows:
(a) Ui recovers the backward key KBm−j+1 from the
broadcast messageBj2 in session j2. Then it repeatedly
apply the one-way hash function on KBm−j+1 to
compute the backward hash sequence for the session
j (j1 < j < j2).
(b) Ui computes the forward keys KFj for all j (j1 ≤ j ≤
j2) by repeatedly applying the one-way hash function
H on the forward key KFj1 .
(c) Ui recovers all the session keys SKj = KFj +
(KBm−j+1 ⊕ rj ), for j1 < j < j2.
The hash chain itself cannot be the only cryptographic
primitive of a self-healing key distribution scheme. It forms
a self-healing key distribution scheme together with other
cryptographic primitives. For example, the scheme [21] is base
on hash function and MAC, the scheme [36] is base on hash
function and XOR operation, the scheme in [14, 15] is based
on hash function and polynomial secret sharing, while the
schemes in [18–20] are based on hash chain and vector space
secret sharing. These schemes share some commonness and
each has its special features as well. We summarize the features
of one-way hash function-based self-healing key distribution
schemes in Table 4 without [21]. In fact, the scheme in
[21] is a totally different self-healing group key distribution
mechanism. It supposes that there is a buffer at each sensor
in order to recover the lost session keys. Each user has to
send the Request Key message to explicitly request the current
rekeying message for the current session. That is, this self-
healing mechanism involves interaction between the user and
the GM. The communication overhead varies at different user
end and it depends on how many rekeying messages the user
fails to receives and how large the renewal interval t is. Because
each message is encrypted with a Traffic Encryption key (TEK),
the computation overhead varies according to the encryption
mechanism. The authors did not suggest which encryption
mechanism is suitable for the scheme. Therefore, we exclude the
scheme [21] from the Table 4. In Table 4, the storage overhead
of a user Ui is the size of its personal key which is closely
related to its life cycle (si, ti). The communication overhead
comes from the broadcast messages for Key recovery and Self-
healing. The communication overhead at the j th session in [18–
20] is (tj + 1) logp bits, where tj = |Wj ∪ Rj |, Rj ∈  is
the set of all revoked users for sessions in and before j and
Wj ⊂ U\Gj with minimum cardinality such that Wj ∪ Rj ∈
0. The computation overhead is measured by the number of
multiplication in the underlying field. In terms of computation
overhead of the scheme in [36], it only includes hash and XOR
operations, so the computation overhead at user end in [36]
is a constant compared with that of other schemes such as
[18] and [19]. The computation overhead of Key recovery in
[18–20] is 2(t2j + tj ). This is the number of multiplication
operations needed to recover ψ(D) by using equation ψ(D) =∑
k∈Wj∪{i} λkψ(k) [18]. This is because self-healing mechanism
involves only hash and addition operations. Compared with the
computation overhead brought by multiplication operations, the
computation overhead brought by hash and addition operations
can be neglected.
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5.5. Bilinear pairing-based self-healing key distribution
schemes
Although a formal definition of ID-based cryptosystems have
been known for a while [37], the first fully functional fitting all
the requirements ID-based cryptosystem appeared only quite
recently in [38]. Inspired by the idea of [38], Du et al. proposed
a broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution in [39]. We
extended the broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution
to a self-healing key distribution scheme in [24] and further
proposed formal definition and security model in [40]. The
whole process is displayed as follows:
(i) Setup: It is supposed that the GM obtains both
public system parameters params = {G1,G2, q, P ,
Ppub,H1, H2} and its private key s and all the public
key of possible users from an ID-based public key
infrastructure (PKI). The GM makes params public
and keeps s secret. In params, where G1 is a cyclic
additive group and G2 is a cyclic multiplicative group
and both of them of the same large prime order q;
P ∈ G1 and s ∈ Z∗q and Ppub = sP ; H1 and H2 are
two cryptographic hash functions: H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
H2 : G2 → {0, 1}∗. Each node is preloaded with a
public/private key pair (Qi, Si) where Qi = H1(IDi)
and Si = sQi before the deployment of the network.
Here we suppose each user Ui has a unique identifier
IDi . The GM choosesm session keysK1, . . . , Km from
Z
∗
q . The session keys are independent to each other and
according to uniform distribution.
(ii) Broadcast: Suppose |Gj | denotes the number of users in
session j . For each session 1 ≤ j ≤ m, according to the
session group Gj , the GM computes QY1 =
∑n
i=1 Qi
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Let a ′i represents the transpose of ai . The group manager
also constructers |Gj | − 1 auxiliary keys
QYi = (Q1,Q2, . . . ,Q|Gj |) × a
′
i 2 ≤ i ≤ |Gj |
which means QY2 = Q1 + Q2, QY3 = Q1 +
Q3, . . . ,QY|Gj | = Q1 + Q|Gj |. The broadcast message
is then formed by computing, for a random rj ∈ Z∗q ,
X1 = rjP Xi = rjQYi 2 ≤ i ≤ |Gj |,
Yj = Kj ⊕ H2(e(Ppub, rjQY1))
Let zj = (Xi(1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj |), Yj ). The j -th broadcast
is in the following form:
Bj = {z1, . . . , zj }.
(iii) Key recovery: When a user Ui ∈ Gj receives
the broadcast message Bj , it sets a vector a1 =
(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with |Gj | elements, and only the











Ui can solve the following system of equations using
Cramer’s rule or other algebraic methods.
(x1, x2, . . . , x|Gj |) × Aj = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
With (x1, x2, . . . , x|Gj |), Ui gets








⎟⎟⎟⎠ = QY1 .
In order to decrypt the ciphertext, user Ui needs to
compute e(Ppub, rjQY1), which with knowledge the
private key Si it can do via:
e(Ppub, rjQY1)
= e(Ppub, rj (x1Qi + x2QY2 + . . . + x|Gj |QY|Gj |))
= e(Ppub, rj x1Qi) · e(Ppub, rj (x2QY2 + . . .
+ x|Gj |QY|Gj |))
= e(rjP, x1sQi) · e(Ppub, x2rjQY2 + . . .
+ x|Gj |rjQY|Gj |)
= e(X1, x1Si) · e(Ppub, x2X2 + . . . + x|Gj |X|Gj |).
Then, Ui can recover the session key




(iv) Self-healing: Without loss of generality, suppose Ui
misses the broadcast message for a session t < j . As
far as it belongs to the session group Gt , it picks up the
polynomial zt from broadcast message Bj and forms
the |Gt |×|Gt | matrix At as operations in the procedure
of Key recovery. Then, Ui solves the following system
of equations.
(x1, x2, . . . , x|Gt |) × At = (1, 1, . . . , 1).
With (x1, x2, . . . , x|Gt |), Ui gets








⎟⎟⎟⎠ = QY1 .
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After that, with knowledge its private key Si , Ui
computes e(Ppub, rtQY1) as follows:
e(Ppub, rtQY1)
= e(Ppub, rt (x1Qi + x2QY2 + . . . + x|Gt |QY|Gt |))
= e(Ppub, rtx1Qi) · e(Ppub, rt (x2QY2 + . . .
+ x|Gt |QY|Gt |))
= e(rtP , x1sQi) · e(Ppub, x2rtQY2 + . . .
+ x|Gt |rtQY|Gt |)
= e(X1, x1Si) · e(Ppub, x2X2 + . . . + x|Gt |X|Gt |).
Finally, Ui recovers the lost session key




If more than one broadcast message get lost, the opera-
tion of key recovery is the same as aforementioned.
(v) Adding or revoking user: If a new user Unew apply for
joining the session j , the GM checks its validity firstly.
If it is an authorized user, in the procedure of broadcast,
the GM constructs a new (|Gj | − 1) × |Gj | matrix
and computes new QYi (1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj |) which should
includes Ynew.
If a user Urov is revoked in session j , what the group
manager should do is constructing a new (|Gj | − 1) ×
|Gj | matrix and computing new QYi (1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj |)
which should excludes Qrov.
The adding and revoking operations are very efficient
in our scheme. For the condition that more than
one user join or revoke, the operations preform as
aforementioned.
This scheme achieves some good properties. In terms of
storage overhead, each user stores only the GM’s public key
and its public/private key pair. The GM’s public key Ppub = sP
which is a point on G1 and the order of G1 is q. The length
of the GM’s public key is 2 log q. Because H1 is a mapping
from {0, 1}∗ to G1 , so the length of the personal public key
Qi = H1(IDi) is 2 log q. The private key is the multiplication
of the master key s ∈ Z∗q and the public key, so the size of
private keys is 2 log q. Therefore, the storage overhead for each
group user is 6 log q. Therefore, the storage overhead for each
user is a constant.
The communication overhead comes from the broadcast
message Bj = {z1, . . . , zj }. zj is composed of Xi(1 ≤
i ≤ |Gj |) and Yj . The size of Xi(1 ≤ i ≤ |Gj |) is
2 log q and the size of Yj is log q bits. Therefore, the length
of zj equals to (2|Gj | + 1) log q, which increases in direct
proportion to |Gj |. Consequently, the size of broadcast message
Bj is
∑j
l=1(2|Gl| + 1) log q bits, which is related to the total
number of users
∑j
i=1 |Gi | in all the communication groups for
different sessions and increases in direct proportion to session
number j . Therefore, this scheme is only suitable for small-scale
networks.
All the computation in the procedure of Key recovery is as
follows: (1) Solving a set of linear equations with |Gj | variables;
(2) |Gj | + 1 scalar multiplications in the group G1; (3) |Gj |
additions in the group G1; (4) Two pairings computation; (5)
One hash computation; (6) One XOR operation. Generally
speaking, bilinear pairing computation is more time-consuming
than scalar multiplication, let alone addition, hash and XOR
operation. Therefore, the main computation overhead comes
form (4). The computation overhead of the users at Key recovery
stage is two pairing operations.
This scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of
unauthorized users, including the revoked users and the newly
joined users. In our scheme, if a user wants to obtain the
session key Ki , it should compute e(X1, x1Si) in the procedure
of Key recovery with personal key Si . Therefore, only the
authorized users can recover the session key. In addition, due
to the difficulty of solving discrete logarithm problem (DLP),
any coalition of non-authorized users cannot derive the private
keys of authorized users from their public keys. The personal
private key has nothing to do with the number of revoked users
and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed. Most important
of all, this paper presented technique to perform mutual-healing
between neighboring nodes.As far as we know, it is the first self-
healing key distribution scheme using bilinear pairings. it is also
the first time to explore technical details of mutual-healing in
self-healing key distribution schemes.
6. THREE CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO
SELF-HEALING KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEMES
In this section, we discuss three considerations which can be
used to strengthen the robustness of the basic self-healing key
distribution schemes. The first one is sponsorization, the second
one is mutual healing and the last one is authentication on
broadcast messages.
6.1. Sponsorization
The motivation for sponsorization is to give dynamism to
the general scheme, allowing an authorized subset of users
in the group to invite a new user for one session without
the interference of the GM. This feature has been considered
in other distributed protocols such as group key distribution
schemes in [41] and [42]. Sáez [17] considered the process
that a coalition of users sponsors a user outside the group
for one session. For the sake of security, it is required that
only a coalition of authorized users in an access structure
can perform this action. A secure unicast channel between
each sponsor and the sponsored user is necessary in order
to fulfill the sponsorization. It is a rigorous requirement
which is infeasible for wireless sensor networks. In addition,
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the operations introduces too much communication and
computation overheads. The motivation is good while the
realization is troublesome.
6.2. Mutual healing
More et al. [11] pointed out that the protocol discussed in
[10] suffers from inconsistent robustness. That is, for certain
sessions, if broadcast messages get lost, the user cannot
recover the session keys, no matter how many other broadcast
messages are received. Subsequently, they used a sliding
window mechanism to make error recovery consistently robust:
after the initial Setup procedure, any lost key can be recovered
as long as two sufficiently close broadcast messages—one
before it and one after it—are received. Similar technique is
discussed in [33]. The minimum size of the window can be
dynamically adjusted according to the condition of networks.
Both [33] and [11] guarantee that authorized users can recover
window size number of session keys as long as they receive
broadcast messages. However, how to recover the session
key if the last broadcast message gets lost or more than
sliding window number of broadcast messages get lost are
never addressed clearly. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to
make users completely self-healing according to the existing
self-healing key distribution mechanism. In view of some
concrete applications, such as live and pay-per-view TV, have
strict requirement of freshness. They would better lose only
a limited number of broadcast messages. Therefore, it is
meaningful to explore counterpart measures to deal with the
aforementioned issues.
The idea of mutual-healing was proposed in [23] by Bohio
et al. The so-called mutual healing is, if a user has missed more
than a fixed number of broadcast messages or the last broadcast
message, it can apply for assistance from its neighboring nodes.
The neighboring users in the same session group cooperate
with each other forwarding broadcast messages which the
neighboring users miss. By this way, the authorized users can
get the missed broadcast messages in a timely and efficient
manner. Thus the robustness of self-healing key distribution
schemes is strengthened. It was claimed in [23] that there
are two requirements for mutual healing: the authentication of
requesting users and the users’ authorization for the requested
session keys. On the one hand, in order to avoid attacks on
their limited resource, effective authentication of requesting
user must be developed to identify misbehaving users. On
the other hand, as messages are broadcasted in the form
of plain text, anyone can read them. We argue that the
second authentication is unnecessary. Instead, the neighboring
users need to forward only the broadcasted message which
corresponds to the requested session key. If the requesting user is
authorized for the session, it would be able to recover the session
key. However, even unauthorized users can receive broadcast
messages, they cannot recover the session key.
The paper [23] proposed only a general idea without
exploring technical details. We targeted the problem with
bilinear pairings technique in [24]. The definition and security
model for mutual healing key distribution was formalized
in [40]. By binding the identity and location of nodes, the
authors explored the ways to realize mutual healing. A pair-
wise key is the byproduct of authentication. The pair-wise key
can be used for private communication between two nodes.
The authentication process is helpful to identify cooperating
or misbehaving nodes. However, the prerequisite of [40] is
the awareness of the identity and location of each node.
This prerequisite implies that the scheme [40] is suitable for
static wireless sensor networks. Although the mutual-healing
technique is more useful in mobile network, tt is not trivial to
realize mutual healing in mobile environment.
6.3. Authentication on broadcast messages
In self-healing key distribution schemes, session keys are
masked by some private elements. The broadcast messages
for key distribution are transmitted in plain text form. The
existing self-healing key distribution schemes focus on the
exact construction and improvement of performance. It is
supposed that the broadcast channel can keep the integrity
of broadcast message. However, in real network environment,
the adversaries can launch various attacks, such as substitute
a false message for a legitimate one and modify broadcast
message, on broadcast message easily. This assumption is not
compatible with real application. In order to keep the correctness
and availability of a self-healing key distribution scheme, it
should be possible for the users in the communication group
to verify that the broadcast messages have not been substituted
or modified in transit. Attempts to add an integrity checking
property to existing protocols often focus on cryptographic
authentication mechanisms. Aside from the limited resource
that make digital signature schemes impractical, authentication
in sensor networks poses serious complications. It is unclear
how to establish trust especially in large-scale ad hoc
deployments. Adding security often fails even in systems
without these additional constraints. Therefore, efficient and
effective authentication on the identity of the GM and the
integrity of broadcasts are of great importance. Otherwise, the
correctness of the recovered session keys cannot be guaranteed.
Designing the authentication mechanism for wireless networks
is an important research topic at present.
Intuitionally, a symmetric key, TEK, can be used to encrypt
broadcast messages by the GM and decrypt broadcast messages
by the group users. In dynamic group communication, TEK
must be refreshed on each change of membership. Jiang
et al. [21] used TEK to prevent non-legitimate nodes from
having access to the secret broadcast contents. The TEK is
renewed periodically instead of an every node topology change.
Han et al. [34] considerate encrypting broadcast messages by
TEK, thus the integrity of broadcast messages can be kept.
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Two constructions of TEK were proposed in [34]. The first
construction brought too much computation load for the GM.
The second construction is only feasible to the self-healing key
distribution scheme proposed in [34]. It is meaningful to explore
practical ways to construct and renew TEK.
7. COMPOSITIVE ANALYSIS AND FUTURE WORK
According to the state-of-the-art research, self-healing key
distribution is the most suitable way to establish session key
for large and dynamic group communication over unreliable
wireless networks. It is one of the branch of key management
and has received much attention. In this section, first, we make
a compositive analysis on existing schemes and then we outline
the problems to be solved.
7.1. Compositive analysis on exiting schemes
Although unconditionally secure self-healing key distribution
schemes can keep strict security requirement, they should meet
some lower bounds in terms of storage and communication
overheads. Computationally secure self-healing key distribution
schemes relax the security slightly and achieve some nice
features, such as constant storage overhead. As far as
the cryptographic primitives are concerned, self-healing key
distribution schemes are limited to polynomial secret sharing,
vector space secret sharing, hash chain and SDR mechanism.
The authors of this paper tried to design bilinear pairing-based
self-healing key distribution scheme and have made a little
progress.
Figure 7 provides taxonomy of papers on self-healing
key distribution schemes. The figure is a directed acyclic
graphs where nodes represent papers. Directed edges show
predecessor/successor relations among the papers. There is
an edge from a paper to another one if the latter provides
improvement for the solution proposed by the former. Papers
are ordered over a horizontal time axis according to their
publication dates. Vertical axis groups papers under five
categories: (1) polynomial secret sharing, (2) SDR, (3) vector
space secret sharing, (4) hash chain and (5) bilinear pairing-
based self-healing key distribution schemes. The style of edge
in between two nodes represents the problem in which an
improvement is provided. A paper may based on more than
one cryptographic primitive; therefore, corresponding may be
reachable from more than one origin paper, and there may
be more than one edge with different styles in between two
papers.
Every category has its features, requirements and goals.
In summary, polynomial secret sharing is the most common
technique used to realize self-healing key distribution. It
performs easily. However, the maximum number of revoked
FIGURE 7. Taxonomy of the papers on self-healing key distribution schemes. The graph is a directed acyclic graph where nodes represent papers,
and edges represent predecessor/successor relations among solutions provided by the papers. Style of an edge represents the problem on which
destination paper provides improvements.
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users is constraint to the degree of the polynomial. In addition, in
the procedure of Key recovery, Lagrange’s interpolation formula
should be used in order to recover the secret polynomial, thus
leading to much computation overhead.
Vector space secret-sharing-based self-healing key distribu-
tion schemes consider a monotone-decreasing family of rejected
subset of users instead of a monotone decreasing threshold
structure. This general case makes the self-healing scheme more
flexible and suitable for practical application. In addition, the
constructions are general in the sense that they depend on the
particular public mappings and for different choices of public
mappings different self-healing key distribution schemes can be
attained. The length of broadcast messages also depends on the
particular function.
Hash chain has many elegant features and can be used to
design self-healing key distribution schemes. The constructions
do not need to send the recorders of revoked subsets of users
in order to perform self-healing, yielding reduction in the
communication cost. Both forward and backward secrecy and
partial collusion resistance property can be assured. However,
the collusion of the revoked nodes whose life cycles do not
expire and the newly joined nodes can recover the session keys
that they are not authorized to.
One of the remarkable properties of SDR-based self-
healing key distributions is that the personal keys of users
are independent of the number of sessions. Because of this
property, the SDR-based schemes do not require a redistribution
of any personal keys after the number of sessions exceeds the
estimation. Another remarkable property of SDR schemes is
that they can revoke any number of users and remain secure
against their collusion. As in the original SDR algorithm, the
number of subsets increases when users join and leave. The
communication complexity depends upon how many additional
subsets Na introduces. The value of Na depends on the group
size, the number of the newly joined users and the revoked users
in each rekeying period and the value of session number m.
Tian et al. presented a self-healing key distribution scheme
by using bilinear pairings. The scheme achieved several
nice features as aforementioned. However, the communication
overhead increases with the number of authorized users in
the communication group. How to reduce the communication
overhead is an interesting problem to be solved.
Table 5 summarizes the advantage and disadvantage of each
class of self-healing key distribution schemes.
7.2. Future work
Further research effort should be made to meet the lower
bounds on communication overhead in unconditionally secure
self-healing key distribution scheme without increasing too
much storage and computation overheads. Finding efficient
constructions which exhibit a good tradeoff between user
memory storage and broadcast size is also an interesting open
problem.
TABLE 5. Summary of different class of self-healing key distribution
schemes.
Class Features
Polynomial Advantage: It performs easily.
secret Disadvantage: High computation over
sharing head; The maximum number of revoked
users is constraint to the degree
of the polynomial.
Vector Advantage: A monotone decreasing
space family of rejected subset of users;
secret Disadvantage: Some public mapping may
sharing introduce large communication
overhead.
Hash Advantage: Efficient in computation;
chain Disadvantage: can not resist collusion
attack.
SDR Advantage: Do not require re-
distribution of any personal keys;
can revoke any number of users;
Disadvantage: The communication depends
on the number of subsets, which
increases with the number of
joined and revoked users.
Bilinear Advantage: Efficient in computation;
pairings Problem to be solved: How to reduce
the communication cost?
The hash condition featured with limited onboard computing
resource and unsupervised environment for wireless nodes
makes them volunerable to attacks. The limited ability of
individual nodes to thwart failure or attack makes ensuring
network availability more difficult [43]. Sponsorization and
mutual healing can be seen as countermeasures against fault
and intrusion. The communication and computation overheads
of sponsorization are too high to afford for nodes in wireless
sensor networks. Mutual healing, that is, if a user has missed
more than a fixed number of broadcast messages or the last
broadcast message, it can get assistance from its neighboring
nodes. It seems that mutual healing is a practical way. However,
many exisiting schemes are not practical technique to realize the
idea since it was proposed in [23] by Bohio et al. By combining
the identity and location of nodes, we explored the means to
realize it. It should be noted that locating node is a resource-
consuming work. It is interesting to explore practical way of
mutual healing.
It is supposed that there is only one GM in general self-healing
key distribution schemes. These schemes can easily be extended
to a multi-GM self-healing key distribution schemes. Each GM
can dynamically broadcast messages into an arbitrary group
of receiver determined by it. This extension raises the issue
of data source or broadcaster authentication. We may acquire
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some ideas from authenticated broadcast encryption scheme
such as [44].
In the pioneering work [10], the possibility of long-lived
personal key scheme was discussed. The reusage of personal
key was also discussed in [11] and [13]. However, it seems that
none of them is feasible. In order to keep security, new personal
keys are periodically distributed to groups users through either
by unicast or by off-line means. Both are inefficient for a
large communication group. It would be interesting to consider
other personal key distribution methods. Specifically, we would
like to be able to periodically distribute new personal keys
via broadcast, so that after a user is added to the group,
no further secure unicast channel between it and the GM is
necessary.
Finally, new techniques to implement self-healing key
distribution, apart from those we have just described, represent
another interesting target for researchers, due to the suitability of
this approach to key distribution. In addition, when the resource
of nodes in wireless networks is not limited, the asymmetric
keys-based self-healing key distribution will be a promising
research direction.
8. CONCLUSION
With the wide application of wireless networks, as one of
the basic security service, self-healing key distribution scheme
will receive more attention. In this paper, we reviewed most
existing self-healing key distribution schemes. We clarified the
security requirements of self-healing key distribution schemes
according to their special application environment. Then we
classified the schemes according to different cryptographic
primitives and give an insight to their features and goals. We
made a thorough comparison on performance and delineated
their similarities and differences through tables and figures.
We have also discussed sponsorization, mutual healing and
authentication techniques which can be used to strengthen
the robustness of self-healing key distribution schemes. We
pointed out several open research problems in self-healing
key distribution schemes and suggested the future research
topics in this field. Our analysis made it clear that there is
no unique solution that satisfies all requirements. The optimal
combination of bandwidth efficiency and robustness against
link loss under a given power consumption should be sought
in future. Also, secure and efficient key revocation remains an
challenge for bilinear pairing based self-healing key distribution
schemes.
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Abstract—The security of Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
has a direct reliance on secure and efficient key management.
This leaves key management as a fundamental research topic
in the field of WSNs security. Among the proposed key
management schemes for WSNs security, LEAP (Localized
Encryption and Authentication Protocol) has been regarded
as an efficient protocol over the last years. LEAP supports the
establishment of four types of keys. The security of these keys
is under the assumption that the initial deployment phase is
secure and the initial key is erased from sensor nodes after
the initialization phase. However, the initial key is used again
for node addition after the initialization phase whereas the
new node can be compromised before erasing the key. A time-
based key management scheme rethought the security of LEAP.
We show the deficiency of the time-based key management
scheme and proposed a key management scheme for multi-
phase WSNs in this paper. The proposed scheme disperses the
damage resulting from the disclosure of the initial key. We show
it has better resilience and higher key connectivity probability
through the analysis.
Keywords-Key management, key predistribution, Wireless
Sensor Networks(WSNs);
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have gained wide
applications ranging from civilian to military use. A typical
WSN is composed of a great number of sensor nodes. These
sensor nodes have limited battery power, weak data pro-
cessing capability and short radio range. Most importantly,
sensor nodes are often randomly spread out over specific
regions and work in unattended environment. They are prone
to all kinds of attacks thus security becomes the first concern.
In order to keep communication secure, sensitive data should
be encrypted and authenticated. Therefore, key management,
which is a prerequisite of encryption and authentication,
should be addressed carefully.
Among all the key management mechanisms for WSNs,
key pre-distribution mechanism provides a nice tradeoff
between storage overhead and processing power, and is
considered as the most suitable mechanism for WSNs.
However, most of key predistribution schemes consider a
homogeneous topology and only support the establishment
of pairwise keys. Even though homogeneous networks are
simple and efficient for small network scale, such networks
lack scalability due to ”one-affect-n” effect in node addition
and revocation. In a hierarchical WSN, the effect of node
addition and revocation can be localized into a cluster thus
scalability is achieved.
In a hierarchical WSN (HWSN), various types of com-
munication may happen. The base station broadcasts control
commands to the whole network. Control node multicasts
messages within the cluster. A node communicates with its
neighboring nodes by unicasting. Therefore, network-wide
key, cluster key, and pairwise key are required to satisfy
different types of secure communication. Zhu et al. [1]
devised a scheme called localized encryption and authentica-
tion protocol (LEAP) for hierarchical WSNs. LEAP supports
establishment of individual keys, pairwise keys, cluster keys,
and a global key. Different keys are used to handle the
different types of packets. The security of all types of
keys relys on that of the initial key. As many existing key
management protocols, LEAP assumes that the initial key
is secure during the initialization phase and is erased from
the memory of sensor nodes when the initialization phase
finishes. The authors regarded the scheme is secure under
such an assumption. However, the same key should be used
again for node addition and replacement. According to the
assumption, some new nodes may be captured at any time
after the initialization phase. That is, the new deployed nodes
could be captured before removing the initialization key. The
security of the scheme is threatened by the attacks launched
after the initialization phase.
Jang et al. [2] improved LEAP by introducing a time-
based key management protocol. The scheme strengthens
the security with a new notion of probabilistic time intervals.
However, the scheme does not guarantee the perfect key con-
nectivity. In addition, the pairwise key does not exclusively
belong to the two end nodes. Those nodes which have the
same initial key or master key can calculate the other nodes’
pairwise keys as the ID of each node is public. To address
these security and performance issues, we present an elegant
key management scheme in this paper.
This paper is organized as follows: We describe the LEAP
protocol [1] and the time-based key management scheme
in [2] and then talk about the security problems of them
in Section II. We propose a key management protocol for
multiphase hierarchical WSNs in Section III. We analyze its
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performance and security in Section IV and conclude this
paper in Section V.
II. RELATED WORKS
A. Key Predistribution Schemes
Eschenauer et al. proposed the pioneering work [3]. It is a
random key predistribution scheme. Initially a large key pool
of P symmetric keys and their identities are generated. Each
sensor randomly draws k(k  P ) keys from the key pool
without replacement. These k keys and their identities form
the key-chain for a sensor node. In the shared-key discovery
phase, two neighbor nodes exchange and compare the list
of identities of keys in their key-chains. If two sensors have
at least one key in common, they can setup a secure link
directly. Otherwise, the path-key establishment procedure is
triggered to setup a link between two neighbors. The nodes
still can establish a secure channel under the help of one
or more intermediate nodes. The advantage of the random
key predistribution scheme is that there is no computational
overhead to generate pairwise keys between sensor nodes.
The main shortcoming of the scheme in [3] is that a large
number of keys could be disclosed by compromising a few
nodes. The basic scheme in [3] was further improved by
Chan et al. in [4] from two different aspects. Two variations
are proposed: the q(q ≥ 2)-composite scheme and the multi-
path key reinforcement scheme. The variations make it more
difficult to compromise a node.
The schemes [3] and [4] share a common shortcoming.
That is, they only explore the way to establish the pairwise
keys between nodes but not other types of keys. Obviously,
it is not enough for different communication manners in
HWSNs. In addition, both of [3] and [4] allow dynamic
addition, however, their key pools do not evolve with time.
As a result, if the network encounters a long-term attack,
the newly deployed nodes may be preloaded with some
already compromised keys. It is possible to discover all the
keys in the key pool if an attacker continues his/her attack.
One naive countermeasure is to refresh key pool when some
nodes are added to the network. The attacker cannot deduce
the key ring of the newly deployed nodes with the knowledge
of the key materials of the compromised nodes. However,
this renewal introduces unexpected consequences. That is,
sensor nodes deployed at different time slots cannot establish
pairwise keys because they do not have the common initial
key. How to achieve connectivity between nodes deployed
at different time slots in a dynamically renewed key pool is
an open problem to be answered.
To the best of our knowledge, RoK [8] is the first key
predistribution scheme adapted to multiphase WSNs. In
this scheme, sensor nodes which run out of power will
be removed from the network and new sensor nodes need
to be periodically deployed to assure network connectivity.
Correspondingly, the predistributed keys have limited life-
times and the key pool should be refreshed periodically.
This scheme overcomes the drawback of the general key
predistribution schemes. [3] [4]. The security of the network
does not degrade with time. Zo-RoK [9] takes advantage of
prior deployment knowledge in order to reduce the size of
key ring. In this way, the resiliency of the network against
node capture attacks increases with a smaller key ring of
each node. However, deployment knowledge is not always
available in WSNs. Lately, a random generation material
(RGM) key predistribution scheme was proposed in [5]. In
this scheme, the lifetime of the whole network is divided
into generations. Each generation has its own random keying
material and pairwise keys are established by two nodes is
only known by the nodes in two generations which the two
nodes belong to. Nodes deployed in other generations other
than the two generations which the nodes belong to have no
access to the pairwise key. We lend this idea to improve the
performance of the LEAP scheme in this paper.
B. LEAP
Zhu et al. [1] devised a key management scheme which is
abbreviated as LEAP for hierarchical WSNs. LEAP offers
establishment methods of individual keys, pairwise keys,
cluster keys, and a global key. Different keys are used to
handle the different types of packets. The establishment of
cluster keys and the global key mainly depends on the the
established pairwise keys, so we omit the establishment of
them here and focus on the description of the establishment
of pairwise keys.
• Individual key: This is an unique key that is shared
between the base station and each sensor node [1]. The
key is preloaded into each node’s memory before being
deployed. The individual key is calculated as Kmu =
fKm(u) where f is a pseudo-random function and Km
is the system key known only to the base station and
u represents the ID of the node u.
• Pairwise key: Each node shares a pairwise key with
each of its immediate neighbors. Similar to the scheme
in [3], there are four stages of pairwise key establish-
ment: key predistribution, neighbor discovery, pairwise
key establishment, and key erasure. During the initial
stage of key predistribution, node u is loaded with a
initial key IK by the controller and drives the master
key Ku = fIK(u). For neighbor discovery, node u
first initialize a timer to activate during a time slot of
Tmin, then it broadcasts a HELLO message contain-
ing its ID to discover its neighbors. The neighboring
node v responds to node u with an acknowledgement
(ACK) message containing its ID if it receives node u’s
HELLO message. The ACK message of v is authenti-
cated using its master key Kv which is derived from
IK. Node u verifies the Message Authentication Code
(MAC) of v by generating the master key Kv with IK.
The neighbor discovery stage can be denoted as:
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Figure 1. Key materials preloaded to nodes at different time slots in
scheme [2].
u→ ∗ : u;
v → u : v,MAC(Kv, u | v).
In the stage of pairwise key establishment, node u
calculates the pairwise key Kuv shared with node v,
as Kuv = fKv (u). Node v can also derive Kuv in
the same way. Kuv serves as their pairwise key. In
the final stage, when its timer expires after Tmin,
node u erases IK and all the masters keys of its
neighbors, which it computed in the neighbor discovery
stage. Even though an adversary captures a node, the
communication between the captured node and another
node cannot be decrypted without the key IK.
C. The Time-based Key Management Scheme
With the motivation of minimizing the portion of compro-
mised network when the initial key IK is disclosed, Jang et
al. split the lifetime of a sensor network into P time slots and
each time slot is assigned with an initial key. As depicted
in Figure 1, Tj and Nj represent a time slot and a group
of node deployed during that time slot Tj , respectively. If
a node will be deployed at time slot Tj , the sensor node is
preloaded with the initial key IKj and m master keys of
randomly-chosen time slots. Then the newly deployed node
can establish pairwise keys with nodes which are deployed
at same or different time slots. Three situations exist for the
establishment of pairwise keys.
1) All nodes in the same group Nj(1 ≤ j ≤ P ) are able
to establish pairwise keys with each other using the
initial key IKj during the time slot Tj .
2) Then, they are able to establish pairwise keys with
other nodes which are deployed at different time slots,
but have the master key derived from the current initial
key. Suppose u is a node deployed at time slot Tj and
v is a node deployed before Tj . If the node v has
the master key Kvj which is derived from the initial
key IKj for time slot Tj , the node v can compute a
pairwise key Kuv = fKvj (u). The node u is also able
to generate a master key of v, Kvj = fIKj (v).
3) Finally, a pair of sensor nodes that do not share any
keying material but are in wireless communication
range can establish pairwise keys via proxy nodes.
D. The Security Problems of LEAP and The Time-based Key
Management Scheme
As many existing key management protocols, LEAP as-
sumes that sensor nodes are secure during the initialization
phase and can be compromised after the phase. However,
such an assumption could be incorrect. Security of LEAP
mainly depends upon the initial key which is erased from
sensor nodes after the initialization phase. However, the
same initial key IK should be used again for node addition
after that phase while the new node can be captured before
removing the initial key. Therefore, the initial key IK should
never be used for node addition in LEAP after the initial time
Tmin. Different initial keys are used for different time slots
in the time-based key management scheme [2]. The threat
caused by the disclosure of the initial key is eliminated.
However, the key connectivity is constrained by the number
of preloaded master keys m and the order of the current time
slot. If m is far less than the lifetime P of the network, the
key connectivity mP−i is far less than 1 at the time slots
j(j ≤ P/2). On the contrary, if m is close to P , higher
key connectivity can be achieved with heavy burden on
storage. We consider the security problem of the established
pairwise key between two nodes. The pairwise key does not
exclusively belong to the two end nodes. As shown in Figure
2 in [2], Nodes of group N1, N2, and N6 are preloaded with
master key Ku7, the pairwise keys between any two groups
of them are known by the other group. In addition, m master
keys of randomly-chosen time slots are preloaded to the
nodes when they are deployed to the network without taking
the lifetime of nodes into consideration. Suppose a node who
can survive at most Gw time slots is deployed at the j-th
time slot with m master keys of randomly-chosen time slots.
Those master keys of the time slots from (j+Gw)-th to P -th
would never be used. They waste scarce memory of sensor
nodes.
III. OUR CONSTRUCTION
Motivated by the random key predistribution scheme in
[5], we propose a novel key management for multi-phase
hierarchical WSN. In this scheme, the time domain of the
network is split into many time slots. In this paper, we
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call the time slot generation as well. It is assumed that
there are totally P generations. Sensor nodes are usually
powered by battery. It is assumed that a node may live at
most for Gw generations. Each generation has its initial key
which is constructed by a key distribution center. There
is no relation between the initial keys for different time
slots. This property prevent the attackers from concluding
the previous and future initial keys. Wireless sensor network
are set up for longer lifetime as compared to that of sensor
nodes. Therefore, new nodes need to be replenished in some
generations in the case of node capture attack or depletion
of battery to provide continuity of network. It is supposed
that an attacker can get all the key materials stored in the
captured node. In order to achieve connectivity between
nodes belonging to different generations and resiliency, the
keys that are used to establish pairwise keys should evolve
in a different way, independent of evolution of the initial
keys. Table I presents the symbols used in our proposed key
management scheme.
Table I
SYMBOLS USED IN THE PROPOSED KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEME
P The initial key pool size and the whole life time of the
network
KRj The key ring of nodes deployed at generation j
Kjuv Pairwise key between nodes u and v which deployed
at generation j
Kghuv Pairwise key between nodes u which deployed at
generation g and v which deployed at generation
v where 1 ≤ g < h ≤ g + Gw − 1
H(·) Secure hash function
A. Predistribution of Key Materials
In the proposed scheme, as depicted in Figure 2, the group
Gj deployed at generation Tj are assigned with an initial
key IKj and Gw− 1 master keys in order to establish links
with nodes deployed at the same or different generations.
The initial key is reserved for the establishment of secure
communication with nodes deployed in the same generation.
The other Gw − 1 master keys are used to establish secure
links with the groups deployed at subsequent generations.
Different from the time-based key management scheme in
[2], the master keys in our scheme are constructed in an
ingenious way. These master keys are transformed from
the initial keys for the generations within the the node’s
generation window Gw. For a group deployed at generation
j, their sub-keyring S − KRj containing the master keys
for the subsequent generations j + 1 ≤ i < j + Gw − 1, is
given as follows:
S −KRj = {Kj,i|Kj,i = H(IKi ‖ j)}, (1)
where IKi is the initial key for the i-th generation.
”This process ” can be detailed as follows. In order to
form the sub-keyring S−KRj , the key distributor first picks
Figure 2. The key rings preloaded to nodes at different generations.
up Gw−1 initial keys for the subsequent Gw−1 generations.
Each of these keys is appended with the generation number
of the group, which is j, and hashed using a secure hash
function like SHA-1 [6] or SHA-256 [7], depending on the
key size. These hashed values are stored in the sub-keyring.
In this way, we customize the keys belonging to a subsequent
generation to be used in another generation without storing
the actual initial keys, owing to the one-way property of the
secure hash functions.
To sum up, the keyring of a sensor node contains (1) the
initial key assigned to the current generation; (2) the trans-
formed master keys for up to Gw−1 subsequent generations.
More formally, for a node deployed at generation j, its key
ring KRj is shown as follows:
KRj = {IKj ,Kj,j+1, . . . ,Kj,j+Gw−1}. (2)
That is, each sensor node stores one initial key and Gw−1
master keys for each upcoming generation. Because a sensor
node may communicate with nodes at most Gw − 1 next
generation, the maximum number of keys in the key ring of
a particular node is Gw.
B. Key Establishment
After the keyring is created, the nodes are deployed over
the sensor field. Two situations exist for the establishment
of pairwise keys.
1) Since all sensor nodes deployed at generation j con-
tain the initial key IKj , they can establish pairwise
keys using IKj . Suppose two nodes u and v belong
to the same generation j, they compute their pairwise
keys as follows:
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• After a node u computes a master key Kju =
fIKj (u), node u broadcasts a HELLO message
with its ID and generation j and then waits for
a response from the neighboring node v which is
deployed in the same generation. Node v sends
node u a response message including its ID and
MAC.
u→ ∗ : u, j, nonce;
v → u : v,MAC(Kjv , u | v).
• Both u and v can compute a pairwise key Kjuv =
fKjv (u) = fKju(v).
2) If the two nodes belong to different generations, the
pairwise key creation process is different. Let us
suppose that the node u deployed at generation g and
another node v deployed at generation h(1 ≥ g < h ≤
g + Gw − 1). They computer their pairwise keys as
follows:
Kghuv = fKghv (u) = fKghu (v)
where Kghv = fKgh(v) and K
gh
u = fKgh(u). Node
u is already preloaded with the key Kgh before
deployment. By using this key, node u can calculate
Kghu . However, from the point of view of node v, the
master key Kgh is the master key for the previous
generation g. Therefore, it is not in node v’s keyring.
Fortunately, node v can calculate Kgh. As discussed
in the previous subsection, Kgh = H(IKh ‖ g),
where H is a secure one-way hash function. Node
v is deployed at generation h, and therefore it stores
the initial key IKh. By using IKh, it calculates the
key Kghv and then calculates K
gh
uv .
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Security Analysis
The goal of this section is to evaluate the security of our
proposal and compare it with that of the time-based key
management scheme proposed in [2].
We suppose that when a node is compromised, the key
material stored in the node will be extracted by the adver-
sary. The key material will be utilized to attack the rest
of network. In [2], the resilience of schemes is described
as that the additional portion of network that an adversary
can compromise using the key material obtained from x
compromised nodes. We still use this definition in this
section. The security of the LEAP scheme depends on the
security of the initial key IK. The whole network can
be compromised once the initial key KI is disclosed. The
damage resulting from a disclosure of an initial key IK is
localized by the time-based key management scheme [2].
In order to provide connectivity between nodes deployed at
different generations, the preloaded master key for different
generation is the same. An compromised initial key IKa at
generation Ta only affect the nodes deployed at generation
Ta rather than the whole network. However, as we men-
tioned in Section II, the pairwise key does not exclusively
belong to the two end nodes. If three nodes are preloaded
with the same master key, the pairwise keys between any
two groups of them are known by the other group. Once
a node is captured, the pairwise keys shared by other two
nodes will be compromised as well.
In our scheme, the pairwise key Kghuv exclusively belongs
to the two end nodes. For example, the pairwise key used
between node u deployed at generation g and v deployed at
generation h is confined to the two end nodes deployed at
these two generations. Nodes deployed at generations other
than g and h have no access to this key. This is because
the master key Kgh can be computed by a node if and only
if this node has been deployed at generation h and has an
initial key IKh in its key ring. As a result, a sensor node w,
which is deployed at any other generation l cannot compute
a master key Kgh. Three conditions exist according to the
value of l
• l < h. The node w needs IKh to compute Kgh. Even
though the node w has the master key Klh = H(IKh ‖
l), it cannot derive IKh from Klh due to the one-way
property of the secure hash function H .
• h < l ≤ g + Gw − 1. The node u is preloaded with
the master key Kgl = H(IKl ‖ g) and the node v
is preloaded with the master key Khl = H(IKl ‖ l).
Even the node w can calculate Kgl and Khl, it cannot
derive IKh or Kgh due to the one-way property of the
secure hash function H .
• l > g + Gw − 1. The node u is power off at the
generation l.
It is clear that a master key Kgh is known only by the
nodes of the generation g and h. No node deployed at any
other generation can compute the key that is unique to the
generation g and h. Hence an attacker has to spend extra
effort if s/he wants to acquire the pairwise key between the
nodes u and v that are deployed at the generations g and h,
respectively. This has an advantage over the scheme in [2]
in restricting the information that an attack acquires if s/he
captures a node.
B. Performance Analysis
Key Connectivity. The key connectivity of a group Nt
which is deployed at generation t of the time-based key
management scheme [2] is assessed from two aspects. One is
Nt’s probability of sharing keying materials with prospective
sensor nodes, ppros(t) and the other is the probability of
sharing keying materials with predeployed sensor nodes
and nodes deployed at the current generation Gt, ppre(t).
According to the scheme, when a sensor node is deployed
at generation t, only the predeployed nodes which have
the master key, which is derived from the initial key IKt
of the generation t, can establish pairwise key with it.
Because each node is preloaded with the initial key of the
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Figure 3. The comparison of the probabilities that Nt establishes pairwise
key with prospective groups in our scheme and the scheme in [2].
current generation and m master keys of randomly chosen
generations after deployment, the probability of sharing key
material with other prospective nodes is mP−t where P is
the number of total generations (Please refer to [2] for the
process of calculation). The variation 1 ≤ t < P . When
P − t ≤ m, the master keys of all remaining generations
will be preloaded to the nodes deployed at generation t so
that the key connectivity probability ppros(t) is 1 and keeps
1 for the subsequent generations. We make a comparison
of the probabilities that Nt establishes pairwise key with
prospective groups in our scheme and the scheme in [2] in
Figure 3. In order to facilitate the comparison, we keep the
size of key pool (the same as the number of generations of
a network) 500. The three curves in Figure 3 demonstrate
the conditions of [2] when m equals 100, 150, and 200,
respectively. As shown in the figure, the probability ppros
increases as the index the generation t increases. In our
scheme, the group Nt can always share keying material with
groups in its generation window [t, t+Gw − 1] with 100%
probability. The variation 1 ≤ m ≤ P−1, it is easy to reach
the conclusion that the more master keys a sensor node has
in [2], the higher probability of key connectivity becomes.
In our scheme, more than Gw − 1 preloaded master keys
do not increase the key connectivity probability as Gw − 1
master keys are enough for reaching 100% probability.
In terms of ppre(t), it can be calculated by using ppros.
If we suppose that sensor nodes are uniformly distributed at





where 1 means that a sensor node can establish pairwise
keys with nodes deployed at the same generation with
100% probability. In fact, it is the average value of the
probabilities of key connectivity with each preloaded and
Figure 4. The comparison of the probabilities that Ni establishes pairwise
key with pre-deployed sensors and the sensors being deployed in the same
generation in our scheme and the scheme in [2].
Figure 5. Nodes deployed at generation j can establish pairwise nodes
with at most 2Gw − 1 generations with 100% probability.
the current group of sensor nodes. Figure 4 describes the
change tendency of probability ppre for various m when the
number of generation P is fixed to 500.
Different from the scheme in [2], when a sensor node
is deployed at generation t, it is preloaded with the initial
key IKt and Gw − 1 master keys for the subsequent
Gw − 1 generations. The node can establish pairwise keys
with nodes in at most 2Gw − 1 generations with 100%
probability as long as both of them are still viable. As
described in Figure 5, a node deployed at generation j can
establish pairwise keys with nodes deployed from generation
j−Gw +1 to generation j by using its initial key IKj and
establish pairwise keys with nodes deployed from generation
j + 1 to generation j + Gw − 1 by using the proloaded
master keys for each generation. In time-based scheme [2],
a node is preloaded with m master keys of randomly- chosen
generations. Some of these master keys might not be used
before the node is power off. Suppose a node is deployed at
generation j and is viable at at most Gw generations, those
master keys of the generations from j+Gw to P are useless.
Storage Overhead. In terms of storage overhead, it is
determined by the memory of a node and generations that
a node can survive. In a practical application of network
deployment model, the beginning of new generation means
the occurrence of node additions Therefore, the number of
generations is approximately equal to the number of node
addition. Therefore, the higher frequency of node additions,
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the larger number of generations a network has. According
to our scheme, a sensor node surviving 100 generations has
to store 100 keys including one initial key and 99 master
keys. These node can establish pairwise keys with nodes in
199 generations with 100% probability. The modern sensor
nodes such as MICA-Z have 128KB program memory,
4KB runtime memory, and 512KB external memory [10].
Suppose the size of a key is 128bits, our scheme requires
only 1.6KB memory. Our scheme has reasonable storage
requirement for modern sensor nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
The LEAP key management mechanism of LEAP is
welcomed due to its multiple keying mechanism. However,
the security of all types of keys is mainly depends on that of
an initial key. It is assumed that the initial deployment phase
is secure and the key is erased from sensor nodes after the
initialization phase. However, the same key should be used
again for node addition after that phase while the new node
can be captured before removing the initial key. A time-
based key management scheme was proposed to eliminate
the effect of disclosure of the initial keys. The time-based
scheme split the time domain of network into many time
slots. Each time slot has its own initial key. This scheme
does disperse the damage resulting from the disclosure of the
initial key. However, the scheme reduces the probability of
key connectivity. In contrast, the proposed scheme in this pa-
per keeps 100% key connectivity within the node’s lifetime
time without degrade security. The established pairwise key
is exclusively known only by the nodes of the generations
which the two end nodes belong to. No node deployed at
other generations can compute the pairwise key.
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